が付けられているすべてのエントリー: "中等度の"
アラブ明日
DAVID B. OTTAWAY
10月 6, 1981, エジプトでのお祝いの日になることを意図していた. これは、3回のアラブ-イスラエル紛争におけるエジプトの最も壮大な勝利の瞬間の記念日でした。, 国の弱者軍がスエズ運河を横切って開通したとき 1973 第四次中東戦争とイスラエル軍の撤退. クールに, 雲ひとつない朝, カイロスタジアムは、軍の支柱を見に来たエジプトの家族でいっぱいでした。, アンワルエルサダト大統領,戦争の建築家, 男性と機械が彼の前をパレードするのを満足して見守っていた. 私は近くにいました, 新しく到着した外国特派員突然。, アクロバティックなパフォーマンスで6機のミラージュジェットが頭上を吠えたのと同じように、軍用トラックの1台がレビュースタンドの真正面で停止しました。, 赤の長い道で空を描く, 黄, 紫の,と緑の煙. サダトは立ち上がった, どうやらエジプト軍のさらに別の部隊と敬礼を交換する準備をしている. 彼はトラックから飛び降りた4人のイスラム教徒の暗殺者の完璧な標的になりました, 表彰台を襲った, 殺人者たちが永遠のように思われることを続けて、スタンドに致命的な火を吹きかけたので、彼の体を弾丸でいっぱいにしました。, 私は一瞬、地面にぶつかってパニックに陥った観客に踏みにじられて死ぬ危険を冒すのか、それとも足を踏み入れたままで迷走する危険を冒すのかを考えました。. 本能は私に私の足にとどまるように言った, ジャーナリズムの義務感から、サダトが生きているのか死んでいるのかを調べに行くようになりました。.
自由民主主義と政治イスラム教: コモングラウンドを検索します.
Mostapha Benhenda
イラクと政治的イスラムの未来
ジェームスPiscatori
イスラム政治文化, 民主主義, 人権
て、Daniel E. 価格
政治的イスラムを係合するための戦略
シャディハミド
AMANDAはカッドレック
エジプトのムスリム同胞団
ウィリアムトーマソン
Is Islam a religion of violence? Is the widely applied stereotype that all Muslims are violently opposed to “infidel” Western cultures accurate? Today’s world is confronted with two opposing faces of Islam; one being a peaceful, adaptive, modernized Islam, and the other strictly fundamentalist and against all things un-Islamic or that may corrupt Islamic culture. Both specimens, though seemingly opposed, mingle and inter-relate, and are the roots of the confusion over modern Islam’s true identity. Islam’s vastness makes it difficult to analyze, but one can focus on a particular Islamic region and learn much about Islam as a whole. 確かに, one may do this with Egypt, particularly the relationship between the Fundamentalist society known as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and population. The two opposing faces of Islam are presented in Egypt in a manageable portion, offering a smaller model of the general multi-national struggle of today’s Islam. In an effort to exemplify the role of Islamic Fundamentalists, and their relationship with Islamic society as a whole in the current debate over what Islam is, this essay will offer a history of the Society of Muslim Brothers, a description of how the organization originated, functioned, and was organized, and a summary of the Brother’s activities and influences on Egyptian culture. そうです, by doing so, one may gain a deeper understanding of how Islamic Fundamentalists interpret Islam
穏健派とイスラム過激派
エンジェルRabasa
本研究のコンポーネントの1つは、私が対処するように頼まれた質問に関連している,イスラム教は中等度以上の主流イスラムとどう違うのかラジカルされている. 率直に, 我々はイスラームについての談話を発見した一前記の問題は、用語"基"または"中程度"は、しばしば主観的かつ不正確な方法で使用されているということです, これらの用語の意味を批判的に検討するaprocessを経由せずに. いくつかのケースで, ラジカルormilitant用語テロや暴力の他の形態のサポートの面で定義されている. Webelieveこれは、焦点を絞るもされていることを, があること, 実際には, 自身が暴力を実践していない可能性がありますはるかに大きい宇宙offundamentalistまたはサラフィーグループ, しかし、暴力のための条件を作成している民主主義社会を破壊する前記の値をイデオロギーをthatpropagate.
イスラム主義者と投票箱OF
Vickie Langohr
As Islamist movements have gained strength across the Muslim world, their commitmentto democratic means of achieving and exercising power has been repeatedlyanalyzed. The question of whether resort to violence to achieve its goals is inherentin the Islamist project (that what some Islamists understand as a divine mandate toimplement sharia ultimately sanctions the use of force against dissenters) or contingent(that the violent exclusion of Islamists from the political arena has driven themto arms, best expressed by Franc¸ois Burgat’s contention that any Western politicalparty could be turned into the Armed Islamic Group in weeks if it were subjected tothe same repression Islamists had endured1) looms large in this debate. Where Islamistmovements have not had the opportunity to participate in elections for political office,analysts willing to give these movements the benefit of the democratic doubt arguethat their peaceful participation in the student body and syndicate elections that theyhave been allowed to contest proves their intention to respect the results of nationallevelelections.2 They also point to these groups’ repeated public commitment to playby the rules of the electoral game.3 The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptand Jordan and members of the Islah Party in Yemen have successfully competed innot one but a series of parliamentary elections and evinced a tendency to wage theirbattles through parliament and the courts rather than by force suggests to many thatthe question of whether Islamists can ever be democrats has already been settled inthe affirmative.Analysts who are more skeptical of the possibility of a democratic Islamism generallyadvance one of two arguments. The first is procedural: that although some Islamistshave seemingly opted to effect change through the ballot box, they have chosenthis method only because they do not yet have the power to use more forceful ones.In a manner of speaking, this line of thinking accuses Islamists competing in parliamentarypolitics of engaging in political taqiyya, of parroting the rhetoric that democratswant to hear until they obtain sufficient power to abort the democratic politicalprocess and institute a policy of “one-man, one-vote, one-time.”
Brothers in Arms?
Within and between western governments, a heated policy debate is raging over the question of whether or not to engage with the world’s oldest and most influential political Islamist group: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. In 2006, publication of a series of leaked memos in the New Statesman magazine revealed that political analysts within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended an enhancement of informal contacts with members of the Brotherhood.
The authors of these documents argued that the UK government should be seeking to influence this group, given the extent of its grassroots support in Egypt. The British analysts further suggested that engagement could provide a valuable opportunity for challenging the Brotherhood’s perceptions of the West, including the UK, and for detailed questioning of their prescriptions for solving the challenges facing Egypt and the wider region.
The Bush administration in the United States has been far less open to the idea of direct engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that it would be inappropriate to enter into formal ties with a group that is not legally recognised by the Egyptian government. However, there are indications that the US position may be starting to shift. In 2007, it emerged that the State Department had approved a policy that would enable US diplomats to meet and coordinate with elected Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and other Arab states.