RSSL-Entrati Kollha Tikkettati Bi: "Lvant Nofsani"

L-Għarab Għarbi

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Ottubru 6, 1981, kien maħsub li jkun jum ta’ ċelebrazzjoni fl-Eġittu. Immarka l-anniversarju tal-akbar mument ta’ rebħa tal-Eġittu fi tliet kunflitti Għarab-Iżraeljani, meta l-armata underdog tal-pajjiż imbuttat tul il-Kanal ta 'Suez fil-ġranet tal-ftuħ tal- 1973 Il-Gwerra ta’ Yom Kippur u bagħtet truppi Iżraeljani tkebbib f’irtir. Fuq jibred, filgħodu bla sħab, l-istadium tal-Kajr kien ippakkjat bil-familji Eġizzjani li kienu ġew biex jaraw il-militar jissawwab il-hardware tiegħu.Fuq l-istand tar-reviżjoni, President Anwar el-Sadat,il-perit tal-gwerra, raw b'sodisfazzjon kif irġiel u magni parad quddiemu. Kont fil-qrib, korrispondent barrani li għadu kif wasal.F’daqqa waħda, wieħed mit-trakkijiet tal-armata waqaf direttament quddiem l-istand tar-reviżjoni eżatt kif sitt ġettijiet Mirage ħarġu fuq rashom fi prestazzjoni akrobatika, pittura s-sema bi traċċi twal aħmar, isfar, vjola,u duħħan aħdar. Sadat qam bil-wieqfa, milli jidher qed jipprepara biex jiskambja tislima ma’ kontinġent ieħor ta’ truppi Eġizzjani. Huwa għamel lilu nnifsu mira perfetta għal erba’ assassini Iżlamiċi li qabżu minn fuq it-trakk, daħlet fuq il-podju, u mifni ġismu bil-balal. Hekk kif il-qattiela komplew għal dik li dehret eternità biex isprejjaw l-istand bin-nar fatali tagħhom, Jien ikkunsidrajt għal instant jekk għandux nolqot l-art u nirriskjax li niġi maqtula sal-mewt minn spettaturi ippanikjati jew jekk nibqax bil-mixi u nirriskja li nieħu balla mitlufa. L-istint qalli biex nibqa’ fuq saqajja, u s-sens ta’ dmir ġurnalistiku tiegħi ġegħluni biex immur insir naf jekk Sadat kienx ħaj jew mejjet.

Demokrazija Liberali u Islam Politiku: it-Tiftix għal Common Ground.

Mostapha Benhenda

Dan id-dokument ifittex li jistabbilixxi djalogu bejn it-teoriji politiċi demokratiċi u Islamiċi.1 L-interazzjoni bejniethom hija mħawwda.: pereżempju, sabiex jispjegaw ir-relazzjoni li teżisti bejn id-demokrazija u l-konċepiment tagħhom tal-politika Islamika ideali
reġim, l-istudjuż Pakistani Abu ‘Ala Maududi ħoloq in-neoloġiżmu “teodemokrazija” filwaqt li l-istudjuż Franċiż Louis Massignon issuġġerixxa l-ossimoron “teokrazija sekulari”. Dawn l-espressjonijiet jissuġġerixxu li xi aspetti tad-demokrazija jiġu evalwati b’mod pożittiv u oħrajn jiġu ġġudikati b’mod negattiv. Pereżempju, L-istudjużi u l-attivisti Musulmani spiss japprovaw il-prinċipju tar-responsabbiltà tal-ħakkiema, li hija karatteristika li tiddefinixxi d-demokrazija. Għall-kuntrarju, spiss jiċħdu l-prinċipju tas-separazzjoni bejn ir-reliġjon u l-istat, li ħafna drabi titqies bħala parti mid-demokrazija (għalinqas, tad-demokrazija kif magħrufa fl-Istati Uniti llum). Minħabba din il-valutazzjoni mħallta tal-prinċipji demokratiċi, jidher interessanti li jiġi determinat il-konċepiment tad-demokrazija sottostanti mudelli politiċi Iżlamiċi. Fi kliem ieħor, għandna nippruvaw insiru nafu x'inhu demokratiku fit-"teodemokrazija". Għal dak il-għan, fost id-diversità impressjonanti u l-pluralità tat-tradizzjonijiet Iżlamiċi tal-ħsieb politiku normattiv, essenzjalment niffukaw fuq il-kurrent wiesa’ tal-ħsieb li jmur lura għal Abu ‘Ala Maududi u l-intellettwali Eġizzjan Sayyed Qutb.8 Din it-tendenza partikolari tal-ħsieb hija interessanti għax fid-dinja Musulmana., tinsab fil-bażi ta’ wħud mill-aktar oppożizzjonijiet ta’ sfida għat-tixrid tal-valuri li joriġinaw mill-Punent. Ibbażat fuq valuri reliġjużi, din it-tendenza elaborat mudell politiku alternattiva għad-demokrazija liberali. B'mod ġenerali, il-konċepiment tad-demokrazija inkluża f’dan il-mudell politiku Iżlamiku huwa proċedurali. B'xi differenzi, dan il-konċepiment huwa ispirat minn teoriji demokratiċi sostnuti minn xi kostituzzjonalisti u xjentisti politiċi.10 Hija rqiqa u minimalista., sa ċertu punt. Pereżempju, ma tistrieħ fuq l-ebda kunċett ta’ sovranità popolari u ma teħtieġ l-ebda separazzjoni bejn ir-reliġjon u l-politika. L-ewwel għan ta’ dan id-dokument huwa li jelabora dan il-kunċett minimalista. Nagħmlu dikjarazzjoni mill-ġdid dettaljata dwarha sabiex niżolaw dan il-konċepiment mill-morali tiegħu (liberali) fondazzjonijiet, li huma kontroversjali mill-perspettiva Iżlamika partikolari kkunsidrata hawn. Tabilħaqq, il-proċess demokratiku ġeneralment ikun derivat minn prinċipju ta’ awtonomija personali, li mhux approvat minn dawn it-teoriji Iżlamiċi.11 Hawnhekk, nuru li prinċipju bħal dan mhuwiex meħtieġ biex jiġġustifika proċess demokratiku.

Iżlamiżmu rivedut

MAHA AZZAM

Hemm kriżi politika u ta’ sigurtà madwar dak li jissejjaħ l-Iżlamiżmu, kriżi li l-anteċedenti tagħha ħafna qabel 9/11. Matul il-passat 25 snin, kien hemm enfasi differenti dwar kif tispjega u tiġġieled l-Iżlamiżmu. Analisti u dawk li jfasslu l-politika
fis-snin tmenin u disgħin tkellmu dwar il-kawżi ewlenin tal-militanza Iżlamika bħala mard ekonomiku u emarġilizzazzjoni. Iktar reċentement kien hemm enfasi fuq ir-riforma politika bħala mezz biex jimmina l-appell tar-radikaliżmu. Illum dejjem aktar, l-aspetti ideoloġiċi u reliġjużi tal-Iżlamiżmu jeħtieġ li jiġu indirizzati għaliex saru karatteristiċi ta’ dibattitu politiku u ta’ sigurtà usa’. Kemm jekk b’rabta mat-terroriżmu tal-Al-Qaeda, riforma politika fid-dinja Musulmana, il-kwistjoni nukleari fl-Iran jew żoni ta’ kriżi bħall-Palestina jew il-Libanu, sar komuni li ssib li l-ideoloġija u r-reliġjon jintużaw minn partiti opposti bħala sorsi ta’ leġittimizzazzjoni, ispirazzjoni u mibdija.
Is-sitwazzjoni hija kkumplikata aktar illum bl-antagoniżmu dejjem jikber lejn u l-biża’ tal-Iżlam fil-Punent minħabba attakki terroristiċi li mbagħad jolqtu l-attitudnijiet lejn l-immigrazzjoni., reliġjon u kultura. Il-konfini tal-umma jew tal-komunità tal-fidili jiġġebbed lil hinn mill-istati Musulmani għal bliet Ewropej. L-umma potenzjalment teżisti kull fejn hemm komunitajiet Musulmani. Is-sens kondiviż ta’ appartenenza għal fidi komuni jiżdied f’ambjent fejn is-sens ta’ integrazzjoni fil-komunità tal-madwar mhuwiex ċar u fejn id-diskriminazzjoni tista’ tkun apparenti. Iktar ma jkun kbir iċ-ċaħda tal-valuri tas-soċjetà,
kemm jekk fil-Punent jew anke fi stat Musulman, akbar tkun il-konsolidazzjoni tal-forza morali tal-Iżlam bħala identità kulturali u sistema ta’ valuri.
Wara l-bumbardamenti f’Londra fuq 7 Lulju 2005 deher aktar ċar li xi żgħażagħ kienu qed jasserixxu l-impenn reliġjuż bħala mod kif jesprimu l-etniċità. Ir-rabtiet bejn il-Musulmani madwar id-dinja u l-perċezzjoni tagħhom li l-Musulmani huma vulnerabbli wasslu lil ħafna f’partijiet differenti ħafna tad-dinja biex jingħaqdu l-qagħdiet lokali tagħhom stess f’wieħed Musulman usa’., wara li identifika kulturalment, jew primarjament jew parzjalment, b’Islam definit b’mod wiesa’.

Iraq and the Future of Political Islam

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?”, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Egypt at the Tipping Point ?

David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 biex 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.

Roots Of Nationalism In The Muslim World

Shabir Ahmed

The Muslim world has been characterised by failure, disunity, bloodshed, oppression and backwardness. At present, no Muslim country in the world can rightly claim to be a leader in any field of human activity. Tabilħaqq, the non-Muslims of the East and the West
now dictate the social, economic and political agenda for the Muslim Ummah.
Furthermore, the Muslims identify themselves as Turkish, Għarbi, African and Pakistani. If this is not enough, Muslims are further sub-divided within each country or continent. Pereżempju, in Pakistan people are classed as Punjabis, Sindhis, Balauchis and
Pathans. The Muslim Ummah was never faced with such a dilemma in the past during Islamic rule. They never suffered from disunity, widespread oppression, stagnation in science and technology and certainly not from the internal conflicts that we have witnessed this century like the Iran-Iraq war. So what has gone wrong with the Muslims this century? Why are there so many feuds between them and why are they seen to be fighting each other? What has caused their weakness and how will they ever recover from the present stagnation?
There are many factors that contributed to the present state of affairs, but the main ones are the abandoning of the Arabic language as the language of understanding Islam correctly and performing ijtihad, the absorption of foreign cultures such as the philosophies of the Greeks, Persian and the Hindus, the gradual loss of central authority over some of the provinces, and the rise of nationalism since the 19th Century.
This book focuses on the origins of nationalism in the Muslim world. Nationalism did not arise in the Muslim world naturally, nor did it came about in response to any hardships faced by the people, nor due to the frustration they felt when Europe started to dominate the world after the industrial revolution. Anzi, nationalism was implanted in the minds of the Muslims through a well thought out scheme by the European powers, after their failure to destroy the Islamic State by force. The book also presents the Islamic verdict on nationalism and practical steps that can be taken to eradicate the disease of nationalism from the Muslim Ummah so as to restore it back to its former glory.

Kultura Politika Iżlamika, Demokrazija, u Drittijiet tal-Bniedem

Daniele. Prezz

Ġie argumentat li l-Iżlam jiffaċilita l-awtoritarjaniżmu, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Konsegwentement, studjużi, kummentaturi, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. Din il-fehma, madankollu, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Teorija politika Islamika, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, li ma jqisux fatturi oħra. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, bħal dawk ta’ reliġjonijiet oħra,
jistgħu jintużaw biex jappoġġjaw varjetà ta’ sistemi u politiki politiċi. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Għalhekk, approċċ ġdid għall-istudju tal-
konnessjoni bejn l-Islam u l-politika hija mitluba.
Nissuġġerixxi, permezz ta’ evalwazzjoni rigoruża tar-relazzjoni bejn l-Islam,
demokrazija, u d-drittijiet tal-bniedem fil-livell transnazzjonali, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, influwenzi ekonomiċi, qsim etniku,

u l-iżvilupp tas-soċjetà, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Partiti tal-Oppożizzjoni Iżlamiċi u l-Potenzjal għall-Impenn tal-UE

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Fid-dawl tal-importanza dejjem tikber tal-movimenti Iżlamiċi fid-dinja Musulmana u

il-mod kif ir-radikalizzazzjoni influwenzat avvenimenti globali mill-bidu tas-seklu, dan

huwa importanti għall-UE li tevalwa l-politiki tagħha lejn atturi fi ħdan dak li jista' jkun laxk

imsejħa d-'dinja Islamika'. Huwa partikolarment importanti li wieħed jistaqsi jekk u kif jimpenja ruħu

mad-diversi gruppi Iżlamiċi.

Dan jibqa’ kontroversjali anke fi ħdan l-UE. Xi wħud iħossu li l-Iżlamiċi jgħollu dan

jinsabu wara partiti Iżlamiċi huma sempliċement inkompatibbli mal-ideali tal-punent tad-demokrazija u

drittijiet umani, filwaqt li oħrajn jaraw l-ingaġġ bħala ħtieġa realistika minħabba t-tkabbir

importanza domestika tal-partiti Iżlamiċi u l-involviment dejjem akbar tagħhom fil-qasam internazzjonali

affarijiet. Perspettiva oħra hija li d-demokratizzazzjoni fid-dinja Musulmana tiżdied

sigurtà Ewropea. Il-validità ta’ dawn u argumenti oħra dwar jekk u kif il-

L-UE għandha timpenja ruħha tista' tiġi ttestjata biss billi tistudja l-movimenti Iżlamiċi differenti u

iċ-ċirkostanzi politiċi tagħhom, pajjiż b’pajjiż.

Id-demokratizzazzjoni hija tema ċentrali tal-azzjonijiet tal-politika barranija komuni tal-UE, kif imqiegħda

fl-Artikolu 11 tat-Trattat dwar l-Unjoni Ewropea. Ħafna mill-istati kkunsidrati f'dan

rapport mhumiex demokratiċi, jew mhux kompletament demokratiku. F'ħafna minn dawn il-pajjiżi, Iżlamiku

partiti u movimenti jikkostitwixxu oppożizzjoni sinifikanti għar-reġimi prevalenti, u

f’xi wħud jiffurmaw l-akbar blokk ta’ oppożizzjoni. Id-demokraziji Ewropej ilhom jagħmlu

jittrattaw reġimi governattivi li huma awtoritarji, iżda huwa fenomenu ġdid għall-istampa

għal riforma demokratika fi stati fejn l-aktar benefiċjarji probabbli jista' jkollhom, minn

l-opinjoni tal-UE, approċċi differenti u kultant problematiċi għad-demokrazija u tagħha

valuri relatati, bħall-minoranzi u d-drittijiet tan-nisa u l-istat tad-dritt. Dawn il-ħlasijiet huma

spiss imqiegħda kontra movimenti Iżlamiċi, għalhekk huwa importanti għal dawk li jfasslu l-politika Ewropej li

ikollhom stampa preċiża tal-politiki u l-filosofiji tal-imsieħba potenzjali.

Esperjenzi minn pajjiżi differenti għandhom it-tendenza li jissuġġerixxu li l-iżlamista aktar libertà

partijiet huma permessi, aktar ikunu moderati fl-azzjonijiet u l-ideat tagħhom. F'ħafna

każi partiti u gruppi Iżlamiċi ilhom li tbiegħdu mill-għan oriġinali tagħhom

tat-twaqqif ta’ stat Iżlamiku rregolat mil-liġi Iżlamika, u waslu biex jaċċettaw bażiku

prinċipji demokratiċi tal-kompetizzjoni elettorali għall-poter, l-eżistenza ta’ politika oħra

kompetituri, u pluraliżmu politiku.

DEĊIŻJONIJIET IŻLAMIĊI DWAR IL-GWERRA

Youssef H. Aboul-Enein
Sherifa zuhur

L-Istati Uniti bla dubju se tkun involuta fil-Lvant Nofsani għal bosta deċennji. Biex tkun ċert, is-soluzzjoni tat-tilwima Iżraeljana-Palestinjana jew it-tnaqqis tal-faqar jistgħu jgħinu biex jitrażżnu l-mewġ tar-radikaliżmu Iżlamiku u s-sentiment anti-Amerikan. Imma fuq livell ideoloġiku, irridu niffaċċjaw interpretazzjoni speċifika tal-liġi Iżlamika, l-istorja,u l-iskrittura li hija periklu kemm għall-Istati Uniti kif ukoll għall-alleati tagħha. Biex tirbaħ dik il-gwerra ideoloġika, irridu nifhmu s-sorsi kemm tar-radikaliżmu Iżlamiku kif ukoll tal-liberaliżmu. Irridu nifhmu aktar bir-reqqa l-modi li bihom il-militanti jinterpretaw ħażin u jippervertu l-Iskrittura Iżlamika. L-Al-Qaeda pproduċiet il-grupp tagħha ta’ kelliema li jippruvaw jipprovdu leġittimità reliġjuża lin-nihiliżmu li jippridkaw. Ħafna spiss jikkwotaw mill-Quran u l-hadith (il-kliem u l-għemil tal-Profeta Muhammad) b’mod preġudikat biex iġibu ġustifikazzjoni għall-kawża tagħhom. Logutenent Kmandant Youssef Aboul-Enein u Dr. Sherifa Zuhur tidħol fil-Koran u l-hadith biex tartikola mezz li bih il-militanza Iżlamika tista’ tiġi miġġielda ideoloġikament, jiġbdu ħafna mill-għarfien tagħhom minn dawn u testi Islamiċi klassiċi oħra. Meta tagħmel hekk, jesponu kontradizzjonijiet u approċċi alternattivi fil-prinċipji ewlenin li jħaddnu gruppi bħall-al-Qaeda. L-awturi sabu li l-użu xieraq tal-Iskrittura Iżlamika fil-fatt jiskredita t-tattiċi tal-al-Qaeda u organizzazzjonijiet ġiħadisti oħra. Din il-monografija tipprovdi bażi biex tħeġġeġ lill-alleati Musulmani tagħna biex jisfidaw it-teoloġija appoġġjata mill-militanti Iżlamiċi. Żerriegħa ta’ dubju mħawla fl-imħuħ tal-bombi suwiċida jistgħu jiddiswaduhom milli jwettqu l-missjonijiet tagħhom. L-Istitut tal-Istudji Strateġiċi bi pjaċir joffri dan l-istudju dwar id-deċiżjonijiet Iżlamiċi dwar il-gwerra lill-komunità tad-difiża nazzjonali bħala sforz biex jikkontribwixxi għad-dibattitu li għaddej dwar kif tegħleb il-militanza Iżlamika.

THE RISE OF “MUSLIM DEMOCRACY

Vali Nasr

A specter is haunting the Muslim world. This particular specter is notthe malign and much-discussed spirit of fundamentalist extremism, nor yet the phantom hope known as liberal Islam. Instead, the specter that I have in mind is a third force, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfullyfor votes in Bangladesh, L-Indoneżja, Il-Malasja, Pakistan (beforeits 1999 military coup), and Turkey.Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule by shari‘a (Islamic law) oreven a restored caliphate, Muslim Democrats view political life with apragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari‘a state, and their main goaltends to be the more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platform sand stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests—Islamic as well as secular—within a democratic arena whosebounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best as a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state.

Hamas and political reform in the middle east

David Mepham

The lesson of Palestine’s election is that the international community should become more serious and sophisticated about political reform in the middle east, says David Mepham of the Institute for Public Policy Research.
Hamas’s stunning victory in the 25 January elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council raises three critical questions for international policymakers:
• why did it happen – that an organisation labelled asterroristby the Israelis, the European Union and the United States manages to win the support of a majority of Palestinian voters?
• how should the international community now respond?
• where does Hamas’s victory leave the cause of political reform and democratisation in the middle east?
The rise of Hamas
Much of the immediate international commentary on the election result has focused on the failings of Fatah during the decade in which the movement held power in the Palestinian Authority (PA) – including the rampant corruption of senior Fatah officials and the lack of meaningful democracy within the PA. There was also a sizeable positive vote for Hamas. The organisation is seen by many Palestinians as untainted by corruption, u, unlike the PA, it has a good track record of providing health, education and other services.
The other part of the explanation for the Hamas victory – less discussed in the international media – has been the failure of thepeace processand the radicalising and impoverishing effects of the Israeli occupation. Under the premiership of Ariel Sharon since 2001, Israel has all but destroyed the infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority. Israel has also continued its policy of illegal settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank and east Jerusalem, and it is in the process of building aseparation barrier”.
Israel is not building the barrier on its pre-1967 occupation border (which it would be allowed to do under international law). Rather it plans to build 80% of the barrier inside Israeli-occupied Palestinian territory. This involves incorporating the main Israeli settlement blocs, as well as taking over Palestinian agricultural lands and water resources. This restricts Palestinian freedom of movement, and makes it much harder for Palestinians to access their schools, health facilities and jobs.
These policies are oppressive and humiliating; they also have disastrous economic consequences. The United Nations estimates that poverty levels have more than trebled in the last five years, dak 60% of Palestinians are now living in poverty, and that unemployment is around 30%. These conditions have provided very fertile soil for the radicalisation of Palestinian opinion and for the rise of Hamas.
The short-term challenge
Hamas’s electoral victory presents the international community with a real conundrum.
On the one hand, il “Quartet” (l-Istati Uniti, l-Unjoni Ewropea, Russia and the United Nations) is right to say that full-scale peace negotiations with Hamas will require significant movement on Hamas’s part. Hamas does not recognise the state of Israel. It also supports violence, including attacks on Israeli civilians, as part of its strategy for Palestinian national liberation. Anyone expecting an immediate and formal shift in Hamas policy on these issues is likely to be disappointed.
But intelligent international diplomacy can still make a difference. While they are reluctant to formally proclaim it, there is evidence that some senior Hamas leaders accept the reality of Israel within its pre-1967 borders. Barra minn hekk, on the question of violence Hamas has largely maintained a unilateral truce (tahdi’a) for the past year. Extending this truce, and working for a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire, should be the immediate focus of international diplomacy towards Hamas, if necessary through third-party intermediaries.
The other critical international objective should be to avoid the collapse of the Palestinian Authority. Fatah’s mismanagement and the disastrous consequences of Israeli occupation and closures have left the PA in a desperate state and entirely dependent on donor funding to stay afloat. Fil 2005, the EU provided £338 million, while the US contributed £225 million. Cutting that assistance overnight would plunge tens of thousands of Palestinians into acute poverty, triggering social implosion and anarchy. But donors are rightly worried about transferring resources to a government dominated by Hamas.
One possibility would be to press for a government of Palestinian technocrats, without senior Hamas figures in key ministerial positions, and to rely on Mahmoud Abbas, the directly elected Palestinian president, as the main interlocutor for the international community. Something along these lines appears to command support amongst the Quartet. If the immediate economic situation can be stabilised, then there is at least a possibility of encouraging Hamas to move in a political direction through a policy of gradual, conditional engagement. Pressure on Israel to live up to its obligations under international law, for example by ending illegal settlement activity, would also help: persuading a sceptical Palestinian public that the world does care about their plight and is committed to a two-state solution.
The regional prospect
While Hamas’s victory has focused attention on the immediate crisis in the Palestinian territories, it raises wider questions about the process of political reform and democratisation in the broader middle east, a process advocated so publicly by the Bush administration. It is ironic, to say the least, that Hamas – a group with which the United States refuses to deal – should be the beneficiary of a free and fair election encouraged by US policy. Some will draw from this the conclusion that democratic reform in the middle east is a hopelessly misguided enterprise and one that should be abandoned forthwith. Smallcconservatives, on all sides of the political spectrum, will feel vindicated in highlighting the risks of rapid political change and in pointing out the virtues of stability.
It is true that political change carries risks, including the risk that radical Islamists like Hamas will be the major beneficiaries of political liberalisation. While this is a reasonable concern, those who highlight it tend to overlook the diversity of political Islamists in the region, the special circumstances that account for the rise of Hamas, and the extent to which some Islamists have moderated their positions in recent years. Unlike Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan and the Justice & Development Party in Morocco all reject violence and have committed themselves to pluralistic politics.
Nor do the critics suggest a better alternative for addressing the phenomenon of political Islamism across the region than the attempted engagement of Islamists in the political process. Repression of Islamists and their systematic exclusion from political institutions has been a recipe for instability and extremism, not moderation.
There is obviously a strong critique to be made of the Bush administration’s attempts to promote political change in the middle east, not least the multiple failings of its policy in Iraq. More broadly, the US lacks credibility in the region as a force for democracy and human rights because of its largely uncritical support for Israel, and its military, diplomatic and often financial backing for many of the more authoritarian regimes in the region. Even when it is particularly outspoken on the need for greater democracy, for example in its recent dealings with President Mubarak of Egypt, the administration’s anti-terrorism agenda consistently trumps its political reform objectives.
But exposing the folly and ineffectiveness of US policy is one thing; ditching the commitment to political reform in the middle east is quite another. The international community needs to strengthen not weaken its commitment to accountable government and human rights in the region. In thinking about political change in the middle east – where the concept of a democratic culture is often very weak – international actors need to give as much emphasis toconstitutionalismas to elections, important though elections are. In this context, constitutionalism means a balance of powers, including checks on the executive, a fair and independent legal process, a free press and media, and the protection of the rights of minorities.
It is important too for international actors to be realistic about what can be achieved in particular countries and over particular timescales. In some cases, support for political reform might involve pushing hard now for genuinely free elections. In other cases, a higher short-term priority for political reform might be encouraging an enlarged space in which opposition groups or civil society can function, greater freedom for the press, support for educational reforms and cultural exchanges, and promoting more inclusive economic development.
It is also vital to think more imaginatively about creating incentives for political reform in the middle east. There is a particular role for the European Union here. The experience of political change in other parts of the world suggests that countries can be persuaded to undertake very significant political and economic reforms if this is part of a process that yields real benefits to the ruling elite and the wider society. The way in which the prospect of EU membership has been used to bring about far-reaching change in eastern and central Europe is a good example of this. The process of Turkey’s accession to the EU can be seen in a similar vein.
A critical question is whether such a process might be used more broadly to stimulate political reform across the middle east, through initiatives like the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP will provide participating middle-eastern states with a stake in EU institutions, in particular the single market, providing a powerful incentive for reform. It also allows for the EU to reward countries that make faster progress against agreed benchmarks for political reform.
There are no simple answers to the current problems besetting the middle east. But the lesson to be drawn from the Hamas result is emphatically not that the international community should give up on the cause of political reform in the region. Rather it should become more serious and sophisticated about helping to support it.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

William Thomasson

Is Islam a religion of violence? Is the widely applied stereotype that all Muslims are violently opposed to “infidel” Western cultures accurate? Today’s world is confronted with two opposing faces of Islam; one being a peaceful, adaptive, modernized Islam, and the other strictly fundamentalist and against all things un-Islamic or that may corrupt Islamic culture. Both specimens, though seemingly opposed, mingle and inter-relate, and are the roots of the confusion over modern Islam’s true identity. Islam’s vastness makes it difficult to analyze, but one can focus on a particular Islamic region and learn much about Islam as a whole. Tabilħaqq, one may do this with Egypt, particularly the relationship between the Fundamentalist society known as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and population. The two opposing faces of Islam are presented in Egypt in a manageable portion, offering a smaller model of the general multi-national struggle of today’s Islam. In an effort to exemplify the role of Islamic Fundamentalists, and their relationship with Islamic society as a whole in the current debate over what Islam is, this essay will offer a history of the Society of Muslim Brothers, a description of how the organization originated, functioned, and was organized, and a summary of the Brother’s activities and influences on Egyptian culture. Certainly, by doing so, one may gain a deeper understanding of how Islamic Fundamentalists interpret Islam


L-Evoluzzjoni Politika tal-Fratellanza Musulmana fl-Eġittu

Stephen Bennett

“Allah huwa l-objettiv tagħna. Il-Profeta huwa l-mexxej tagħna. Il-Koran huwa l-liġi tagħna. Jihad huwa mod tagħna. Il-mewt fit-triq ta’ Allah hija l-ogħla tama tagħna.”

Sa mill-bidu tagħha fl-Eġittu l-Fratellanza Musulmana ħolqot ħafna kontroversja, peress li xi wħud jargumentaw li l-organizzazzjoni hija favur il-vjolenza f'isem l-Islam. Skont Dr. Mamoun Fandy tal-James A. Baker III Istitut tal-Politika Pubblika, “ġiħadiżmu u l-attivazzjoni tal-fehmiet tad-dinja tad-dar tal-Islam u d-dar tal-gwerra huma l-ideat li ħarġu mill-kitbiet u t-tagħlim tal-Fratellanza Musulmana” (Livesy, 2005). L-evidenza primarja għal dan l-argument hija membru notevoli tal-Fratellanza, Sayeed Qutb, li huwa akkreditat li jiżviluppa l-interpretazzjoni reviżjonista u kontroversjali ta’ jihad li pprovdew ġustifikazzjonijiet reliġjużi għall-vjolenza mwettqa minn organizzazzjonijiet offshoot tal-Fratellanza bħal al-jihad, al-Takfir wa al-Hijra, Hamas, u al-Qaeda.

Madankollu dik għadha pożizzjoni dibattibbli, għax minkejja li hu l-ġenitur ideoloġiku ta’ dawn l-għaqdiet vjolenti, il-Fratellanza Musulmana stess dejjem żammet pożizzjoni uffiċjali kontra l-vjolenza u minflok ippromwoviet azzjoni ċivili u soċjali Iżlamika fil-livell tal-bażi. Fl-ewwel għoxrin sena tal-eżistenza tagħha l-Fratellanza Musulmana kisbet status bħala l-aktar influwenti mill-gruppi ewlenin kollha fil-Lvant Nofsani permezz tal-attiviżmu popolari tagħha.. It also spread from Egypt into other nations throughout the region and served as the catalyst for many of the successful popular liberation movements against Western colonialism in the Middle East.

While it has retained most of its founding principles from its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has made a dramatic transformation in some crucial aspects of its political ideology. Formerly denounced by many as a terrorist organization, as of late the Muslim Brotherhood has been labeled by most current scholars of the Middle East as politically “moderate”, “politically centrist”, and “accommodationist” to Egypt’s political and governmental structures (Abed-Kotob, 1995, p. 321-322). Sana Abed-Kotob tgħidilna wkoll li mill-gruppi attwali tal-oppożizzjoni Iżlamika li jeżistu llum “aktar ‘radikali’ jew militanti ta’ dawn il-gruppi jinsistu fuq bidla rivoluzzjonarja li għandha tiġi imposta fuq il-massa u s-sistema politika., billi... il-Fratellanza Musulmana l-ġdida tal-Eġittu, sejħa għal bidla gradwali li għandha ssir minn ġewwa s-sistema politika u bl-ingaġġ tal-mases Musulmani”

Parting the Veil

shadi hamid

America’s post-September 11 project to promote democracy in the Middle East has proven a spectacular failure. Illum,Arab autocrats are as emboldened as ever. L-Eġittu, Il-Ġordan, It-Tuneżija, and others are backsliding on reform. Opposition forces are being crushed. Three of the most democratic polities in the region, Il-Libanu, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories,are being torn apart by violence and sectarian conflict.Not long ago, it seemed an entirely different outcome was in the offing. Asrecently as late 2005, observers were hailing the “Arab spring,” an “autumn forautocrats,” and other seasonal formulations. They had cause for such optimism.On January 31, 2005, the world stood in collective awe as Iraqis braved terroristthreats to cast their ballots for the first time. That February, Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak announced multi-candidate presidential elections, another first.And that same month, after former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri wasshadi hamid is director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracyand an associate of the Truman National Security Project.Parting the Veil Now is no time to give up supporting democracy in the Muslim world.But to do so, the United States must embrace Islamist moderates.shadi hamiddemocracyjournal.org 39killed, Lebanon erupted in grief and then anger as nearly one million Lebanesetook to the streets of their war-torn capital, demanding self-determination. Notlong afterward, 50,000 Bahrainis—one-eighth of the country’s population—ralliedfor constitutional reform. The opposition was finally coming alive.But when the Arab spring really did come, the American response provide dample evidence that while Arabs were ready for democracy, the United States most certainly was not. Looking back, the failure of the Bush Administration’s efforts should not have been so surprising. Mill-bidu tas-snin disgħin, L-Istati Uniti. policymakershave had two dueling and ultimately incompatible objectives in the Middle East: promoting Arab democracy on one hand, and curbing the power and appealof Islamist groups on the other. In his second inaugural address, President George W. Bush declared that in supporting Arab democracy, our “vital interests and our deepest beliefs” were now one. The reality was more complicated.When Islamist groups throughout the region began making impressive gains at the ballot box, particularly in Egypt and in the Palestinian territories, the Bush Administration stumbled. With Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza high on the agendaand a deteriorating situation in Iraq, American priorities began to shift. Friendly dictators once again became an invaluable resource for an administration that found itself increasingly embattled both at home and abroad.The reason for this divergence in policy revolves around a critical question:What should the United States do when Islamists come to power through free elections? In a region where Islamist parties represent the only viable oppositionto secular dictatorships, this is the crux of the matter. In the MiddleEastern context, the question of democracy and the question of political Islamare inseparable. Without a well-defined policy of engagement toward politicalIslam, the United States will fall victim to the same pitfalls of the past. In many ways, it already has.

How to Promote Human Rights in Egypt

Id-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem l-Ewwel

The United States’ relationship with Egypt is central toseveral policy challenges facing the new administration inthe Middle East. As the most populous Arab state, Egyptis a major regional power. Since signing a peace treatywith Israel in 1979, it has played a key role in negotiationsfor an Israeli-Palestinian and a broader Israeli-Arab peaceagreement. Egypt helped to mediate a tense ceasefirebetween Israel and Hamas that broke down with theoutbreak of conflict in the Gaza Strip at the end ofDecember 2008, and continues to serve as anintermediary between the warring parties in the Gazaconflict. Egypt is again at the center of renewed peacemaking efforts in the region launched by the Obamaadministration with the appointment of former SenatorGeorge Mitchell as Special Envoy in January 2009.In a part of the world where so many vital U.S. interestsare at stake, Egypt is a key partner for any U.S.administration. The Egyptian government can greatlyassist the United States in legitimizing and supporting thenew government in Iraq, pereżempju, u, as the owner ofthe Suez Canal and as an oil producer, Egypt is vital tothe security of energy supplies from the region.Egypt is also a testing ground for U.S. human rightspromotion in the region, and was frequently the target ofexhortations to move forward with political reform anddemocratization during the Bush administration.Successive administrations have been encouraging theEgyptian government to reform for decades, but after the9/11 attacks, with the prominent involvement of Egyptianslike Mohamed Atta and Ayman al-Zawahiri, calls forreform took on greater centrality—and a new urgency—inU.S. policy. Human rights and democracy were no longerjust desirable; they became national security concernsand the subject of a new “Freedom Agenda.

Democratization and Islamic Politics:

YOKOTA Takayuki�

The aim of this article is to explore the often contradictory correlation between democratizationand Islamic politics in Egypt, focusing on a new Islamic political party, the Wasat Party (Ḥizbal-Wasaṭ).Theoretically, democratization and Islamic politics are not incompatible if Islamic politicalorganizations can and do operate within a legal and democratic framework. Minn naha l-ohra,this requires democratic tolerance by governments for Islamic politics, as long as they continueto act within a legal framework. In the Middle East, madankollu, Islamic political parties are oftensuspected of having undemocratic agendas, and governments have often used this suspicion as ajustification to curb democratization. This is also the case with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood(Jam‘īya al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) under the Ḥusnī Mubārak regime. Although the Brotherhood is amainstream Islamic movement in Egypt, operating publicly and enjoying considerable popularity,successive governments have never changed its illegal status for more than half a century. Someof the Brotherhood members decided to form the Wasat Party as its legal political organ in order tobreak this stalemate.There have been some studies on the Wasat Party. Stacher [2002] analyzes the “Platformof the Egyptian Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Miṣrī 1998] and explains the basic principlesof the Wasat Party as follows: demokrazija, sharī‘a (Islamic law), rights of women, and Muslim-Christian relations. Baker [2003] regards the Wasat Party as one of the new Islamist groups thathave appeared in contemporary Egypt, and analyzes its ideology accordingly. Wickham [2004]discusses the moderation of Islamic movements in Egypt and the attempt to form the WasatParty from the perspective of comparative politics. Norton [2005] examines the ideology andactivities of the Wasat Party in connection with the Brotherhood’s political activities. As theseearlier studies are mainly concerned with the Wasat Party during the 1990s and the early 2000s,I will examine the ideology and activities of the Wasat Party till the rise of the democratizationmovement in Egypt in around 2005. I will do so on the basis of the Wasat Party’s documents, suchas the “Platform of the New Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Jadīd 2004]1), and my interviews withits members.