RSSSvi unosi označeni: "muslimansko bratstvo"

The Arab Tomorrow

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

listopad 6, 1981, was meant to be a day of celebration in Egypt. It marked the anniversary of Egypt’s grandest moment of victory in three Arab-Israeli conflicts, when the country’s underdog army thrust across the Suez Canal in the opening days ofthe 1973 Yom Kippur War and sent Israeli troops reeling in retreat. On a cool, cloudless morning, the Cairo stadium was packed with Egyptian families that had come to see the military strut its hardware.On the reviewing stand, President Anwar el-Sadat,the war’s architect, watched with satisfaction as men and machines paraded before him. I was nearby, a newly arrived foreign correspondent.Suddenly, one of the army trucks halted directly in front of the reviewing stand just as six Mirage jets roared overhead in an acrobatic performance, painting the sky with long trails of red, yellow, purple,and green smoke. Sadat stood up, apparently preparing to exchange salutes with yet another contingent of Egyptian troops. He made himself a perfect target for four Islamist assassins who jumped from the truck, stormed the podium, and riddled his body with bullets.As the killers continued for what seemed an eternity to spray the stand with their deadly fire, I considered for an instant whether to hit the ground and risk being trampled to death by panicked spectators or remain afoot and risk taking a stray bullet. Instinct told me to stay on my feet, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

razmazivanje: How Islamophobes spread fear, bigotry and misinformation

FAIR

Julie Hollar

Jim Naureckas

Making Islamophobia Mainstream:
How Muslim-bashers broadcast their bigotry
A remarkable thing happened at the National Book Critics Circle (NBCC) nominations in February 2007: The normally highbrow and tolerant group nominated for best book in the field of criticism a book widely viewed as denigrating an entire religious group.
The nomination of Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West From Within didn’t pass without controversy. Past nominee Eliot Weinberger denounced the book at the NBCC’s annual gathering, calling it ‘‘racism as criticism’’ (New York Times, 2/8/07). NBCC board president John Freeman wrote on the group’s blog (Critical Mass, 2/4/07): ‘‘I have never been
more embarrassed by a choice than I have been with Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept…. Its hyperventilated rhetoric tips from actual critique into Islamophobia.’’
Though it didn’t ultimately win the award, While Europe Slept’s recognition in the highest literary circles was emblematic of a mainstreaming of Islamophobia, not just in American publishing but in the broader media. This report takes a fresh look at Islamophobia in today’s media and its perpetratrators, outlining some of the behind-the-scenes connections that are rarely explored in media. The report also provides four snapshots, or “case studies,” describing how Islamophobes continue to manipulate media to in order to paint Muslims with a broad, hateful brush. Our aim is to document smearcasting: the public writings and appearances of Islamophobic activists and pundits who intentionally and regularly spread fear, bigotry and misinformation. The term “Islamophobia” refers to hostility toward Islam and Muslims that tends to dehumanize an entire faith, portraying it as fundamentally alien and attributing to it an inherent, essential set of negative traits such as irrationality, intolerance and violence. And not unlike the charges made in the classical document of anti-Semitism, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, some of Islamophobia’s more virulent expressionslike While Europe Sleptinclude evocations of Islamic designs to dominate the West.
Islamic institutions and Muslims, of course, should be subject to the same kind of scrutiny and criticism as anyone else. Na primjer, when a Norwegian Islamic Council debates whether gay men and lesbians should be executed, one may forcefully condemn individuals or groups sharing that opinion without pulling all European Muslims into it, as did Bawer’s Pajamas Media post (8/7/08),
“European Muslims Debate: Should Gays Be Executed?
Na sličan način, extremists who justify their violent actions by invoking some particular interpretation of Islam can be criticized without implicating the enormously diverse population of Muslims around the world. Nakon svega, reporters managed to cover the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeighan adherent of the racist Christian Identity sectwithout resorting to generalized statements about “Christian terrorism.” Likewise, media have covered acts of terrorism by fanatics who are Jewishfor instance the Hebron massacre carried out by Baruch Goldstein (Extra!, 5/6/94)–without implicating the entirety of Judaism.

The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe and to Islam

Basso tibi

When reading the majority of texts that comprise the vast literature that has been published by self-proclaimed pundits on political Islam, it is easy to miss the fact that a new movement has arisen. Further, this literature fails to explain in a satisfactory manner the fact that the ideology which drives it is based on a particular interpretation of Islam, and that it is thus a politicised religious faith,
not a secular one. The only book in which political Islam is addressed as a form of totalitarianism is the one by Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (2003). The author is, međutim, not an expert, cannot read Islamic sources, and therefore relies on the selective use of one or two secondary sources, thus failing to grasp the phenomenon.
One of the reasons for such shortcomings is the fact that most of those who seek to inform us about the ‘jihadist threat’ – and Berman is typical of this scholarship – not only lack the language skills to read the sources produced by the ideologues of political Islam, but also lack knowledge about the cultural dimension of the movement. This new totalitarian movement is in many ways a novelty
in the history of politics since it has its roots in two parallel and related phenomena: first, the culturalisation of politics which leads to politics being conceptualised as a cultural system (a view pioneered by Clifford Geertz); and second the return of the sacred, or ‘re-enchantment’ of the world, as a reaction to its intensive secularisation resulting from globalisation.
The analysis of political ideologies that are based on religions, and that can exert appeal as a political religion as a consequence of this, involves a social science understanding of the role of religion played by world politics, especially after the bi-polar system of the Cold War has given way to a multi-polar world. In a project conducted at the Hannah Arendt Institute for the application of totalitarianism to the study of political religions, I proposed the distinction between secular ideologies that act as a substitute for religion, and religious ideologies based on genuine religious faith, which is the case in religious fundamentalism (see note
24). Another project on ‘Political Religion’, carried out at the University of Basel, has made clearer the point that new approaches to politics become necessary once a religious faith becomes clothed in a political garb.Drawing on the authoritative sources of political Islam, this article suggests that the great variety of organisations inspired by Islamist ideology are to be conceptualised both as political religions and as political movements. The unique quality of political Islam lies is the fact that it is based on a transnational religion (see note 26).

Islam and the New Political Landscape

Les Back, Michael Keith, Azra Khan,
Kalbir Shukra and John Solomos

IN THE wake of the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 rujan 2001, and the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 i 2005, a literature that addresses the forms and modalities of religious expression – particularly Islamic religious expression – has flourished in the penumbral regions that link mainstream social science to social policy design, think tanks and journalism. Much of the work has attempted to define attitudes or predispositions of a Muslim population in a particular site of tension such as London or the UK (Barnes, 2006; Ethnos Consultancy, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; Populus, 2006), or critiqued particular forms of social policy intervention (Bright, 2006a; Mirza et al., 2007). Studies of Islamism and Jihadism have created a particular focus on the syncretic and complex links between Islamic religious faith and forms of social movement and political mobilization (Husain, 2007; Kepel, 2004, 2006; McRoy, 2006; Neville-Jones et al., 2006, 2007; Phillips, 2006; Roy, 2004, 2006). Conventionally, the analytical focus has spotlighted the culture of Islam, the belief systems of the faithful, and the historical and geographical trajectories of Muslim populations across the world in general and in ‘the West’ in particular (Abbas, 2005; Ansari, 2002; Eade and Garbin, 2002; Hussein, 2006; Modood, 2005; Ramadan, 1999, 2005). In this article the emphasis is different. We argue that studies of Islamic political participation need to be contextualized carefully without recourse to grand generalities about culture and faith. This is because both culture and faith are structured by and in turn structure the cultural, institutional and deliberative landscapes through which they are articulated. In the case of the British experience, the hidden traces of Christianity in the formation of the welfare state in the last century, the rapidly changing cartography of spaces of the political and the role of ‘faith organizations’ in the restructuring of welfare provision generate the material social context determining the opportunities and the outlines of new forms of political participation.

ISLAM, DEMOKRACIJA & SAD:

Zaklada Cordoba

Abdullah Faliq |

uvod ,


Unatoč tome što je to i višegodišnja i složena rasprava, Tromjesečnik Arches preispituje iz teoloških i praktičnih razloga, važna rasprava o odnosu i kompatibilnosti između islama i demokracije, kao što je odjeknulo u programu nade i promjene Baracka Obame. Dok mnogi slave Obamin uspon u Ovalnom uredu kao nacionalnu katarzu za SAD, drugi ostaju manje optimistični glede promjene ideologije i pristupa u međunarodnoj areni. Iako se velik dio napetosti i nepovjerenja između muslimanskog svijeta i SAD-a može pripisati pristupu promicanja demokracije, tipično favoriziranje diktatura i marionetskih režima koji na riječima govore o demokratskim vrijednostima i ljudskim pravima, naknadni potres od 9/11 je uistinu dodatno zacementirao nedoumice kroz američki stav o političkom islamu. Stvorio je zid negativnosti kako je utvrdio worldpublicopinion.org, prema kojoj 67% Egipćana vjeruje da Amerika globalno igra "uglavnom negativnu" ulogu.
Stoga je odgovor Amerike bio prikladan. Izborom Obame, mnogi diljem svijeta polažu nade u razvoj manje ratoborne, ali pravedniju vanjsku politiku prema muslimanskom svijetu. Test za Obamu, dok raspravljamo, tako Amerika i njezini saveznici promoviraju demokraciju. Hoće li biti olakšavajuće ili impozantno?
Štoviše, može li biti pošten posrednik u dugotrajnim zonama sukoba? Uključivanje stručnosti i uvida tvrtke Prolifi
c učenjaci, akademici, iskusni novinari i političari, Arches Quarterly donosi na vidjelo odnos između islama i demokracije i uloge Amerike – kao i promjene koje je donio Obama, u traženju zajedničkog jezika. Anas Altikriti, glavni izvršni direktor Th e Cordoba Foundation daje uvodni gambit ovoj raspravi, gdje se osvrće na nade i izazove koji počivaju na Obaminom putu. Slijedeći Altikriti, bivši savjetnik predsjednika Nixona, Dr Robert Crane nudi temeljitu analizu islamskog principa prava na slobodu. Anwar Ibrahim, bivši zamjenik premijera Malezije, obogaćuje raspravu praktičnom realnošću provedbe demokracije u muslimanskim dominantnim društvima, naime, u Indoneziji i Maleziji.
Imamo i dr. Shireen Hunter, Sveučilišta Georgetown, SAD, koji istražuje muslimanske zemlje koje zaostaju u demokratizaciji i modernizaciji. To je dopunjeno piscem o terorizmu, Objašnjenje krize postmoderne i dr. Nafeeza Ahmeda
propast demokracije. dr. Daud Abdullah (Direktor Middle East Media Monitora), Alan Hart (bivši dopisnik ITN-a i BBC-ja Panorama; autor cionizma: Pravi neprijatelj Židova) i Asem Sondos (Urednik egipatskog tjednika Sawt Al Omma) usredotočite se na Obamu i njegovu ulogu vis-à-vis promicanja demokracije u muslimanskom svijetu, kao i odnosi SAD-a s Izraelom i Muslimanskim bratstvom.
javlja se ministar vanjskih poslova, Maldivi, Ahmed Shaheed spekulira o budućnosti islama i demokracije; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– član Sinn Féina koji je izdržao četiri godine zatvora zbog irskih republikanskih aktivnosti i borac za Guildford 4 i Birmingham 6, osvrće se na svoje nedavno putovanje u Gazu gdje je svjedočio utjecaju brutalnosti i nepravde nad Palestincima; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Ravnateljica Centra za proučavanje radikalizacije i suvremenog političkog nasilja o izazovima kritičkog istraživanja političkog terora; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, književnik i dramatičar, raspravlja o izgledima za mir u Darfuru; i konačno, novinar i aktivist za ljudska prava Ashur Shamis kritički gleda na demokratizaciju i politizaciju muslimana danas.
Nadamo se da će sve ovo biti sveobuhvatno štivo i izvor za razmišljanje o problemima koji nas sve pogađaju u novoj zori nade.
Hvala vam

US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

Henry Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Revizija islamizma

MAHA AZZAM

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 godine, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, postalo je uobičajeno pronaći da ideologiju i religiju suprotstavljene strane koriste kao izvore legitimizacije, nadahnuće i neprijateljstvo.
Situacija je danas dodatno komplicirana rastućim antagonizmom i strahom od islama na Zapadu zbog terorističkih napada koji zauzvrat utiču na stavove prema imigraciji, vjera i kultura. Granice umma ili zajednice vjernika protegle su se izvan muslimanskih država do europskih gradova. Umma potencijalno postoji gdje god postoje muslimanske zajednice. Zajednički osjećaj pripadnosti zajedničkoj vjeri povećava se u okruženju gdje je osjećaj integracije u okolnu zajednicu nejasan i gdje diskriminacija može biti očita. Što je veće odbacivanje vrijednosti društva,
bilo na Zapadu ili čak u muslimanskoj državi, veća je konsolidacija moralne snage islama kao kulturnog identiteta i sustava vrijednosti.
Nakon bombaških napada u Londonu na 7 srpanj 2005 postalo je očiglednije da neki mladi ljudi ističu vjersko opredjeljenje kao način izražavanja etničke pripadnosti. Veze između muslimana diljem svijeta i njihova percepcija da su muslimani ranjivi naveli su mnoge u vrlo različitim dijelovima svijeta da spoje vlastite lokalne nevolje sa širim muslimanskim problemima, identificiravši se kulturno, bilo prvenstveno ili djelomično, sa široko definiranim islamom.

ISLAM I VLADAVINA PRAVA

Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld

In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. U isto vrijeme, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, ili (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.

Islamska politička kultura, Demokracija, i ljudska prava

Daniele. Cijena

Tvrdi se da islam olakšava autoritarizam, proturječi vrijednostima zapadnih društava, te značajno utječe na važne političke ishode u muslimanskim narodima. Slijedom toga, učenjaci, komentatori, a vladini dužnosnici često ističu ‘’islamski fundamentalizam’’ kao sljedeću ideološku prijetnju liberalnim demokracijama. Ovaj pogled, međutim, temelji se prvenstveno na analizi tekstova, Islamska politička teorija, i ad hoc studije pojedinih zemalja, koji ne uzimaju u obzir druge faktore. Moja je tvrdnja da tekstovi i tradicija islama, poput onih drugih religija, može se koristiti za podršku različitim političkim sustavima i politikama. Deskriptivne studije specifične za zemlju ne pomažu nam pronaći obrasce koji bi nam pomogli objasniti različite odnose između islama i politike u zemljama muslimanskog svijeta. Stoga, novi pristup proučavanju
traži se veza između islama i politike.
predlažem, kroz rigoroznu evaluaciju odnosa između islama, demokracija, i ljudska prava na međunacionalnoj razini, da se previše naglašava moć islama kao političke snage. Prvo koristim komparativne studije slučaja, koji se usredotočuju na čimbenike koji se odnose na međuigru između islamskih skupina i režima, ekonomski utjecaji, etnički rascjepi, i društveni razvoj, objasniti razlike u utjecaju islama na politiku u osam nacija. Tvrdim da velik dio moći
pripisuje islamu kao pokretačkoj snazi ​​iza politika i političkih sustava u muslimanskim nacijama može se bolje objasniti prethodno spomenutim čimbenicima. Također nalazim, suprotno uvriježenom mišljenju, da je sve veća snaga islamskih političkih skupina često bila povezana sa skromnom pluralizacijom političkih sustava.
Konstruirao sam indeks islamske političke kulture, na temelju toga u kojoj se mjeri islamsko pravo koristi i je li i, ako je tako, kako,zapadne ideje, institucija, i tehnologije se implementiraju, ispitati prirodu odnosa između islama i demokracije i islama i ljudskih prava. Ovaj se pokazatelj koristi u statističkoj analizi, koji uključuje uzorak od dvadeset i tri pretežno muslimanske zemlje i kontrolnu skupinu od dvadeset i tri nemuslimanske zemlje u razvoju. Osim uspoređivanja
Islamske nacije neislamskim nacijama u razvoju, statistička analiza omogućuje mi kontrolu utjecaja drugih varijabli za koje je utvrđeno da utječu na razine demokracije i zaštitu prava pojedinca. Rezultat bi trebao biti realnija i točnija slika utjecaja islama na politiku i politiku.

PRECIZNOST U GLOBALNOM RATU PROTIV TERORA:

Šerifa zuhur

Sedam godina nakon rujna 11, 2001 (9/11) napadi, mnogi stručnjaci vjeruju da je al-Qa'ida ponovno ojačala i da su njezini imitatori ili podružnice smrtonosniji nego prije. Nacionalna obavještajna procjena 2007 ustvrdio da je al-Qa'ida sada opasnija nego prije 9/11.1 Al-Qa'idini emulatori nastavljaju prijetiti Zapadu, Srednji istok, i europskih naroda, kao u zavjeri osujećenoj u rujnu 2007 u Njemačkoj. Bruce Riedel navodi: Uvelike zahvaljujući spremnosti Washingtona da ode u Irak umjesto da lovi vođe Al Qaide, organizacija sada ima solidnu bazu operacija u pustoši Pakistana i učinkovitu franšizu u zapadnom Iraku. Njegov doseg se proširio po muslimanskom svijetu i Europi . . . Osama bin Laden je pokrenuo uspješnu propagandnu kampanju. . . . Njegove ideje sada privlače više sljedbenika nego ikada.
Istina je da se razne selefijsko-džihadističke organizacije još uvijek pojavljuju diljem islamskog svijeta. Zašto se odgovori na islamistički terorizam koji zovemo globalni džihad nisu pokazali iznimno učinkovitima?
Prelazak na alate „meke moći,” što je s učinkovitošću zapadnih nastojanja da podupre muslimane u Globalnom ratu protiv terorizma (GWOT)? Zašto su Sjedinjene Države osvojile tako malo “srca i umova” u širem islamskom svijetu? Zašto američke strateške poruke o ovom pitanju tako loše igraju u regiji? Zašto, usprkos širokom muslimanskom neodobravanju ekstremizma kao što je prikazano u anketama i službenim izjavama ključnih muslimanskih vođa, je zapravo porasla podrška bin Ladinu u Jordanu i Pakistanu?
Ova monografija neće se ponovno baviti podrijetlom islamističkog nasilja. Umjesto toga, bavi se vrstom konceptualnog neuspjeha koji krivo konstruira GWOT i koji obeshrabruje muslimane da ga podrže. Ne mogu se identificirati s predloženim transformativnim protumjerama jer prepoznaju neka od svojih temeljnih uvjerenja i institucija kao mete u
ovaj pothvat.
Nekoliko duboko problematičnih trendova zbunjuje američke konceptualizacije GWOT-a i strateških poruka osmišljenih za vođenje tog rata. Ovi se razvijaju iz (1) postkolonijalni politički pristupi muslimanima i muslimanskim većinskim narodima koji se uvelike razlikuju i stoga proizvode proturječne i zbunjujuće dojmove i učinke; i (2) zaostalo generalizirano neznanje i predrasude prema islamu i subregionalnim kulturama. Dodajte ovome američki bijes, strah, i tjeskoba zbog smrtonosnih događaja 9/11, a pojedini elementi koji, unatoč nagovaranjima hladnijih glava, smatrati muslimane i njihovu vjeru odgovornima za nedjela njihovih istovjeraca, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

Demokracija, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. Odgovarajući na, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) odbijanje popuštanja stiska riskira pogoršanje napetosti u vrijeme političke neizvjesnosti oko nasljeđivanja predsjednika i ozbiljnih socioekonomskih nemira. Iako će to vjerojatno biti produljeno, postupan proces, režim bi trebao poduzeti preliminarne korake za normalizaciju sudjelovanja Muslimanske braće u političkom životu. Muslimanska braća, čije su se društvene aktivnosti dugo tolerirale, ali čija je uloga u formalnoj politici strogo ograničena, osvojio neviđenu 20 posto zastupničkih mjesta u 2005 izbori. Učinili su to unatoč tome što su se natjecali za samo trećinu raspoloživih mjesta i unatoč značajnim preprekama, uključujući policijsku represiju i izbornu prijevaru. Ovim uspjehom potvrdili su svoju poziciju izuzetno dobro organizirane i duboko ukorijenjene političke snage. U isto vrijeme, ona je naglasila slabosti i legalne oporbe i vladajuće stranke. Režim se mogao kladiti da bi se skromno povećanje zastupljenosti Muslimanske braće u parlamentu moglo iskoristiti za raspirivanje straha od islamističkog preuzimanja vlasti i time poslužiti kao razlog za odugovlačenje reforme. Ako je tako, strategija je pod velikim rizikom od povratnog učinka.

Iraq and the Future of Political Islam

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Islam i demokracija

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Tess Lee Eisenhart

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (Bratstvo) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, međutim, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
režim: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Umjesto toga, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

Speech of Dr,MUHAMMAD BADIE

Dr,Muhammad Badie

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate Praise be to Allah and Blessing on His messenger, companions and followers
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
I greet you with the Islamic greeting; Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings;
It is the will of Allah that I undertake this huge responsibility which Allah has chosen for me and a request from the MB Movement which I respond to with the support of Allah. With the support of my Muslim Brothers I look forward to achieving the great goals, we devoted ourselves to, solely for the sake of Allah.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
At the outset of my speech I would like to address our teacher, older brother, and distinguished leader Mr. Mohamed Mahdy Akef, the seventh leader of the MB group a strong, dedicated and enthusiastic person who led the group’s journey amid storms and surpassed all its obstacles, thus providing this unique and outstanding model to all leaders and senior officials in the government, associations and other parties by fulfilling his promise and handing over the leadership after only one term, words are not enough to express our feelings to this great leader and guide and we can only sayMay Allah reward you all the best”.
We say to our beloved Muslim brothers who are spread around the globe, it is unfortunate for us to have this big event happening while you are not among us for reasons beyond our control, however we feel that your souls are with us sending honest and sincere smiles and vibes.
As for the beloved ones who are behind the bars of tyranny and oppression for no just reason other than reiterating Allah is our God, and for seeking the dignity, pride and development of their country, we sincerely applaud and salute them for their patience, steadfastness and sacrifices which we are sure will not be without gain. We pray that those tyrants and oppressors salvage their conscience and that we see you again in our midst supporting our cause, may Allah bless and protect you all.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
As you are aware, the main goal of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement (MB) is comprehensive modification, which deals with all kinds of corruption through reform and change. “I only desire (your) betterment to the best of my power; and my success (in my task) can only come from Allah.” (Hud-88) and through cooperation with all powers of the nation and those with high spirits who are sincere to their religion and nation.
The MB believes that Allah has placed all the foundations necessary for the development and welfare of nations in the great Islam; stoga, Islam is their reference towards reform, which starts from the disciplining and training of the souls of individuals, followed by regulating families and societies by strengthening them, preceded by bringing justice to it and the continuous jihad to liberate the nation from any foreign dominance or intellectual, spiritual, cultural hegemony and economic, political or military colonialism, as well as leading the nation to development, prosperity and assuming its appropriate place in the world.