Tất cả mục Tagged Với: "Trung Đông"
Ngày mai Ả Rập
DAVID B. OTTAWAY
Tháng Mười 6, 1981, được coi là một ngày kỷ niệm ở Ai Cập. Nó đánh dấu kỷ niệm thời khắc chiến thắng vĩ đại nhất của Ai Cập trong ba cuộc xung đột Ả Rập-Israel, khi quân đội yếu kém của đất nước tràn qua Kênh đào Suez trong những ngày đầu của 1973 Chiến tranh Yom Kippur và khiến quân đội Israel quay cuồng trong việc rút lui. Mát mẻ, buổi sáng không mây, sân vận động Cairo chật kín các gia đình Ai Cập đã đến xem quân đội nâng cấp phần cứng của nó., Tổng thống Anwar el-Sadat,kiến trúc sư của chiến tranh, hài lòng nhìn những người đàn ông và máy móc diễu hành trước anh ta. Tôi đã ở gần đây, một phóng viên nước ngoài mới đến., một trong những chiếc xe tải quân đội dừng ngay trước khán đài xét duyệt ngay khi sáu máy bay phản lực Mirage gầm rú trên đầu trong một màn biểu diễn nhào lộn, vẽ bầu trời với những con đường dài màu đỏ, màu vàng, màu tía,và khói xanh. Sadat đứng dậy, dường như đang chuẩn bị chào hỏi với một đội quân Ai Cập khác. Anh ta tự biến mình thành mục tiêu hoàn hảo cho 4 tên sát thủ Hồi giáo đã nhảy khỏi xe tải, xông vào bục, và bắn thủng cơ thể anh ta bằng những viên đạn., Tôi cân nhắc ngay lập tức liệu có nên rơi xuống đất và có nguy cơ bị giẫm chết bởi những khán giả đang hoảng loạn hay vẫn đứng yên và mạo hiểm với một viên đạn lạc. Bản năng mách bảo tôi phải đứng vững trên đôi chân của mình, và ý thức về nghĩa vụ báo chí thôi thúc tôi phải đi tìm hiểu xem Sadat còn sống hay đã chết.
Tự do Dân chủ và Hồi giáo chính trị: Tìm kiếm cho Ground thường gặp.
Mostapha Benhenda
Hồi giáo xem xét lại
Maha Azzam
Iraq và tương lai của Hồi giáo chính trị
James Piscatori
Ai Cập ở điểm tới hạn ?
Nguồn gốc của chủ nghĩa dân tộc trong thế giới Hồi giáo
Shabir Ahmed
Văn hóa chính trị Hồi giáo, Dân chủ, và Nhân quyền
Daniel E. Giá
Các bên đối lập theo chủ nghĩa Hồi giáo và tiềm năng cho sự tham gia của Liên minh Châu Âu
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
QUY TẮC ISLAMIC TRÊN WARFARE
The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, lịch sử,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.
SỰ TĂNG TRƯỞNG CỦA “DÂN CHỦ MUSLIM”
Thống đốc Nasr
A specter is haunting the Muslim world. This particular specter is notthe malign and much-discussed spirit of fundamentalist extremism, nor yet the phantom hope known as liberal Islam. Instead, the specter that I have in mind is a third force, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfullyfor votes in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan (beforeits 1999 military coup), and Turkey.Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule by shari‘a (Luật Hồi giáo) oreven a restored caliphate, Muslim Democrats view political life with apragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari‘a state, and their main goaltends to be the more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platform sand stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests—Islamic as well as secular—within a democratic arena whosebounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best as a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state.
Hamas và cải cách chính trị ở giữa phía đông
Brotherhood Hồi giáo ở Ai Cập
William Thomasson
Hồi giáo là một tôn giáo bạo lực? Is the widely applied stereotype that all Muslims are violently opposed to “infidel” Western cultures accurate? Today’s world is confronted with two opposing faces of Islam; một là một thanh bình, thích ứng, hiện đại hóa Hồi giáo, and the other strictly fundamentalist and against all things un-Islamic or that may corrupt Islamic culture. Both specimens, mặc dù có vẻ như trái ngược, trộn lẫn và liên quan, and are the roots of the confusion over modern Islam’s true identity. Islam’s vastness makes it difficult to analyze, but one can focus on a particular Islamic region and learn much about Islam as a whole. Thật, người ta có thể làm điều này với Ai Cập, particularly the relationship between the Fundamentalist society known as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and population. The two opposing faces of Islam are presented in Egypt in a manageable portion, offering a smaller model of the general multi-national struggle of today’s Islam. In an effort to exemplify the role of Islamic Fundamentalists, và mối quan hệ của họ với xã hội Hồi giáo như một toàn thể trong cuộc tranh luận hiện nay là những gì đạo Hồi, bài viết này sẽ cung cấp một lịch sử của Hiệp hội Hồi giáo Brothers, một mô tả về cách tổ chức có nguồn gốc, chức năng, và đã được tổ chức, and a summary of the Brother’s activities and influences on Egyptian culture. Chắc chắn, làm như vậy, người ta có thể đạt được một sự hiểu biết sâu sắc hơn về cách diễn giải Hồi giáo trào Hồi giáo
Sự phát triển chính trị của tổ chức Anh em Hồi giáo ở Ai Cập
Stephen Bennett
“Allah is our objective. Tiên tri là lãnh đạo của chúng tôi. Qur’an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”
Since its early days in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood has created much controversy, as some argue that the organization advocates violence in the name of Islam. According to Dr. Mamoun Fandy of the James A. Baker III Institute of Public Policy, “jihadism and the activation of the views of the world of the house of Islam and the house of war are the ideas that emerged from the writings and the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood” (Livesy, 2005). The primary evidence for this argument is notable member of the Brotherhood, Sayeed Qutb, who is credited with developing the revisionist and controversial interpretation of jihad that provided religious justifications for violence committed by offshoot organizations of the Brotherhood like al-jihad, al-Takfir wa al-Hijra, Hamas, và al-Qaeda.
Yet that is still a debatable position, because despite being the ideological parent of these violent organizations, the Muslim Brotherhood itself has always maintained an official stance against violence and instead has promoted Islamic civil and social action at the grassroots level. Within the first twenty years of its existence the Muslim Brotherhood gained status as the most influential of all major groups in the Middle East through its popular activism. It also spread from Egypt into other nations throughout the region and served as the catalyst for many of the successful popular liberation movements against Western colonialism in the Middle East.
While it has retained most of its founding principles from its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has made a dramatic transformation in some crucial aspects of its political ideology. Formerly denounced by many as a terrorist organization, as of late the Muslim Brotherhood has been labeled by most current scholars of the Middle East as politically “moderate”, “politically centrist”, and “accommodationist” to Egypt’s political and governmental structures (Abed-Kotob, 1995, p. 321-322). Sana Abed-Kotob also tells us that of the current Islamist opposition groups that exist today “the more ‘radical’ or militant of these groups insist upon revolutionary change that is to be imposed on the masses and political system, whereas… the new Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, call for gradual change that is to be undertaken from within the political system and with the enlistment of the Muslim masses”
Chia tay tấm màn che
shadi hamid
America’s post-September 11 project to promote democracy in the Middle East has proven a spectacular failure. Hôm nay,Arab autocrats are as emboldened as ever. Ai Cập, Jordan, Tunisia, and others are backsliding on reform. Opposition forces are being crushed. Three of the most democratic polities in the region, Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories,are being torn apart by violence and sectarian conflict.Not long ago, it seemed an entirely different outcome was in the offing. Asrecently as late 2005, observers were hailing the “Arab spring,” an “autumn forautocrats,” and other seasonal formulations. They had cause for such optimism.On January 31, 2005, the world stood in collective awe as Iraqis braved terroristthreats to cast their ballots for the first time. That February, Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak announced multi-candidate presidential elections, another first.And that same month, after former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri wasshadi hamid is director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracyand an associate of the Truman National Security Project.Parting the Veil Now is no time to give up supporting democracy in the Muslim world.But to do so, the United States must embrace Islamist moderates.shadi hamiddemocracyjournal.org 39killed, Lebanon erupted in grief and then anger as nearly one million Lebanesetook to the streets of their war-torn capital, demanding self-determination. Notlong afterward, 50,000 Bahrainis—one-eighth of the country’s population—ralliedfor constitutional reform. The opposition was finally coming alive.But when the Arab spring really did come, the American response provide dample evidence that while Arabs were ready for democracy, the United States most certainly was not. Looking back, the failure of the Bush Administration’s efforts should not have been so surprising. Since the early 1990s, Mỹ. policymakershave had two dueling and ultimately incompatible objectives in the Middle East: promoting Arab democracy on one hand, and curbing the power and appealof Islamist groups on the other. In his second inaugural address, Tổng thống George W. Bush declared that in supporting Arab democracy, our “vital interests and our deepest beliefs” were now one. The reality was more complicated.When Islamist groups throughout the region began making impressive gains at the ballot box, particularly in Egypt and in the Palestinian territories, the Bush Administration stumbled. With Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza high on the agendaand a deteriorating situation in Iraq, American priorities began to shift. Friendly dictators once again became an invaluable resource for an administration that found itself increasingly embattled both at home and abroad.The reason for this divergence in policy revolves around a critical question:What should the United States do when Islamists come to power through free elections? In a region where Islamist parties represent the only viable oppositionto secular dictatorships, this is the crux of the matter. In the MiddleEastern context, the question of democracy and the question of political Islamare inseparable. Without a well-defined policy of engagement toward politicalIslam, the United States will fall victim to the same pitfalls of the past. In many ways, it already has.
Làm thế nào để thúc đẩy quyền con người tại Ai Cập
Nhân quyền đầu tiên
The United States’ relationship with Egypt is central toseveral policy challenges facing the new administration inthe Middle East. As the most populous Arab state, Egyptis a major regional power. Since signing a peace treatywith Israel in 1979, it has played a key role in negotiationsfor an Israeli-Palestinian and a broader Israeli-Arab peaceagreement. Egypt helped to mediate a tense ceasefirebetween Israel and Hamas that broke down with theoutbreak of conflict in the Gaza Strip at the end ofDecember 2008, and continues to serve as anintermediary between the warring parties in the Gazaconflict. Egypt is again at the center of renewed peacemaking efforts in the region launched by the Obamaadministration with the appointment of former SenatorGeorge Mitchell as Special Envoy in January 2009.In a part of the world where so many vital U.S. interestsare at stake, Egypt is a key partner for any U.S.administration. The Egyptian government can greatlyassist the United States in legitimizing and supporting thenew government in Iraq, Ví dụ, và, as the owner ofthe Suez Canal and as an oil producer, Egypt is vital tothe security of energy supplies from the region.Egypt is also a testing ground for U.S. human rightspromotion in the region, and was frequently the target ofexhortations to move forward with political reform anddemocratization during the Bush administration.Successive administrations have been encouraging theEgyptian government to reform for decades, but after the9/11 attacks, with the prominent involvement of Egyptianslike Mohamed Atta and Ayman al-Zawahiri, calls forreform took on greater centrality—and a new urgency—inU.S. policy. Human rights and democracy were no longerjust desirable; they became national security concernsand the subject of a new “Freedom Agenda.
Dân chủ hóa và Chính trị Hồi giáo:
Yokota Takayuki
The aim of this article is to explore the often contradictory correlation between democratizationand Islamic politics in Egypt, focusing on a new Islamic political party, the Wasat Party (Ḥizbal-Wasaṭ).Theoretically, democratization and Islamic politics are not incompatible if Islamic politicalorganizations can and do operate within a legal and democratic framework. Mặt khác,this requires democratic tolerance by governments for Islamic politics, as long as they continueto act within a legal framework. In the Middle East, Tuy nhiên, Islamic political parties are oftensuspected of having undemocratic agendas, and governments have often used this suspicion as ajustification to curb democratization. This is also the case with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood(Jam‘īya al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) under the Ḥusnī Mubārak regime. Although the Brotherhood is amainstream Islamic movement in Egypt, operating publicly and enjoying considerable popularity,successive governments have never changed its illegal status for more than half a century. Someof the Brotherhood members decided to form the Wasat Party as its legal political organ in order tobreak this stalemate.There have been some studies on the Wasat Party. Stacher [2002] analyzes the “Platformof the Egyptian Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Miṣrī 1998] and explains the basic principlesof the Wasat Party as follows: dân chủ, sharī‘a (Luật Hồi giáo), rights of women, and Muslim-Christian relations. Baker [2003] regards the Wasat Party as one of the new Islamist groups thathave appeared in contemporary Egypt, and analyzes its ideology accordingly. Wickham [2004]discusses the moderation of Islamic movements in Egypt and the attempt to form the WasatParty from the perspective of comparative politics. Norton [2005] examines the ideology andactivities of the Wasat Party in connection with the Brotherhood’s political activities. As theseearlier studies are mainly concerned with the Wasat Party during the 1990s and the early 2000s,I will examine the ideology and activities of the Wasat Party till the rise of the democratizationmovement in Egypt in around 2005. I will do so on the basis of the Wasat Party’s documents, suchas the “Platform of the New Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Jadīd 2004]1), and my interviews withits members.