RSSGach Iontráil Tagged Leis: "Bráithreachas Moslamach"

Amárach Arabach

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Deireadh Fómhair 6, 1981, Bhí sé i gceist go mbeadh sé ina lá ceiliúrtha san Éigipt. Ba chomóradh é an bua is mó a bhí ag an Éigipt i dtrí choimhlint Arabach-Iosraelach, nuair a chuaigh arm faoi thalamh na tíre trasna Chanáil Suez i laethanta oscailte na tíre 1973 Cogadh Yom Kippur agus chuir sé trúpaí Iosraelacha sa tóir ar chúlú. Ar fionnuar, maidin gan scamall, bhí staidiam Cairo pacáilte le teaghlaigh Éigipteacha a tháinig chun na crua-earraí míleata a fheiceáil. Ar an seastán athbhreithnithe, Uachtarán Anwar el-Sadat,ailtire an chogaidh, d'fhéach sé le sásamh agus fir agus meaisíní ag paráid os a chomhair. Bhí mé in aice láimhe, comhfhreagraí eachtrach nua-theacht.Suddenly, Stopadh ceann de na trucailí airm díreach os comhair an tseastáin athbhreithnithe díreach agus sé scaird Mirage ag ruathar lastuas i dtaibhiú androgsaineach, péinteáil an spéir le rianta fada dearg, buí, corcra,agus deatach glas. Sheas Sadat suas, de réir dealraimh ag ullmhú chun beannachtaí a mhalartú le meithle eile de thrúpaí na hÉigipte. Rinne sé sprioc foirfe dó féin do cheathrar feallmharfóirí Ioslamacha a léim as an trucail, stormed an podium, agus lán urchair ar a chorp. Mar a lean na marfóirí ar aghaidh ar feadh an chuma ar an tsíoraíocht chun an seastán a spraeáil lena tine mharfach., Rinne mé machnamh láithreach ar cé acu an mbuailfinn ar an talamh agus an baol a bheith á satailt chun báis ag lucht féachana a raibh scaoll orthu nó fanacht faoi chois agus an baol ann piléar strae a thógáil. Dúirt Instinct liom fanacht ar mo chosa, agus chuir mo chiall ar dhualgas iriseoireachta brú orm dul ag fáil amach an raibh Sadat beo nó marbh.

smearaidh: How Islamophobes spread fear, bigotry and misinformation

FAIR

Julie Hollar

Jim Naureckas

Making Islamophobia Mainstream:
How Muslim-bashers broadcast their bigotry
A remarkable thing happened at the National Book Critics Circle (NBCC) nominations in February 2007: The normally highbrow and tolerant group nominated for best book in the field of criticism a book widely viewed as denigrating an entire religious group.
The nomination of Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West From Within didn’t pass without controversy. Past nominee Eliot Weinberger denounced the book at the NBCC’s annual gathering, calling it ‘‘racism as criticism’’ (New York Times, 2/8/07). NBCC board president John Freeman wrote on the group’s blog (Critical Mass, 2/4/07): ‘‘I have never been
more embarrassed by a choice than I have been with Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept…. Its hyperventilated rhetoric tips from actual critique into Islamophobia.’’
Though it didn’t ultimately win the award, While Europe Slept’s recognition in the highest literary circles was emblematic of a mainstreaming of Islamophobia, not just in American publishing but in the broader media. This report takes a fresh look at Islamophobia in today’s media and its perpetratrators, outlining some of the behind-the-scenes connections that are rarely explored in media. The report also provides four snapshots, or “case studies,” describing how Islamophobes continue to manipulate media to in order to paint Muslims with a broad, hateful brush. Our aim is to document smearcasting: the public writings and appearances of Islamophobic activists and pundits who intentionally and regularly spread fear, bigotry and misinformation. The term “Islamophobia” refers to hostility toward Islam and Muslims that tends to dehumanize an entire faith, portraying it as fundamentally alien and attributing to it an inherent, essential set of negative traits such as irrationality, intolerance and violence. And not unlike the charges made in the classical document of anti-Semitism, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, some of Islamophobia’s more virulent expressionslike While Europe Sleptinclude evocations of Islamic designs to dominate the West.
Islamic institutions and Muslims, of course, should be subject to the same kind of scrutiny and criticism as anyone else. For instance, when a Norwegian Islamic Council debates whether gay men and lesbians should be executed, one may forcefully condemn individuals or groups sharing that opinion without pulling all European Muslims into it, as did Bawer’s Pajamas Media post (8/7/08),
“European Muslims Debate: Should Gays Be Executed?”
Similarly, extremists who justify their violent actions by invoking some particular interpretation of Islam can be criticized without implicating the enormously diverse population of Muslims around the world. Tar éis gach rud, reporters managed to cover the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeighan adherent of the racist Christian Identity sectwithout resorting to generalized statements about “Christian terrorism.” Likewise, media have covered acts of terrorism by fanatics who are Jewishfor instance the Hebron massacre carried out by Baruch Goldstein (Extra!, 5/6/94)–without implicating the entirety of Judaism.

The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe and to Islam

Basso tibi

When reading the majority of texts that comprise the vast literature that has been published by self-proclaimed pundits on political Islam, it is easy to miss the fact that a new movement has arisen. Further, this literature fails to explain in a satisfactory manner the fact that the ideology which drives it is based on a particular interpretation of Islam, and that it is thus a politicised religious faith,
not a secular one. The only book in which political Islam is addressed as a form of totalitarianism is the one by Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (2003). The author is, ach, not an expert, cannot read Islamic sources, and therefore relies on the selective use of one or two secondary sources, thus failing to grasp the phenomenon.
One of the reasons for such shortcomings is the fact that most of those who seek to inform us about the ‘jihadist threat’ – and Berman is typical of this scholarship – not only lack the language skills to read the sources produced by the ideologues of political Islam, but also lack knowledge about the cultural dimension of the movement. This new totalitarian movement is in many ways a novelty
in the history of politics since it has its roots in two parallel and related phenomena: first, the culturalisation of politics which leads to politics being conceptualised as a cultural system (a view pioneered by Clifford Geertz); and second the return of the sacred, or ‘re-enchantment’ of the world, as a reaction to its intensive secularisation resulting from globalisation.
The analysis of political ideologies that are based on religions, and that can exert appeal as a political religion as a consequence of this, involves a social science understanding of the role of religion played by world politics, especially after the bi-polar system of the Cold War has given way to a multi-polar world. In a project conducted at the Hannah Arendt Institute for the application of totalitarianism to the study of political religions, I proposed the distinction between secular ideologies that act as a substitute for religion, and religious ideologies based on genuine religious faith, which is the case in religious fundamentalism (see note
24). Another project on ‘Political Religion’, carried out at the University of Basel, has made clearer the point that new approaches to politics become necessary once a religious faith becomes clothed in a political garb.Drawing on the authoritative sources of political Islam, this article suggests that the great variety of organisations inspired by Islamist ideology are to be conceptualised both as political religions and as political movements. The unique quality of political Islam lies is the fact that it is based on a transnational religion (see note 26).

Islam and the New Political Landscape

Les Ar Ais, Michael Keith, Azra Khan,
Kalbir Shukra and John Solomos

IN THE wake of the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 Meán Fómhair 2001, and the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 agus 2005, a literature that addresses the forms and modalities of religious expression – particularly Islamic religious expression – has flourished in the penumbral regions that link mainstream social science to social policy design, think tanks and journalism. Much of the work has attempted to define attitudes or predispositions of a Muslim population in a particular site of tension such as London or the UK (Barnes, 2006; Ethnos Consultancy, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; Populus, 2006), or critiqued particular forms of social policy intervention (Bright, 2006a; Mirza et al., 2007). Studies of Islamism and Jihadism have created a particular focus on the syncretic and complex links between Islamic religious faith and forms of social movement and political mobilization (Husain, 2007; Kepel, 2004, 2006; McRoy, 2006; Neville-Jones et al., 2006, 2007; Phillips, 2006; Roy, 2004, 2006). Conventionally, the analytical focus has spotlighted the culture of Islam, the belief systems of the faithful, and the historical and geographical trajectories of Muslim populations across the world in general and in ‘the West’ in particular (Abbas, 2005; Ansari, 2002; Eade and Garbin, 2002; Hussein, 2006; Modood, 2005; Ramadan, 1999, 2005). In this article the emphasis is different. We argue that studies of Islamic political participation need to be contextualized carefully without recourse to grand generalities about culture and faith. This is because both culture and faith are structured by and in turn structure the cultural, institutional and deliberative landscapes through which they are articulated. In the case of the British experience, the hidden traces of Christianity in the formation of the welfare state in the last century, the rapidly changing cartography of spaces of the political and the role of ‘faith organizations’ in the restructuring of welfare provision generate the material social context determining the opportunities and the outlines of new forms of political participation.

ISLAM, Daonlathas & AN SAM:

Fondúireacht Cordoba

Abdullah Faliq |

Intro ,


In ainneoin gur díospóireacht ilbhliantúil agus casta araon í, Arches Ráithiúil athscrúdú ar chúiseanna diagachta agus praiticiúla, an díospóireacht thábhachtach faoin gcaidreamh agus comhoiriúnacht idir Ioslam agus an Daonlathas, mar a léirítear i gclár oibre dóchais agus athraithe Barack Obama. Cé go gceiliúrann go leor cinnt Obama san Oifig Oval mar chatharsis náisiúnta do na SA, tá cuid eile fós nach bhfuil chomh dóchasach faoi athrú san idé-eolaíocht agus sa chur chuige sa saol idirnáisiúnta. Cé gur féidir cuid mhór den teannas agus den easpa muiníne idir an domhan Moslamach agus SAM a chur i leith an chur chuige a bhaineann le cur chun cinn an daonlathais., go tipiciúil i bhfabhar deachtóireachtaí agus réimis puipéad a íocann seirbhís liopa do luachanna daonlathacha agus cearta daonna, iarshlua na 9/11 dhaingnigh sé an amhras go fírinneach trí sheasamh Mheiriceá ar Ioslam polaitiúil. Tá balla diúltach cruthaithe aige mar a d’aimsigh worldpublicopinion.org, dá réir a 67% Creideann na hÉigiptigh go bhfuil ról “diúltach den chuid is mó” á imirt ag Meiriceá ar fud an domhain.
Mar sin bhí freagra Mheiriceá oiriúnach. Trí Obama a thoghadh, tá go leor ar fud an domhain ag súil le duine nach bhfuil chomh corraitheach a fhorbairt, ach beartas eachtrach níos cothroime i dtreo an domhain Moslamach. An tástáil le haghaidh Obama, agus muid ag plé, is é an chaoi a gcuireann Meiriceá agus a comhghuaillithe an daonlathas chun cinn. An mbeidh sé ag éascú nó ag impí?
Thairis sin, an bhfuil sé tábhachtach gur bróicéir macánta é i gcriosanna fada coinbhleachta? Ag liostáil saineolas agus léargas prolifi
c scoláirí, acadóirí, iriseoirí agus polaiteoirí le taithí, Tugann Arches Quarterly an gaol idir Ioslam agus Daonlathas agus ról Mheiriceá chun solais – chomh maith leis na hathruithe a tharla de bharr Obama., agus an talamh coitianta á lorg. Anas Altikriti, Soláthraíonn POF The Cordoba Foundation an t-athrú tosaigh don phlé seo, áit a ndéanann sé machnamh ar na dóchais agus na dúshláin atá ar chosán Obama. Tar éis Altikriti, an t-iarchomhairleoir don Uachtarán Nixon, Tairgeann an Dr Robert Crane anailís chríochnúil ar phrionsabal Ioslamach an chirt chun saoirse. Anwar Ibrahim, iar-Leas-Phríomh-Aire na Malaeisia, saibhríonn sé an plé leis na réaltachtaí praiticiúla a bhaineann le daonlathas a chur i bhfeidhm i sochaithe ceannasacha Moslamach, eadhon, san Indinéis agus sa Mhalaeisia.
Tá an Dr Shireen Hunter againn freisin, de chuid Ollscoil Georgetown, SAM, a dhéanann iniúchadh ar thíortha Moslamacha atá tite chun deiridh sa daonlathú agus sa nuachóiriú. Comhlánaíonn scríbhneoir sceimhlitheoireachta Th é, Míniú an Dr Nafeez Ahmed ar ghéarchéim na hiar-nua-aoiseachais agus an
meath an daonlathais. An Dr Daud Abdullah (Stiúrthóir Monatóir Meán an Mheánoirthir), Alan Hart (iar-chomhfhreagraí ITN agus BBC Panorama; údar Zionism: Fíor-namhaid na nGiúdach) agus Asem Sondos (Eagarthóir Sawt Al Omma na hÉigipte go seachtainiúil) díriú ar Obama agus a ról vis-à-vis an daonlathas-chur chun cinn sa domhan Moslamach, chomh maith le caidreamh SAM le hIosrael agus leis an mBráithreachas Moslamach.
Aire Gnóthaí Eachtracha Aff airs, Oileáin Mhaildíve, Déanann Ahmed Shaheed tuairimíocht ar thodhchaí an Ioslaim agus an Daonlathais; An Clr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– ball de Shinn Féin a d’fhulaing ceithre bliana sa phríosún as gníomhaíochtaí Poblachtánacha na hÉireann agus feachtasóir ar son Guildford 4 agus Birmingham 6, léiríonn sé ar an turas a thug sé go Gaza le déanaí áit ar chonaic sé tionchar na brúidiúlachta agus na héagóra a cuireadh le chéile i gcoinne na bPalaistíneach; An Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Pléann Stiúrthóir an Ionaid um Staidéar ar Radacú agus ar Fhoréigean Polaitiúil Comhaimseartha na dúshláin a bhaineann le taighde criticiúil a dhéanamh ar sceimhle polaitíochta; An Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, scríbhneoir agus drámadóir, pléann sé ionchais na síochána i Darfur; agus faoi dheireadh breathnaíonn an t-iriseoir agus gníomhaí cearta daonna Ashur Shamis go criticiúil ar dhaonlathú agus ar pholaitíocht na Moslamaigh inniu.
Tá súil againn go dtabharfaidh sé seo go léir léamh cuimsitheach agus foinse machnaimh ar cheisteanna a théann i gcion orainn go léir le linn nua dóchais..
Go raibh maith agat

US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

Henry Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Athchuairt ar an Ioslamachas

MAHA AZZAM

Tá géarchéim pholaitiúil agus slándála ag baint leis an rud ar a dtugtar an tIoslamachas, géarchéim a bhfuil a réamhshainithe le fada roimh 9/11. Thar an am atá caite 25 blianta, cuireadh béimeanna éagsúla ar conas Ioslamachas a mhíniú agus a chomhrac. Anailísithe agus lucht déanta beartas
labhair sna 1980idí agus 1990idí faoi bhunchúiseanna na míleatachta Ioslamaí mar mhíshásamh eacnamaíoch agus imeallú. Le deireanas díríodh ar athchóiriú polaitiúil mar mhodh chun an bonn a bhaint de mhealltacht an radacachais. Níos mó sa lá atá inniu ann, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Iúil 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW

Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld

In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. At the same time, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.

Islamic Political Culture, Daonlathas, and Human Rights

Daniele. Praghas

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, ach, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Teoiric pholaitiúil Ioslamach, agus staidéir ad hoc ar thíortha aonair, nach measann fachtóirí eile. Is é mo áiteamh go bhfuil na téacsanna agus traidisiúin an Ioslam, cosúil leis na reiligiúin eile, is féidir iad a úsáid chun tacú le córais agus beartais pholaitiúla éagsúla. Ní chuidíonn staidéir a bhaineann go sonrach le tír ar leith linn patrúin a aimsiú a chuideoidh linn na caidrimh éagsúla idir Ioslam agus an pholaitíocht ar fud thíortha an domhain Mhoslamaigh a mhíniú.. Uaidh sin, cur chuige nua maidir le staidéar a dhéanamh ar an
éilítear nasc idir Ioslam agus an pholaitíocht.
Molaim, trí mheastóireacht dhian ar an ngaol idir Ioslam, daonlathas, agus cearta an duine ar an leibhéal trasnáisiúnta, go bhfuil an iomarca béime á cur ar chumhacht an Ioslaim mar fhórsa polaitiúil. Úsáidim cás-staidéir chomparáideacha ar dtús, a dhíríonn ar fhachtóirí a bhaineann leis an idirghníomhú idir grúpaí agus réimis Ioslamacha, tionchair eacnamaíocha, scoilteanna eitneacha, agus forbairt na sochaí, míniú a thabhairt ar an éagsúlacht i dtionchar an Ioslaim ar an bpolaitíocht thar ocht náisiún. Áitím go bhfuil cuid mhór den chumhacht
atá curtha i leith Ioslam mar an fórsa tiomána taobh thiar de bheartais agus córais pholaitiúla i náisiúin Mhoslamacha a mhíniú níos fearr ag na fachtóirí a luadh cheana. Faighim freisin, contrártha le creideamh coiteann, gur minic a bhaineann neart méadaithe na ngrúpaí polaitiúla Ioslamacha le hiolrúchán measartha ar chórais pholaitiúla.
Tá innéacs de chultúr polaitiúil Ioslamach tógtha agam, bunaithe ar a mhéid a úsáidtear an dlí Ioslamach agus an bhfuil agus, más amhlaidh, conas,Smaointe an Iarthair, institiúidí, agus cuirtear teicneolaíochtaí i bhfeidhm, chun nádúr an chaidrimh idir Ioslam agus an daonlathas agus Ioslam agus cearta daonna a thástáil. Úsáidtear an táscaire seo in anailís staitistiúil, lena n-áirítear sampla de thrí thír is fiche ar Mhoslamacha den chuid is mó agus grúpa rialaithe de thrí cinn is fiche de náisiún forbraíochta neamh-Mhuslamach. Chomh maith le comparáid a dhéanamh
náisiúin Ioslamacha chuig náisiúin i mbéal forbartha neamh-Ioslamach, ligeann anailís staitistiúil dom tionchar na n-athróg eile a fuarthas a chuireann isteach ar leibhéil daonlathais agus ar chosaint chearta an duine aonair a rialú.. Ba cheart go mbeadh pictiúr níos réadúla agus níos cruinne ar an tionchar atá ag Ioslam ar pholaitíocht agus ar bheartais mar thoradh air.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; agus (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

Daonlathas, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 toghcháin. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. At the same time, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

Iraq and the Future of Political Islam

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?”, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Islam and Democracy

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Tess Lee Eisenhart

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (Bráithreachas) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, ach, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
regime: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

Speech of Dr,MUHAMMAD BADIE

Bhí an Dr,Muhammad Badie

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate Praise be to Allah and Blessing on His messenger, companions and followers
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
I greet you with the Islamic greeting; Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings;
It is the will of Allah that I undertake this huge responsibility which Allah has chosen for me and a request from the MB Movement which I respond to with the support of Allah. With the support of my Muslim Brothers I look forward to achieving the great goals, we devoted ourselves to, solely for the sake of Allah.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
At the outset of my speech I would like to address our teacher, older brother, and distinguished leader Mr. Mohamed Mahdy Akef, the seventh leader of the MB group a strong, dedicated and enthusiastic person who led the group’s journey amid storms and surpassed all its obstacles, thus providing this unique and outstanding model to all leaders and senior officials in the government, associations and other parties by fulfilling his promise and handing over the leadership after only one term, words are not enough to express our feelings to this great leader and guide and we can only sayMay Allah reward you all the best”.
We say to our beloved Muslim brothers who are spread around the globe, it is unfortunate for us to have this big event happening while you are not among us for reasons beyond our control, however we feel that your souls are with us sending honest and sincere smiles and vibes.
As for the beloved ones who are behind the bars of tyranny and oppression for no just reason other than reiterating Allah is our God, and for seeking the dignity, pride and development of their country, we sincerely applaud and salute them for their patience, steadfastness and sacrifices which we are sure will not be without gain. We pray that those tyrants and oppressors salvage their conscience and that we see you again in our midst supporting our cause, may Allah bless and protect you all.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
As you are aware, the main goal of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement (MB) is comprehensive modification, which deals with all kinds of corruption through reform and change. “I only desire (your) betterment to the best of my power; and my success (in my task) can only come from Allah.” (Hud-88) and through cooperation with all powers of the nation and those with high spirits who are sincere to their religion and nation.
The MB believes that Allah has placed all the foundations necessary for the development and welfare of nations in the great Islam; therefore, Islam is their reference towards reform, which starts from the disciplining and training of the souls of individuals, followed by regulating families and societies by strengthening them, preceded by bringing justice to it and the continuous jihad to liberate the nation from any foreign dominance or intellectual, spiritual, cultural hegemony and economic, political or military colonialism, as well as leading the nation to development, prosperity and assuming its appropriate place in the world.