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El demà àrab

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Octubre 6, 1981, havia de ser un dia de celebració a Egipte. Va marcar l'aniversari de la victòria més gran d'Egipte en tres conflictes àrabs-israelians, quan l'exèrcit desfavorit del país va creuar el canal de Suez en els primers dies de la 1973 La guerra del Yom Kippur i va enviar tropes israelianes en retirada. En un fresc, matí sense núvols, l'estadi del Caire estava ple de famílies egípcies que havien vingut a veure com l'exèrcit posava el seu maquinari. A l'estand de revisió, President Anwar el-Sadat,l'arquitecte de la guerra, observava amb satisfacció com homes i màquines desfilaven davant seu. Estava a prop, un corresponsal estranger acabat d'arribar.De sobte, un dels camions de l'exèrcit es va aturar directament davant de l'estand de revisió just quan sis avions Mirage rugien per sobre en una actuació acrobàtica., pintant el cel amb llargs estels de vermell, groc, porpra,i fum verd. Sadat es va aixecar, aparentment es prepara per intercanviar salutacions amb un altre contingent de tropes egípcies. Es va convertir en un objectiu perfecte per a quatre assassins islamistes que van saltar del camió, va assaltar el podi, i va cridar el seu cos amb bales. Mentre els assassins van continuar durant el que va semblar una eternitat ruixant el suport amb el seu foc mortal., Vaig pensar per un instant si topar a terra i arriscar-me a ser trepitjat fins a la mort per espectadors en pànic o romandre a peu i arriscar-me a agafar una bala perduda.. L'instint em va dir que em mantingués de peu, i el meu sentit del deure periodístic em va impulsar a anar a saber si Sadat era viu o mort.

Liberal Democracy and Political Islam: the Search for Common Ground.

Mostapha Benhenda

This paper seeks to establish a dialogue between democratic and Islamic political theories.1 The interplay between them is puzzling: for example, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
règim, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. Per exemple, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, which is a defining feature of democracy. On the contrary, they often reject the principle of separation between religion and the state, which is often considered to be part of democracy (at least, of democracy as known in the United States today). Given this mixed assessment of democratic principles, it seems interesting to determine the conception of democracy underlying Islamic political models. En altres paraules, we should try to find out what is democratic in “theodemocracy”. To that end, among the impressive diversity and plurality of Islamic traditions of normative political thought, we essentially focus on the broad current of thought going back to Abu ‘Ala Maududi and the Egyptian intellectual Sayyed Qutb.8 This particular trend of thought is interesting because in the Muslim world, it lies at the basis of some of the most challenging oppositions to the diffusion of the values originating from the West. Based on religious values, this trend elaborated a political model alternative to liberal democracy. Broadly speaking, the conception of democracy included in this Islamic political model is procedural. With some differences, this conception is inspired by democratic theories advocated by some constitutionalists and political scientists.10 It is thin and minimalist, up to a certain point. Per exemple, it does not rely on any notion of popular sovereignty and it does not require any separation between religion and politics. The first aim of this paper is to elaborate this minimalist conception. We make a detailed restatement of it in order to isolate this conception from its moral (liberal) foundations, which are controversial from the particular Islamic viewpoint considered here. En efecte, the democratic process is usually derived from a principle of personal autonomy, which is not endorsed by these Islamic theories.11 Here, we show that such principle is not necessary to justify a democratic process.

Iraq and the Future of Political Islam

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?”, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Cultura política islàmica, democràcia, i Drets Humans

Daniel I. preu

S'ha argumentat que l'islam facilita l'autoritarisme, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. conseqüentment, erudits, comentaristes, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. Aquesta vista, malgrat això, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Teoria política islàmica, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, que no tenen en compte altres factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, com els d'altres religions,
es pot utilitzar per donar suport a una varietat de sistemes i polítiques polítiques. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Per tant, un nou enfocament de l'estudi de la
Es demana connexió entre l'islam i la política.
suggereixo, mitjançant una avaluació rigorosa de la relació entre l'Islam,
democràcia, i els drets humans a nivell transnacional, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, influències econòmiques, clivages ètnics,

i desenvolupament de la societat, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

ESTRATÈGIES PER A IMPLICAR L'ISLAM POLÍTIC

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA ECOM

L'islam polític és avui la força política més activa a l'Orient Mitjà. El seu futur està íntimament lligat al de la regió. Si els Estats Units i la Unió Europea es comprometen a donar suport a la reforma política a la regió, hauran d'elaborar el formigó, estratègies coherents per implicar grups islamistes. No obstant això, Els EUA. generalment no ha volgut obrir un diàleg amb aquests moviments. De la mateixa manera, El compromís de la UE amb els islamistes ha estat l'excepció, no la regla. On hi ha contactes de baix nivell, serveixen principalment per a la recollida d'informació, no objectius estratègics. Els EUA. i la UE tenen una sèrie de programes que aborden el desenvolupament econòmic i polític a la regió, entre ells la Iniciativa d'Associació per a l'Orient Mitjà. (MEPI), la Corporació del Desafiament del Mil·lenni (MCC), la Unió per la Mediterrània, i la Política Europea de Veïnatge (ENP) No obstant això, tenen poc a dir sobre com el repte de l'oposició política islamista s'ajusta als objectius regionals més amplis. nosaltres. i l'assistència i la programació de la democràcia de la UE es dirigeixen gairebé completament als propis governs autoritaris o a grups laics de la societat civil amb un suport mínim a les seves pròpies societats..
És el moment d'una reavaluació de les polítiques actuals. Des dels atemptats terroristes de setembre 11, 2001, el suport a la democràcia de l'Orient Mitjà ha assumit una importància més gran per als responsables polítics occidentals, que veuen un vincle entre la manca de democràcia i la violència política. S'ha dedicat més atenció a la comprensió de les variacions dins de l'islam polític. La nova administració nord-americana està més oberta a ampliar la comunicació amb el món musulmà. Mentrestant, la gran majoria de les organitzacions islamistes principals, inclosa la Germandat Musulmana a Egipte, Front d'Acció Islàmica de Jordània (IAF), Partit de la Justícia i el Desenvolupament del Marroc (PJD), el Moviment Constitucional Islàmic de Kuwait, i el Partit Iemenita d'Islah, han fet que cada cop més el suport a la reforma política i la democràcia sigui un component central de les seves plataformes polítiques.. A més, molts han manifestat un gran interès a obrir un diàleg amb els EUA. i els governs de la UE.
El futur de les relacions entre les nacions occidentals i l'Orient Mitjà pot estar determinat en gran mesura pel grau en què els primers impliquen els partits islamistes noviolents en un ampli diàleg sobre interessos i objectius compartits.. Hi ha hagut una proliferació recent d'estudis sobre el compromís amb els islamistes, però pocs aborden clarament el que pot suposar a la pràctica. Com Zoe Nautre, becari visitant al Consell Alemany de Relacions Exteriors, ho posa, "La UE està pensant en el compromís, però realment no sap com."1 Amb l'esperança d'aclarir la discussió, distingim entre tres nivells de “complicació,” cadascun amb diferents mitjans i finalitats: contactes de baix nivell, diàleg estratègic, i col·laboració.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

William Thomasson

Is Islam a religion of violence? Is the widely applied stereotype that all Muslims are violently opposed to “infidel” Western cultures accurate? Today’s world is confronted with two opposing faces of Islam; one being a peaceful, adaptive, modernized Islam, and the other strictly fundamentalist and against all things un-Islamic or that may corrupt Islamic culture. Both specimens, though seemingly opposed, mingle and inter-relate, and are the roots of the confusion over modern Islam’s true identity. Islam’s vastness makes it difficult to analyze, but one can focus on a particular Islamic region and learn much about Islam as a whole. En efecte, one may do this with Egypt, particularly the relationship between the Fundamentalist society known as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and population. The two opposing faces of Islam are presented in Egypt in a manageable portion, offering a smaller model of the general multi-national struggle of today’s Islam. In an effort to exemplify the role of Islamic Fundamentalists, and their relationship with Islamic society as a whole in the current debate over what Islam is, this essay will offer a history of the Society of Muslim Brothers, a description of how the organization originated, functioned, and was organized, and a summary of the Brother’s activities and influences on Egyptian culture. Certainly, by doing so, one may gain a deeper understanding of how Islamic Fundamentalists interpret Islam


Islam moderat i radical

ÀNGEL RABASA

Un dels components d'aquest estudi és rellevant per a una pregunta que em van demanar,que és com es diferencia l'Islam radical de l'Islam moderat o dominant. Francament, Un dels problemes que hem trobat en el discurs sobre l'islam és que els termes "radical" o "moderat" s'utilitzen sovint d'una manera subjectiva i imprecisa., sense passar per un procés d'examen crític del que signifiquen aquests termes. En alguns casos, el terme radical omilitant es defineix en termes de suport al terrorisme o altres formes de violència. Webcreu que aquest és un focus massa reduït, que hi ha, de fet, un univers molt més ampli de grups fonamentalistes o salafistes que potser no practiquen la violència, sinó que propaguen una ideologia que crea les condicions per a la violència i que és subversiva dels valors de les societats democràtiques..

OF ISLAMISTS AND BALLOT BOXES

Vickie Langohr

As Islamist movements have gained strength across the Muslim world, their commitmentto democratic means of achieving and exercising power has been repeatedlyanalyzed. The question of whether resort to violence to achieve its goals is inherentin the Islamist project (that what some Islamists understand as a divine mandate toimplement sharia ultimately sanctions the use of force against dissenters) or contingent(that the violent exclusion of Islamists from the political arena has driven themto arms, best expressed by Franc¸ois Burgat’s contention that any Western politicalparty could be turned into the Armed Islamic Group in weeks if it were subjected tothe same repression Islamists had endured1) looms large in this debate. Where Islamistmovements have not had the opportunity to participate in elections for political office,analysts willing to give these movements the benefit of the democratic doubt arguethat their peaceful participation in the student body and syndicate elections that theyhave been allowed to contest proves their intention to respect the results of nationallevelelections.2 They also point to these groups’ repeated public commitment to playby the rules of the electoral game.3 The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptand Jordan and members of the Islah Party in Yemen have successfully competed innot one but a series of parliamentary elections and evinced a tendency to wage theirbattles through parliament and the courts rather than by force suggests to many thatthe question of whether Islamists can ever be democrats has already been settled inthe affirmative.Analysts who are more skeptical of the possibility of a democratic Islamism generallyadvance one of two arguments. The first is procedural: that although some Islamistshave seemingly opted to effect change through the ballot box, they have chosenthis method only because they do not yet have the power to use more forceful ones.In a manner of speaking, this line of thinking accuses Islamists competing in parliamentarypolitics of engaging in political taqiyya, of parroting the rhetoric that democratswant to hear until they obtain sufficient power to abort the democratic politicalprocess and institute a policy of “one-man, one-vote, one-time.”

Brothers in Arms?

Joshua Stacher
Within and between western governments, a heated policy debate is raging over the question of whether or not to engage with the world’s oldest and most influential political Islamist group: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. In 2006, publication of a series of leaked memos in the New Statesman magazine revealed that political analysts within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended an enhancement of informal contacts with members of the Brotherhood.
The authors of these documents argued that the UK government should be seeking to influence this group, given the extent of its grassroots support in Egypt. The British analysts further suggested that engagement could provide a valuable opportunity for challenging the Brotherhood’s perceptions of the West, including the UK, and for detailed questioning of their prescriptions for solving the challenges facing Egypt and the wider region.
The Bush administration in the United States has been far less open to the idea of direct engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that it would be inappropriate to enter into formal ties with a group that is not legally recognised by the Egyptian government. However, there are indications that the US position may be starting to shift. In 2007, it emerged that the State Department had approved a policy that would enable US diplomats to meet and coordinate with elected Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and other Arab states.

Within and between western governments, a heated policy debate is raging over the question of whether or not to engage with the world’s oldest and most influential political Islamist group: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. In 2006, publication of a series of leaked memos in the New Statesman magazine revealed that political analysts within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended an enhancement of informal contacts with members of the Brotherhood.

The authors of these documents argued that the UK government should be seeking to influence this group, given the extent of its grassroots support in Egypt. The British analysts further suggested that engagement could provide a valuable opportunity for challenging the Brotherhood’s perceptions of the West, including the UK, and for detailed questioning of their prescriptions for solving the challenges facing Egypt and the wider region.

The Bush administration in the United States has been far less open to the idea of direct engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that it would be inappropriate to enter into formal ties with a group that is not legally recognised by the Egyptian government. However, there are indications that the US position may be starting to shift. In 2007, it emerged that the State Department had approved a policy that would enable US diplomats to meet and coordinate with elected Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and other Arab states.