RSSรายการทั้งหมดที่ติดแท็กด้วย: "ประเทศโมร็อกโก"

ศาสนาอิสลาม, ศาสนาอิสลามทางการเมืองและอเมริกา

Insight อาหรับ

Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?

khalil al-anani

"มีโอกาสของการติดต่อสื่อสารกับสหรัฐอเมริกาใด ๆ. การบริหารตราบใดที่สหรัฐอเมริกายังคงดูยาวนานในเรื่องของของศาสนาอิสลามเป็นอันตรายจริง, a view that puts the United States in the same boat as the Zionist enemy. We have no pre-conceived notions concerning the American people or the U.S. society and its civic organizations and think tanks. We have no problem communicating with the American people but no adequate efforts are being made to bring us closer,” said Dr. Issam al-Iryan, chief of the political department of the Muslim Brotherhood in a phone interview.
Al-Iryan’s words sum up the Muslim Brotherhood’s views of the American people and the U.S. government. Other members of the Muslim Brotherhood would agree, as would the late Hassan al-Banna, who founded the group in 1928. Al- Banna viewed the West mostly as a symbol of moral decay. Other Salafis – an Islamic school of thought that relies on ancestors as exemplary models – have taken the same view of the United States, but lack the ideological flexibility espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Muslim Brotherhood believes in engaging the Americans in civil dialogue, other extremist groups see no point in dialogue and maintain that force is the only way of dealing with the United States.

ภาคี Islamist : จะกลับไปต้นกำเนิด

Haqqani Husain

Fradkin Hillel

How should we understand the emergence and the nature of Islamist parties? Can they reasonably be expected not just to participate in democratic politics but even to respect the norms of liberal democracy? These questions lie at the heart of the issues that we have been asked to address.
In our view, any response that is historically and thus practically relevant must begin with the following observation: Until very recently, even the idea of an Islamist party (let alone a democratic Islamist party) would have seemed, from the perspective of Islamism itself, a paradox if not a contradiction in terms. Islamism’s original conception of a healthy Islamic political life made no room for—indeed rejected—any role for parties of any sort. Islamist groups described themselves as the vanguard of Islamic revival, claiming that they represented the essence of Islam and reflected the aspiration of the global umma (community of believers) for an Islamic polity. Pluralism, which is a precondition for the operation of political parties, was rejected by most Islamist political
thinkers as a foreign idea.
As should be more or less obvious, the novelty not only of actually existing Islamist parties but of the very idea of such parties makes it exceptionally difficult to assess their democratic bona fides. But this difficulty merely adds another level of complication to a problem that stems from the very origins of Islamism and its conception of the true meaning of Islam and of Islam’s relationship to political life




การเมืองศาสนาอิสลามเป็นผู้ทรงอิทธิพลทางการเมืองเพียงครั้งเดียวใช้งานมากที่สุดในตะวันออกกลางในวันนี้. อนาคตขึ้นจะเชื่อมโยงอย่างใกล้ชิดกับที่ของพื้นที่. หากประเทศสหรัฐอเมริกาและสหภาพยุโรปมีความมุ่งมั่นที่จะสนับสนุนการปฏิรูปการเมืองในภูมิภาค, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. ยัง, สหรัฐอเมริกา. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. เหมือนกับ, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. สหรัฐอเมริกา. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. นอกจากนี้, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.



Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.





Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

อิสลาม Radical ใน Maghreb

Carlos Echeverría Jesús

การพัฒนา Islamist เคลื่อนไหวหัวรุนแรงถูก featureof แอลจีเรียสำคัญทางการเมืองตั้งแต่ช่วงกลางปี 1970, โดยเฉพาะหลังจากการตายของ PresidentHouari Boumediène, ประธานแรกของสาธารณรัฐ, ในเดือนธันวาคม 1978.1 Boumediènehad adopted a policy of Arabization that included phasing out the French language.French professors were replaced by Arabic speakers from Egypt, ประเทศเลบานอน, andSyria, many of them members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The troubles began in 1985, when the Mouvement islamique algérien (MIA),founded to protest the single-party socialist regime, began attacking police stations.Escalating tensions amid declining oil prices culminated in the Semoule revolt inOctober 1988. More than 500 people were killed in the streets of Algiers in thatrevolt, and the government was finally forced to undertake reforms. ใน 1989 itlegalized political parties, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and over thenext two years the Islamists were able to impose their will in many parts of thecountry, targeting symbols of Western “corruption” such as satellite TV dishes thatbrought in European channels, alcohol, and women who didn’t wear the hiyab (theIslam veil). FIS victories in the June 1990 municipal elections and in the first roundof the parliamentary elections held in December 1991 generated fears of animpending Islamist dictatorship and led to a preemptive interruption of the electoralprocess in January 1992. The next year saw an increase in the violence that hadbegun in 1991 with the FIS’s rhetoric in support of Saddam Hussein in the GulfWar, the growing presence of Algerian “Afghans”—Algerian volunteer fightersreturning from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan—and the November 1991massacre of border guards at Guemmar, on the border between Algeria andTunisia.2Until mid-1993, victims of MIA, Islamic Salvation Army–AIS (the FIS’sarmed wing), and Islamic Armed Group (GIA) violence were mostly policemen,soldiers, and terrorists. Later that year the violence expanded to claim both foreignand Algerian civilians. In September 1993, the bodies of seven foreigners werefound in various locations around the country.3 Dozens of judges, doctors,intellectuals, and journalists were also murdered that year. In October 1993 Islamistsvowed to kill any foreigner remaining in Algeria after December 1; more than 4,000foreigners left in November 1993.

เดินทางระหว่าง NEIGHBOURS MUSLIM ยุโรป

Lagendijk Joost

Jan Wiersma Marinus

“A ring of friends surrounding the Union [], from Morocco to Russia”.This is how, in late 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, described the key challenge facing Europe following the planned enlargement of 2004. The accession process had built up momentum, and the former communist countries of Central Europe had been stabilised and were transforming themselves into democracies. EU membership was not directly on the agenda for countries beyond the enlargement horizon, อย่างไรก็ตาม. How could Europe prevent new dividing lines forming at its borders? How could the European Union guarantee stability, security and peace along its perimeter? Those questions were perhaps most pertinent to the EU’s southern neighbours. Since 11 กันยายน 2001, in particular, our relations with the Islamic world have been imbued with a sense of urgency. Political developments in our Islamic neighbour countries bordering the Mediterranean could have a tremendous impact on European security. Although the area is nearby, the political distance is great. Amid threatening language about a ‘clash of civilisations’, the EU quickly drew the conclusion that conciliation and cooperation, rather than confrontation, constituted the best strategy for dealing with its southern neighbours.


Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 กันยายน 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. อย่างไรก็ตาม, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.


B Jon. Alterman

ข่าวมรณกรรมของการเมืองอิสลามได้เริ่มที่จะเขียน. หลังจากปี unstoppablegrowth ดูเหมือนว่า, ฝ่ายอิสลามได้เริ่มสะดุด. In Morocco, the Justice and DevelopmentParty (or PJD) did far worse than expected in last September’s elections, and Jordan’sIslamic Action Front lost more than half its seats in last month’s polling. The eagerly awaitedmanifesto of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a draft of which appeared last September,showed neither strength nor boldness. แทน, it suggested the group was beset by intellectualcontradictions and consumed by infighting.It is too early to declare the death of political Islam, as it was premature to proclaim therebirth of liberalism in the Arab world in 2003-04, but its prospects seem notably dimmerthan they did even a year ago.To some, the fall from grace was inevitable; political Islam has collapsed under its owncontradictions, they say. They argue that, in objective terms, political Islam was never morethan smoke and mirrors. Religion is about faith and truth, and politics are about compromiseand accommodation. Seen this way, political Islam was never a holy enterprise, butmerely an effort to boost the political prospects of one side in a political debate. Backed byreligious authority and legitimacy, opposition to Islamists’ will ceased to be merely political—it became heresy—and the Islamists benefited.These skeptics see political Islam as having been a useful way to protect political movements,cow political foes, and rally support. As a governing strategy, อย่างไรก็ตาม, they arguethat political Islam has not produced any successes. In two areas where it recently rose topower, the Palestinian Authority and Iraq, governance has been anemic. In Iran, where themullahs have been in power for almost three decades, clerics struggle for respect and thecountry hemorrhages money to Dubai and other overseas markets with more predictablerules and more positive returns. The most avowedly religious state in the Middle East, SaudiArabia, has notably less intellectual freedom than many of its neighbors, and the guardiansof orthodoxy there carefully circumscribe religious thought. As the French scholar of Islam,Olivier Roy, memorably observed more than a decade ago, the melding of religion and politics did not sanctify politics, it politicizedreligion.But while Islam has not provided a coherent theory of governance, let alone a universally accepted approach to the problems ofhumanity, the salience of religion continues to grow among many Muslims.That salience goes far beyond issues of dress, which have become more conservative for both women and men in recent years, andbeyond language, which invokes God’s name far more than was the case a decade ago. It also goes beyond the daily practice ofIslam—from prayer to charity to fasting—all of which are on the upswing.What has changed is something even more fundamental than physical appearance or ritual practice, and that is this: A growingnumber of Muslims start from the proposition that Islam is relevant to all aspects of their daily lives, and not merely the province oftheology or personal belief.Some see this as a return to traditionalism in the Middle East, when varying measures of superstition and spirituality governed dailylife. More accurately, though, what we are seeing is the rise of “neo-traditionalism,” in which symbols and slogans of the past areenlisted in the pursuit of hastening entry into the future. Islamic finance—which is to say, finance that relies on shares and returnsrather than interest—is booming, and sleek bank branches contain separate entrances for men and women. Slick young televangelistsrely on the tropes of sanctifying the everyday and seeking forgiveness, drawing tens of thousands to their meetings and televisionaudiences in the millions. Music videos—viewable on YouTube—implore young viewers to embrace faith and turn away froma meaningless secular life.Many in the West see secularism and relativism as concrete signs of modernity. ในตะวันออกกลาง, many see them as symbols ofa bankrupt secular nationalist past that failed to deliver justice or development, freedom or progress. The suffering of secularism ismeaningless, but the discipline of Islam is filled with signficance.It is for this reason that it is premature to declare the death of political Islam. ศาสนาอิสลาม, increasingly, cannot be contained. It is spreadingto all aspects of life, and it is robust among some of the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. It enjoys state subsidies to be sure,but states have little to do with the creativity occurring in the religious field.The danger is that this Islamization of public life will cast aside what little tolerance is left in the Middle East, after centuries asa—fundamentally Islamic—multicultural entrepôt. It is hard to imagine how Islamizing societies can flourish if they do not embraceinnovation and creativity, diversity and difference. “Islamic” is not a self-evident concept, as my friend Mustapha Kamal Pasha onceobserved, but it cannot be a source of strength in modern societies if it is tied to ossified and parochial notions of its nature.Dealing with difference is fundamentally a political task, and it is here that political Islam will face its true test. The formal structuresof government in the Middle East have proven durable, and they are unlikely to crumble under a wave of Islamic activism. For politicalIslam to succeed, it needs to find a way to unite diverse coalitions of varying faiths and degrees of faith, not merely speak to itsbase. It has not yet found a way to do so, but that is not to say that it cannot.

Internet และการเมือง Islamist ในจอร์แดน, โมร็อกโกและอียิปต์.

ปลายของศตวรรษที่ยี่สิบและจุดเริ่มต้นของ 21 เห็น
เผยแพร่ Internet เป็นศูนย์กลางในการติดต่อสื่อสาร, ข้อมูล, และความบันเทิง
ค้า. การแพร่กระจายของอินเทอร์เน็ตไปถึงทั้งสี่มุมของโลก, เชื่อมต่อ
Bedouin ในอียิปต์. ผ่านทางอินเทอร์เน็ต, การไหลของข้อมูลและเวลาจริงข่าวถึง
ข้ามทวีป, และเสียงของ subalternity มีศักยภาพในการงานของพวกเขาก่อนหน้านี้
เสียง silenced ผ่านบล็อก, เว็บไซต์และเว็บไซต์เครือข่ายสังคม. องค์กรทางการเมือง
ต่อเนื่องกันซ้ายขวาที่มีเป้าหมาย Internet เป็น mobilizer ทางการเมืองของอนาคต,
และรัฐบาลนี้ให้เข้าถึงเอกสารทางประวัติศาสตร์, แพลตฟอร์มอื่น, และ
เอกสารการบริหารผ่านเว็บไซต์ของตน. เหมือนกับ, กลุ่มศาสนาออนไลน์แสดงความเชื่อ
ผ่านเว็บไซต์อย่างเป็นทางการ, และบอร์ดให้สมาชิกจากทั่วโลกเพื่ออภิปรายประเด็นของ
eschatology, orthopraxy และจำนวนศาสนศาสตร์ nuanced ปัญหาใดๆ. Fusing สอง, Islamist
แพลตฟอร์มทางการเมือง, ข่าวที่เกี่ยวข้อง, และวัสดุเชิงเคร่งครัดคุยได้
views ศาสนศาสตร์. บทความนี้จะตรวจสอบเฉพาะ Nexus นี้ -- การใช้อินเทอร์เน็ตโดย
องค์กรทางการเมืองมุสลิมในตะวันออกกลางในประเทศจอร์แดน, และโมร็อกโก
แม้ว่าที่หลากหลายขององค์กรทางการเมือง Islamist ใช้อินเทอร์เน็ตเป็นเวทีให้
เผยแพร่ความคิดเห็นและสร้างชื่อเสียงระดับชาติหรือระดับนานาชาติ, วิธีการและความตั้งใจ
ของกลุ่มเหล่านี้แตกต่างกันมากและขึ้นอยู่กับลักษณะขององค์กร. กระดาษนี้จะ
ตรวจสอบการใช้อินเทอร์เน็ตสาม'บุคคล Islamist ปานกลาง': หน้า Action อิสลามใน
ประเทศจอร์แดน, ยุติธรรมและภาคีการพัฒนาในโมร็อกโกและภราดรภาพมุสลิมในอียิปต์.
เป็นสามเหล่านี้มีความซับซ้อนมากขึ้นทางการเมืองและชื่อเสียงของพวกเขา, ทั้งที่บ้าน
และต่างประเทศ, พวกเขาได้ใช้อินเทอร์เน็ตมากขึ้นสำหรับหลากหลายวัตถุประสงค์. แรก, Islamist
องค์กรได้ใช้อินเทอร์เน็ตเป็นส่วนขยายวงร่วมสมัยของประชาชน, ทรงกลม
ที่ผ่านกรอบบุคคล, สื่อสารและ institutionalize คิดเป็นสาธารณะกว้าง.
ในประการที่สอง, อินเทอร์เน็ตให้องค์กร Islamist forum ไม่กรองผ่านที่
เจ้าหน้าที่อาจส่งเสริมและโฆษณาตำแหน่งและมุมมองของพวกเขา, รวมทั้งหลีกเลี่ยงสื่อท้องถิ่น
ข้อ จำกัด ที่กำหนดโดยรัฐ. ในที่สุด, Internet จะช่วยให้องค์กร Islamist นำเสนอ
วาทกรรมต่อต้าน counterhegemonic ในระบอบปกครองหรือสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์หรือบนจอแสดงผลไปยัง
ผู้ชมต่างประเทศ. แรงจูงใจที่สามนี้ใช้ส่วนใหญ่เฉพาะเพื่อมุสลิม
ภราดรภาพ, ซึ่งนำเสนอภาษาอังกฤษซับซ้อนเว็บไซต์ออกแบบในตะวันตก
รูปแบบและปรับแต่งให้เข้าถึงผู้ชมเลือกของนักวิชาการ, นักการเมืองและนักหนังสือพิมพ์. MB
มี excelled นี้เรียกว่า"bridgeblogging" 1 และได้กำหนดมาตรฐานสำหรับบุคคล Islamist
พยายามมีอิทธิพลต่อการรับรู้ระหว่างประเทศของตำแหน่งงานของพวกเขา. เนื้อหาจะแตกต่างกัน
ระหว่างอาหรับและเวอร์ชันภาษาอังกฤษของเว็บไซต์, และจะตรวจสอบเพิ่มเติมในส่วน
ในภราดรภาพมุสลิม. ทั้งสามลูกซ้อนกันอย่างมีนัยสำคัญทั้งในความตั้งใจและ
ผลลัพธ์ที่ต้องการ; อย่างไรก็ตาม, เป้าหมายแต่ละกลุ่มเป้าหมายเป็นนักแสดงที่แตกต่างกัน: สาธารณะ, สื่อมวลชน, และ
ระบบการปกครอง. ต่อไปนี้การวิเคราะห์ของทั้งสามพื้นที่, กระดาษนี้จะดำเนินการเป็นกรณีศึกษา
การวิเคราะห์เว็บไซต์ของ IAF, PJD และภราดรภาพมุสลิม.

Helms Andrew


The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, ข้อมูล, entertainment and commerce.

การแพร่กระจายของอินเทอร์เน็ตไปถึงทั้งสี่มุมของโลก, connecting the researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the Bedouin in Egypt.

ผ่านทางอินเทอร์เน็ต, the flow of information and real-time news reaches across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously silenced voices through blogs, เว็บไซต์และเว็บไซต์เครือข่ายสังคม.

Political organizations across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future, และรัฐบาลนี้ให้เข้าถึงเอกสารทางประวัติศาสตร์, แพลตฟอร์มอื่น, and administrative papers through their sites. เหมือนกับ, religious groups display their beliefs online through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of eschatology, orthopraxy และจำนวนศาสนศาสตร์ nuanced ปัญหาใดๆ.

Fusing สอง, องค์กรทางการเมืองมุสลิมได้ทำให้สถานะของพวกเขาที่รู้จักกันผ่านเว็บไซต์รายละเอียดซับซ้อนแพลตฟอร์มทางการเมือง, ข่าวที่เกี่ยวข้อง, และวัสดุเชิงเคร่งครัด views คุยเกี่ยวกับธรรมชาติของพวกเขา. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, โมร็อกโกและอียิปต์.

Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization.

This paper will examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, ยุติธรรมและภาคีการพัฒนาในโมร็อกโกและภราดรภาพมุสลิมในอียิปต์. เป็นสามเหล่านี้มีความซับซ้อนมากขึ้นทางการเมืองและชื่อเสียงของพวกเขา, both at home and abroad, พวกเขาได้ใช้อินเทอร์เน็ตมากขึ้นสำหรับหลากหลายวัตถุประสงค์.

แรก, Islamist organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere through which parties frame, สื่อสารและ institutionalize คิดเป็นสาธารณะกว้าง.

ในประการที่สอง, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media restrictions imposed by the state.

ในที่สุด, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim Brotherhood, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, นักการเมืองและนักหนังสือพิมพ์.

The MB has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section on the Muslim Brotherhood.

These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and desired outcomes; อย่างไรก็ตาม, เป้าหมายแต่ละกลุ่มเป้าหมายเป็นนักแสดงที่แตกต่างกัน: สาธารณะ, สื่อมวลชน, and the regime. ต่อไปนี้การวิเคราะห์ของทั้งสามพื้นที่, this paper will proceed into a case study analysis of the websites of the IAF, PJD และภราดรภาพมุสลิม.