L-Entrati Kollha Tikkettati Bi: "Lvant Nofsani"
L-Għarab Għarbi
DAVID B. OTTAWAY
Ottubru 6, 1981, kien maħsub li jkun jum ta’ ċelebrazzjoni fl-Eġittu. Immarka l-anniversarju tal-akbar mument ta’ rebħa tal-Eġittu fi tliet kunflitti Għarab-Iżraeljani, meta l-armata underdog tal-pajjiż imbuttat tul il-Kanal ta 'Suez fil-ġranet tal-ftuħ tal- 1973 Il-Gwerra ta’ Yom Kippur u bagħtet truppi Iżraeljani tkebbib f’irtir. Fuq jibred, filgħodu bla sħab, l-istadium tal-Kajr kien ippakkjat bil-familji Eġizzjani li kienu ġew biex jaraw il-militar jissawwab il-hardware tiegħu.Fuq l-istand tar-reviżjoni, President Anwar el-Sadat,il-perit tal-gwerra, raw b'sodisfazzjon kif irġiel u magni parad quddiemu. Kont fil-qrib, korrispondent barrani li għadu kif wasal.F’daqqa waħda, wieħed mit-trakkijiet tal-armata waqaf direttament quddiem l-istand tar-reviżjoni eżatt kif sitt ġettijiet Mirage ħarġu fuq rashom fi prestazzjoni akrobatika, pittura s-sema bi traċċi twal aħmar, isfar, vjola,u duħħan aħdar. Sadat qam bil-wieqfa, milli jidher qed jipprepara biex jiskambja tislima ma’ kontinġent ieħor ta’ truppi Eġizzjani. Huwa għamel lilu nnifsu mira perfetta għal erba’ assassini Iżlamiċi li qabżu minn fuq it-trakk, daħlet fuq il-podju, u mifni ġismu bil-balal. Hekk kif il-qattiela komplew għal dik li dehret eternità biex isprejjaw l-istand bin-nar fatali tagħhom, Jien ikkunsidrajt għal instant jekk għandux nolqot l-art u nirriskjax li niġi maqtula sal-mewt minn spettaturi ippanikjati jew jekk nibqax bil-mixi u nirriskja li nieħu balla mitlufa. L-istint qalli biex nibqa’ fuq saqajja, u s-sens ta’ dmir ġurnalistiku tiegħi ġegħluni biex immur insir naf jekk Sadat kienx ħaj jew mejjet.
Demokrazija Liberali u Islam Politiku: it-Tiftix għal Common Ground.
Mostapha Benhenda
Iżlamiżmu rivedut
MAHA AZZAM
Iraq and the Future of Political Islam
James Piscatori
Egypt at the Tipping Point ?
Roots Of Nationalism In The Muslim World
Shabir Ahmed
Kultura Politika Iżlamika, Demokrazija, u Drittijiet tal-Bniedem
Daniele. Prezz
Partiti tal-Oppożizzjoni Iżlamiċi u l-Potenzjal għall-Impenn tal-UE
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
DEĊIŻJONIJIET IŻLAMIĊI DWAR IL-GWERRA
L-Istati Uniti bla dubju se tkun involuta fil-Lvant Nofsani għal bosta deċennji. Biex tkun ċert, is-soluzzjoni tat-tilwima Iżraeljana-Palestinjana jew it-tnaqqis tal-faqar jistgħu jgħinu biex jitrażżnu l-mewġ tar-radikaliżmu Iżlamiku u s-sentiment anti-Amerikan. Imma fuq livell ideoloġiku, irridu niffaċċjaw interpretazzjoni speċifika tal-liġi Iżlamika, l-istorja,u l-iskrittura li hija periklu kemm għall-Istati Uniti kif ukoll għall-alleati tagħha. Biex tirbaħ dik il-gwerra ideoloġika, irridu nifhmu s-sorsi kemm tar-radikaliżmu Iżlamiku kif ukoll tal-liberaliżmu. Irridu nifhmu aktar bir-reqqa l-modi li bihom il-militanti jinterpretaw ħażin u jippervertu l-Iskrittura Iżlamika. L-Al-Qaeda pproduċiet il-grupp tagħha ta’ kelliema li jippruvaw jipprovdu leġittimità reliġjuża lin-nihiliżmu li jippridkaw. Ħafna spiss jikkwotaw mill-Quran u l-hadith (il-kliem u l-għemil tal-Profeta Muhammad) b’mod preġudikat biex iġibu ġustifikazzjoni għall-kawża tagħhom. Logutenent Kmandant Youssef Aboul-Enein u Dr. Sherifa Zuhur tidħol fil-Koran u l-hadith biex tartikola mezz li bih il-militanza Iżlamika tista’ tiġi miġġielda ideoloġikament, jiġbdu ħafna mill-għarfien tagħhom minn dawn u testi Islamiċi klassiċi oħra. Meta tagħmel hekk, jesponu kontradizzjonijiet u approċċi alternattivi fil-prinċipji ewlenin li jħaddnu gruppi bħall-al-Qaeda. L-awturi sabu li l-użu xieraq tal-Iskrittura Iżlamika fil-fatt jiskredita t-tattiċi tal-al-Qaeda u organizzazzjonijiet ġiħadisti oħra. Din il-monografija tipprovdi bażi biex tħeġġeġ lill-alleati Musulmani tagħna biex jisfidaw it-teoloġija appoġġjata mill-militanti Iżlamiċi. Żerriegħa ta’ dubju mħawla fl-imħuħ tal-bombi suwiċida jistgħu jiddiswaduhom milli jwettqu l-missjonijiet tagħhom. L-Istitut tal-Istudji Strateġiċi bi pjaċir joffri dan l-istudju dwar id-deċiżjonijiet Iżlamiċi dwar il-gwerra lill-komunità tad-difiża nazzjonali bħala sforz biex jikkontribwixxi għad-dibattitu li għaddej dwar kif tegħleb il-militanza Iżlamika.
THE RISE OF “MUSLIM DEMOCRACY”
Vali Nasr
A specter is haunting the Muslim world. This particular specter is notthe malign and much-discussed spirit of fundamentalist extremism, nor yet the phantom hope known as liberal Islam. Instead, the specter that I have in mind is a third force, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfullyfor votes in Bangladesh, L-Indoneżja, Il-Malasja, Pakistan (beforeits 1999 military coup), and Turkey.Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule by shari‘a (Islamic law) oreven a restored caliphate, Muslim Democrats view political life with apragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari‘a state, and their main goaltends to be the more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platform sand stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests—Islamic as well as secular—within a democratic arena whosebounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best as a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state.
Hamas and political reform in the middle east
The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
William Thomasson
Is Islam a religion of violence? Is the widely applied stereotype that all Muslims are violently opposed to “infidel” Western cultures accurate? Today’s world is confronted with two opposing faces of Islam; one being a peaceful, adaptive, modernized Islam, and the other strictly fundamentalist and against all things un-Islamic or that may corrupt Islamic culture. Both specimens, though seemingly opposed, mingle and inter-relate, and are the roots of the confusion over modern Islam’s true identity. Islam’s vastness makes it difficult to analyze, but one can focus on a particular Islamic region and learn much about Islam as a whole. Tabilħaqq, one may do this with Egypt, particularly the relationship between the Fundamentalist society known as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and population. The two opposing faces of Islam are presented in Egypt in a manageable portion, offering a smaller model of the general multi-national struggle of today’s Islam. In an effort to exemplify the role of Islamic Fundamentalists, and their relationship with Islamic society as a whole in the current debate over what Islam is, this essay will offer a history of the Society of Muslim Brothers, a description of how the organization originated, functioned, and was organized, and a summary of the Brother’s activities and influences on Egyptian culture. Certainly, by doing so, one may gain a deeper understanding of how Islamic Fundamentalists interpret Islam
L-Evoluzzjoni Politika tal-Fratellanza Musulmana fl-Eġittu
Stephen Bennett
“Allah huwa l-objettiv tagħna. Il-Profeta huwa l-mexxej tagħna. Il-Koran huwa l-liġi tagħna. Jihad huwa mod tagħna. Il-mewt fit-triq ta’ Allah hija l-ogħla tama tagħna.”
Sa mill-bidu tagħha fl-Eġittu l-Fratellanza Musulmana ħolqot ħafna kontroversja, peress li xi wħud jargumentaw li l-organizzazzjoni hija favur il-vjolenza f'isem l-Islam. Skont Dr. Mamoun Fandy tal-James A. Baker III Istitut tal-Politika Pubblika, “ġiħadiżmu u l-attivazzjoni tal-fehmiet tad-dinja tad-dar tal-Islam u d-dar tal-gwerra huma l-ideat li ħarġu mill-kitbiet u t-tagħlim tal-Fratellanza Musulmana” (Livesy, 2005). L-evidenza primarja għal dan l-argument hija membru notevoli tal-Fratellanza, Sayeed Qutb, li huwa akkreditat li jiżviluppa l-interpretazzjoni reviżjonista u kontroversjali ta’ jihad li pprovdew ġustifikazzjonijiet reliġjużi għall-vjolenza mwettqa minn organizzazzjonijiet offshoot tal-Fratellanza bħal al-jihad, al-Takfir wa al-Hijra, Hamas, u al-Qaeda.
Madankollu dik għadha pożizzjoni dibattibbli, għax minkejja li hu l-ġenitur ideoloġiku ta’ dawn l-għaqdiet vjolenti, il-Fratellanza Musulmana stess dejjem żammet pożizzjoni uffiċjali kontra l-vjolenza u minflok ippromwoviet azzjoni ċivili u soċjali Iżlamika fil-livell tal-bażi. Fl-ewwel għoxrin sena tal-eżistenza tagħha l-Fratellanza Musulmana kisbet status bħala l-aktar influwenti mill-gruppi ewlenin kollha fil-Lvant Nofsani permezz tal-attiviżmu popolari tagħha.. It also spread from Egypt into other nations throughout the region and served as the catalyst for many of the successful popular liberation movements against Western colonialism in the Middle East.
While it has retained most of its founding principles from its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has made a dramatic transformation in some crucial aspects of its political ideology. Formerly denounced by many as a terrorist organization, as of late the Muslim Brotherhood has been labeled by most current scholars of the Middle East as politically “moderate”, “politically centrist”, and “accommodationist” to Egypt’s political and governmental structures (Abed-Kotob, 1995, p. 321-322). Sana Abed-Kotob tgħidilna wkoll li mill-gruppi attwali tal-oppożizzjoni Iżlamika li jeżistu llum “aktar ‘radikali’ jew militanti ta’ dawn il-gruppi jinsistu fuq bidla rivoluzzjonarja li għandha tiġi imposta fuq il-massa u s-sistema politika., billi... il-Fratellanza Musulmana l-ġdida tal-Eġittu, sejħa għal bidla gradwali li għandha ssir minn ġewwa s-sistema politika u bl-ingaġġ tal-mases Musulmani”
Parting the Veil
shadi hamid
America’s post-September 11 project to promote democracy in the Middle East has proven a spectacular failure. Illum,Arab autocrats are as emboldened as ever. L-Eġittu, Il-Ġordan, It-Tuneżija, and others are backsliding on reform. Opposition forces are being crushed. Three of the most democratic polities in the region, Il-Libanu, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories,are being torn apart by violence and sectarian conflict.Not long ago, it seemed an entirely different outcome was in the offing. Asrecently as late 2005, observers were hailing the “Arab spring,” an “autumn forautocrats,” and other seasonal formulations. They had cause for such optimism.On January 31, 2005, the world stood in collective awe as Iraqis braved terroristthreats to cast their ballots for the first time. That February, Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak announced multi-candidate presidential elections, another first.And that same month, after former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri wasshadi hamid is director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracyand an associate of the Truman National Security Project.Parting the Veil Now is no time to give up supporting democracy in the Muslim world.But to do so, the United States must embrace Islamist moderates.shadi hamiddemocracyjournal.org 39killed, Lebanon erupted in grief and then anger as nearly one million Lebanesetook to the streets of their war-torn capital, demanding self-determination. Notlong afterward, 50,000 Bahrainis—one-eighth of the country’s population—ralliedfor constitutional reform. The opposition was finally coming alive.But when the Arab spring really did come, the American response provide dample evidence that while Arabs were ready for democracy, the United States most certainly was not. Looking back, the failure of the Bush Administration’s efforts should not have been so surprising. Mill-bidu tas-snin disgħin, L-Istati Uniti. policymakershave had two dueling and ultimately incompatible objectives in the Middle East: promoting Arab democracy on one hand, and curbing the power and appealof Islamist groups on the other. In his second inaugural address, President George W. Bush declared that in supporting Arab democracy, our “vital interests and our deepest beliefs” were now one. The reality was more complicated.When Islamist groups throughout the region began making impressive gains at the ballot box, particularly in Egypt and in the Palestinian territories, the Bush Administration stumbled. With Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza high on the agendaand a deteriorating situation in Iraq, American priorities began to shift. Friendly dictators once again became an invaluable resource for an administration that found itself increasingly embattled both at home and abroad.The reason for this divergence in policy revolves around a critical question:What should the United States do when Islamists come to power through free elections? In a region where Islamist parties represent the only viable oppositionto secular dictatorships, this is the crux of the matter. In the MiddleEastern context, the question of democracy and the question of political Islamare inseparable. Without a well-defined policy of engagement toward politicalIslam, the United States will fall victim to the same pitfalls of the past. In many ways, it already has.
How to Promote Human Rights in Egypt
Id-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem l-Ewwel
The United States’ relationship with Egypt is central toseveral policy challenges facing the new administration inthe Middle East. As the most populous Arab state, Egyptis a major regional power. Since signing a peace treatywith Israel in 1979, it has played a key role in negotiationsfor an Israeli-Palestinian and a broader Israeli-Arab peaceagreement. Egypt helped to mediate a tense ceasefirebetween Israel and Hamas that broke down with theoutbreak of conflict in the Gaza Strip at the end ofDecember 2008, and continues to serve as anintermediary between the warring parties in the Gazaconflict. Egypt is again at the center of renewed peacemaking efforts in the region launched by the Obamaadministration with the appointment of former SenatorGeorge Mitchell as Special Envoy in January 2009.In a part of the world where so many vital U.S. interestsare at stake, Egypt is a key partner for any U.S.administration. The Egyptian government can greatlyassist the United States in legitimizing and supporting thenew government in Iraq, pereżempju, u, as the owner ofthe Suez Canal and as an oil producer, Egypt is vital tothe security of energy supplies from the region.Egypt is also a testing ground for U.S. human rightspromotion in the region, and was frequently the target ofexhortations to move forward with political reform anddemocratization during the Bush administration.Successive administrations have been encouraging theEgyptian government to reform for decades, but after the9/11 attacks, with the prominent involvement of Egyptianslike Mohamed Atta and Ayman al-Zawahiri, calls forreform took on greater centrality—and a new urgency—inU.S. policy. Human rights and democracy were no longerjust desirable; they became national security concernsand the subject of a new “Freedom Agenda.
Democratization and Islamic Politics:
YOKOTA Takayuki
The aim of this article is to explore the often contradictory correlation between democratizationand Islamic politics in Egypt, focusing on a new Islamic political party, the Wasat Party (Ḥizbal-Wasaṭ).Theoretically, democratization and Islamic politics are not incompatible if Islamic politicalorganizations can and do operate within a legal and democratic framework. Minn naha l-ohra,this requires democratic tolerance by governments for Islamic politics, as long as they continueto act within a legal framework. In the Middle East, madankollu, Islamic political parties are oftensuspected of having undemocratic agendas, and governments have often used this suspicion as ajustification to curb democratization. This is also the case with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood(Jam‘īya al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) under the Ḥusnī Mubārak regime. Although the Brotherhood is amainstream Islamic movement in Egypt, operating publicly and enjoying considerable popularity,successive governments have never changed its illegal status for more than half a century. Someof the Brotherhood members decided to form the Wasat Party as its legal political organ in order tobreak this stalemate.There have been some studies on the Wasat Party. Stacher [2002] analyzes the “Platformof the Egyptian Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Miṣrī 1998] and explains the basic principlesof the Wasat Party as follows: demokrazija, sharī‘a (Islamic law), rights of women, and Muslim-Christian relations. Baker [2003] regards the Wasat Party as one of the new Islamist groups thathave appeared in contemporary Egypt, and analyzes its ideology accordingly. Wickham [2004]discusses the moderation of Islamic movements in Egypt and the attempt to form the WasatParty from the perspective of comparative politics. Norton [2005] examines the ideology andactivities of the Wasat Party in connection with the Brotherhood’s political activities. As theseearlier studies are mainly concerned with the Wasat Party during the 1990s and the early 2000s,I will examine the ideology and activities of the Wasat Party till the rise of the democratizationmovement in Egypt in around 2005. I will do so on the basis of the Wasat Party’s documents, suchas the “Platform of the New Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Jadīd 2004]1), and my interviews withits members.