RSSسب کے ساتھ ٹیگ کردہ تحاریر درآمد کریں: "مشرق وسطی"

قانونی حیثیت کے حصول میں

Hesham القاعدہ Awadi -
On the extraordinary morning of 11 ستمبر 2001, I happened to be in the London office of the Muslim
Brothers conducting interviews for this study. The faces of everyone in the office reflected the shocking scene of aeroplanes crashing into the towers of the World Trade Centre in New York.
Although the identity of the perpetrators was initially unclear, there were early fears that radical Islamists from Al-Qa‘eda might be involved. The Brothers in the office were clearly uncomfortable about the potential implications. If Islamists were indeed involved, such an event would certainly heighten the fears of the Americans, and of the West at large, against Islam and Muslims, and would give more credibility to Huntington’s notion of the “clash of civilisations”.
In the midst of these legitimate Western fears, the significantly visible line of differentiation between moderate and radical Islamists would become blurred or irrelevant. Not only would this register as a seriously mistaken attitude on the part of the United States and the West towards the sophisticated Islamist phenomenon, but it would encourage authoritarian Arab regimes to quell all Islamists indiscriminately, on the basis of would-be conventional wisdom that
“all Islamists are potentially dangerous”.
Egypt’s President Mohammad Hosni Mubarak was among the Arab leaders who had already launched coercive campaigns against Islamists, both moderates and radicals, since the early and mid- 1990s. His campaign reached its peak in 1995, کب 95 civilian Islamists who were members of the Muslim Brotherhood, were put
on trial in military courts, charged with belonging to an illegal organisation and conspiring to overthrow the government.

مشرق وسطیٰ میں جمہوریت کا فروغ ایک طرفہ گلی نہیں ہے۔

مرینا Ottaway

امریکہ. administration is under pressure to revive democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East,but momentum toward political reform has stalled in most of the region. Opposition parties are at lowebb, and governments are more firmly in control than ever. While new forms of activism, such as laborprotests and a growing volume of blogging critical of government and opposition parties have becomewidespread, they have yet to prove effective as means of influencing leaders to change long-standingpolicies.The last time a U.S. administration faced such unfavorable circumstances in advancing political reformswas over 30 years ago, when the Helsinki process was launched during the Cold War. That experiencetaught us that the United States needs to give reluctant interlocutors something they want if itexpects them to engage on issues they would rather not address. If Washington wants Arab countriesto discuss the universal democratic principles that should underpin their political systems, it needs to beprepared to discuss the universal principles that should underpin its own Middle East policies.

جنوبی مصر میں اسلام

James Toth

For years, religious violence and terrorism in Middle Eastern countries such as Egypthave splashed across the headlines and surged across the screen, announcing yet anotherround of senseless death and destruction. While Arabists and Islamicists attemptto pick their way carefully through the ideological and intellectual minefields to makesense of what is happening, the wider public generally disregards their insights andinstead sticks to what it knows best: deeply ingrained prejudices and biases. مصر,عرب, Muslim—all are painted in a very unfavorable light. Even in Egypt, manybystanders show the same sorry prejudices. In the end, people simply blame the brutalityon inexplicable backward religious ideas and then move on.Yet comprehending terrorism and violence in places such as Egypt by recourse toan unnuanced religious fundamentalism is generally acknowledged not only to begthe question of why these events actually happen, but also to lead to misunderstandingsand misperceptions, and perhaps even to exacerbating existing tensions.1 Mostscholars agree that such seemingly “irrational” social behavior instead needs to beplaced in its appropriate context to be properly understood, and hence made rational.Analyzing these actions, تو, involves situating this violence and destruction in theireconomic, political, and ideological milieu as these have developed historically, forthis so-called Islamic terrorism does not merely arise, ex nihilo, out of a timeless void.What follows, تو, is one case study of one portion of the Islamic movement as itemerged principally in southern Egypt and as it was revealed through anthropologicalfieldwork conducted in one of this region’s major cities. This account takes a completelydifferent direction from that of stigmatizing this movement as a sordid collectionof terrorist organizations hell bent on the senseless destruction of Egypt and itsIslamic civilization.2 Because this view is somewhat at odds with the perceptions oflocal spectators, Egyptians in Cairo, and non–Egyptians inside and outside the country,I go to some length not only to discuss the movement itself but also to shed lighton why it might have received such negative publicity.

خواتین, کام, اور عرب معاشروں میں اسلام

یوسف (علیہ السلام Sidani

Arab societies are currently in a state of confusion. Problems of underdevelopment,inequity, institutional deficiencies, and illiteracy are rampant (Arab HumanDevelopment Report, 2002). Arabs seem to be in a futile search for a new identity ina world that is transforming: power structures are shifting, societal expectations arechanging, and male-female relations are developing. The Arabs seem to yearn for anew identity that does not displace them from their roots, and at the same timeconnects them to the future; the search seems incessantly fruitless. Even non-Arabsseem to be confused about the issue. Vivid movie images mostly portray the Arab maleas a primitive, fanatic, brutal, lunatic, vicious, and splendidly prosperous individualwhile the Arab woman is portrayed as a belly dancer or whore, a veiled submissivemember of a luxurious harem, or a speechless oppressed character with no identity(Boullata, 1990). The political developments of the past few years did not help bringabout a better image. The rise of Islamic activism, end of the cold war, Huntington’s“clash of civilizations” supposition, and the events of 11th September only reinforcedthe bewilderment and confusion.In addressing the notion of women’s participation in the business and politicalarenas in Arab societies, conflicting remarks are brought forward. Some refer to therole of culture and the prevailing religion in the area – Islam and interpretations ofIslam – as possible reasons for such lack of participation (El-Saadawi, 1997; Mernissi,1991). اسلام, it is asserted, is not merely a set of beliefs and rituals but is also a socialorder that has an all-pervading influence on its followers (Weir, 2000). This essayattempts to present varying discourses pertaining to women’s work and how it isimpacted by interpretations of Islam. We present current discourses from variousviewpoints including Muslim scholars on the one hand and active feminists on theother hand. We address the disagreements that exist in the camps of the religiousscholars in their interpretations of religious texts impacting women and their work. Inaddition, we tackle the feminist discourse pertaining to the role of Islam, orunderstandings of Islam, in their participation and development.

عالمی اور مقامی درمیان

انتھونی BUBALO

گریگ FEALY

Against the background of the ‘war on terror’,many people have come to view Islamism as amonolithic ideological movement spreading from thecenter of the Muslim world, the Middle East, toMuslim countries around the globe. To borrow aphrase from Abdullah Azzam, the legendary jihadistwho fought to expel the Soviet Union fromAfghanistan in the 1980s, many today see all Islamistsas fellow travellers in a global fundamentalist caravan.This paper evaluates the truth of that perception. Itdoes so by examining the spread of two broad categoriesof Islamic thinking and activism — the morepolitically focused Islamism and more religiouslyfocused ‘neo-fundamentalism’ — from the MiddleEast to Indonesia, a country often cited as an exampleof a formerly peaceful Muslim community radicalizedby external influences.Islamism is a term familiar to many.Most commonly itis used to categorize ideas and forms of activism thatconceive of Islam as a political ideology. آج, a widerange of groups are classified as Islamist, from theEgyptian Muslim Brotherhood to al-qa‘ida.While sucha categorization remains appropriate in many cases,Islamism seems less useful as a label for those groupsthat do not see Islam as a political ideology and largelyeschew political activism — even if their activism sometimeshas political implications. Included in this categoryare groups concerned primarily with Islamic mission-IV Be t w e e n t h e G l o b a l a n d t h e L o c a l : اسلامیت, the Mi d d l e E a s t , a n d Indonesiaary activity, but it would also include a group such asal-qa‘ida whose acts of terrorism are arguably drivenless by concrete political objectives than religious inspiration,albeit of a misguided form. This paper thereforeuses the term ‘neo-fundamentalist’, developed by theFrench scholar Olivier Roy, to describe these groups andwill study the transmission of both Islamist and neofundamentalistideas to Indonesia.

Political Islam Gaining Ground

مائیکل ایک. لانگ

characteristics of the democratic order. Their newly-discovered acceptance of elections andparliamentary processes results not least from a gradual democratisation of the formerlyauthoritarian regimes these groups had fought by terrorist means even in their home countries.The prime example of this development is Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, which started out as acharitable social movement and has now become the most powerful political opposition force inEgypt.Founded in the 1920s, the Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest Islamic organisation of the Arabworld today. Following the ideas of its founder Al-Banna, it intended to return to a state of ‘trueIslam’, یعنی. to return to the way of life of the early Islamic congregation at the time of theProphet, and to establish a community of social justice. This vision was increasingly viewed as acounterweight to the Western social model that was marked by secularisation, moral decay, andgreed. During World War II, the Muslim Brotherhood even founded a secret military arm, whoseactivities, تاہم, were uncovered, leading to the execution of Mr Al-Banna by Egypt’s secretpolice

اخوان المسلمون مصر میں قانونی وجود اور فکری ترقی کے حصول میں

منار حسن


اکتوبر میں آنے والے تباہ کن زلزلے کے تناظر میں جس نے مصر کے گنجان دارالحکومت اور اس کے پڑوسی شہروں کو لرز کر رکھ دیا تھا۔ 1992, پرائیویٹ رضاکارانہ تنظیمیں – جن پر اسلام پسندوں کا غلبہ ہے – گھنٹوں کے اندر امدادی سرگرمیوں کی کافی حد تک قیادت کرنے میں کامیاب ہو گئے۔, موجودہ حکومت کو اس کی بیوروکریٹک نااہلیوں سے دوچار کرنا. تباہی کے وقت اہم آپریٹو خدمات کی فراہمی میں حکومت کی اپنی حدود عوام میں اس کی گرتی ہوئی ساکھ کی محض ایک مثال ہے۔. اس کے علاوہ, its response to this publicembarrassment was even more austere – passing a decree to ban any direct relief efforts by thePVOs therefore forcing all aid to materialize through the government only. But withgovernmental impediments still looming, the regime struggled to meet the needs of the victimsin time which led to riots and posed as a mere reminder of the incessant exasperation thatEgyptians have faced in their recent history. لہذا, it became apparent that Mubarak’sattempts to salvage his image in order to corroborate his grip on power had by and largealienated vital forces within Egypt’s civil society.The civil society has, لہذا, been a crucial source through which oppositionists –predominantly the Muslim Brotherhood – derive the power of popular appeal. حزب اختلاف کی سب سے بڑی اور بااثر تنظیم میں سے ایک ہے۔, اخوان المسلمین نے جدید محنت کش طبقے جیسے الگ الگ سماجی ڈھانچے کو کاٹ دیا۔, شہری غریب, نوجوان, اور پھر متوسط ​​طبقہ, جو ایک سپورٹ بیس بناتے ہیں۔. اخوان المسلمین کے کچھ نمایاں ارکان خود بھی نئے متوسط ​​طبقے سے تعلق رکھتے ہیں اور اس وجہ سے النقابات المہانیہ کے ذریعے نیٹ ورک (پیشہ ورانہ تنظیموں). ایک مثال ڈاکٹر. احمد الملت, جو اخوان کے سابق ڈپٹی سپریم گائیڈ اور اپنی موت سے قبل ڈاکٹروں کی سنڈیکیٹ کے صدر بھی تھے

اخوان المسلمون کے یو. نیٹ ورک

Zeyno باراں


Washington D.C. has suddenly become very interested in the Muslim Brotherhood. American policymakers are debating whether to engage non-violent elements of the Muslim Brotherhood network, both inside and outside the United States, in the hope that such engagement will empower these “moderates” against violent Wahhabi and Salafi groups such as al-Qaeda. بدقسمتی سے, this strategy is based on a false assumption: that “moderate” Islamist groups will confront and weaken their violent co-religionists, robbing them of their support base.
This lesser-of-two-evils strategy is reminiscent of the rationale behind the Cold War-era decision to support the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet army. In the short term, امریکہ. alliance with the mujahideen did indeed aid America in its struggle against the Soviet Union. In the long term, تاہم, U.S. support led to the empowerment of a dangerous and potent adversary. In choosing its allies, امریکہ. cannot afford to elevate short-term tactical considerations above longer-term strategic ones. Most importantly, امریکہ. must consider the ideology of any potential partners.
Although various Islamist groups do quarrel over tactics and often bear considerable animosity towards one another, they all agree on the endgame: a world dictated by political Islam. A “divide and conquer” strategy by the United States will only push them closer together.

جمہوریت اور اسلامی جماعتوں نے

مونا Yacoubian

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, international pressure mounted for political reform in the Middle East, particularly the Arab world. For its part, the Bush administration elevated democracy promotion in the Middle East to a key strategic priority. The administration’s policy sprung from the belief that strong linkages exist between the Middle East’s long history of autocratic rule and the emergence of a transnational terrorist movement with its roots in many of those same countries. Numerous independent analyses likewise have suggested that the Middle East’s dysfunctional, autocratic political systems are helping to breed Islamist extremism.An Islamist “Tsunami”Yet, despite the critical importance assigned to political opening in the Middle East, a number of factors, including ongoing turmoil in Iraq and competing priorities of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), have intervened to complicate U.S. democracy promotion efforts. میں خاص, various Islamist parties’ strong showings in recent elections have added a new layer of complexity to U.S. democracy promotion efforts in the Arab world. بے شک, across the region, Islamist parties and organizations boast strong grassroots support. These groups represent a broad spectrum of views, ranging from moderate parties that have renounced violence to well-established terrorist organizations.Hamas’ resounding victory in the January 25, 2006 Palestinian elections, winning 74 باہر کا 132 نشستیں, is perhaps the most dramatic example of the power Islamists wield at the ballot box. Deemed a terrorist organization by the United States and Europe, the party’s rise to power has significantly complicated U.S. policy toward the Palestinian Authority as well as efforts to help resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Similar concerns characterize Hizballah’s role in Lebanon. The terrorist organization won 14 کے 128 seats in the Lebanese parliament in the June 2005 انتخابات, the first independent vote in thirty years following the withdrawal of Syrian troops. While Hizballah’s parliamentary presence is far outstripped by an anti-Syrian opposition bloc, the organization still holds significant sway over Lebanese politics and is the only political party to maintain an armed militia.

سیاسی اسلام کی موت

جان بی. Alterman

سیاسی اسلام کے لئے مشاہدات لکھنا شروع ہوگئے ہیں. بظاہر نہ رکنے والی ترقی کے برسوں بعد, اسلامی جماعتوں نے ٹھوکریں کھانی شروع کردی ہیں. مراکش میں, انصاف اور ترقی پارٹی (یا پی جے ڈی) پچھلے ستمبر کے انتخابات میں توقع سے کہیں زیادہ خراب کام کیا, اور اردن کے اسلامک ایکشن فرنٹ نے گزشتہ ماہ کی رائے شماری میں اپنی نصف سے زیادہ نشستیں کھو دیں. مصر کے اخوان المسلمون کا بے صبری سے انتظار کیا گیا منشور, جس کا ایک مسودہ گذشتہ ستمبر میں شائع ہوا تھا,نہ ہی طاقت کا مظاہرہ کیا اور نہ ہی دلیری کا مظاہرہ کیا. اس کے بجائے, اس نے تجویز کیا کہ اس گروہ کو دانشورانہ پابندیوں کا سامنا کرنا پڑا اور لڑائی جھگڑا ہوا۔ سیاسی اسلام کی موت کا اعلان کرنا ابھی جلد بازی ہے۔, چونکہ عرب دنیا میں لبرل ازم کی پیدائش کا اعلان قبل از وقت تھا 2003-04, لیکن اس کے امکانات خاصی دھیمے ہوئے دکھائی دیتے ہیں جو انہوں نے ایک سال پہلے بھی کیا تھا, فضل سے زوال ناگزیر تھا; سیاسی اسلام اپنی اپنی پابندیوں کے تحت منہدم ہوگیا ہے, وہ کہتے ہیں. وہ بحث کرتے ہیں, معروضی لحاظ سے, سیاسی اسلام کبھی بھی دھواں اور عکس نہیں تھا. مذہب ایمان اور سچائی کے بارے میں ہے, اور سیاست سمجھوتہ اور رہائش کے بارے میں ہے. اس طرح دیکھا, سیاسی اسلام کبھی بھی مقدس کاروبار نہیں تھا, لیکن ایک سیاسی بحث میں ایک طرف کے سیاسی امکانات کو فروغ دینے کی کوشش. حمایت یافتہ قانونی اختیار اور قانونی حیثیت, اسلام پسندوں کی مخالفت ’محض سیاسی ہونا ہی بند ہو گی - یہ بدعت ہوگئی — اور اسلام پسندوں کو فائدہ ہوا۔ یہ شکی سیاستدان اسلام کو سیاسی تحریکوں کے تحفظ کا ایک مفید طریقہ سمجھتے ہیں,گائے کے سیاسی دشمن, اور ریلی کی حمایت. گورننگ حکمت عملی کے طور پر, تاہم, ان کا کہنا ہے کہ سیاسی اسلام نے کوئی کامیابی حاصل نہیں کی ہے. دو شعبوں میں جہاں یہ حال ہی میں ٹورور گلاب ہے, فلسطینی اتھارٹی اور عراق, حکمرانی خون کی کمی رہی ہے. ایران میں, جہاں وہ تقریباullah تین دہائیوں سے اقتدار میں ہیں, علمائے کرام احترام کے لئے جدوجہد کرتے ہیں اور ملک سے نکسیر کی وجہ سے دبئی اور دیگر بیرون ملک مارکیٹوں میں زیادہ پیش گوئی کی جاتی ہے اور زیادہ مثبت واپسی ہوتی ہے. مشرق وسطی میں سب سے زیادہ مذہبی ریاست, سعودی عرب, اس کے بہت سارے پڑوسیوں کے مقابلے میں خاص طور پر فکری آزادی کم ہے, اور وہاں کے آرتھوڈوکس نگاہوں نے دینی افکار کو احتیاط سے دفع کیا ہے. بطور فرانسیسی عالم اسلام,اولیویر رائے, ایک دہائی قبل یادگار طور پر مشاہدہ کیا گیا, مذہب اور سیاست کی سازش نے سیاست کو تقویت نہیں دی, جبکہ اس نے سیاست کو سیاسی شکل دی۔ لیکن جبکہ اسلام نے حکمرانی کا مربوط نظریہ فراہم نہیں کیا ہے, انسانیت کی پریشانیوں کے لئے عالمی طور پر منظور شدہ نقطہ نظر کو چھوڑ دو, بہت سارے مسلمانوں میں مذہب کی فراغت بڑھتی جارہی ہے۔ یہ لباس لباس کے معاملات سے بہت آگے ہے, جو حالیہ برسوں میں خواتین اور مردوں دونوں کے لئے زیادہ قدامت پسند بن چکے ہیں, زبان سے پرے, جو ایک دہائی پہلے کے معاملے سے کہیں زیادہ خدا کے نام کی دعا کرتا ہے. یہ اسلام کے یومیہ مشق سے بھی بالاتر ہے - نماز سے لے کر خیرات تک ، روزے تک - یہ سب کچھ عروج پر ہیں۔ جو بدلا ہے وہ جسمانی ظہور یا رسم رواج سے کہیں زیادہ بنیادی بات ہے, اور یہ ہے: مسلمانوں کی بڑھتی ہوئی تعداد اس تجویز سے شروع ہوتی ہے کہ اسلام ان کی روزمرہ کی زندگی کے تمام پہلوؤں سے متعلق ہے, اور نہ صرف یہ کہ صوبہ الہیات یا ذاتی عقیدہ ہے۔ کچھ اسے مشرق وسطی میں روایت پسندی کی واپسی کے طور پر دیکھتے ہیں, جب روز مرہ کی زندگی پر حکمرانی ، توہم پرستی اور روحانیت کے مختلف اقدامات ہوتے ہیں. زیادہ درست طریقے سے, اگرچہ, ہم جو کچھ دیکھ رہے ہیں وہ "نو روایت پسندی" کا عروج ہے,”جس میں ماضی کی علامتیں اور نعرے مستقبل میں جلد داخل ہونے کے تعاقب میں شامل ہیں. اسلامی خزانہ — جو کہنا ہے, فنانس جو سود سے زیادہ حصص اور ریٹرنریٹر پر انحصار کرتی ہے وہ عروج پر ہے, اور چیکنا بینک شاخوں میں مرد اور خواتین کے لئے الگ الگ راستے شامل ہیں. ہوشیار نوجوان ٹیلیویژن انجمن روزانہ تقویت بخش اور معافی کے درپے پر ہیں, لاکھوں کی تعداد میں ہزاروں کی تعداد میں ان کی مجلسوں اور ٹیلی ویژنوں کو اپنی طرف متوجہ کرنا. میوزک ویڈیو YouTube یوٹیوب پر دیکھنے کے قابل young نوجوان ناظرین کو عقیدے کو قبول کرنے اور غیر معقول سیکولر زندگی کو پھیرنے کی التجا کرتے ہیں۔. مشرق وسطی میں, بہت سے لوگ انہیں دیوالیہ سیکولر قوم پرست ماضی کی علامتوں کے طور پر دیکھتے ہیں جو انصاف یا ترقی کی فراہمی میں ناکام رہے ہیں, آزادی یا ترقی. سیکولرازم کی تکلیف ناقابل معافی ہے, لیکن اسلام کا نظم و ضبط اشارے سے بھرا ہوا ہے۔ اسی وجہ سے یہ ہے کہ سیاسی اسلام کی موت کا اعلان کرنا قبل از وقت ہے. اسلام, تیزی سے, شامل نہیں ہوسکتا. یہ زندگی کے تمام پہلوؤں میں پھیل رہا ہے, اور یہ مشرق وسطی کی کچھ متحرک قوتوں میں مضبوط ہے. یہ یقینی بننے کے لئے سرکاری سبسڈی حاصل کرتا ہے,لیکن ریاستوں کا مذہبی میدان میں پیدا ہونے والی تخلیقی صلاحیتوں سے بہت کم لینا دینا ہے۔ خطرہ یہ ہے کہ عوامی زندگی کی اس اسلامائزیشن نے مشرق وسطی میں جو تھوڑی بہت رواداری چھوڑی ہے وہ ایک طرف رہ جائے گی۔, صدیوں کے بعد آسا — بنیادی طور پر اسلامی — کثیر الثقافتی دلچسپی. یہ تصور کرنا مشکل ہے کہ اگر اسلام پسند معاشرے ترقی اور تخلیقی صلاحیتوں کو قبول نہیں کرتے ہیں تو وہ کس طرح پنپ سکتے ہیں, تنوع اور فرق. "اسلامی" خود واضح تصور نہیں ہے, جیسا کہ میرے دوست مصطفٰی کمال پاشا نے ایک بار محفوظ کیا تھا, لیکن اگر جدید معاشروں میں اس کی فطرت کے متنازعہ اور تعل notق خیالات سے جڑا ہوا ہے تو یہ طاقت کا ذریعہ نہیں بن سکتا۔ فرق کے ساتھ جدوجہد کرنا بنیادی طور پر ایک سیاسی کام ہے, اور یہاں یہ ہے کہ سیاسی اسلام کو اس کے حقیقی امتحان کا سامنا کرنا پڑے گا. مشرق وسطی میں باضابطہ ڈھانچے کی حکومت پائیدار ثابت ہوئی ہے, اور اس کا امکان نہیں ہے کہ وہ اسلامی سرگرمی کی لہر کے نیچے گر جائیں. سیاسی اسلام کے کامیاب ہونے کے لئے, اس کو مختلف عقائد اور عقیدے کی ڈگریوں کے متنوع اتحادوں کو متحد کرنے کا راستہ تلاش کرنے کی ضرورت ہے, محض اس کے بیس سے بات نہ کریں. اسے ابھی تک ایسا کرنے کا کوئی راستہ نہیں ملا ہے, لیکن یہ کہنا یہ نہیں ہے کہ ایسا نہیں ہوسکتا.

ریاست ہائے متحدہ امریکہ اور مصر

A Conference Report

The study of bilateral relations has fallen deeply out of favor in the academiccommunity. Political science has turned to the study of international state systemsrather than relations between individual states; anthropologists and sociologists arefar more interested in non-state actors; and historians have largely abandonedstates altogether. It is a shame, because there is much to be learned from bilateralrelationships, and some such relationships are vital—not only to the countriesinvolved, but also to a broader array of countries.One such vital relationship is that between the United States and Egypt. Forgedduring the Cold War almost entirely on the issue of Arab-Israeli peacemaking, theU.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship has deepened and broadened over the lastquarter century. Egypt remains one of the United States’ most important Arab allies,and the bilateral relationship with Washington remains the keystone of Egypt’sforeign policy. Strong U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relations are also an important anchorfor states throughout the Middle East and for Western policy in the region. Therelationship is valuable for policymakers in both countries; doing without it isunthinkable.To explore this relationship, the CSIS Middle East Program, in cooperation with theAl-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, convened a one-dayconference on June 26, 2003, entitled, “The United States and Egypt: Building thePartnership.” The goal of the meeting was to brainstorm how that partnership mightbe strengthened.Participants agreed that much needs to be done on the diplomatic, political, فوجی,and economic levels. Although all did not agree on a single course forward, theparticipants unanimously concurred that a stronger U.S.-Egyptian relationship is verymuch in the interests of both countries, and although it will require a great deal ofwork to achieve, the benefits are worth the effort.

Reneging on Reform: Egypt and Tunisia

جیفری Azarva

On November 6, 2003, President George W. Bush proclaimed, “Sixty years of Western nations excusingand accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe—because in the longrun, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty.” This strategic shift, coupled with the invasionsof Iraq and Afghanistan, put regional governments on notice. The following spring, Tunisia’s president, ZineEl Abidine Bin Ali, and Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak—stalwart allies in the U.S.-led war on terrorismand two of North Africa’s most pro-American rulers—were among the first Arab leaders to visit Washingtonand discuss reform. But with this “Arab spring” has come the inadvertent rise of Islamist movementsthroughout the region. ابھی, as U.S. policymakers ratchet down pressure, Egypt and Tunisia see a greenlight to backtrack on reform.

جمہوریت خود سے خود کی حفاظت?

Ebru Erdem

Studies on government in Muslim societies and in the Middle East in particular have mostly focused on authoritarianism. They sought to answer why authoritarianism is the most often observed regime type, and why it persists. Recent work has looked at the role of elections and elected bodies under authoritarianism, explaining why they exist and what purposes they serve (Blaydes 2008; Lust-Okar 2006). The goal of this paper is to shift the spotlight onto the judiciary, and to the political role of high courts in Muslim societies with different levels of authoritarianism.Judiciaries and the judicial processes in Muslim societies have not caught much scholarly attention. Much of the work in this area has revolved around Shari’a. Shari’a law, incorporation of the Shari’a into western style judicial systems and legal codes, conflicts between western and Shari’a inspired codes of family law, and especially the impact of the latter on women’s rights are some of the extensively studied topics concerning the judicial processes in these societies. دوسری طرف, work on judiciary as a political institution in the Muslim world is scarce, notable exceptions being Moustafa (2003) and Hirschl (2004). Judiciaries may take different institutional forms, be based on different legal traditions, or vary in the level of independence they enjoy, but they are still a political institutions.Why study the judiciary in the Muslim World? Is a focus on the judiciary meaningful given the dominance of the executives in countries with authoritarian regimes? The justification for a focus on the judiciary has different dimensions. From a rational choice-institutionalist perspective: if an institution exists, there must be a reason for it, and we think that investigating the raison d’être of the judiciaries will provide interesting insights about political processes and executive strategies. From an institutional-design perspective, the shape that an institution takes2is related to the strategies of the actors negotiating over that institution, and we would like to use the observed variance in judicial institutions and powers across countries and time periods to learn about different aspects of political bargains that scholars have studied in other political realms. From a democratic development perspective, the establishment of the checks and balances is central to a functioning and sustainable democracy, and we would argue that studying the judiciary is central to understanding the prospects towards establishment of rule of law and a credible commitment to democracy (Weingast 1997).

What Happened to the “Arab Street?"

نیہا سہگل



Why do opposition movements engage in protest under some circumstances but not inothers? Why did the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt organize large scale protest during the 2005regime initiated political reforms while remaining largely off the streets during the United States’led war in Iraq in 2003? There is a common notion among Western public opinion and policymakers that United States’ policies in the Middle East have led to greater political activismamong Islamic fundamentalists. ابھی تک, while citizens around the world protested the war in Iraq,Egypt remained largely quiet. The lack of protest and other acts of opposition were surprisinggiven the history of Arab-anti colonial struggle, the 1950s street politics in Egypt that broughtNasser to power and the flourishing civil society organizations in the region exemplified byIslamist parties, non governmental organizations and professional syndicates. زیادہ اہم بات,with the 2005 regime initiated political opening in Egypt, the country’s largest oppositionmovement, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood organized high levels of protests anddemonstrations exposing undemocratic practices of the current government and seeking greaterpolitical freedom. اس سال 2005, was marked by a “wave of contention” in Egypt standing instark contrast to the lack of mobilization against the Iraq war. Clearly, Muslim Brotherhoodprotest activity is guided by factors other than the prevalence of “anti-Americanism.”Scholars of contentions politics have developed and tested various theories that explainand predict protest behavior. Strain and breakdown theories explain protest as an outcome ofeconomic conditions while resource mobilization theories have stressed the role of material andorganizational constraints in organizing protest. Yet others have argued that protests are spurredby structural changes, مثال کے طور پر, divisions or breakdown in the government. In this paper, Iargue that explaining the protest behavior of one group should take into account the group’sinteraction with other opposition actors. Opposition groups operate in a dense network of allies,adversaries as well as counter movements. Therefore their strategies influence each other intangible ways. I present an analysis of how the 2005 political opening in Egypt led to changes inlegal parties such as al-Ghad and al-Wafd that were allowed to contest presidential andparliamentary elections. مزید, the new movement Kifaya, originally formed to expressopposition to the Iraq war, also gained momentum as an anti-Mubarak, pro-democracy alliance.The changes in the parties that were allowed to contest elections and the emergence of newmovements altered the socio-political context for the “officially banned, yet tolerated,” MuslimBrotherhood. The Brotherhood tried to reassert itself as the main voice of political opposition inthe country by organizing greater protest activity and in this way established similarity with legalopposition parties. While legal opposition parties remain weak and ineffective in Egypt, andnewer opposition movements are still small in their membership, they may still influence eachothers’ strategies in tangible ways.