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The Arab Tomorrow

DAVID B. ÚTTAKA

október 6, 1981, átti að vera hátíðardagur í Egyptalandi. Það markaði afmæli stórkostlegustu sigurstundar Egyptalands í þremur átökum araba og Ísraela., þegar fátækur her landsins lagðist yfir Súez-skurðinn á opnunardögum landsins 1973 Yom Kippur-stríðið og sendi ísraelska hermenn að hörfa. Á svala, skýlaus morgun, Kaíró leikvangurinn var troðfullur af egypskum fjölskyldum sem höfðu komið til að sjá herinn stinga vélbúnaði sínum., Anwar el-Sadat forseti,arkitekt stríðsins, horfði með ánægju þegar menn og vélar gengu fram fyrir hann. Ég var nálægt, nýkominn erlendur fréttaritari.Skyndilega, einn af herflutningabílunum stöðvaði beint fyrir framan yfirlitssýninguna rétt þegar sex Mirage þotur öskruðu yfir höfuð í loftfimleikum, að mála himininn með löngum rauðum slóðum, gulur, fjólublár,og grænan reyk. Sadat stóð upp, að því er virðist að búa sig undir að skiptast á kveðjum við enn einn lið egypskra hermanna. Hann gerði sig að fullkomnu skotmarki fyrir fjóra íslamista morðingja sem stukku úr vörubílnum, ruddist inn á pallinn, og þeytti líkama hans með byssukúlum. Þegar morðingjarnir héldu áfram í það sem virtist heila eilífð að úða stallinum með banvænum eldi sínum, Ég velti því fyrir mér í augnabliki hvort ég ætti að lenda í jörðu og eiga á hættu að verða troðinn til bana af skelfingu lostnum áhorfendum eða halda áfram og eiga á hættu að taka villandi byssukúlu. Eðlishvöt sagði mér að halda mér á fætur, og blaðamannaskylda mín varð til þess að ég fór að komast að því hvort Sadat væri á lífi eða dáinn.

| september 26, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
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Frjálslynt lýðræði og pólitískt íslam: Leitin að sameiginlegum vettvangi.

Mostapha Benhenda

Í þessari grein er leitast við að koma á samræðum milli lýðræðislegra og íslamskra stjórnmálakenninga.1 Samspil þeirra er furðulegt.: til dæmis, í því skyni að útskýra sambandið sem er á milli lýðræðis og hugmynda þeirra um hið fullkomna íslamska stjórnmála
stjórn, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. Til dæmis, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, which is a defining feature of democracy. On the contrary, they often reject the principle of separation between religion and the state, which is often considered to be part of democracy (að minnsta kosti, of democracy as known in the United States today). Given this mixed assessment of democratic principles, it seems interesting to determine the conception of democracy underlying Islamic political models. Með öðrum orðum, við ættum að reyna að komast að því hvað er lýðræðislegt í „gyðræði“. Í því skyni, meðal áhrifamikillar fjölbreytni og fjölbreytni íslamskra hefða staðlaðrar pólitískrar hugsunar, við einblínum í meginatriðum á breiðan hugsunarstraum sem fer aftur til Abu 'Ala Maududi og egypska menntamannsins Sayyed Qutb.8 Þessi tiltekna hugsunarstefna er áhugaverð vegna þess að í múslimaheiminum, hún liggur til grundvallar sumum erfiðustu andstöðunum við útbreiðslu þeirra gilda sem koma frá Vesturlöndum. Byggt á trúarlegum gildum, þessi þróun útfærði pólitíska fyrirmynd valkost við frjálslynt lýðræði. Í stórum dráttum, Lýðræðishugmyndin sem felst í þessu íslamska pólitíska líkani er málsmeðferð. Með nokkrum mun, þessi hugmynd er innblásin af lýðræðiskenningum sem sumir stjórnskipunarsinnar og stjórnmálafræðingar hafa haldið fram.10 Hún er þunn og mínímalísk., upp að vissu marki. Til dæmis, það byggir ekki á neinum hugmyndum um alþýðufullveldi og það krefst ekki aðskilnaðar á milli trúarbragða og stjórnmála. Fyrsta markmið þessarar greinar er að útfæra þessa mínimalísku hugmynd. Við gerum nákvæma endurupptöku á því til að einangra þessa hugmynd frá siðferði sínu (frjálslyndur) undirstöður, sem eru umdeildar út frá því sérstaka íslamska sjónarhorni sem hér er fjallað um. Einmitt, hið lýðræðislega ferli er venjulega dregið af meginreglunni um persónulegt sjálfræði, sem er ekki studd af þessum íslömsku kenningum.11 Hér, við sýnum að slík meginregla er ekki nauðsynleg til að réttlæta lýðræðislegt ferli.
| september 09, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
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Íslamismi endurskoðaður

Maha AZZAM

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 ár, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, það er orðið algengt að finna að hugmyndafræði og trú séu notuð af andstæðum aðilum sem heimild til lögfestingar, innblástur og fjandskap.
Staðan er enn flóknari í dag vegna vaxandi andstöðu og ótta við íslam á Vesturlöndum vegna hryðjuverkaárása sem aftur hafa áhrif á viðhorf til innflytjenda., trú og menningu. Mörk umma eða samfélags hinna trúuðu hafa teygt sig út fyrir múslimska ríki til evrópskra borga. Umma er hugsanlega til alls staðar þar sem múslimsk samfélög eru. Sameiginleg tilfinning um að tilheyra sameiginlegri trú eykst í umhverfi þar sem tilfinningin um aðlögun að nærliggjandi samfélagi er óljós og þar sem mismunun gæti verið augljós. Því meiri höfnun á gildum samfélagsins,
hvort sem er á Vesturlöndum eða jafnvel í múslimaríki, því meiri styrking á siðferðislegu afli íslams sem menningarlegrar sjálfsmyndar og gildiskerfis.
Í kjölfar sprenginganna í London á 7 Júlí 2005 það varð meira áberandi að sumt ungt fólk var að fullyrða trúarlega skuldbindingu sem leið til að tjá þjóðerni. Tengsl múslima um allan heim og skynjun þeirra á að múslimar séu viðkvæmir hafa leitt til þess að margir í mjög mismunandi heimshlutum hafa sameinað eigin staðbundnar vandræði í hinum víðtækari múslima., hafa auðkennt sér menningarlega, annað hvort fyrst og fremst eða að hluta, með vítt skilgreint íslam.

| september 06, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
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Iraq and the Future of Political Islam

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?", where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.
| september 04, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
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Egyptaland á Tipping Point ?

David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat af íslömskum ofstækismönnum í október 1981.
Seinni þjóðarleikritið, sem ég varð vitni að persónulega, hafði reynst gríðarlegur áfangi. Það neyddi arftaka Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, að snúa inn á við til að takast á við íslamista áskorun af óþekktum hlutföllum og binda í raun enda á leiðtogahlutverk Egypta í arabaheiminum.
Mubarak sýndi sig strax vera mjög varkár, hugmyndalaus leiðtogi, brjálæðislega viðbragðsfús frekar en forvirk í að takast á við félagsleg og efnahagsleg vandamál sem eru yfirþyrmandi þjóð hans eins og sprengiefni fólksfjölgun hennar (1.2 milljón fleiri Egypta á ári) og efnahagslægð.
Í fjögurra hluta Washington Post seríu sem skrifuð var þegar ég var að fara snemma 1985, Ég tók eftir því að nýi egypski leiðtoginn væri enn nokkurn veginn
algjör ráðgáta fyrir sitt eigið fólk, bjóða enga sýn og stjórna því sem virtist vera stýrislaust ríkisskip. Sósíalískt hagkerfi
erfður frá tímum Gamal Abdel Nasser forseta (1952 til 1970) var rugl. Gjaldmiðill landsins, pundið, var starfræktur
á átta mismunandi gengi; ríkisreknar verksmiðjur þess voru óframleiðandi, ósamkeppnishæf og djúpt í skuldum; og ríkisstjórnin var á leið í gjaldþrot að hluta til vegna niðurgreiðslna á matvælum, rafmagn og bensín eyddu þriðjungi ($7 milljarða) af fjárhagsáætlun sinni. Kaíró hafði sokkið niður í vonlausa grýttu umferðar og iðandi mannkyns — 12 milljónir manna þrengdust inn í þröngt landsvæði sem liggur að ánni Níl., mest lifandi kinn við kjálka í hrikalegum leiguíbúðum í sífellt stækkandi fátækrahverfum borgarinnar.

| september 02, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
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Rætur þjóðernishyggju í heimi múslima

Shabir Ahmed

The Muslim world has been characterised by failure, disunity, bloodshed, oppression and backwardness. At present, no Muslim country in the world can rightly claim to be a leader in any field of human activity. Einmitt, the non-Muslims of the East and the West
now dictate the social, economic and political agenda for the Muslim Ummah.
Enn fremur, the Muslims identify themselves as Turkish, Arab, African and Pakistani. If this is not enough, Muslims are further sub-divided within each country or continent. Til dæmis, in Pakistan people are classed as Punjabis, Sindhis, Balauchis and
Pathans. The Muslim Ummah was never faced with such a dilemma in the past during Islamic rule. They never suffered from disunity, widespread oppression, stagnation in science and technology and certainly not from the internal conflicts that we have witnessed this century like the Iran-Iraq war. So what has gone wrong with the Muslims this century? Why are there so many feuds between them and why are they seen to be fighting each other? What has caused their weakness and how will they ever recover from the present stagnation?
There are many factors that contributed to the present state of affairs, but the main ones are the abandoning of the Arabic language as the language of understanding Islam correctly and performing ijtihad, the absorption of foreign cultures such as the philosophies of the Greeks, Persian and the Hindus, the gradual loss of central authority over some of the provinces, and the rise of nationalism since the 19th Century.
This book focuses on the origins of nationalism in the Muslim world. Nationalism did not arise in the Muslim world naturally, nor did it came about in response to any hardships faced by the people, nor due to the frustration they felt when Europe started to dominate the world after the industrial revolution. Frekar, nationalism was implanted in the minds of the Muslims through a well thought out scheme by the European powers, after their failure to destroy the Islamic State by force. The book also presents the Islamic verdict on nationalism and practical steps that can be taken to eradicate the disease of nationalism from the Muslim Ummah so as to restore it back to its former glory.

| Ág 28, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
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Íslamsk stjórnmálamenning, Lýðræði, og mannréttindi

Daniel E. Verð

Því hefur verið haldið fram að íslam auðveldi forræðishyggju, stangast á við

gildi vestrænna samfélaga, og hefur veruleg áhrif á mikilvægar pólitískar niðurstöður
í múslimskum þjóðum. Þar af leiðandi, fræðimenn, álitsgjafar, og ríkisstjórn
embættismenn benda oft á „íslamska bókstafstrú“ sem næsta
hugmyndafræðileg ógn við frjálslynd lýðræðisríki. Þetta útsýni, þó, byggist fyrst og fremst á
um greiningu texta, Íslamsk stjórnmálakenning, og sértækar rannsóknir
einstakra landa, sem taka ekki tillit til annarra þátta. Það er mín röksemdafærsla
að textar og hefðir íslams, eins og annarra trúarbragða,
hægt að nota til að styðja við margvísleg stjórnmálakerfi og stefnur. Land
sérstakar og lýsandi rannsóknir hjálpa okkur ekki að finna mynstur sem munu hjálpa
við útskýrið mismunandi tengsl á milli íslams og stjórnmála um allt land
löndum múslimaheimsins. Þess vegna, ný nálgun við rannsókn á
tengsl milli íslams og stjórnmála eru kallaðar.
ég legg til, með ströngu mati á tengslum íslams,
lýðræði, og mannréttindi á þverþjóðlegum vettvangi, það of mikið
áhersla er lögð á mátt íslams sem stjórnmálaafls. Ég fyrst
nota samanburðarrannsóknir, sem einblína á þætti sem tengjast samspilinu
milli íslamskra hópa og stjórnvalda, efnahagsleg áhrif, þjóðernisbrot,

og samfélagsþróun, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

| Ág 22, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
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Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB, Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB. Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB.

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB. Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

mannréttindi, Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum. innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum

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innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum, innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum.

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum, innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum 11 innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum. innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum, innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum. innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum, Íslamista

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum, og

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum. innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg. takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg.

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg. takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum, að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum

að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum, að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum

að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum, að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum.

| Ág 21, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
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ISLAMIC RULINGS ON WARFARE

H Youssef. Aboul-Enein
Sherifa Zuhur

The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.

| Ág 13, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
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Hækkun UM "múslima Lýðræði”

Governor Nasr

A Vofa er áleitnum múslima heimi. Þetta tiltekna Vofa er notthe malign og vel fjallað anda fundamentalist extremism, né enn The Phantom von þekktur sem frjálslynda Íslam. Í staðinn, the specter that I have in mind is a third force, a hopeful if still somewhat ambiguoustrend that I call—in a conscious evocation of the political tradition associated with the Christian Democratic parties of Europe—“Muslim Democracy.”The emergence and unfolding of Muslim Democracy as a “fact on the ground” over the last fifteen years has been impressive. This is so even though all its exponents have thus far eschewed that label1 and even though the lion’s share of scholarly and political attention has gone to the question of how to promote religious reform within Islam as a prelude to democratization.2 Since the early 1990s, political openings in anumber of Muslim-majority countries—all, admittedly, outside the Arabworld—have seen Islamic-oriented (but non-Islamist) parties vying successfullyfor votes in Bangladesh, Indónesía, Malasía, Pakistan (beforeits 1999 military coup), and Turkey.Unlike Islamists, with their visions of rule by shari‘a (Íslamsk lög) oreven a restored caliphate, Muslim Democrats view political life with apragmatic eye. They reject or at least discount the classic Islamist claim that Islam commands the pursuit of a shari‘a state, and their main goaltends to be the more mundane one of crafting viable electoral platform sand stable governing coalitions to serve individual and collective interests—Islamic as well as secular—within a democratic arena whosebounds they respect, win or lose. Islamists view democracy not as something deeply legitimate, but at best as a tool or tactic that may be useful in gaining the power to build an Islamic state.

| Sjór 29, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
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Hamas og pólitískar umbætur í Mið-Austurlöndum

David Mepham

The lesson of Palestine’s election is that the international community should become more serious and sophisticated about political reform in the middle east, says David Mepham of the Institute for Public Policy Research.
Hamas’s stunning victory in the 25 January elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council raises three critical questions for international policymakers:
• why did it happen – that an organisation labelled as “terrorist” by the Israelis, the European Union and the United States manages to win the support of a majority of Palestinian voters?
• how should the international community now respond?
• where does Hamas’s victory leave the cause of political reform and democratisation in the middle east?
The rise of Hamas
Much of the immediate international commentary on the election result has focused on the failings of Fatah during the decade in which the movement held power in the Palestinian Authority (PA) – including the rampant corruption of senior Fatah officials and the lack of meaningful democracy within the PA. There was also a sizeable positive vote for Hamas. The organisation is seen by many Palestinians as untainted by corruption, og, unlike the PA, it has a good track record of providing health, education and other services.
The other part of the explanation for the Hamas victory – less discussed in the international media – has been the failure of the “peace process” and the radicalising and impoverishing effects of the Israeli occupation. Under the premiership of Ariel Sharon since 2001, Israel has all but destroyed the infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority. Israel has also continued its policy of illegal settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank and east Jerusalem, and it is in the process of building a “separation barrier”.
Israel is not building the barrier on its pre-1967 occupation border (which it would be allowed to do under international law). Rather it plans to build 80% of the barrier inside Israeli-occupied Palestinian territory. This involves incorporating the main Israeli settlement blocs, as well as taking over Palestinian agricultural lands and water resources. This restricts Palestinian freedom of movement, and makes it much harder for Palestinians to access their schools, health facilities and jobs.
These policies are oppressive and humiliating; they also have disastrous economic consequences. The United Nations estimates that poverty levels have more than trebled in the last five years, that 60% of Palestinians are now living in poverty, and that unemployment is around 30%. These conditions have provided very fertile soil for the radicalisation of Palestinian opinion and for the rise of Hamas.
The short-term challenge
Hamas’s electoral victory presents the international community with a real conundrum.
Hinsvegar, the “Quartet” (the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations) is right to say that full-scale peace negotiations with Hamas will require significant movement on Hamas’s part. Hamas does not recognise the state of Israel. It also supports violence, including attacks on Israeli civilians, as part of its strategy for Palestinian national liberation. Anyone expecting an immediate and formal shift in Hamas policy on these issues is likely to be disappointed.
But intelligent international diplomacy can still make a difference. While they are reluctant to formally proclaim it, there is evidence that some senior Hamas leaders accept the reality of Israel within its pre-1967 borders. Ennfremur, on the question of violence Hamas has largely maintained a unilateral truce (tahdi’a) for the past year. Extending this truce, and working for a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire, should be the immediate focus of international diplomacy towards Hamas, if necessary through third-party intermediaries.
The other critical international objective should be to avoid the collapse of the Palestinian Authority. Fatah’s mismanagement and the disastrous consequences of Israeli occupation and closures have left the PA in a desperate state and entirely dependent on donor funding to stay afloat. Í 2005, the EU provided £338 million, while the US contributed £225 million. Cutting that assistance overnight would plunge tens of thousands of Palestinians into acute poverty, triggering social implosion and anarchy. But donors are rightly worried about transferring resources to a government dominated by Hamas.
One possibility would be to press for a government of Palestinian technocrats, without senior Hamas figures in key ministerial positions, and to rely on Mahmoud Abbas, the directly elected Palestinian president, as the main interlocutor for the international community. Something along these lines appears to command support amongst the Quartet. If the immediate economic situation can be stabilised, then there is at least a possibility of encouraging Hamas to move in a political direction through a policy of gradual, conditional engagement. Pressure on Israel to live up to its obligations under international law, for example by ending illegal settlement activity, would also help: persuading a sceptical Palestinian public that the world does care about their plight and is committed to a two-state solution.
The regional prospect
While Hamas’s victory has focused attention on the immediate crisis in the Palestinian territories, it raises wider questions about the process of political reform and democratisation in the broader middle east, a process advocated so publicly by the Bush administration. It is ironic, to say the least, that Hamas – a group with which the United States refuses to deal – should be the beneficiary of a free and fair election encouraged by US policy. Some will draw from this the conclusion that democratic reform in the middle east is a hopelessly misguided enterprise and one that should be abandoned forthwith. Small “c” conservatives, on all sides of the political spectrum, will feel vindicated in highlighting the risks of rapid political change and in pointing out the virtues of stability.
It is true that political change carries risks, including the risk that radical Islamists like Hamas will be the major beneficiaries of political liberalisation. While this is a reasonable concern, those who highlight it tend to overlook the diversity of political Islamists in the region, the special circumstances that account for the rise of Hamas, and the extent to which some Islamists have moderated their positions in recent years. Unlike Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan and the Justice & Development Party in Morocco all reject violence and have committed themselves to pluralistic politics.
Nor do the critics suggest a better alternative for addressing the phenomenon of political Islamism across the region than the attempted engagement of Islamists in the political process. Repression of Islamists and their systematic exclusion from political institutions has been a recipe for instability and extremism, not moderation.
There is obviously a strong critique to be made of the Bush administration’s attempts to promote political change in the middle east, not least the multiple failings of its policy in Iraq. More broadly, the US lacks credibility in the region as a force for democracy and human rights because of its largely uncritical support for Israel, and its military, diplomatic and often financial backing for many of the more authoritarian regimes in the region. Even when it is particularly outspoken on the need for greater democracy, for example in its recent dealings with President Mubarak of Egypt, the administration’s anti-terrorism agenda consistently trumps its political reform objectives.
But exposing the folly and ineffectiveness of US policy is one thing; ditching the commitment to political reform in the middle east is quite another. The international community needs to strengthen not weaken its commitment to accountable government and human rights in the region. In thinking about political change in the middle east – where the concept of a democratic culture is often very weak – international actors need to give as much emphasis to “constitutionalism” as to elections, important though elections are. In this context, constitutionalism means a balance of powers, including checks on the executive, a fair and independent legal process, a free press and media, and the protection of the rights of minorities.
It is important too for international actors to be realistic about what can be achieved in particular countries and over particular timescales. Í sumum tilfellum, support for political reform might involve pushing hard now for genuinely free elections. In other cases, a higher short-term priority for political reform might be encouraging an enlarged space in which opposition groups or civil society can function, greater freedom for the press, support for educational reforms and cultural exchanges, and promoting more inclusive economic development.
It is also vital to think more imaginatively about creating incentives for political reform in the middle east. There is a particular role for the European Union here. The experience of political change in other parts of the world suggests that countries can be persuaded to undertake very significant political and economic reforms if this is part of a process that yields real benefits to the ruling elite and the wider society. The way in which the prospect of EU membership has been used to bring about far-reaching change in eastern and central Europe is a good example of this. The process of Turkey’s accession to the EU can be seen in a similar vein.
A critical question is whether such a process might be used more broadly to stimulate political reform across the middle east, through initiatives like the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP will provide participating middle-eastern states with a stake in EU institutions, in particular the single market, providing a powerful incentive for reform. It also allows for the EU to reward countries that make faster progress against agreed benchmarks for political reform.
There are no simple answers to the current problems besetting the middle east. But the lesson to be drawn from the Hamas result is emphatically not that the international community should give up on the cause of political reform in the region. Rather it should become more serious and sophisticated about helping to support it.

| Sjór 28, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
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Bræðralag múslima í Egyptalandi

William Thomasson

Er íslam trú ofbeldis? Er sú útbreidda staðalímynd að allir múslimar séu ofbeldisfullir andvígir „vantrúuðum“ vestrænum menningu rétt? Heimurinn í dag stendur frammi fyrir tveimur andstæðum andlitum íslams; einn er friðsæll, aðlögunarhæfni, nútímavæddur íslam, og hitt er stranglega bókstafstrúarlegt og á móti öllu sem er óíslamskt eða sem gæti spillt íslamskri menningu. Bæði eintökin, þó að því er virðist á móti, blandast saman og tengjast innbyrðis, og eru rætur ruglsins yfir raunverulegri sjálfsmynd nútíma íslams. Víðáttur íslams gerir það erfitt að greina, en maður getur einbeitt sér að ákveðnu íslömsku svæði og lært mikið um íslam í heild sinni. Einmitt, maður getur gert þetta með Egyptalandi, sérstaklega sambandið milli bókstafstrúarsamfélagsins sem kallast múslimska bræðralagið og egypskra stjórnvalda og íbúa. Tvö andstæð andlit íslams eru sýnd í Egyptalandi í viðráðanlegum hluta, bjóða upp á minni fyrirmynd af almennri fjölþjóðlegri baráttu íslams nútímans. Í viðleitni til að sýna hlutverk íslamskra bókstafstrúarmanna, og tengsl þeirra við íslamskt samfélag í heild sinni í umræðunni um hvað íslam er, þessi ritgerð mun bjóða upp á sögu Félags múslimskra bræðra, lýsing á því hvernig stofnunin er til komin, virkaði, og var skipulagður, og samantekt um starfsemi bróðurins og áhrif á egypska menningu. Svo sannarlega, með því að gera það, maður getur öðlast dýpri skilning á því hvernig íslamskir bókstafstrúarmenn túlka íslam


| Sjór 27, 2010 | Athugasemdir 1
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Löggjafarvald Þróun múslima bróðurlega í Egyptalandi

Stephen Bennett

“Allah is our objective. Spámaðurinn er leiðtogi okkar. Qur’an is our law. Jihad er leið okkar. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”

Since its early days in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood has created much controversy, as some argue that the organization advocates violence in the name of Islam. According to Dr. Mamoun Fandy of the James A. Baker III Institute of Public Policy, “jihadism and the activation of the views of the world of the house of Islam and the house of war are the ideas that emerged from the writings and the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood” (Livesy, 2005). The primary evidence for this argument is notable member of the Brotherhood, Sayeed Qutb, who is credited with developing the revisionist and controversial interpretation of jihad that provided religious justifications for violence committed by offshoot organizations of the Brotherhood like al-jihad, al-Takfir wa al-Hijra, Hamas, og al-Qaeda.

Yet that is still a debatable position, because despite being the ideological parent of these violent organizations, the Muslim Brotherhood itself has always maintained an official stance against violence and instead has promoted Islamic civil and social action at the grassroots level. Within the first twenty years of its existence the Muslim Brotherhood gained status as the most influential of all major groups in the Middle East through its popular activism. It also spread from Egypt into other nations throughout the region and served as the catalyst for many of the successful popular liberation movements against Western colonialism in the Middle East.

While it has retained most of its founding principles from its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has made a dramatic transformation in some crucial aspects of its political ideology. Formerly denounced by many as a terrorist organization, as of late the Muslim Brotherhood has been labeled by most current scholars of the Middle East as politically “moderate”, “politically centrist”, and “accommodationist” to Egypt’s political and governmental structures (Abed-Kotob, 1995, p. 321-322). Sana Abed-Kotob also tells us that of the current Islamist opposition groups that exist today “the more ‘radical’ or militant of these groups insist upon revolutionary change that is to be imposed on the masses and political system, whereas… the new Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, call for gradual change that is to be undertaken from within the political system and with the enlistment of the Muslim masses”

| Sjór 27, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
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Skilnaður er Veil

shadi hamid

America’s post-September 11 project to promote democracy in the Middle East has proven a spectacular failure. Today,Arab autocrats are as emboldened as ever. Egyptaland, Jórdanía, Túnis, and others are backsliding on reform. Opposition forces are being crushed. Three of the most democratic polities in the region, Líbanon, Írak, and the Palestinian territories,are being torn apart by violence and sectarian conflict.Not long ago, it seemed an entirely different outcome was in the offing. Asrecently as late 2005, observers were hailing the “Arab spring,” an “autumn forautocrats,” and other seasonal formulations. They had cause for such optimism.On January 31, 2005, the world stood in collective awe as Iraqis braved terroristthreats to cast their ballots for the first time. That February, Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak announced multi-candidate presidential elections, another first.And that same month, after former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri wasshadi hamid is director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracyand an associate of the Truman National Security Project.Parting the Veil Now is no time to give up supporting democracy in the Muslim world.But to do so, the United States must embrace Islamist moderates.shadi hamiddemocracyjournal.org 39killed, Lebanon erupted in grief and then anger as nearly one million Lebanesetook to the streets of their war-torn capital, demanding self-determination. Notlong afterward, 50,000 Bahrainis—one-eighth of the country’s population—ralliedfor constitutional reform. The opposition was finally coming alive.But when the Arab spring really did come, the American response provide dample evidence that while Arabs were ready for democracy, the United States most certainly was not. Looking back, the failure of the Bush Administration’s efforts should not have been so surprising. Since the early 1990s, US. policymakershave had two dueling and ultimately incompatible objectives in the Middle East: promoting Arab democracy on one hand, and curbing the power and appealof Islamist groups on the other. In his second inaugural address, President George W. Bush declared that in supporting Arab democracy, our “vital interests and our deepest beliefs” were now one. The reality was more complicated.When Islamist groups throughout the region began making impressive gains at the ballot box, particularly in Egypt and in the Palestinian territories, the Bush Administration stumbled. With Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza high on the agendaand a deteriorating situation in Iraq, American priorities began to shift. Friendly dictators once again became an invaluable resource for an administration that found itself increasingly embattled both at home and abroad.The reason for this divergence in policy revolves around a critical question:What should the United States do when Islamists come to power through free elections? In a region where Islamist parties represent the only viable oppositionto secular dictatorships, this is the crux of the matter. In the MiddleEastern context, the question of democracy and the question of political Islamare inseparable. Without a well-defined policy of engagement toward politicalIslam, the United States will fall victim to the same pitfalls of the past. In many ways, it already has.

| Sjór 07, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
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Hvernig á að stuðla að mannréttindum í Egyptalandi

Human Rights First

The United States’ relationship with Egypt is central toseveral policy challenges facing the new administration inthe Middle East. As the most populous Arab state, Egyptis a major regional power. Since signing a peace treatywith Israel in 1979, it has played a key role in negotiationsfor an Israeli-Palestinian and a broader Israeli-Arab peaceagreement. Egypt helped to mediate a tense ceasefirebetween Israel and Hamas that broke down with theoutbreak of conflict in the Gaza Strip at the end ofDecember 2008, and continues to serve as anintermediary between the warring parties in the Gazaconflict. Egypt is again at the center of renewed peacemaking efforts in the region launched by the Obamaadministration with the appointment of former SenatorGeorge Mitchell as Special Envoy in January 2009.In a part of the world where so many vital U.S. interestsare at stake, Egypt is a key partner for any U.S.administration. The Egyptian government can greatlyassist the United States in legitimizing and supporting thenew government in Iraq, til dæmis, og, as the owner ofthe Suez Canal and as an oil producer, Egypt is vital tothe security of energy supplies from the region.Egypt is also a testing ground for U.S. human rightspromotion in the region, and was frequently the target ofexhortations to move forward with political reform anddemocratization during the Bush administration.Successive administrations have been encouraging theEgyptian government to reform for decades, but after the9/11 attacks, with the prominent involvement of Egyptianslike Mohamed Atta and Ayman al-Zawahiri, calls forreform took on greater centrality—and a new urgency—inU.S. policy. Human rights and democracy were no longerjust desirable; they became national security concernsand the subject of a new “Freedom Agenda.

| Sjór 06, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
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Lýðræðisþróun og íslamska Stjórnmál:

YOKOTA Takayuki�

The aim of this article is to explore the often contradictory correlation between democratizationand Islamic politics in Egypt, focusing on a new Islamic political party, the Wasat Party (Ḥizbal-Wasaṭ).Theoretically, democratization and Islamic politics are not incompatible if Islamic politicalorganizations can and do operate within a legal and democratic framework. Á hinn bóginn,this requires democratic tolerance by governments for Islamic politics, as long as they continueto act within a legal framework. Í Miðausturlöndum, þó, Islamic political parties are oftensuspected of having undemocratic agendas, and governments have often used this suspicion as ajustification to curb democratization. This is also the case with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood(Jam‘īya al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) under the Ḥusnī Mubārak regime. Although the Brotherhood is amainstream Islamic movement in Egypt, operating publicly and enjoying considerable popularity,successive governments have never changed its illegal status for more than half a century. Someof the Brotherhood members decided to form the Wasat Party as its legal political organ in order tobreak this stalemate.There have been some studies on the Wasat Party. Stacher [2002] analyzes the “Platformof the Egyptian Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Miṣrī 1998] and explains the basic principlesof the Wasat Party as follows: lýðræði, sharī‘a (Íslamsk lög), rights of women, and Muslim-Christian relations. Baker [2003] regards the Wasat Party as one of the new Islamist groups thathave appeared in contemporary Egypt, and analyzes its ideology accordingly. Wickham [2004]discusses the moderation of Islamic movements in Egypt and the attempt to form the WasatParty from the perspective of comparative politics. Norton [2005] examines the ideology andactivities of the Wasat Party in connection with the Brotherhood’s political activities. As theseearlier studies are mainly concerned with the Wasat Party during the 1990s and the early 2000s,I will examine the ideology and activities of the Wasat Party till the rise of the democratizationmovement in Egypt in around 2005. I will do so on the basis of the Wasat Party’s documents, suchas the “Platform of the New Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Jadīd 2004]1), and my interviews withits members.

| Febrúar 19, 2010 | Athugasemdir 0
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