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Mâine arabă

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

octombrie 6, 1981, trebuia să fie o zi de sărbătoare în Egipt. A marcat aniversarea celui mai mare moment de victorie al Egiptului în trei conflicte arabo-israeliene, când armata subordonată a țării a străbătut Canalul Suez în zilele de deschidere 1973 Războiul din Yom Kippur și a trimis trupe israeliene care se retrăgeau în retragere. Pe un răcoros, dimineață fără nori, stadionul din Cairo era plin de familii egiptene care veniseră să vadă militarii strângându-și echipamentul, Președintele Anwar el-Sadat,arhitectul războiului, privea cu satisfacție cum bărbații și mașinile defilau în fața lui. Eram în apropiere, un corespondent străin nou sosit.Deodată, unul dintre camioanele armatei s-a oprit direct în fața standului de examinare, exact când șase avioane Mirage răcneau deasupra capului într-o performanță acrobatică, pictând cerul cu trasee lungi de roșu, galben, Violet,și fum verde. Sadat se ridică, se pare că se pregătea să facă schimb de saluturi cu un alt contingent de trupe egiptene. El s-a făcut o țintă perfectă pentru patru asasini islamiști care au sărit din camion, a asaltat podiumul, În timp ce ucigașii au continuat, ceea ce părea o eternitate, să stropească standul cu focul lor mortal, M-am gândit pentru o clipă dacă să lovesc pământul și să risc să fiu călcat în picioare de spectatori panicați sau să rămân în picioare și să risc să iau un glonț rătăcit. Instinctul mi-a spus să rămân în picioare, iar sentimentul meu de datorie jurnalistică m-a determinat să merg să aflu dacă Sadat era în viață sau mort.

Liberal Democracy and Political Islam: the Search for Common Ground.

Mostapha Benhenda

This paper seeks to establish a dialogue between democratic and Islamic political theories.1 The interplay between them is puzzling: for example, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
regim, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. De exemplu, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, which is a defining feature of democracy. On the contrary, they often reject the principle of separation between religion and the state, which is often considered to be part of democracy (at least, of democracy as known in the United States today). Given this mixed assessment of democratic principles, it seems interesting to determine the conception of democracy underlying Islamic political models. In other words, we should try to find out what is democratic in “theodemocracy”. To that end, among the impressive diversity and plurality of Islamic traditions of normative political thought, we essentially focus on the broad current of thought going back to Abu ‘Ala Maududi and the Egyptian intellectual Sayyed Qutb.8 This particular trend of thought is interesting because in the Muslim world, it lies at the basis of some of the most challenging oppositions to the diffusion of the values originating from the West. Based on religious values, this trend elaborated a political model alternative to liberal democracy. Broadly speaking, the conception of democracy included in this Islamic political model is procedural. With some differences, this conception is inspired by democratic theories advocated by some constitutionalists and political scientists.10 It is thin and minimalist, up to a certain point. De exemplu, it does not rely on any notion of popular sovereignty and it does not require any separation between religion and politics. The first aim of this paper is to elaborate this minimalist conception. We make a detailed restatement of it in order to isolate this conception from its moral (liberal) foundations, which are controversial from the particular Islamic viewpoint considered here. Într-adevăr, the democratic process is usually derived from a principle of personal autonomy, which is not endorsed by these Islamic theories.11 Here, we show that such principle is not necessary to justify a democratic process.

Iraq and the Future of Political Islam

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Cultura politică islamică, Democraţie, și drepturile omului

Daniel E. Preț

S-a susținut că islamul facilitează autoritarismul, contrazice

valorile societăților occidentale, și afectează semnificativ rezultatele politice importante
în națiunile musulmane. prin urmare, cărturari, comentatori, și guvern
oficialii indică frecvent „„ fundamentalismul islamic ”ca fiind următorul
amenințare ideologică pentru democrațiile liberale. Această vedere, in orice caz, se bazează în primul rând
privind analiza textelor, Teoria politică islamică, și studii ad hoc
de țări individuale, care nu iau în considerare alți factori. Este argumentul meu
că textele și tradițiile islamului, ca cele ale altor religii,
poate fi folosit pentru a sprijini o varietate de sisteme și politici politice. Țară
studiile specifice și descriptive nu ne ajută să găsim modele care să ne ajute
ne explicăm diferitele relații dintre islam și politică din întreaga lume
țări ale lumii musulmane. Prin urmare, o nouă abordare a studiului
este necesară legătura dintre islam și politică.
sugerez, printr-o evaluare riguroasă a relației dintre islam,
democraţie, și drepturile omului la nivel transnațional, prea mult
se pune accent pe puterea Islamului ca forță politică. eu primul
utilizați studii de caz comparative, care se concentrează pe factorii legați de interacțiune
între grupuri și regimuri islamice, influențele economice, clivaje etnice,

și dezvoltarea societății, pentru a explica varianța în influența

Islamul asupra politicii din opt națiuni.

STRATEGII PENTRU ANGAJAREA ISLAMULUI POLITIC

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Islamul politic este cea mai activă forță politică din Orientul Mijlociu astăzi. Viitorul său este intim legat de cel al regiunii. Dacă Statele Unite și Uniunea Europeană se angajează să sprijine reforma politică în regiune, vor trebui să elaboreze concret, strategii coerente pentru angajarea grupurilor islamiste. Inca, SUA. în general nu a fost dispus să deschidă un dialog cu aceste mișcări. asemănător, Angajamentul UE cu islamiștii a fost excepția, nu regula. Acolo unde există contacte de nivel scăzut, ele servesc în principal scopurilor de colectare a informațiilor, nu obiective strategice. SUA. și UE au o serie de programe care abordează dezvoltarea economică și politică din regiune - printre care inițiativa de parteneriat în Orientul Mijlociu (MEPI), Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), Uniunea pentru Mediterana, și politica europeană de vecinătate (ENP) - totuși, ei au puțin de spus despre modul în care provocarea opoziției politice islamiste se încadrează în obiective regionale mai largi. NE. și asistența și programarea democrației UE sunt direcționate aproape în totalitate fie către guverne autoritare în sine, fie către grupuri seculare ale societății civile cu sprijin minim în propriile societăți.
Este timpul pentru o reevaluare a politicilor actuale. De la atacurile teroriste din septembrie 11, 2001, sprijinirea democrației din Orientul Mijlociu și-a asumat o importanță mai mare pentru factorii de decizie occidentali, care văd o legătură între lipsa democrației și violența politică. O atenție sporită a fost dedicată înțelegerii variațiilor din islamul politic. Noua administrație americană este mai deschisă extinderii comunicării cu lumea musulmană. Între timp, marea majoritate a principalelor organizații islamiste - inclusiv Frăția Musulmană din Egipt, Frontul de acțiune islamică al Iordaniei (IAF), Partidul Justiției și Dezvoltării din Maroc (PJD), mișcarea constituțională islamică din Kuweit, și Partidul Yemeni Islah - au făcut din ce în ce mai mult sprijinul pentru reforma politică și democrație o componentă centrală a platformelor lor politice. în plus, mulți au semnalat un interes puternic în deschiderea dialogului cu SUA. și guvernele UE.
Viitorul relațiilor dintre națiunile occidentale și Orientul Mijlociu poate fi determinat în mare măsură de gradul în care primii angajează partidele islamiste nonviolente într-un dialog larg despre interese și obiective comune.. S-a înregistrat o proliferare recentă a studiilor privind angajamentul cu islamiștii, însă puțini abordează în mod clar ce ar putea presupune în practică. Ca Zoe Nautré, coleg vizitat la Consiliul German pentru Relații Externe, o pune, „UE se gândește la angajament, dar nu știe cu adevărat cum.” 1 În speranța clarificării discuției, distingem trei niveluri de „logodnă”,”Fiecare cu mijloace și scopuri variate: contacte de nivel scăzut, dialog strategic, și parteneriat.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

William Thomasson

Is Islam a religion of violence? Is the widely applied stereotype that all Muslims are violently opposed to “infidel” Western cultures accurate? Today’s world is confronted with two opposing faces of Islam; one being a peaceful, adaptive, modernized Islam, and the other strictly fundamentalist and against all things un-Islamic or that may corrupt Islamic culture. Both specimens, though seemingly opposed, mingle and inter-relate, and are the roots of the confusion over modern Islam’s true identity. Islam’s vastness makes it difficult to analyze, but one can focus on a particular Islamic region and learn much about Islam as a whole. Într-adevăr, one may do this with Egypt, particularly the relationship between the Fundamentalist society known as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and population. The two opposing faces of Islam are presented in Egypt in a manageable portion, offering a smaller model of the general multi-national struggle of today’s Islam. In an effort to exemplify the role of Islamic Fundamentalists, and their relationship with Islamic society as a whole in the current debate over what Islam is, this essay will offer a history of the Society of Muslim Brothers, a description of how the organization originated, functioned, and was organized, and a summary of the Brother’s activities and influences on Egyptian culture. Certainly, by doing so, one may gain a deeper understanding of how Islamic Fundamentalists interpret Islam


Moderate and Radical Islam

ANGEL RABASA

One of the components of this study is relevant to a question that I was asked to address,which is how radical Islam differs from moderate or mainstream Islam. Frankly, one ofthe problems that we have found in the discourse about Islam is that the terms “radical”or “moderate” are often used in a subjective and imprecise way, without going through aprocess of critically examining what these terms mean. In some cases, the term radical ormilitant is defined in terms of support for terrorism or other forms of violence. Webelieve that this is too narrow a focus, that there is, in fact, a much larger universe offundamentalist or Salafi groups who may not themselves practice violence, but thatpropagate an ideology that creates the conditions for violence and that is subversive ofthe values of democratic societies.

OF ISLAMISTS AND BALLOT BOXES

Vickie Langohr

As Islamist movements have gained strength across the Muslim world, their commitmentto democratic means of achieving and exercising power has been repeatedlyanalyzed. The question of whether resort to violence to achieve its goals is inherentin the Islamist project (that what some Islamists understand as a divine mandate toimplement sharia ultimately sanctions the use of force against dissenters) or contingent(that the violent exclusion of Islamists from the political arena has driven themto arms, best expressed by Franc¸ois Burgat’s contention that any Western politicalparty could be turned into the Armed Islamic Group in weeks if it were subjected tothe same repression Islamists had endured1) looms large in this debate. Where Islamistmovements have not had the opportunity to participate in elections for political office,analysts willing to give these movements the benefit of the democratic doubt arguethat their peaceful participation in the student body and syndicate elections that theyhave been allowed to contest proves their intention to respect the results of nationallevelelections.2 They also point to these groups’ repeated public commitment to playby the rules of the electoral game.3 The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptand Jordan and members of the Islah Party in Yemen have successfully competed innot one but a series of parliamentary elections and evinced a tendency to wage theirbattles through parliament and the courts rather than by force suggests to many thatthe question of whether Islamists can ever be democrats has already been settled inthe affirmative.Analysts who are more skeptical of the possibility of a democratic Islamism generallyadvance one of two arguments. The first is procedural: that although some Islamistshave seemingly opted to effect change through the ballot box, they have chosenthis method only because they do not yet have the power to use more forceful ones.In a manner of speaking, this line of thinking accuses Islamists competing in parliamentarypolitics of engaging in political taqiyya, of parroting the rhetoric that democratswant to hear until they obtain sufficient power to abort the democratic politicalprocess and institute a policy of “one-man, one-vote, one-time.”

Brothers in Arms?

Joshua Stacher
Within and between western governments, a heated policy debate is raging over the question of whether or not to engage with the world’s oldest and most influential political Islamist group: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. In 2006, publication of a series of leaked memos in the New Statesman magazine revealed that political analysts within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended an enhancement of informal contacts with members of the Brotherhood.
The authors of these documents argued that the UK government should be seeking to influence this group, given the extent of its grassroots support in Egypt. The British analysts further suggested that engagement could provide a valuable opportunity for challenging the Brotherhood’s perceptions of the West, including the UK, and for detailed questioning of their prescriptions for solving the challenges facing Egypt and the wider region.
The Bush administration in the United States has been far less open to the idea of direct engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that it would be inappropriate to enter into formal ties with a group that is not legally recognised by the Egyptian government. However, there are indications that the US position may be starting to shift. In 2007, it emerged that the State Department had approved a policy that would enable US diplomats to meet and coordinate with elected Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and other Arab states.

Within and between western governments, a heated policy debate is raging over the question of whether or not to engage with the world’s oldest and most influential political Islamist group: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. In 2006, publication of a series of leaked memos in the New Statesman magazine revealed that political analysts within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended an enhancement of informal contacts with members of the Brotherhood.

The authors of these documents argued that the UK government should be seeking to influence this group, given the extent of its grassroots support in Egypt. The British analysts further suggested that engagement could provide a valuable opportunity for challenging the Brotherhood’s perceptions of the West, including the UK, and for detailed questioning of their prescriptions for solving the challenges facing Egypt and the wider region.

The Bush administration in the United States has been far less open to the idea of direct engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that it would be inappropriate to enter into formal ties with a group that is not legally recognised by the Egyptian government. However, there are indications that the US position may be starting to shift. In 2007, it emerged that the State Department had approved a policy that would enable US diplomats to meet and coordinate with elected Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and other Arab states.