RSSEntries Tagged Kwa: "Mashariki ya kati"

Arab Kesho

Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan'. Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan'

Oktoba 6, 1981, Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan'. Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan' 1973 Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan'. Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan',Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan'. Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', Mlisho wa RSS wa Kitengo cha 'Jordan', moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi.,moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi.. moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi.. moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi.. moja ya lori la jeshi lilisimama moja kwa moja mbele ya stendi ya kukagua mara tu ndege sita aina ya Mirage zilipokuwa zikiunguruma katika mchezo wa sarakasi., na hisia yangu ya wajibu wa uandishi wa habari ilinisukuma kwenda kujua kama Sadat alikuwa hai au amekufa.

| Septemba 26, 2010 | Maoni 0
Soma zaidi

Demokrasia huria na Uislamu wa Kisiasa: Utafutaji wa Sehemu ya Kawaida.

Mostapha Benhenda

This paper seeks to establish a dialogue between democratic and Islamic political theories.1 The interplay between them is puzzling: kwa mfano, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
regime, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. Kwa mfano, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, which is a defining feature of democracy. On the contrary, they often reject the principle of separation between religion and the state, which is often considered to be part of democracy (at least, of democracy as known in the United States today). Given this mixed assessment of democratic principles, it seems interesting to determine the conception of democracy underlying Islamic political models. In other words, we should try to find out what is democratic in “theodemocracy”. To that end, among the impressive diversity and plurality of Islamic traditions of normative political thought, we essentially focus on the broad current of thought going back to Abu ‘Ala Maududi and the Egyptian intellectual Sayyed Qutb.8 This particular trend of thought is interesting because in the Muslim world, it lies at the basis of some of the most challenging oppositions to the diffusion of the values originating from the West. Based on religious values, this trend elaborated a political model alternative to liberal democracy. Broadly speaking, the conception of democracy included in this Islamic political model is procedural. With some differences, this conception is inspired by democratic theories advocated by some constitutionalists and political scientists.10 It is thin and minimalist, up to a certain point. Kwa mfano, it does not rely on any notion of popular sovereignty and it does not require any separation between religion and politics. The first aim of this paper is to elaborate this minimalist conception. We make a detailed restatement of it in order to isolate this conception from its moral (liberal) foundations, which are controversial from the particular Islamic viewpoint considered here. Kwa kweli, the democratic process is usually derived from a principle of personal autonomy, which is not endorsed by these Islamic theories.11 Here, we show that such principle is not necessary to justify a democratic process.
| Septemba 09, 2010 | Maoni 0
Soma zaidi

Uislam upya

Matta Azzam

Kuna siasa na usalama mgogoro jirani kile ni inajulikana kama Uislam, mgogoro ambao utangulizi Hutangulia muda 9/11. Katika kipindi cha 25 miaka, kumekuwa na msisitizo tofauti juu ya jinsi ya kuelezea na kupambana Uislam. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji., imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji..
imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji., imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji.. imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji.. imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji.. imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji.. imekuwa kawaida kupata kwamba itikadi na dini hutumiwa na vyama vinavyopingana kama vyanzo vya uhalalishaji.,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Julai 2005 ilidhihirika zaidi kuwa baadhi ya vijana walikuwa wakisisitiza kujitolea kwa kidini kama njia ya kudhihirisha ukabila. Uhusiano kati ya Waislamu kote ulimwenguni na mtazamo wao kwamba Waislamu wako hatarini kumesababisha watu wengi katika sehemu mbali mbali za dunia kuunganisha matatizo yao ya ndani na kuwa Waislamu wengi zaidi., kuwa na kitambulisho kitamaduni, ama kimsingi au sehemu, na Uislamu unaojulikana kwa mapana.

| Septemba 06, 2010 | Maoni 0
Soma zaidi

Iraq na Baadaye ya Uislamu wa Kisiasa

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?”, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.
| Septemba 04, 2010 | Maoni 0
Soma zaidi

Misri kwenye Kituo cha Tipping ?

David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 kwa 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja ($7 umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja) umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja. umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja, umeme na petroli vilikuwa vinatumia theluthi moja.

| Septemba 02, 2010 | Maoni 0
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Mizizi Ya Utaifa Katika Ulimwengu Wa Kiislamu

Shabir Ahmed

The Muslim world has been characterised by failure, disunity, bloodshed, oppression and backwardness. At present, no Muslim country in the world can rightly claim to be a leader in any field of human activity. Kwa kweli, the non-Muslims of the East and the West
now dictate the social, economic and political agenda for the Muslim Ummah.
Zaidi ya hayo, the Muslims identify themselves as Turkish, Arab, African and Pakistani. If this is not enough, Muslims are further sub-divided within each country or continent. Kwa mfano, in Pakistan people are classed as Punjabis, Sindhis, Balauchis and
Pathans. The Muslim Ummah was never faced with such a dilemma in the past during Islamic rule. They never suffered from disunity, widespread oppression, stagnation in science and technology and certainly not from the internal conflicts that we have witnessed this century like the Iran-Iraq war. So what has gone wrong with the Muslims this century? Why are there so many feuds between them and why are they seen to be fighting each other? What has caused their weakness and how will they ever recover from the present stagnation?
There are many factors that contributed to the present state of affairs, but the main ones are the abandoning of the Arabic language as the language of understanding Islam correctly and performing ijtihad, the absorption of foreign cultures such as the philosophies of the Greeks, Persian and the Hindus, the gradual loss of central authority over some of the provinces, and the rise of nationalism since the 19th Century.
This book focuses on the origins of nationalism in the Muslim world. Nationalism did not arise in the Muslim world naturally, nor did it came about in response to any hardships faced by the people, nor due to the frustration they felt when Europe started to dominate the world after the industrial revolution. Rather, nationalism was implanted in the minds of the Muslims through a well thought out scheme by the European powers, after their failure to destroy the Islamic State by force. The book also presents the Islamic verdict on nationalism and practical steps that can be taken to eradicate the disease of nationalism from the Muslim Ummah so as to restore it back to its former glory.

| Agosti 28, 2010 | Maoni 0
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Islamic Culture Political, Demokrasia, na Haki za Binadamu

Daniel E. Bei

Imesemekana kwamba Uislamu kuwezesha ubabe, inapingana na

maadili ya jamii za Magharibi, na inaathiri sana matokeo muhimu ya kisiasa
katika mataifa ya Waislamu. Kwa hiyo, wasomi, wachambuzi, na serikali
maafisa mara nyingi huelekeza kwa '' misingi ya Kiislam '' kama inayofuata
tishio la kiitikadi kwa demokrasia za huria. Mtazamo huu, hata hivyo, inategemea kimsingi
juu ya uchambuzi wa maandishi, Nadharia ya kisiasa ya Kiislamu, na masomo ya muda
ya nchi binafsi, ambazo hazizingatii mambo mengine. Ni ubishi wangu
kwamba maandiko na mila ya Uislamu, kama zile za dini zingine,
inaweza kutumika kusaidia mifumo na sera anuwai za kisiasa. Nchi
masomo maalum na ya kuelezea hayatusaidii kupata mifumo ambayo itasaidia
tunaelezea uhusiano tofauti kati ya Uislamu na siasa kote
nchi za ulimwengu wa Kiislamu. Kwa hivyo, mbinu mpya ya utafiti wa
uhusiano kati ya Uislamu na siasa unahitajika.
ninashauri, kupitia tathmini kali ya uhusiano kati ya Uislamu,
demokrasia, na haki za binadamu katika ngazi ya kitaifa, hiyo sana
mkazo umewekwa juu ya nguvu ya Uislamu kama nguvu ya kisiasa. Mimi kwanza
tumia masomo ya kulinganisha, ambayo huzingatia mambo yanayohusiana na mwingiliano
kati ya vikundi vya Kiislamu na tawala, ushawishi wa kiuchumi, machafuko ya kikabila,

na maendeleo ya jamii, kuelezea utofauti katika ushawishi wa

Uislamu juu ya siasa katika mataifa manane.

| Agosti 22, 2010 | Maoni 0
Soma zaidi

Vyama vya Upinzani vya Kiisilamu na Uwezo wa Ushirikiano wa EU

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Kwa kuzingatia kuongezeka kwa umuhimu wa harakati za Kiislamu katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu na

Kwa kuzingatia kuongezeka kwa umuhimu wa harakati za Kiislamu katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu na, Kwa kuzingatia kuongezeka kwa umuhimu wa harakati za Kiislamu katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu na

Kwa kuzingatia kuongezeka kwa umuhimu wa harakati za Kiislamu katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu na

Kwa kuzingatia kuongezeka kwa umuhimu wa harakati za Kiislamu katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu na. Kwa kuzingatia kuongezeka kwa umuhimu wa harakati za Kiislamu katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu na

Kwa kuzingatia kuongezeka kwa umuhimu wa harakati za Kiislamu katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu na.

Kwa kuzingatia kuongezeka kwa umuhimu wa harakati za Kiislamu katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu na. Kwa kuzingatia kuongezeka kwa umuhimu wa harakati za Kiislamu katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu na

Kwa kuzingatia kuongezeka kwa umuhimu wa harakati za Kiislamu katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu na

haki za binadamu, Kwa kuzingatia kuongezeka kwa umuhimu wa harakati za Kiislamu katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu na

Kwa kuzingatia kuongezeka kwa umuhimu wa harakati za Kiislamu katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu na

Kwa kuzingatia kuongezeka kwa umuhimu wa harakati za Kiislamu katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu na. Mtazamo mwingine ni kwamba demokrasia katika ulimwengu wa Kiislamu ingeongezeka

Usalama wa Ulaya. Uhalali wa hoja hizi na nyinginezo juu ya kama na jinsi ya

EU inapaswa kujihusisha inaweza tu kujaribiwa kwa kusoma mienendo tofauti ya Kiislamu na

hali zao za kisiasa, nchi baada ya nchi.

Udemokrasia ni mada kuu ya hatua za pamoja za sera za kigeni za EU, kama ilivyowekwa

nje katika Kifungu 11 ya Mkataba wa Umoja wa Ulaya. Majimbo mengi yanazingatiwa katika hili

ripoti sio ya kidemokrasia, au si ya kidemokrasia kikamilifu. Katika nchi nyingi hizi, Muislamu

vyama na vuguvugu vinaunda upinzani mkubwa kwa tawala zilizopo, na

wengine wanaunda kambi kubwa ya upinzani. Demokrasia za Ulaya zimelazimika kwa muda mrefu

kushughulikia tawala zinazotawala ambazo ni za kimabavu, lakini ni jambo jipya kuchapishwa

kwa ajili ya mageuzi ya kidemokrasia katika majimbo ambayo walengwa wanaweza kuwa nayo, kutoka

Mtazamo wa EU, njia tofauti na wakati mwingine zenye matatizo kwa demokrasia na yake

maadili yanayohusiana, kama vile wachache na haki za wanawake na utawala wa sheria. Malipo haya ni

mara nyingi huwekwa dhidi ya harakati za Kiislamu, kwa hivyo ni muhimu kwa watunga sera wa Uropa

kuwa na picha sahihi ya sera na falsafa za washirika watarajiwa.

Uzoefu kutoka nchi mbalimbali huelekea kupendekeza kwamba uhuru zaidi Kiislamu

vyama vinaruhusiwa, ndivyo wanavyokuwa wastani katika matendo na mawazo yao. Katika nyingi

kesi vyama na makundi ya Kiislamu kwa muda mrefu tangu kuhama kutoka lengo yao ya awali

ya kuanzisha dola ya Kiislamu inayoongozwa na sheria za Kiislamu, na wamekubali msingi

kanuni za kidemokrasia za ushindani wa uchaguzi kwa mamlaka, kuwepo kwa mambo mengine ya kisiasa

washindani, na wingi wa kisiasa.

| Agosti 21, 2010 | Maoni 0
Soma zaidi

UTAWALA WA KIISLAMU KWENYE PAMBANO

H Youssef. Aboul-Enein
Sherifa Zuhur

The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.

| Agosti 13, 2010 | Maoni 0
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KUPANDA KWA “DEMOKRASI YA WAISLAMU”

Vali Nasr

A specter is haunting the Muslim world. This particular specter is notthe malign and much-discussed spirit of fundamentalist extremism, nor yet the phantom hope known as liberal Islam. Instead, the specter that I have in mind is a third force, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfullyfor votes in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan (beforeits 1999 military coup), and Turkey.Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule by shari‘a (Islamic law) oreven a restored caliphate, Muslim Democrats view political life with apragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari‘a state, and their main goaltends to be the more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platform sand stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests—Islamic as well as secular—within a democratic arena whosebounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best as a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state.

| Mar 29, 2010 | Maoni 0
Soma zaidi

Hamas na mageuzi ya kisiasa mashariki ya kati

David Mepham

The lesson of Palestine’s election is that the international community should become more serious and sophisticated about political reform in the middle east, says David Mepham of the Institute for Public Policy Research.
Hamas’s stunning victory in the 25 January elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council raises three critical questions for international policymakers:
• why did it happen – that an organisation labelled as “terrorist” by the Israelis, the European Union and the United States manages to win the support of a majority of Palestinian voters?
• jumuiya ya kimataifa inapaswa kujibu vipi sasa?
• wapi ushindi wa Hamas unaacha sababu ya mageuzi ya kisiasa na demokrasia katika mashariki ya kati?
Kupanda kwa Hamas
Mengi ya maoni ya kimataifa ya mara moja juu ya matokeo ya uchaguzi yamezingatia mapungufu ya Fatah wakati wa muongo ambao harakati ilishikilia mamlaka katika Mamlaka ya Palestina. (PA) - ikiwa ni pamoja na kukithiri kwa ufisadi wa maafisa wakuu wa Fatah na ukosefu wa demokrasia yenye maana ndani ya PA. Pia kulikuwa na kura nyingi chanya kwa Hamas. Shirika hilo linaonekana na Wapalestina wengi kuwa halijachafuliwa na ufisadi, na, tofauti na PA, ina rekodi nzuri ya kutoa afya, elimu na huduma nyinginezo.
The other part of the explanation for the Hamas victory – less discussed in the international media – has been the failure of the “peace process” and the radicalising and impoverishing effects of the Israeli occupation. Under the premiership of Ariel Sharon since 2001, Israel has all but destroyed the infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority. Israel has also continued its policy of illegal settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank and east Jerusalem, and it is in the process of building a “separation barrier”.
Israel is not building the barrier on its pre-1967 occupation border (which it would be allowed to do under international law). Rather it plans to build 80% of the barrier inside Israeli-occupied Palestinian territory. This involves incorporating the main Israeli settlement blocs, pamoja na kutwaa ardhi ya kilimo na vyanzo vya maji vya Wapalestina. Hii inazuia uhuru wa Wapalestina wa kutembea, na hufanya iwe vigumu zaidi kwa Wapalestina kupata shule zao, vituo vya afya na ajira.
Sera hizi ni kandamizi na udhalilishaji; pia wana matokeo mabaya ya kiuchumi. Umoja wa Mataifa unakadiria kuwa viwango vya umaskini vimeongezeka zaidi ya mara tatu katika miaka mitano iliyopita, hiyo 60% Wapalestina sasa wanaishi katika umaskini, na kwamba ukosefu wa ajira uko karibu 30%. Masharti haya yametoa udongo wenye rutuba sana kwa ajili ya itikadi kali ya Wapalestina na kuongezeka kwa Hamas.
Changamoto ya muda mfupi
Ushindi wa uchaguzi wa Hamas unaleta kitendawili cha kweli kwa jumuiya ya kimataifa.
Kwa upande mmoja, the “Quartet” (Marekani, Umoja wa Ulaya, Urusi na Umoja wa Mataifa) ni sawa kusema kwamba mazungumzo kamili ya amani na Hamas yatahitaji harakati kubwa kwa upande wa Hamas. Hamas haitambui taifa la Israel. Pia inasaidia vurugu, ikiwemo mashambulizi dhidi ya raia wa Israel, kama sehemu ya mkakati wake wa ukombozi wa taifa la Palestina. Yeyote anayetarajia mabadiliko ya mara moja na rasmi katika sera ya Hamas kuhusu masuala haya anaweza kukatishwa tamaa.
Lakini diplomasia ya kimataifa yenye akili bado inaweza kuleta mabadiliko. Huku wakisitasita kuitangaza rasmi, kuna ushahidi kwamba baadhi ya viongozi wakuu wa Hamas wanakubali ukweli wa Israel ndani ya mipaka yake ya kabla ya 1967. Kwa kuongezea, kuhusu suala la vurugu Hamas kwa kiasi kikubwa imedumisha mapatano ya upande mmoja (tahdi'a) kwa mwaka uliopita. Kupanua makubaliano haya, na kufanya kazi kwa ajili ya usitishaji vita wa Israel na Palestina, inapaswa kuwa lengo la haraka la diplomasia ya kimataifa kuelekea Hamas, ikiwa ni lazima kupitia waamuzi wa mtu wa tatu.
Lengo lingine muhimu la kimataifa linapaswa kuwa kuzuia kuanguka kwa Mamlaka ya Palestina. Utawala mbaya wa Fatah na matokeo mabaya ya uvamizi na kufungwa kwa Israeli kumeiacha PA katika hali ya kukata tamaa na kutegemea kabisa ufadhili wa wafadhili ili kuendelea kufanya kazi.. katika 2005, EU ilitoa pauni milioni 338, huku Marekani ikichangia pauni milioni 225. Kukata msaada huo mara moja kutawatumbukiza makumi ya maelfu ya Wapalestina katika umaskini mkubwa, kuchochea migogoro ya kijamii na machafuko. Lakini wafadhili wana wasiwasi kuhusu kuhamisha rasilimali kwa serikali inayoongozwa na Hamas.
Uwezekano mmoja ungekuwa kushinikiza serikali ya wanateknolojia wa Palestina, without senior Hamas figures in key ministerial positions, and to rely on Mahmoud Abbas, the directly elected Palestinian president, as the main interlocutor for the international community. Something along these lines appears to command support amongst the Quartet. If the immediate economic situation can be stabilised, then there is at least a possibility of encouraging Hamas to move in a political direction through a policy of gradual, conditional engagement. Pressure on Israel to live up to its obligations under international law, for example by ending illegal settlement activity, would also help: persuading a sceptical Palestinian public that the world does care about their plight and is committed to a two-state solution.
The regional prospect
Wakati ushindi wa Hamas umelenga umakini katika mgogoro wa mara moja katika maeneo ya Palestina, inazua maswali mapana zaidi kuhusu mchakato wa mageuzi ya kisiasa na demokrasia katika Mashariki ya Kati, mchakato uliotetewa hivyo hadharani na utawala wa Bush. Ni kinaya, kusema kidogo, kwamba Hamas - kundi ambalo Marekani inakataa kukabiliana nalo - wanapaswa kuwa wanufaika wa uchaguzi huru na wa haki unaohimizwa na sera ya Marekani.. Baadhi watapata hitimisho kwamba mageuzi ya kidemokrasia katika Mashariki ya Kati ni biashara potofu isiyo na matumaini na ambayo inapaswa kuachwa mara moja.. Ndogo “c” wahafidhina, pande zote za wigo wa kisiasa, itahisi imethibitishwa katika kuangazia hatari za mabadiliko ya haraka ya kisiasa na katika kuashiria fadhila za utulivu..
Ni kweli kwamba mabadiliko ya kisiasa yana hatari, ikiwa ni pamoja na hatari kwamba Waislam wenye itikadi kali kama Hamas watakuwa wanufaika wakuu wa ukombozi wa kisiasa. Ingawa hii ni wasiwasi unaofaa, wale wanaoangazia wanaelekea kupuuza tofauti za Waislam wa kisiasa katika eneo hilo, mazingira maalum ambayo yanachangia kuinuka kwa Hamas, na kiwango ambacho baadhi ya Waislam wamesimamia misimamo yao katika miaka ya hivi karibuni. Tofauti na Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood nchini Misri, Msimamo wa Utekelezaji wa Kiislamu nchini Jordan na Uadilifu & Chama cha Maendeleo nchini Morocco wote wanakataa vurugu na wamejitolea wenyewe kwa siasa za vyama vingi.
Nor do the critics suggest a better alternative for addressing the phenomenon of political Islamism across the region than the attempted engagement of Islamists in the political process. Repression of Islamists and their systematic exclusion from political institutions has been a recipe for instability and extremism, not moderation.
There is obviously a strong critique to be made of the Bush administration’s attempts to promote political change in the middle east, not least the multiple failings of its policy in Iraq. More broadly, the US lacks credibility in the region as a force for democracy and human rights because of its largely uncritical support for Israel, and its military, diplomatic and often financial backing for many of the more authoritarian regimes in the region. Even when it is particularly outspoken on the need for greater democracy, for example in its recent dealings with President Mubarak of Egypt, the administration’s anti-terrorism agenda consistently trumps its political reform objectives.
But exposing the folly and ineffectiveness of US policy is one thing; ditching the commitment to political reform in the middle east is quite another. The international community needs to strengthen not weaken its commitment to accountable government and human rights in the region. In thinking about political change in the middle east – where the concept of a democratic culture is often very weak – international actors need to give as much emphasis to “constitutionalism” as to elections, important though elections are. In this context, constitutionalism means a balance of powers, including checks on the executive, a fair and independent legal process, a free press and media, and the protection of the rights of minorities.
It is important too for international actors to be realistic about what can be achieved in particular countries and over particular timescales. In some cases, support for political reform might involve pushing hard now for genuinely free elections. In other cases, a higher short-term priority for political reform might be encouraging an enlarged space in which opposition groups or civil society can function, greater freedom for the press, support for educational reforms and cultural exchanges, and promoting more inclusive economic development.
It is also vital to think more imaginatively about creating incentives for political reform in the middle east. There is a particular role for the European Union here. The experience of political change in other parts of the world suggests that countries can be persuaded to undertake very significant political and economic reforms if this is part of a process that yields real benefits to the ruling elite and the wider society. The way in which the prospect of EU membership has been used to bring about far-reaching change in eastern and central Europe is a good example of this. The process of Turkey’s accession to the EU can be seen in a similar vein.
Swali muhimu ni kama mchakato kama huo unaweza kutumika kwa upana zaidi ili kuchochea mageuzi ya kisiasa katika mashariki ya kati, kupitia mipango kama vile Sera ya Ujirani ya Ulaya (ENP). ENP itatoa nchi zinazoshiriki za mashariki ya kati hisa katika taasisi za EU, hasa soko moja, kutoa motisha yenye nguvu ya mageuzi. Pia inaruhusu EU kuzizawadia nchi ambazo zinapiga hatua haraka dhidi ya vigezo vilivyokubaliwa vya mageuzi ya kisiasa.
Hakuna majibu rahisi kwa matatizo ya sasa yanayokumba Mashariki ya Kati. Lakini somo litakalotolewa kutokana na matokeo ya Hamas ni msisitizo kwamba jumuiya ya kimataifa inapaswa kukata tamaa katika suala la mageuzi ya kisiasa katika eneo hilo.. Badala yake inapaswa kuwa kubwa zaidi na ya kisasa juu ya kusaidia kuiunga mkono.

| Mar 28, 2010 | Maoni 0
Soma zaidi

Udugu wa Kiislam huko Misri

William Thomasson

Je, Uislamu ni dini ya vurugu? Je, dhana inayotumika sana ambayo Waislamu wote wanaipinga vikali tamaduni za "kafiri" ni sahihi?? Ulimwengu wa leo unakabiliwa na nyuso mbili zinazopingana za Uislamu; mmoja akiwa mwenye amani, kubadilika, Uislamu wa kisasa, na yule mwingine mwenye msimamo mkali kabisa na dhidi ya mambo yote yasiyo ya Kiislamu au ambayo yanaweza kuharibu utamaduni wa Kiislamu. Vielelezo vyote viwili, ingawa inaonekana kupinga, kuchanganya na kuingiliana, na ndio mizizi ya mkanganyiko juu ya utambulisho wa kweli wa Uislamu wa kisasa. Ukuu wa Uislamu hufanya iwe vigumu kuuchambua, lakini mtu anaweza kuzingatia eneo fulani la Kiislamu na kujifunza mengi kuhusu Uislamu kwa ujumla wake. Kwa kweli, mtu anaweza kufanya hivi na Misri, hasa uhusiano kati ya jamii ya Wafundamentalisti inayojulikana kama Muslim Brotherhood na serikali ya Misri na idadi ya watu. Nyuso mbili zinazopingana za Uislamu zinawasilishwa nchini Misri kwa sehemu inayoweza kudhibitiwa, kutoa mfano mdogo wa mapambano ya jumla ya mataifa mengi ya Uislamu wa leo. Katika juhudi za kuonesha mfano wa nafasi ya Wasimamizi wa Kiislamu, na uhusiano wao na jamii ya Kiislamu kwa ujumla katika mjadala wa sasa kuhusu Uislamu ni nini, insha hii itatoa historia ya Jumuiya ya Ndugu Waislam, maelezo ya jinsi shirika lilivyoanzishwa, ilifanya kazi, na ilipangwa, na muhtasari wa shughuli za Ndugu na mvuto juu ya utamaduni wa Misri. Hakika, kwa kufanya hivyo, mtu anaweza kupata ufahamu wa kina wa jinsi Wafuasi wa imani za Kiislamu wanavyoufasiri Uislamu


| Mar 27, 2010 | Maoni 1
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Evolution Siasa ya Muslim Brotherhood nchini Misri

Stephen Bennett

“Mwenyezi Mungu ndiye lengo letu. Mtume ndiye kiongozi wetu. Qur’an ni sheria yetu. Jihad ni njia yetu. Kufa katika njia ya Mwenyezi Mungu ndilo tumaini letu kuu.”

Tangu siku zake za mwanzo nchini Misri chama cha Muslim Brotherhood kimezua utata mwingi, kama wengine wanavyosema kuwa shirika hilo linatetea vurugu kwa jina la Uislamu. Kwa mujibu wa Dk. Mamoun Fandy wa James A. Taasisi ya Sera ya Umma ya Baker III, "jihadi na uanzishaji wa mitazamo ya ulimwengu wa nyumba ya Kiislamu na nyumba ya vita ni fikra zilizojitokeza kutoka katika maandishi na mafundisho ya Ikhwanul Muslimin” (Livesy, 2005). Ushahidi wa msingi wa hoja hii ni mwanachama mashuhuri wa Udugu, Sayeed Qutb, ambaye anasifiwa kwa kuendeleza mrekebishaji na tafsiri yenye utata ya jihadi ambayo ilitoa uhalali wa kidini kwa vurugu zinazofanywa na mashirika mbali mbali ya Udugu kama al-jihad, al-Takfir wa al-Hijra, Hamas, na al-Qaeda.

Hata hivyo huo bado ni msimamo unaojadiliwa, kwa sababu licha ya kuwa mzazi wa kiitikadi wa mashirika haya yenye jeuri, Muslim Brotherhood yenyewe daima imekuwa na msimamo rasmi dhidi ya ghasia na badala yake imekuza hatua za Kiislamu za kiraia na kijamii katika ngazi za chini.. Katika kipindi cha miaka ishirini ya uhai wake, chama cha Muslim Brotherhood kilipata hadhi ya kuwa kikundi chenye ushawishi mkubwa kuliko vikundi vyote vikuu vya Mashariki ya Kati kupitia harakati zake maarufu.. It also spread from Egypt into other nations throughout the region and served as the catalyst for many of the successful popular liberation movements against Western colonialism in the Middle East.

While it has retained most of its founding principles from its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has made a dramatic transformation in some crucial aspects of its political ideology. Formerly denounced by many as a terrorist organization, as of late the Muslim Brotherhood has been labeled by most current scholars of the Middle East as politically “moderate”, “politically centrist”, and “accommodationist” to Egypt’s political and governmental structures (Abed-Kotob, 1995, p. 321-322). Sana Abed-Kotob pia anatuambia kwamba kati ya vikundi vya upinzani vya Kiislam vilivyopo hivi sasa "wale wenye 'itikadi kali' zaidi au wapiganaji wa vikundi hivi wanasisitiza juu ya mabadiliko ya mapinduzi ambayo yanapaswa kuwekwa kwa raia na mfumo wa kisiasa., ambapo... kundi jipya la Ikhwanul Muslimin ya Misri, wito wa mabadiliko ya taratibu ambayo yanapasa kufanywa kutoka ndani ya mfumo wa kisiasa na kwa kuandikishwa kwa umati wa Kiislamu”

| Mar 27, 2010 | Maoni 0
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Kugawanya pazia

shadi hamid

America’s post-September 11 project to promote democracy in the Middle East has proven a spectacular failure. Leo,Arab autocrats are as emboldened as ever. Misri, Jordan, Tunisia, and others are backsliding on reform. Opposition forces are being crushed. Three of the most democratic polities in the region, Lebanon, Iraq, na maeneo ya Palestina,are being torn apart by violence and sectarian conflict.Not long ago, it seemed an entirely different outcome was in the offing. Asrecently as late 2005, observers were hailing the “Arab spring,” an “autumn forautocrats,” and other seasonal formulations. They had cause for such optimism.On January 31, 2005, the world stood in collective awe as Iraqis braved terroristthreats to cast their ballots for the first time. That February, Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak announced multi-candidate presidential elections, another first.And that same month, after former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri wasshadi hamid is director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracyand an associate of the Truman National Security Project.Parting the Veil Now is no time to give up supporting democracy in the Muslim world.But to do so, the United States must embrace Islamist moderates.shadi hamiddemocracyjournal.org 39killed, Lebanon erupted in grief and then anger as nearly one million Lebanesetook to the streets of their war-torn capital, demanding self-determination. Notlong afterward, 50,000 Bahrainis—one-eighth of the country’s population—ralliedfor constitutional reform. The opposition was finally coming alive.But when the Arab spring really did come, the American response provide dample evidence that while Arabs were ready for democracy, the United States most certainly was not. Looking back, the failure of the Bush Administration’s efforts should not have been so surprising. Since the early 1990s, Marekani. policymakershave had two dueling and ultimately incompatible objectives in the Middle East: promoting Arab democracy on one hand, and curbing the power and appealof Islamist groups on the other. In his second inaugural address, President George W. Bush declared that in supporting Arab democracy, our “vital interests and our deepest beliefs” were now one. The reality was more complicated.When Islamist groups throughout the region began making impressive gains at the ballot box, particularly in Egypt and in the Palestinian territories, the Bush Administration stumbled. With Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza high on the agendaand a deteriorating situation in Iraq, American priorities began to shift. Friendly dictators once again became an invaluable resource for an administration that found itself increasingly embattled both at home and abroad.The reason for this divergence in policy revolves around a critical question:What should the United States do when Islamists come to power through free elections? In a region where Islamist parties represent the only viable oppositionto secular dictatorships, this is the crux of the matter. In the MiddleEastern context, the question of democracy and the question of political Islamare inseparable. Without a well-defined policy of engagement toward politicalIslam, the United States will fall victim to the same pitfalls of the past. In many ways, it already has.

| Mar 07, 2010 | Maoni 0
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Jinsi ya Kukuza Haki za Binadamu huko Misri

Haki za Binadamu ya kwanza

The United States’ relationship with Egypt is central toseveral policy challenges facing the new administration inthe Middle East. As the most populous Arab state, Egyptis a major regional power. Since signing a peace treatywith Israel in 1979, it has played a key role in negotiationsfor an Israeli-Palestinian and a broader Israeli-Arab peaceagreement. Egypt helped to mediate a tense ceasefirebetween Israel and Hamas that broke down with theoutbreak of conflict in the Gaza Strip at the end ofDecember 2008, and continues to serve as anintermediary between the warring parties in the Gazaconflict. Egypt is again at the center of renewed peacemaking efforts in the region launched by the Obamaadministration with the appointment of former SenatorGeorge Mitchell as Special Envoy in January 2009.In a part of the world where so many vital U.S. interestsare at stake, Egypt is a key partner for any U.S.administration. The Egyptian government can greatlyassist the United States in legitimizing and supporting thenew government in Iraq, kwa mfano, na, as the owner ofthe Suez Canal and as an oil producer, Egypt is vital tothe security of energy supplies from the region.Egypt is also a testing ground for U.S. human rightspromotion in the region, and was frequently the target ofexhortations to move forward with political reform anddemocratization during the Bush administration.Successive administrations have been encouraging theEgyptian government to reform for decades, but after the9/11 attacks, with the prominent involvement of Egyptianslike Mohamed Atta and Ayman al-Zawahiri, calls forreform took on greater centrality—and a new urgency—inU.S. policy. Human rights and democracy were no longerjust desirable; they became national security concernsand the subject of a new “Freedom Agenda.

| Mar 06, 2010 | Maoni 0
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Demokrasia na Siasa za Kiislamu:

YOKOTA Takayuki�

The aim of this article is to explore the often contradictory correlation between democratizationand Islamic politics in Egypt, focusing on a new Islamic political party, the Wasat Party (Ḥizbal-Wasaṭ).Theoretically, democratization and Islamic politics are not incompatible if Islamic politicalorganizations can and do operate within a legal and democratic framework. Kwa upande mwingine,this requires democratic tolerance by governments for Islamic politics, as long as they continueto act within a legal framework. In the Middle East, hata hivyo, Islamic political parties are oftensuspected of having undemocratic agendas, and governments have often used this suspicion as ajustification to curb democratization. This is also the case with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood(Jam‘īya al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) under the Ḥusnī Mubārak regime. Although the Brotherhood is amainstream Islamic movement in Egypt, operating publicly and enjoying considerable popularity,successive governments have never changed its illegal status for more than half a century. Someof the Brotherhood members decided to form the Wasat Party as its legal political organ in order tobreak this stalemate.There have been some studies on the Wasat Party. Stacher [2002] analyzes the “Platformof the Egyptian Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Miṣrī 1998] and explains the basic principlesof the Wasat Party as follows: demokrasia, sharī‘a (Islamic law), rights of women, and Muslim-Christian relations. Baker [2003] regards the Wasat Party as one of the new Islamist groups thathave appeared in contemporary Egypt, and analyzes its ideology accordingly. Wickham [2004]discusses the moderation of Islamic movements in Egypt and the attempt to form the WasatParty from the perspective of comparative politics. Norton [2005] examines the ideology andactivities of the Wasat Party in connection with the Brotherhood’s political activities. As theseearlier studies are mainly concerned with the Wasat Party during the 1990s and the early 2000s,I will examine the ideology and activities of the Wasat Party till the rise of the democratizationmovement in Egypt in around 2005. I will do so on the basis of the Wasat Party’s documents, suchas the “Platform of the New Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Jadīd 2004]1), and my interviews withits members.

| Februari 19, 2010 | Maoni 0
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