RSSAlle Entries Tagged Met: "Gematigde"

Die Arabiese Môre

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Oktober 6, 1981, was bedoel as 'n dag van viering in Egipte. Dit was die herdenking van Egipte se grootste oomblik van oorwinning in drie Arabies-Israelitiese konflikte, toe die land se onderhondleër oor die Suezkanaal in die openingsdae stoot 1973 Yom Kippur-oorlog en stuur Israelitiese troepe om terug te trek. Op 'n koelte, wolklose oggend, die Kaïro-stadion was propvol Egiptiese gesinne wat die militêre stut sy hardeware gaan sien het, President Anwar el-Sadat,die oorlog se argitek, met tevredenheid dopgehou terwyl mans en masjiene voor hom staan. Ek was naby, 'n nuut aangekome buitelandse korrespondent. Skielik, een van die weermagvragmotors het direk voor die beoordeelstalletjie gestop net toe ses Mirage-jets in 'n akrobatiese vertoning oorhoofs gebrul het, die lug skilder met lang rooi roetes, geel, pers,en groen rook. Sadat staan ​​op, klaarblyklik voor te berei om hulde met nog 'n kontingent Egiptiese troepe te ruil. Hy het homself 'n perfekte teiken gemaak vir vier Islamitiese sluipmoordenaars wat uit die vragmotor gespring het, storm die podium af, en hy het sy lyf met koeëls toegeslaan. Soos die moordenaars voortgegaan het vir 'n ewigheid om die erf met hul dodelike vuur te spuit., Ek het 'n oomblik oorweeg of ek op die grond moet slaan en waag om deur die toeskouers van paniekbevange afgetrap te word of om aan die gang te wees en die risiko om 'n verdwaalde koeël te neem. Instink het my aangesê om op my voete te bly, en my gevoel van joernalistieke plig het my gedwing om uit te vind of Sadat lewend of dood was.

Liberale demokrasie en politieke Islam: die soek Common Ground.

Mostapha Benhenda

Hierdie artikel poog om 'n dialoog tussen demokratiese en Islamitiese politieke theories.1 Die wisselwerking tussen hulle is verwarrend vestig: byvoorbeeld, ten einde die verhouding wat bestaan ​​tussen demokrasie en hul begrip van die ideale verduidelik Islamitiese politieke
regime, die Pakistani geleerde Abu 'Ala Maududi gevat onder die neologisme "theodemocracy" terwyl die Franse geleerde Louis Massignon voorgestel dat die oksimoron "sekulêre teokrasie". Hierdie uitdrukkings dui daarop dat sommige aspekte van demokrasie positief geëvalueer en ander negatiewe beoordeel. Byvoorbeeld, Moslem geleerdes en aktiviste onderskryf dikwels die beginsel van aanspreeklikheid van regeerders, Dit is 'n kenmerk van demokrasie. Inteendeel, hulle verwerp dikwels die beginsel van skeiding tussen godsdiens en die staat, wat dikwels beskou word as deel van die demokrasie wees (ten minste, van demokrasie as bekend in die Verenigde State van Amerika vandag). Gegewe hierdie gemengde assessering van demokratiese beginsels, blyk dit interessant om die opvatting van demokrasie te bepaal onderliggende Islamitiese politieke modelle. Met ander woorde, Ons moet probeer om uit te vind wat demokratiese in "theodemocracy" is. Met daardie einde in sig, onder die indrukwekkende diversiteit en pluraliteit van Islamitiese tradisies van normatiewe politieke denke, ons in wese fokus op die breë stroom van denke terug te gaan na Abu 'Ala Maududi en die Egiptiese intellektuele Sayyed Qutb.8 Hierdie spesifieke tendens van denke is interessant, want in die Moslem-wêreld, dit lê aan die basis van 'n paar van die mees uitdagende opposisies om die verspreiding van die waardes wat uit die Weste. Gebaseer op godsdienstige waardes, hierdie tendens uitgebrei 'n politieke model alternatief vir liberale demokrasie. In die algemeen kan ons se, die opvatting van demokrasie in hierdie Islamitiese politieke model is prosedurele. Met 'n paar verskille, hierdie opvatting is geïnspireer deur demokratiese teorieë voorgestaan ​​deur sommige konstitusionaliste en politieke scientists.10 Dit is dun en minimalistiese, tot 'n sekere punt. Byvoorbeeld, dit nie staatmaak op enige idee van populêre soewereiniteit en dit nie enige skeiding tussen godsdiens en politiek vereis. Die eerste doel van hierdie artikel is om hierdie minimalistiese bevrugting uit te brei. Ons maak 'n gedetailleerde hersamestelling daarvan om hierdie opvatting te isoleer van sy morele (liberale) fondamente, wat omstrede van die bepaalde Islamitiese siening hier beskou is. Inderdaad, die demokratiese proses word gewoonlik verkry uit 'n beginsel van persoonlike outonomie, wat nie deur hierdie Islamitiese theories.11 Hier is geëndosseer, wys ons dat so 'n beginsel is nie nodig om 'n demokratiese proses te regverdig.

Irak en die toekoms van politieke Islam

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?”, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Islamitiese politieke kultuur, Demokrasie, en Menseregte

Daniel E. Prys

Dit is aangevoer dat die Islam fasiliteer outoritarisme, weerspreek die

waardes van Westerse samelewings, en dit het belangrike politieke uitkomste beduidend beïnvloed
in Moslemlande. Gevolglik, geleerdes, kommentators, en die regering
amptenare wys gereeld op '' Islamitiese fundamentalisme '' as die volgende
ideologiese bedreiging vir liberale demokrasieë. hierdie siening, egter, is hoofsaaklik gebaseer
oor die ontleding van tekste, Islamitiese politieke teorie, en ad hoc-studies
van individuele lande, wat nie oorweeg ander faktore. Dit is my stelling
dat die tekste en tradisies van Islam, soos dié van ander godsdienste,
gebruik kan word om 'n verskeidenheid van politieke stelsels en beleid te ondersteun. land
spesifieke en beskrywende studies help ons nie om patrone te vind wat sal help nie
ons verduidelik die verskillende verhoudings tussen Islam en politiek regoor die land
lande van die Moslem-wêreld. vandaar, 'n nuwe benadering tot die studie van die
verband tussen Islam en die politiek is 'n beroep vir.
Ek stel voor, deur middel van streng evaluering van die verhouding tussen Islam,
demokrasie, en menseregte by die kruis-nasionale vlak, dit te veel
klem word gelê op die mag van Islam as 'n politieke mag. Ek eerste
gebruik vergelykende gevallestudies, wat fokus op faktore wat verband hou met die wisselwerking
tussen Islamitiese groepe en regimes, ekonomiese invloede, etniese gleufies,

en maatskaplike ontwikkeling, om die variansie in die invloed van

Islam oor politiek in agt nasies.

STRATEGIEë VIR innemende politieke Islam

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Politieke Islam is vandag die enkele mees aktiewe politieke mag in die Midde-Ooste. Sy toekoms is intiem gekoppel aan dié van die streek. As die Verenigde State en die Europese Unie daartoe verbind is om politieke hervorming in die streek te ondersteun, hulle sal beton moet uitdink, samehangende strategieë om Islamitiese groepe te betrek. Tog, die VSA. was oor die algemeen onwillig om 'n dialoog met hierdie bewegings te open. Net so, EU-betrokkenheid met Islamiete was die uitsondering, nie die reël nie. Waar laevlak kontakte bestaan, hulle dien hoofsaaklik inligting-insamelingsdoeleindes, nie strategiese doelwitte nie. Die VSA. en die EU het 'n aantal programme wat ekonomiese en politieke ontwikkeling in die streek aanspreek - onder andere die Midde-Ooste Vennootskapsinisiatief (MEPI), die Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), die Unie vir die Middellandse See, en die Europese Buurtbeleid (ENP) – tog het hulle min te sê oor hoe die uitdaging van Islamitiese politieke opposisie binne breër streekdoelwitte inpas. VSA. en EU-demokrasiebystand en -programmering is feitlik geheel en al gerig aan óf outoritêre regerings self óf sekulêre burgerlike samelewingsgroepe met minimale ondersteuning in hul eie samelewings.
Die tyd is ryp vir 'n herevaluering van huidige beleide. Sedert die terreuraanvalle van September 11, 2001, die ondersteuning van Midde-Ooste-demokrasie het 'n groter belang vir Westerse beleidmakers aangeneem, wat 'n verband sien tussen 'n gebrek aan demokrasie en politieke geweld. Groter aandag is gewy aan die begrip van die variasies binne politieke Islam. Die nuwe Amerikaanse administrasie is meer oop vir verbreding van kommunikasie met die Moslemwêreld. Intussen, die oorgrote meerderheid hoofstroom Islamitiese organisasies – insluitend die Moslem Broederskap in Egipte, Jordan se Islamitiese Aksiefront (IAF), Marokko se Party vir Geregtigheid en Ontwikkeling (PJD), die Islamitiese Grondwetlike Beweging van Koeweit, en die Yemeni Islah Party – het toenemend steun vir politieke hervorming en demokrasie 'n sentrale komponent in hul politieke platforms gemaak. Daarby, baie het sterk belangstelling getoon in die opening van dialoog met U.S. en EU-regerings.
Die toekoms van betrekkinge tussen Westerse nasies en die Midde-Ooste kan grootliks bepaal word deur die mate waarin eersgenoemde nie-gewelddadige Islamitiese partye in 'n breë dialoog oor gedeelde belange en doelwitte betrek. Daar was 'n onlangse verspreiding van studies oor betrokkenheid by Islamiete, maar min spreek duidelik aan wat dit in die praktyk kan behels. Soos Zoe Nautré, besoekende genoot by die Duitse Raad vir Buitelandse Betrekkinge, stel dit, "die EU dink aan betrokkenheid, maar weet nie regtig hoe nie."1 In die hoop om die bespreking te verduidelik, ons onderskei tussen drie vlakke van “betrokkenheid,” elk met verskillende middele en doelwitte: laevlak kontakte, strategiese dialoog, en vennootskap.

Die Moslem-Broederskap in Egipte

William Thomasson

Is Islam a religion of violence? Is the widely applied stereotype that all Muslims are violently opposed to “infidel” Western cultures accurate? Today’s world is confronted with two opposing faces of Islam; one being a peaceful, adaptive, modernized Islam, and the other strictly fundamentalist and against all things un-Islamic or that may corrupt Islamic culture. Both specimens, though seemingly opposed, mingle and inter-relate, and are the roots of the confusion over modern Islam’s true identity. Islam’s vastness makes it difficult to analyze, but one can focus on a particular Islamic region and learn much about Islam as a whole. Inderdaad, one may do this with Egypt, particularly the relationship between the Fundamentalist society known as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and population. The two opposing faces of Islam are presented in Egypt in a manageable portion, offering a smaller model of the general multi-national struggle of today’s Islam. In an effort to exemplify the role of Islamic Fundamentalists, and their relationship with Islamic society as a whole in the current debate over what Islam is, this essay will offer a history of the Society of Muslim Brothers, a description of how the organization originated, functioned, and was organized, and a summary of the Brother’s activities and influences on Egyptian culture. Certainly, by doing so, one may gain a deeper understanding of how Islamic Fundamentalists interpret Islam


Matig en fundamentele Islam

Angel Rabasa

Een van die komponente van hierdie studie is met betrekking tot 'n vraag wat ek gevra is om aan te spreek,dit is hoe radikale Islam verskil van matige of hoofstroom Islam. Frankly, one ofthe problems that we have found in the discourse about Islam is that the terms “radical”or “moderate” are often used in a subjective and imprecise way, without going through aprocess of critically examining what these terms mean. In some cases, the term radical ormilitant is defined in terms of support for terrorism or other forms of violence. Webelieve that this is too narrow a focus, that there is, in werklikheid, a much larger universe offundamentalist or Salafi groups who may not themselves practice violence, but thatpropagate an ideology that creates the conditions for violence and that is subversive ofthe values of democratic societies.

VAN ISLAMISTE EN STEMBUSSE

Vickie Langohr

As Islamist movements have gained strength across the Muslim world, their commitmentto democratic means of achieving and exercising power has been repeatedlyanalyzed. The question of whether resort to violence to achieve its goals is inherentin the Islamist project (that what some Islamists understand as a divine mandate toimplement sharia ultimately sanctions the use of force against dissenters) or contingent(that the violent exclusion of Islamists from the political arena has driven themto arms, best expressed by Franc¸ois Burgat’s contention that any Western politicalparty could be turned into the Armed Islamic Group in weeks if it were subjected tothe same repression Islamists had endured1) looms large in this debate. Where Islamistmovements have not had the opportunity to participate in elections for political office,analysts willing to give these movements the benefit of the democratic doubt arguethat their peaceful participation in the student body and syndicate elections that theyhave been allowed to contest proves their intention to respect the results of nationallevelelections.2 They also point to these groups’ repeated public commitment to playby the rules of the electoral game.3 The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptand Jordan and members of the Islah Party in Yemen have successfully competed innot one but a series of parliamentary elections and evinced a tendency to wage theirbattles through parliament and the courts rather than by force suggests to many thatthe question of whether Islamists can ever be democrats has already been settled inthe affirmative.Analysts who are more skeptical of the possibility of a democratic Islamism generallyadvance one of two arguments. The first is procedural: that although some Islamistshave seemingly opted to effect change through the ballot box, they have chosenthis method only because they do not yet have the power to use more forceful ones.In a manner of speaking, this line of thinking accuses Islamists competing in parliamentarypolitics of engaging in political taqiyya, of parroting the rhetoric that democratswant to hear until they obtain sufficient power to abort the democratic politicalprocess and institute a policy of “one-man, one-vote, one-time.”

Brothers in Arms?

Joshua Stacher
Within and between western governments, a heated policy debate is raging over the question of whether or not to engage with the world’s oldest and most influential political Islamist group: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. In 2006, publication of a series of leaked memos in the New Statesman magazine revealed that political analysts within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended an enhancement of informal contacts with members of the Brotherhood.
The authors of these documents argued that the UK government should be seeking to influence this group, given the extent of its grassroots support in Egypt. The British analysts further suggested that engagement could provide a valuable opportunity for challenging the Brotherhood’s perceptions of the West, including the UK, and for detailed questioning of their prescriptions for solving the challenges facing Egypt and the wider region.
The Bush administration in the United States has been far less open to the idea of direct engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that it would be inappropriate to enter into formal ties with a group that is not legally recognised by the Egyptian government. However, there are indications that the US position may be starting to shift. In 2007, it emerged that the State Department had approved a policy that would enable US diplomats to meet and coordinate with elected Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and other Arab states.

Within and between western governments, a heated policy debate is raging over the question of whether or not to engage with the world’s oldest and most influential political Islamist group: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. In 2006, publication of a series of leaked memos in the New Statesman magazine revealed that political analysts within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended an enhancement of informal contacts with members of the Brotherhood.

The authors of these documents argued that the UK government should be seeking to influence this group, given the extent of its grassroots support in Egypt. The British analysts further suggested that engagement could provide a valuable opportunity for challenging the Brotherhood’s perceptions of the West, including the UK, and for detailed questioning of their prescriptions for solving the challenges facing Egypt and the wider region.

The Bush administration in the United States has been far less open to the idea of direct engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that it would be inappropriate to enter into formal ties with a group that is not legally recognised by the Egyptian government. However, there are indications that the US position may be starting to shift. In 2007, it emerged that the State Department had approved a policy that would enable US diplomats to meet and coordinate with elected Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and other Arab states.