RSSAlle Entries Tagged Met: "Moslem"

Die Arabiese Môre

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Oktober 6, 1981, was bedoel as 'n dag van viering in Egipte. Dit was die herdenking van Egipte se grootste oomblik van oorwinning in drie Arabies-Israelitiese konflikte, toe die land se onderhondleër oor die Suezkanaal in die openingsdae stoot 1973 Yom Kippur-oorlog en stuur Israelitiese troepe om terug te trek. Op 'n koelte, wolklose oggend, die Kaïro-stadion was propvol Egiptiese gesinne wat die militêre stut sy hardeware gaan sien het, President Anwar el-Sadat,die oorlog se argitek, met tevredenheid dopgehou terwyl mans en masjiene voor hom staan. Ek was naby, 'n nuut aangekome buitelandse korrespondent. Skielik, een van die weermagvragmotors het direk voor die beoordeelstalletjie gestop net toe ses Mirage-jets in 'n akrobatiese vertoning oorhoofs gebrul het, die lug skilder met lang rooi roetes, geel, pers,en groen rook. Sadat staan ​​op, klaarblyklik voor te berei om hulde met nog 'n kontingent Egiptiese troepe te ruil. Hy het homself 'n perfekte teiken gemaak vir vier Islamitiese sluipmoordenaars wat uit die vragmotor gespring het, storm die podium af, en hy het sy lyf met koeëls toegeslaan. Soos die moordenaars voortgegaan het vir 'n ewigheid om die erf met hul dodelike vuur te spuit., Ek het 'n oomblik oorweeg of ek op die grond moet slaan en waag om deur die toeskouers van paniekbevange afgetrap te word of om aan die gang te wees en die risiko om 'n verdwaalde koeël te neem. Instink het my aangesê om op my voete te bly, en my gevoel van joernalistieke plig het my gedwing om uit te vind of Sadat lewend of dood was.

VSA Hamas-beleid blokke Midde-Ooste

Henry Siegman


Misluk bilaterale gesprekke oor die afgelope 16 jaar het getoon dat 'n Midde-Ooste beweging kan nooit bereik kan word deur die partye self. Israeliese regerings glo dat hulle internasionale veroordeling van hul onwettige koloniale projek in die Wesoewer kan trotseer omdat hulle op die VSA kan vertrou om internasionale sanksies te weerstaan. Bilaterale gesprekke wat nie deur die VSA geformuleer word nie (gebaseer op resolusies van die Veiligheidsraad, die Oslo-ooreenkomste, die Arabiese vredesinisiatief, die "padkaart" en ander vorige Israeliese-Palestynse ooreenkomste) nie kan slaag nie. Die regering van Israel is van mening dat die Amerikaanse Kongres nie 'n Amerikaanse president sal toelaat om sulke parameters uit te reik en hul aanvaarding te eis nie. Watter hoop is daar vir die bilaterale gesprekke wat in September in Washington DC hervat word? 2 hang heeltemal daarvan af dat president Obama bewys dat die geloof verkeerd is, en of die 'oorbruggingsvoorstelle' wat hy belowe het, sou die gesprekke 'n impasse bereik, is 'n eufemisme vir die indiening van Amerikaanse parameters. So 'n Amerikaanse inisiatief moet Israel ystergekleurde versekerings bied vir sy veiligheid binne sy grense voor 1967, maar moet dit terselfdertyd duidelik maak dat hierdie versekering nie beskikbaar is as Israel daarop aandring om Palestyne 'n lewensvatbare en soewereine staat in die Wesoewer en Gaza te ontken nie. Hierdie referaat fokus op die ander belangrike struikelblok vir 'n permanente statusooreenkoms: die afwesigheid van 'n effektiewe Palestynse gespreksgenoot. Die aanspreek van Hamas se wettige griewe - en soos opgemerk in 'n onlangse CENTCOM-verslag, Hamas het wettige griewe - dit kan lei tot sy terugkeer na 'n Palestynse koalisieregering wat Israel 'n geloofwaardige vredesvennoot sal gee.. As daardie uitreik misluk weens Hamas se verwerping, die organisasie se vermoë om 'n redelike ooreenkoms wat deur ander Palestynse politieke partye beding word, te voorkom, sal aansienlik belemmer word. As die Obama-regering nie 'n internasionale inisiatief sal lei om die parameters van 'n Israeliese-Palestynse ooreenkoms te definieer en Palestynse politieke versoening aktief te bevorder nie, Europa moet dit doen, en hoop Amerika sal volg. Ongelukkig, daar is geen silwer koeël wat die doel kan waarborg dat 'twee state langs mekaar in vrede en veiligheid sal leef nie'.
Maar president Obama se huidige kursus sluit dit absoluut uit.

Islamisme Revisited

MAHA Azzam

Daar is 'n politieke en veiligheidskrisis rondom wat na verwys word as Islamisme, 'n krisis waarvan die voorgange lank voorafgaan 9/11. Oor die verlede 25 jaar, daar was verskillende klem op hoe om Islamisme te verduidelik en te bekamp. Ontleders en beleidmakers
in die 1980's en 1990's het gepraat van die grondoorsake van Islamitiese militantheid as ekonomiese malaise en marginalisering. Meer onlangs was daar 'n fokus op politieke hervorming as 'n manier om die aantrekkingskrag van radikalisme te ondermyn. Vandag toenemend, die ideologiese en godsdienstige aspekte van Islamisme moet aangespreek word omdat dit kenmerke geword het van 'n wyer politieke en veiligheidsdebat. Hetsy in verband met Al-Kaïda-terrorisme, politieke hervorming in die Moslemwêreld, die kernkragkwessie in Iran of krisisgebiede soos Palestina of Libanon, dit het alledaags geword om te vind dat ideologie en godsdiens deur opponerende partye as bronne van legitimering gebruik word, inspirasie en vyandskap.
Die situasie word vandag verder gekompliseer deur die groeiende antagonisme teenoor en vrees vir Islam in die Weste as gevolg van terreuraanvalle wat op hul beurt houdings teenoor immigrasie beïnvloed., godsdiens en kultuur. Die grense van die umma of gemeenskap van die gelowiges het verder as Moslem-state tot Europese stede gestrek. Die umma bestaan ​​moontlik oral waar daar Moslem-gemeenskappe is. Die gedeelde gevoel van behoort aan 'n gemeenskaplike geloof neem toe in 'n omgewing waar die gevoel van integrasie in die omliggende gemeenskap onduidelik is en waar diskriminasie sigbaar mag wees.. Hoe groter die verwerping van die waardes van die samelewing,
hetsy in die Weste of selfs in 'n Moslemstaat, hoe groter die konsolidasie van die morele krag van Islam as 'n kulturele identiteit en waardesisteem.
Na aanleiding van die bomaanvalle in Londen op 7 Julie 2005 dit het meer duidelik geword dat sommige jongmense godsdienstige verbintenis beweer as 'n manier om etnisiteit uit te druk. Die bande tussen Moslems regoor die wêreld en hul persepsie dat Moslems kwesbaar is, het daartoe gelei dat baie in baie verskillende dele van die wêreld hul eie plaaslike penarie in die breër Moslem een ​​saamgevoeg het., kultureel geïdentifiseer het, óf primêr óf gedeeltelik, met 'n wyd gedefinieerde Islam.

Irak en die toekoms van politieke Islam

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?”, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Islamofobie en Anti-Moslem-haatmisdaad

JONATHAN GITHENS-MAZER

ROBERT LAMBERT MBE

The perils of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime threaten to undermine basic human rights, fundamental aspects of citizenship and co-existing partnerships for Muslims and non- Muslims alike in contemporary Europe. Routine portrayals of Islam as a religion of hatred, violence and inherent intolerance have become key planks for the emergence of extremist nationalist, anti-immigration politics in Europe – planks which seek to exploit populist fears and which have the potential to lead to Muslim disempowerment in Europe. Sections of the media have created a situation where the one serves to heighten the unfounded claims and anxieties of the other – such that politicians from Austria to the Britain, and the Netherlands to Spain, feel comfortable in using terms like “Tsunamis of Muslim immigration”, and accuse Islam of being a fundamental threat to a “European way of life”. While in many cases, the traction of this populist approach reflects an ignorance of Islamic faith, practice and belief, there are many think-tanks which are currently engaged in promoting erroneous depictions of Islam and Muslim political beliefs through unsubstantiated and academically baseless studies, and a reliance on techniques such as ‘junk-polling’. Prior to researching Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime in London, we worked with Muslim Londoners to research the contested notion of what is widely termed by academics and policy makers as “violent radicalisation” (Githens-Mazer, 2010, Lambert 2010). To a large extent it was that prior research experience that persuaded us to embark on this new project. That is to say, there is an important link between the two areas
of work which we should explain at the outset. Sedert 9/11 Muslim Londoners, no less than Muslims in towns and cities across Europe, have often been unfairly stigmatised as subversive threats to state security and social cohesion, sometimes characterised as a fifth column (Cox and Marks 2006, Gove 2006, Mayer and Frampton 2009). We do not suggest that this stigmatisation did not exist before 9/11, still less do we argue that it revolves solely around the issues of security and social cohesion, but we do claim that the response to 9/11 – ‘the war on terror’ – and much of the rhetoric that has surrounded it has played a significant part in increasing the public perception of European Muslims as potential enemies rather than potential partners and neighbours.

Wortels van nasionalisme in die Moslemwêreld

Shabir Ahmed

The Muslim world has been characterised by failure, disunity, bloodshed, oppression and backwardness. At present, no Muslim country in the world can rightly claim to be a leader in any field of human activity. Inderdaad, the non-Muslims of the East and the West
now dictate the social, economic and political agenda for the Muslim Ummah.
Verder, the Muslims identify themselves as Turkish, Arabiese, African and Pakistani. If this is not enough, Muslims are further sub-divided within each country or continent. Byvoorbeeld, in Pakistan people are classed as Punjabis, Sindhis, Balauchis and
Pathans. The Muslim Ummah was never faced with such a dilemma in the past during Islamic rule. They never suffered from disunity, widespread oppression, stagnation in science and technology and certainly not from the internal conflicts that we have witnessed this century like the Iran-Iraq war. So what has gone wrong with the Muslims this century? Why are there so many feuds between them and why are they seen to be fighting each other? What has caused their weakness and how will they ever recover from the present stagnation?
There are many factors that contributed to the present state of affairs, but the main ones are the abandoning of the Arabic language as the language of understanding Islam correctly and performing ijtihad, the absorption of foreign cultures such as the philosophies of the Greeks, Persian and the Hindus, the gradual loss of central authority over some of the provinces, and the rise of nationalism since the 19th Century.
This book focuses on the origins of nationalism in the Muslim world. Nationalism did not arise in the Muslim world naturally, dit het ook nie ontstaan ​​as reaksie op die ontberinge wat die mense ondervind het nie, ook nie weens die frustrasie wat hulle gevoel het toe Europa na die industriële revolusie die wêreld begin oorheers het nie. Eerder, nasionalisme is in die gedagtes van die Moslems ingeplant deur 'n weldeurdagte plan deur die Europese moondhede, na hul versuim om die Islamitiese Staat met geweld te vernietig. Die boek bied ook die Islamitiese uitspraak oor nasionalisme en praktiese stappe wat geneem kan word om die siekte van nasionalisme uit die Moslem -Ummah uit te roei om dit terug te bring na sy eertydse glorie.

Demokrasie in Islamitiese Politieke Denke

Azzam S. Tamimi

Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, in 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, in 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.

Islamitiese politieke kultuur, Demokrasie, en Menseregte

Daniel E. Prys

Dit is aangevoer dat die Islam fasiliteer outoritarisme, weerspreek die

waardes van Westerse samelewings, en dit het belangrike politieke uitkomste beduidend beïnvloed
in Moslemlande. Gevolglik, geleerdes, kommentators, en die regering
amptenare wys gereeld op '' Islamitiese fundamentalisme '' as die volgende
ideologiese bedreiging vir liberale demokrasieë. hierdie siening, egter, is hoofsaaklik gebaseer
oor die ontleding van tekste, Islamitiese politieke teorie, en ad hoc-studies
van individuele lande, wat nie oorweeg ander faktore. Dit is my stelling
dat die tekste en tradisies van Islam, soos dié van ander godsdienste,
gebruik kan word om 'n verskeidenheid van politieke stelsels en beleid te ondersteun. land
spesifieke en beskrywende studies help ons nie om patrone te vind wat sal help nie
ons verduidelik die verskillende verhoudings tussen Islam en politiek regoor die land
lande van die Moslem-wêreld. vandaar, 'n nuwe benadering tot die studie van die
verband tussen Islam en die politiek is 'n beroep vir.
Ek stel voor, deur middel van streng evaluering van die verhouding tussen Islam,
demokrasie, en menseregte by die kruis-nasionale vlak, dit te veel
klem word gelê op die mag van Islam as 'n politieke mag. Ek eerste
gebruik vergelykende gevallestudies, wat fokus op faktore wat verband hou met die wisselwerking
tussen Islamitiese groepe en regimes, ekonomiese invloede, etniese gleufies,

en maatskaplike ontwikkeling, om die variansie in die invloed van

Islam oor politiek in agt nasies.

Islamitiese geloof in AMERIKA

JAMES A. BEVERLEY

AMERICA BEGINS A NEW MILLENNIUM AS ONE OF THE MOST RELIGIOUSLY diverse nations of all time. Nowhere else in the world do so many people—offered a choice free from government influence—identify with such a wide range of religious and spiritual communities. Nowhere else has the human search for meaning been so varied. In America today, there are communities and centers for worship representing all of the world’s religions.
The American landscape is dotted with churches, temples, synagogues, and mosques. Zen Buddhist zendos sit next to Pentecostal tabernacles. Hasidic Jews walk the streets with Hindu swamis. Most amazing of all, relatively little conflict has occurred among religions in America. This fact, combined with a high level of tolerance of each other’s beliefs and practices, has let America produce people of goodwill ready to try to resolve any tensions that might emerge. The Faith in America series celebrates America’s diverse religious heritage.
People of faith and ideals who longed for a better world have created a unique society where freedom of religious expression is a keynote of culture. The freedom that America offers to people of faith means that not only have ancient religions found a home
hier, but that newer ways of expressing spirituality have also taken root. From huge churches in large cities to small spiritual communities in towns and villages, faith in America has never been stronger. The paths that different religions have taken through
American history is just one of the stories readers will find in this series. Like anything people create, religion is far from perfect. Egter, its contribution to the culture and its ability to help people are impressive, and these accomplishments will be found in all the books in the series. Intussen, awareness and tolerance of the different paths our neighbors take to the spiritual life has become an increasingly important part of citizenship in America.
Vandag, more than ever, America as a whole puts its faith in freedom—the freedom to believe.

Islamitiese partye : terug te gaan na die oorsprong

Husain Haqqani

Hillel Fradkin

Hoe moet ons die ontstaan ​​en die aard van Islamitiese partye verstaan? Kan daar redelikerwys van hulle verwag word om nie net aan demokratiese politiek deel te neem nie, maar om selfs die norme van liberale demokrasie te respekteer? Hierdie vrae lê in die kern van die kwessies wat ons gevra is om aan te spreek.
Na ons mening, enige respons wat histories en dus prakties relevant is, moet met die volgende waarneming begin: Tot baie onlangs, selfs die idee van 'n Islamitiese party (wat nog te sê van 'n demokratiese Islamitiese party) sou gelyk het, vanuit die perspektief van Islamisme self, 'n paradoks indien nie 'n teenstrydigheid in terme nie. Islamisme se oorspronklike opvatting van 'n gesonde Islamitiese politieke lewe het geen ruimte gemaak vir - inderdaad verwerp - enige rol vir partye van enige aard nie. Islamitiese groepe het hulself beskryf as die voorhoede van Islamitiese herlewing, beweer dat hulle die wese van Islam verteenwoordig en die strewe van die globale umma weerspieël (gemeenskap van gelowiges) vir 'n Islamitiese beleid. Pluralisme, wat 'n voorwaarde is vir die werking van politieke partye, is deur die meeste Islamitiese politieke verwerp
denkers as 'n vreemde idee.
Soos min of meer voor die hand liggend behoort te wees, die nuutheid van nie net bestaande Islamitiese partye nie, maar van die idee van sulke partye maak dit buitengewoon moeilik om hul demokratiese bona fides te evalueer. Maar hierdie moeilikheid voeg net nog 'n vlak van komplikasie by tot 'n probleem wat spruit uit die oorsprong van Islamisme en sy opvatting van die ware betekenis van Islam en van Islam se verhouding tot die politieke lewe

Duitse bekeerlinge tot Islam en Hul Ambivalent Betrekkingen met Immigrant Moslems

Esra Ozyurek

“I would never have become a Muslim if I had met Muslims before I met Islam.” I heard these words over and over again during my yearlong ethnographic research among ethnic German converts to Islam in Berlin.1 The first time, it was uttered by a self-declared German imam who had converted to Islam while trying to convert Arabs and Turks to Christianity. The second time, the speaker was a twenty-five-year-old former East German woman who came to Islam through her Bosnian boyfriend, whose family never accepted her. The third time, the comment was made by a fifty-year-old man who converted to Islam about thirty years ago after meeting Iranians who came to Europe to collect money and organize for the Iranian revolution. After that I stopped counting. Although all of the several dozen German converts I talked to (and the dozens of converts whose narratives I read on the internet) claim that they embraced Islam in a context of significant personal relationships with Muslims,2 a substantial portion of German Muslims are quite discontented with born Muslims, especially those of immigrant backgrounds. This paper is an attempt to comprehend the paradoxical feelings of love and hate for Islam and Muslims that many German Muslims experience. My aim in exploring this issue is to understand what it takes to be a (supposed) Islamophile in a political and social context that is highly Islamophobic.

KIES BIBLIOGRAFIE OOR ISLAM EN DEMOKRASIE

Saliba Sarsar

Alexander Keller

Democracy is highly promoted and sought these days but its principles are hard to practice and protect. Once secured, egter, it generates real life in human communities. Its sunrises provide energy to freedom and growth to civil society and culture, while its sunsets store energy to sustain deliberative citizenship and liberty and bridge past accomplishments to future aspirations.
Egter, what do we mean by democracy? Are there perfect democratic societies around the world? Are democracy’s rays likely to shine on all landscapes? Is Muslim culture hospitable to deepening democracy’s impact? Do Muslims have a different understanding of democracy? If democracy is the preferred goal, how can democracy’s supporters move democratization forward in Muslim countries?
What we know is that no “one model fits all environments” exists. The journey of democracy is a “generational initiative” that must carefully consider internal and external dynamics. If Muslims, like others, wish to promote democracy, then they can detect their country’s place on the democratic terrain and determine how best to improve their practices and standing at home and abroad given their culture, historical experiences, resources, and vision for the future.
This select bibliography is designed to help all those interested in understanding the link between Islam and Muslims on the one hand and democracy on the other. It consists of over 100 entries, divided among books, articles, presentations, and reports; government sources; and institutes and organizations.

Moslem-broederskap in die Jordaan

Die Islamitiese beweging in die Jordaan gekom het om internasionale aandag in thewake van die April 1989 versteurings en die daaropvolgende November 1989 parlementêre verkiesings. Hierdie ontwikkelinge uitgelig die beweging se politieke invloed en die orde van die spook in die weste van 'n Iraanse-styl Islamitiese revolusie in die Jordaan, aangevuur deur radikale Islamitiese bewegings soos dié van Egipte en die Magreb. Terwyl verskeie politieke tendense meegeding om invloed gedurende die maande voor die verkiesing, die Moslem-broederskap het 'n duidelike voordeel; its infrastructure in the mosques, die Qur'anicschools en die universiteite het dit 'n gereed gemaak politieke base. Die leftistand pro-regime groepe, aan die ander kant, gehad het om te skep de facto politicalparties-nog wettig verban-en hul organisatoriese base almostex Nihilo te bou, of 'n klandestiene infrastruktuur te omskep in' n openlike politicalone. Daar moes gewees het baie klein verrassing, dus, wanneer die Moslem-broederskap en ander Islamitiese kandidate het 'n meevaller van 32 van die 80seats in Parliament.Politicization van Islam is nie nuut in Jordan.1 Sedert die stigting van die Emirate van Trans jordan deur 'Abdallah, Islam het gedien as een van die boustene van die regime legitimiteit en van nasiebou. Die geslagsregister van die Hasjemitische gesin as fonteine van die profeet se stam was 'n belangrike bron van legitimiteit vir sy heerskappy in Sirië, Irak en Jordanië, soos dit was indie Hijaz. Die ideologie van die "Groot Arabiese opstand" was nie minder nie as wat dit was Islamitiese Arabiese, en die beheer van Jerusalem na 1948 was interpretedby die regime as 'n Islamitiese verantwoordelikheid en nie net' n Arabiese one.2King 'Abdallah en sy kleinseun Hussein, gesorg aan te bied themselvesas glo Moslems, verskyn op rituele en gebede, die verrigting van die pelgrimstog na Mekka en versier hul toesprake met Islamitiese motifs.3The status van die Islam in die Koninkryk is ook geformaliseer in die Jordaanse grondwet (1952) deur te bepaal dat Islam is die godsdiens van die koninkryk en dat die koning moet word om 'n Moslem en van Moslem ouers. Islamitiese wet(Sharia) is omskryf in die grondwet as een van die pilare van die wetgewing in die koninkryk, terwyl die gesin reg is in die eksklusiewe hande van die sharia howe.

Aanspraak maak op die Center: Politieke Islam in Transition

John L. Edwards

In die 1990's politieke Islam, wat sommige noem “Islamitiese fundamentalisme,” bly 'n groot teenwoordigheid in die regering en politiek oppositioneel uit Noord-Afrika te Suidoos-Asië. Politieke Islam in krag en in die politiek aan die orde het baie probleme en vrae: “Is Islam teenstelling tot modernisering?,” “Is Islam en demokrasie onversoenbaar?,” “Wat is die implikasies van 'n Islamitiese regering vir pluralisme, minderheids- en vroueregte,” “Hoe verteenwoordigend is Islamiete,” “Is daar Islamitiese gematigdes?,” “Sou die Weste 'n transnasionale Islamitiese bedreiging of botsing van beskawings vrees?” Hedendaagse Islamitiese Herlewing Die landskap van die Moslemwêreld vandag openbaar die opkoms van nuwe Islamitiese republieke (Iran, Soedan, Afghanistan), die verspreiding van Islamitiese bewegings wat as belangrike politieke en sosiale rolspelers binne bestaande stelsels funksioneer, en die konfronterende politiek van radikale gewelddadige ekstremiste._ In teenstelling met die 1980's toe politieke Islam eenvoudig gelykgestel is aan revolusionêre Iran of klandestiene groepe met name soos Islamitiese jihad of die Leër van God, die Moslemwêreld in die 1990's is een waarin Islamiete aan die verkiesingsproses deelgeneem het en as eerste ministers sigbaar is, kabinetsbeamptes, sprekers van nasionale vergaderings, parlementslede, en burgemeesters in lande so uiteenlopend soos Egipte, Soedan, Turkye, Iran, Libanon, Koeweit, Jemen, Jordaan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Maleisië, Indonesië, en Israel/Palestina. Aan die begin van die een-en-twintigste eeu, politieke Islam bly 'n groot krag vir orde en wanorde in globale politiek, een wat deelneem aan die politieke proses, maar ook aan dade van terrorisme, 'n uitdaging vir die Moslemwêreld en die Weste. Verstaan ​​die aard van politieke Islam vandag, en in die besonder die kwessies en vrae wat na vore gekom het uit die ervaring van die onlangse verlede, bly krities vir regerings, beleidmakers, en studente van internasionale politiek.

DIE OPKOMS VAN "Moslem DEMOKRASIE”

Goewerneur Nasr

'N spook was die Moslem wêreld. Hierdie spesifieke spook is notthe skadelike en baie bespreek gees van fundamentalistiese ekstremisme, nog nie die spook hoop bekend as liberale Islam. In plaas daarvan, the specter that I have in mind is a third force, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfullyfor votes in Bangladesh, Indonesië, Maleisië, Pakistan (beforeits 1999 military coup), and Turkey.Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule by shari‘a (Islamitiese wet) oreven a restored caliphate, Muslim Democrats view political life with apragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari‘a state, and their main goaltends to be the more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platform sand stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests—Islamic as well as secular—within a democratic arena whosebounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best as a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state.

Moslem instellings en alle politieke MOBILISATIE

SARA Silvestri

In Europa, en die meeste van die Westerse wêreld, Moslem teenwoordigheid in die publicsphere is 'n onlangse verskynsel wat kenmerkend was van die laaste dekade van die 20thcentury en het diep was die begin van die 21ste. This visiblepresence, which amounts to something between 15 en 20 millionindividuals, can best be analysed if dissected into a number of components.The first part of this chapter illustrates where, when and why organisedMuslim voices and institutions have emerged in Europe, and which actorshave been involved. The second part is more schematic and analytical, inthat it seeks to identify from these dynamics the process through whichMuslims become political actors and how they relate to other, often incompeting political forces and priorities. It does so by observing theobjectives and the variety of strategies that Muslims have adopted in orderto articulate their concerns vis-à-vis different contexts and interlocutors.The conclusions offer an initial evaluation of the impact and of theconsequences of Muslim mobilisation and institution-formation forEuropean society and policy-making.