RSSรายการทั้งหมดที่ติดแท็กด้วย: "ประเทศจอร์แดน"

อิรักและในอนาคตทางการเมืองของศาสนาอิสลาม

Piscatori James

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, อิสลามที่ไหน"?", โลกอิสลามเป็นที่ไป? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, ไม่สามารถหลีกเลี่ยงแนวโน้มของโลกอาทิ, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(B) the key to the future lay in leadership, หรือพูด authoritatively ที่สำหรับศาสนาอิสลาม.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, แฉสงครามขยายตัวและการโต้เถียงในความหวาดกลัว, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. มักจะใช้แทนกันได้กับ'การนับถือหลักเดิม', Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, ยัง, ไม่หวั่นไหว, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

ศาสนาอิสลามและประชาธิปไตย

ITAC

ถ้าคนอ่านกดหรือฟังการแสดงความเห็นในกิจการระหว่างประเทศ, ได้มีการกล่าวมักจะ -- และโดยนัยได้มากขึ้น แต่มักจะไม่กล่าวว่า -- ว่าศาสนาอิสลามเข้ากันไม่ได้กับระบอบประชาธิปไตย. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

วัฒนธรรมทางการเมืองของศาสนาอิสลาม, ประชาธิปไตย, และสิทธิมนุษยชน

Daniel E. ราคา

จะได้รับการเสนอว่าศาสนาอิสลามอำนวยความสะดวกในเผด็จการ, contradicts

ค่านิยมของสังคมตะวันตก, และส่งผลกระทบต่อผลอย่างมีนัยสำคัญทางการเมืองที่สำคัญ
ในประเทศมุสลิม. จึง, นักวิชาการ, แสดงความเห็น, รัฐบาลและ
เจ้าหน้าที่บ่อยชี้ไปที่การนับถือหลักเดิมของศาสนาอิสลาม '' '' เป็นต่อไป
ภัยคุกคามทางอุดมการณ์เพื่อประชาธิปไตยเสรีนิยม. มุมมองนี้, อย่างไรก็ตาม, เป็นไปตามหลัก
การวิเคราะห์ตัวบท, ทฤษฎีทางการเมืองของศาสนาอิสลาม, และการโฆษณาการศึกษาเฉพาะกิจ
ของแต่ละประเทศ, ซึ่งจะไม่พิจารณาปัจจัยอื่น ๆ. มันคือการต่อสู้ของฉัน
ที่ข้อความและประเพณีของศาสนาอิสลาม, เช่นผู้ที่นับถือศาสนาอื่น,
สามารถใช้ในการสนับสนุนความหลากหลายของระบบการเมืองและนโยบาย. ประเทศ
เฉพาะการศึกษาและอธิบายไม่ได้ช่วยให้เราเพื่อหารูปแบบที่จะช่วยให้
เราจะอธิบายความสัมพันธ์ที่แตกต่างกันระหว่างศาสนาอิสลามและการเมืองใน
ประเทศในโลกมุสลิม. ด้วยเหตุนี้, วิธีการใหม่ในการศึกษาของ
การเชื่อมต่อระหว่างศาสนาอิสลามและทางการเมืองจะเรียกร้องให้.
ผมขอแนะนำ, ผ่านการประเมินอย่างเข้มข้นของความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างศาสนาอิสลาม,
ประชาธิปไตย, และสิทธิมนุษยชนในระดับข้ามชาติ, ที่มากเกินไป
เน้นจะถูกวางไว้ในอำนาจของศาสนาอิสลามเป็นผู้ทรงอิทธิพลทางการเมือง. ฉันแรก
การใช้กรณีศึกษาเปรียบเทียบ, ซึ่งมุ่งเน้นไปที่ปัจจัยที่เกี่ยวข้องกับการมีอิทธิพลซึ่งกันและกัน
ระหว่างกลุ่มอิสลามและระบอบการปกครอง, อิทธิพลทางเศรษฐกิจ, cleavages ชาติพันธุ์,

และการพัฒนาสังคม, เพื่ออธิบายความแปรปรวนในอิทธิพลของ

ศาสนาอิสลามทางการเมืองในแปดประเทศ.

Islamist ภาคีฝ่ายค้านและศักยภาพในการหมั้นของสหภาพยุโรป

อาร์เชอร์ Toby

Huuhtanen Heidi

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, it

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

สิทธิมนุษยชน, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international

affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase

European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the

EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and

their political circumstances, country by country.

Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid

out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this

report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamist

parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, และ

in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

การเคลื่อนไหวของมุสลิมและกระบวนการประชาธิปไตยในโลกอาหรับ: การสำรวจเขตพื้นที่สีเทา

J Nathan. สีน้ำตาล, Hamzawy Amr,

Ottaway Marina

ในช่วงทศวรรษที่ผ่านมา, การเคลื่อนไหวของมุสลิมมีการจัดตั้งตัวเองเป็นผู้เล่นทางการเมืองที่สำคัญในตะวันออกกลาง. ด้วยความร่วมมือกับรัฐบาล, Islamist เคลื่อนไหว, ปานกลางรวมทั้งอนุมูลอิสระ, จะกำหนดวิธีการทางการเมืองของภูมิภาคเปิดตัวขึ้นในอนาคตอันใกล้. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, อย่างไรก็ตาม, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, ประเทศจอร์แดน, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. การเมือง, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

ประชาชาติมุสลิมปานกลาง

S โรเบิร์ต. แง่มุม

บรู๊คสตีเว่น

The Muslim Brotherhood is the world’s oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organization. It is also the most controversial,
condemned by both conventional opinion in the West and radical opinion in the Middle East. American commentators have called the Muslim Brothers “radical Islamists” and “a vital component of the enemy’s assault forcedeeply hostile to the United States.” Al Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri sneers at them for “lur[ing] thousands of young Muslim men into lines for electionsinstead of into the lines of jihad.” Jihadists loathe the Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) for rejecting global jihad and embracing democracy. These positions seem to make them moderates, the very thing the United States, short on allies in the Muslim world, seeks.
But the Ikhwan also assails U.S. นโยบายต่างประเทศ, especially Washington’s support for Israel, and questions linger about its actual commitment to the democratic process. Over the past year, we have met with dozens of Brotherhood leaders and activists from Egypt, ประเทศฝรั่งเศส, ประเทศจอร์แดน, ประเทศสเปน, ประเทศซีเรีย,ตูนิเซีย, and the United Kingdom.

การบริหารจัดการของการเคลื่อนไหวอิสลาม: Salafis, ภราดรภาพมุสลิม, อำนาจรัฐและในประเทศจอร์แดน

Ghori Faisal

In his first book, การบริหารจัดการของการเคลื่อนไหวอิสลาม, Quintan Wiktorowicz examines the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis through the lens of social movement theory. Unlike some political scientists who dismiss Islamic movements because of their informal networks, Wiktorowicz contends that social movement theory is an apt framework through which Islamic movements can be examined and studied. In this regard, his work leads the field. Yet for all its promise, this book largely fails to deliver.
The book is divided into four primary sections, through which he tries to construct his conclusion: Jordanian political liberalization has occurred because of structural necessities, not because of its commitment to democratization. นอกจากนี้, the state has been masterful in what he dubs the “management of collective action," (p. 3) which has, for all practical purposes, stifled any real opposition. While his conclusion is certainly tenable, given his extensive fieldwork, the book is poorly organized and much of the evidence examined earlier in the work leaves many questions unanswered.

นำไปสู่การลงคะแนนเสียงเพื่อสนับสนุนสิ่งที่ฝ่ายค้านภายใต้เผด็จการ ?

DH ไมเคิล. Robbins

Elections have become commonplace in most authoritarian states. While this may seem to be a contradiction in terms, in reality elections play an important role in these regimes. While elections for positions of real power tend to be non-competitive, many
elections—including those for seemingly toothless parliaments—can be strongly contested.
The existing literature has focused on the role that elections play in supporting the regime. เช่น, they can help let off steam, help the regime take the temperature of society, or can be used to help a dominant party know which individuals it should promote (Schedler 2002; Blaydes 2006). ยัง, while the literature has focused on the supply-side of elections in authoritarian states, there are relatively few systematic studies of voter behavior in these elections (see Lust-Okar 2006 for an exception). ค่อนข้าง, most analyses have argued that patronage politics are the norm in these societies and that ordinary citizens tend to be very cynical about these exercises given that they cannot bring any real change (Kassem 2004; Desposato 2001; Zaki 1995). While the majority of voters in authoritarian systems may behave in this manner, not all do. ในความเป็นจริง, at times, even the majority vote against the regime leading to
significant changes as has occurred recently in Kenya, the Ukraine and Zimbabwe. ยัง, even in cases where opposition voters make up a much smaller percentage of voters, it is important to understand who these voters are and what leads them to vote against the
ระบบการปกครอง.

พี่น้องชาวมุสลิมในประเทศจอร์แดน

The Islamic movement in Jordan came to international attention in thewake of the April 1989 disturbances and the subsequent November 1989 การเลือกตั้งสมาชิกสภาผู้แทนราษฎร. These developments highlighted the movement’s political clout and raised the spectre in the West of an Iranian-style Islamic revolution in Jordan, fuelled by radical Islamic movements such as those of Egypt and the Maghrib. While various political trends competed for influence during the months prior to the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood had a clear advantage; its infrastructure in the mosques, the Qur’anicschools and the universities gave it a ready-made political base. The leftistand pro-regime groups, on the other hand, had to create de facto politicalparties—still legally banned—and to build their organizational base almostex nihilo, or to transform a clandestine infrastructure into an overt politicalone. There should have been very little surprise, จึง, when the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist candidates won a windfall of 32 of the 80seats in Parliament.Politicization of Islam is not new in Jordan.1 Since the foundation of the Emirate of Trans jordan by ‘Abdallah, Islam has served as one of the building blocks of regime legitimacy and of nation-building. The genealogy of the Hashemite family as scions of the Prophet’s tribe was an important source of legitimacy for its rule in Syria, Iraq and Jordan, as it had been inthe Hijaz. The ideology of the “Great Arab Revolt” was no less Islamic than it was Arab, and the control of Jerusalem after 1948 was interpretedby the regime as an Islamic responsibility and not only an Arab one.2King ‘Abdallah and his grandson Hussein, took care to present themselvesas believing Muslims, appearing at rituals and prayers, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca and embellishing their speeches with Islamic motifs.3The status of Islam in the Kingdom was also formalized in the Jordanian constitution (1952) by stipulating that Islam is the religion of the kingdom and that the king must be a Muslim and of Muslim parents. กฎหมายอิสลาม(Shari‘a) is defined in the constitution as one of the pillars of legislation in the kingdom, while family law is in the exclusive hands of the Shari‘a courts.

ศูนย์อ้างว่า: ศาสนาอิสลามในการเปลี่ยนผ่านทางการเมือง

John L. Edwards

ในปี 1990 ทางการเมืองศาสนาอิสลาม, บางสิ่งที่เรียก “การนับถือหลักเดิมของศาสนาอิสลาม,” การแสดงตนที่สำคัญในรัฐบาลและในทางการเมืองยังคงอยู่ตรงข้ามจากทวีปแอฟริกาไปเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้. ศาสนาอิสลามในทางการเมืองและอำนาจทางการเมืองได้ระดมปัญหาหลายอย่างและคำถาม: “ศาสนาอิสลามเป็น antithetical ให้ทันสมัย?,” “มีศาสนาอิสลามและประชาธิปไตยเข้ากันไม่ได้?,” “อะไรคือความหมายของรัฐบาลอิสลามฝ่าย, ชนกลุ่มน้อยและสิทธิสตรี,” “วิธีการเป็นตัวแทนอิสลาม,” “มีกลางอิสลาม?,” “ควรตะวันตกกลัวภัยคุกคามข้ามชาติอิสลามหรือการปะทะกันของอารยธรรม?” ร่วมสมัยอิสลามฟื้นฟูภูมิทัศน์ของโลกมุสลิมวันนี้เผยให้เห็นการเกิดขึ้นของสาธารณรัฐอิสลามใหม่ (ประเทศอิหร่าน, ซูดาน, ประเทศอัฟกานิสถาน), การขยายตัวของการเคลื่อนไหวอิสลามที่ทำงานนักแสดงทางการเมืองและสังคมเป็นสำคัญในระบบที่มีอยู่, และการเมืองคาดคั้นของ extremists._ รุนแรงรุนแรงในทางตรงกันข้ามกับปี 1980 เมื่อทางการเมืองอิสลามได้รับการบรรจุเพียงกับการปฏิวัติอิหร่านหรือกลุ่มลับที่มีชื่อเหมือนญิฮาดอิสลามหรือกองทัพของพระเจ้า, โลกมุสลิมในปี 1990 ซึ่งเป็นหนึ่งในอิสลามมีส่วนร่วมในกระบวนการเลือกตั้งและสามารถมองเห็นได้เป็นนายกรัฐมนตรี, เจ้าหน้าที่ตู้, ลำโพงของการประกอบชาติ, พระบรมวงศานุวงศ์, และนายกเทศมนตรีในประเทศที่หลากหลายเช่นอียิปต์, ซูดาน, ไก่งวง, ประเทศอิหร่าน, ประเทศเลบานอน, คูเวต, เยเมน, ประเทศจอร์แดน, ปากีสถาน, บังคลาเทศ, ประเทศมาเลเซีย, ประเทศอินโดนีเซีย, และอิสราเอล / ปาเลสไตน์. ในช่วงเริ่มต้นของศตวรรษที่ยี่สิบเอ็ดแรก, การเมืองศาสนาอิสลามยังคงเป็นกำลังสำคัญสำหรับการสั่งซื้อและความผิดปกติในทางการเมืองทั่วโลก, หนึ่งที่มีส่วนร่วมในกระบวนการทางการเมือง แต่ยังอยู่ในการกระทำของการก่อการร้าย, เป็นความท้าทายที่โลกมุสลิมและไปทางทิศตะวันตก. ทำความเข้าใจธรรมชาติของการเมืองศาสนาอิสลามในวันนี้, และโดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งปัญหาและคำถามที่ได้เกิดจากประสบการณ์ที่ผ่านมาเมื่อเร็ว ๆ นี้, ยังคงเป็นสิ่งสำคัญสำหรับรัฐบาล, ผู้กำหนดนโยบาย, และนักเรียนของการเมืองระหว่างประเทศเหมือนกัน.

เปรียบเทียบสาม BROTHERHOODS MUSLIM: ซีเรีย, จอร์แดน, อียิปต์

Rubin Barry

banner ของการปฏิวัติ Islamist ในตะวันออกกลางในวันนี้ได้ผ่านส่วนใหญ่ในกลุ่มการสนับสนุนจากหรือมาจากมุสลิมภราดรภาพ. บทความนี้จะพัฒนาการตรวจสอบเบื้องต้นของสามคีย์กลุ่มประชาชาติมุสลิมและเปรียบเทียบการเมืองของพวกเขา, interrelations, และวิธีการ. แต่ละ, แน่นอน, สามารถปรับให้เข้ากับเงื่อนไขของแบนเนอร์ country.The เฉพาะของการปฏิวัติมุสลิมในตะวันออกกลางในวันนี้ได้ผ่านการส่วนใหญ่ในกลุ่มการสนับสนุนจากหรือได้มาจากประชาชาติมุสลิม. บทความนี้จะพัฒนาการตรวจสอบเบื้องต้นของสามคีย์กลุ่มประชาชาติมุสลิมและเปรียบเทียบการเมืองของพวกเขา, interrelations, และวิธีการ. แต่ละ, แน่นอน, สามารถปรับให้เข้ากับเงื่อนไขของ country.First โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่ง, มันเป็นสิ่งสำคัญที่จะเข้าใจนโยบายที่มีต่อประชาชาติและความสัมพันธ์กับกลุ่ม jihadist ทั้ง (al - Qa'ida, เครือข่าย Zarqawi, และอื่น ๆ เช่น Hizb al - Tahrir และ Hamas) และนักทฤษฎี (such as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi).The Brotherhoods do not have ongoing relationships with Hizb al-Tahrir—which is regarded by them as a small, cultish กลุ่มที่มีความสำคัญไม่. ที่นอกเหนือจากในประเทศจอร์แดน, พวกเขาได้มีการติดต่อกับมันน้อยที่ all.Regarding al - Qa'ida - ทั้งนักทฤษฎีและ Brotherhoods ของโครงสร้างพื้นฐานของการก่อการร้าย - อนุมัติโดยทั่วไปของความเข้มแข็งของ, การโจมตีในอเมริกา, และอุดมการณ์ (หรือเคารพ ideologues ของ), แต่จะดูเป็นคู่แข่ง.

อนาคตของศาสนาอิสลามแล้ว 9/11

Moaddel Mansoor

มีมติในประวัติศาสตร์และ Islamicists เกี่ยวกับลักษณะของระบบความเชื่อ theIslamic และประสบการณ์ของประวัติศาสตร์ศาสนาอิสลามไม่มี, ซึ่งหนึ่ง couldbase ตัดสินสรุปเกี่ยวกับความเข้ากันได้กับศาสนาอิสลามสมัยใหม่. กระนั้น,ความพร้อมของทั้งทางประวัติศาสตร์และค่าข้อมูลการสำรวจช่วยให้เราสามารถ analyzethe อนาคตของศาสนาอิสลามในแสงของเหตุการณ์น่ากลัวของ 9/11. ปัจจัยสำคัญที่ woulddetermine ระดับของการมองเห็นสังคมที่จำเป็นสำหรับการทำนายอนาคต developmentof วัฒนธรรมเป็นธรรมชาติและความชัดเจนของเป้าหมายทางอุดมการณ์ในวาทกรรม towhich ความสัมพันธ์ทางวัฒนธรรมใหม่มีการผลิต. ขึ้นอยู่กับสถานที่นี้, ฉันจะลอง toilluminate ธรรมชาติของเป้าหมายดังกล่าวที่มีการเผชิญหน้าโดยมุสลิม inIran กิจกรรม, อียิปต์, และจอร์แดน.

สะพานอาคารไม่ผนัง

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 กันยายน 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. อย่างไรก็ตาม, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.

ประชาชาติมุสลิมของจอร์แดนและ Jama'at - I ศาสนาอิสลามของปากีสถาน

Sahgal Neha

The study of Islamist activism is new to social movement theory. Socialmovement scholarship has ignored Islamist movements because of their unique faithbasednature. More recently scholars have recognized that the processes of contentionconceptualized by social movement theory can be applied to Islamist activism to seektheoretical refinements in both areas of study.In this paper, I examine variations in the strategies followed by Islamistmovements in response to government policies. States have followed various policies inmanaging the tide of Islamist opposition to their power. Some states have chosen to userepressive means (อียิปต์, Jordan before 1989), while others, ในช่วงเวลาที่แตกต่างกันใน theirhistory ได้ใช้นโยบายผ่อนคลาย (หลังจากที่จอร์แดน 1989, ปากีสถาน, ประเทศมาเลเซีย). Iexamine ผลกระทบของที่พักของรัฐบาลในการเคลื่อนไหวอิสลาม strategies.I ยืนยันว่าที่พักที่สามารถมีผลกระทบที่แตกต่างกันใน movementstrategies อิสลามขึ้นอยู่กับลักษณะของนโยบายที่ผ่อนคลายตาม. Governmentshave ลูกจ้างทั้งสองประเภทที่แตกต่างกันของนโยบายที่ผ่อนคลายใน tenuousrelationship ของพวกเขาด้วยการต่อต้านอิสลาม - อิสลามและการเปิดเสรี. Islamizationattempts to co-opt the movements through greater religiosity in state and society.Liberalization allows the movements to conduct their activities at both the state and thesocietal level without necessarily increasing the religiosity of the state1. Islamizationdisempowers อิสลามในขณะที่การเปิดเสรีจะช่วยให้พวกเขาโดยการให้ ofinfluence ทรงกลม.

บัตร Spoilt

Marc Lynch

marc-akef

Moderate Islamist movements across the Arab world have made a decisive turn towards participation in democratic politics over the last 20 ปีที่. They have developed an elaborate ideological justification for contesting elections, which they have defended against intense criticism from more radical Islamist competitors. At the same time, they have demonstrated a commitment to internal democracy remarkable by the standards of the region, and have repeatedly proved their willingness to respect the results of elections even when they lose.
But rather than welcome this development, secular authoritarian regimes have responded with growing repression. Again and again, successful electoral participation by Islamists has triggered a backlash, often with the consent – if not the encouragement – of the United States. When Hamas prevailed in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, the response was boycott and political subversion. When the Egyptian government cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood after elections in 2005, few outsiders objected.
As the door to democracy is slammed in their faces, how have the Islamist groups that embraced participation responded? In some ways, they have passed the test with flying colours. They have remained committed to democratic participation even in the face of massive electoral fraud and harsh campaigns of repression. Their leaders have affirmed their democratic ideals, and have often spoken out to reiterate their ideological and strategic commitment to democracy. จริง, they have often emerged as the leading advocates for public freedoms and democratic reform. And there is as yet little sign of any such organisation turning to violence as an alternative.
But in other ways, the toll of repression is beginning to show. Doubts about the value of democratic participation inside these movements are growing. Splits in the top ranks have roiled movements in Jordan and Egypt, among others. In many of the cases, a Brotherhood leadership which prefers a moderate, accommodationist approach to the regime has struggled to find a way to respond to the escalating pressures of repression and the closing down of the paths towards democratic participation. In Egypt, frustration over extended detentions of the most moderate leaders have tarnished the coin of those calling for political participation, with a rising trend calling for a retreat from politics and a renewed focus upon social activism and religious work. In Jordan, the influence of those seeking to abandon worthless domestic politics and to focus instead on supporting Hamas has grown.
Critics of the Brotherhood have pointed to these recent struggles as evidence that Islamists cannot be trusted with democracy. But this profoundly misreads the current trends. These crises in fact reflect a delayed response to the blocked promise of democratic participation. The Islamist debate today is not about the legitimacy of democracy – it is about how to respond to frustrated efforts to play the democratic game.
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I recently spent a week in Amman, talking to most of the senior leaders of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood as well as a cross-section of the country’s political and journalistic elite. The picture that emerged was one not simply of an Islamist movement in crisis, but also of a blocked and deteriorating political system. The government was in the process of declining to call the Parliament back into session in order to force through its desired legislation as temporary laws of dubious constitutionality. Stories of social conflict among the tribes and of crushing economic problems amid spiralling corruption filled daily conversation.
The Jordanian Brotherhood, ก่อตั้งขึ้นในปี 1946, is one of the oldest and most deeply rooted branches of the global Islamist organisation. Unlike in many other countries, where the Brotherhood worked in opposition to those in power, in Jordan it played a crucial role for decades in supporting the Hashemite throne against external and domestic challengers. In return, it enjoyed a privileged relationship with the Jordanian state, including control over key ministries, and good relations with King Hussein in spite of his friendly ties with Israel and the United States.
When Jordan lost the West Bank in the 1967 war, it struggled to maintain its role in the occupied territories. ใน 1988, อย่างไรก็ตาม, as the Palestinian Intifada raged and threatened to spread to the East Bank, Jordan formally renounced its claims, severing its ties and concentrating on developing the East Bank and “Jordanising” the truncated state, a decision that was not accepted by the Brotherhood, which maintained ties with its West Bank counterparts.
When riots broke out throughout the country the next year, King Hussein responded with a remarkable democratic opening which revitalised the Kingdom’s political life. The Brotherhood participated fully in this process, and emerged in the 1989 elections as the dominant bloc in Parliament. The years that followed are fondly remembered in Jordan as the apex of political life, with an effective Parliament, a “national pact” establishing the ground rules of democracy and a vibrant emerging press.
ใน 1993, อย่างไรก็ตาม, the Jordanian regime changed the electoral law in a way that served to limit Muslim Brotherhood success. As it moved rapidly towards a peace treaty with Israel, the state began to clamp down on the Brotherhood and on all other forms of political opposition. Its interventions in the political process grew so extreme that in 1997 the Brotherhood’s political party, the Islamic Action Front, decided to boycott elections. After King Hussein’s death in 1999, the crown passed to his son Abdullah, who showed little interest in democratic reform, และใน 2001 decided to suspend Parliament and rule by emergency law. While formal democracy returned in 2003, political reform efforts failed to gain traction. The extent of electoral fraud against the Brotherhood and other critics of the regime during the 2007 vote shocked even jaded observers.
The Jordanian crackdown has not reached the brutal levels of Syria or Tunisia (where the Islamist opposition was massacred or driven abroad). The Brotherhood continues to operate publicly, and the Islamic Action Front holds six seats in Parliament. But the gerrymandered electoral system and massive fraud has hamstrung Islamist political participation, to the degree that many believe that the Brotherhood is being dared to boycott.
Following the 2007 electoral debacle, the Brotherhood entered a period of intense internal unrest. It dissolved its Shura Council as penance for its fateful decision to participate in the election. The core issue was over how best to respond to the regime’s repression: through confrontation, or through a retreat and consolidation of the political strategy? In April 2008, the “hawkish” trend won the internal elections to the Shura Council by a single vote, and the pragmatic and domestically-orientated Salem Falahat was replaced by the fiery, Palestine-centric hawk Himmam Said. Said and the new head of the Islamic Action Front, Zaki Bani Arshid, steered the Islamist movement into more direct conflict with the regime, with little success. The reformist trend, led by the soft-spoken intellectual Ruheil Ghuraybeh, avoided open confrontation but advanced an ambitious programme to transform Jordan into a constitutional monarchy.
As the Brotherhood rank and file lost interest in a stalled domestic political process, they were simultaneously galvanised by the electoral success of Hamas and then by the visceral images of Israel’s war on Gaza. The growing interest in Palestinian issues at the expense of Jordanian politics worried not only the regime but also the traditional leadership of the Brotherhood. The leading Jordanian journalist Mohammed Abu Rumman argues that the issue of relations with Hamas has supplanted the traditional “hawk-dove” struggle within the organisation. While both trends support Hamas – “if you are not with Hamas, you are not with the Muslim Brotherhood”, explained one of the “dovish” leaders – they disagree over the appropriate organisational relationship. The “Hamasi” trend supports close ties and the prioritisation of Palestinian issues, and embraces a common Muslim identity over a narrowly Jordanian one. The “reformist” trend insists that Hamas, as the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, should have responsibility for Palestine while the Jordanian Brotherhood must be a national organisation focused upon domestic Jordanian issues.
This crisis came to a head over the issue of Hamas participation in the administrative structures of the Jordanian Brotherhood. Three leading reformists resigned from the Executive Office, triggering an as-yet-unresolved internal crisis that threatens one of the first serious internal splits in the history of the movement. The media has eagerly egged this conflict on; จริงๆ, a number of Brotherhood leaders told me that what made the current crisis unique was not the issues at stake or the intensity of the disagreement, but the fact that for the first time it had become public.
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The story of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is many things, but certainly not a story of Islamists retreating from democracy. Similar dynamics can be seen in Egypt, where the Brotherhood’s leadership is similarly divided over how to respond to escalating repression. During multiple trips to Cairo in the last few years, I saw the growing frustration of a generation of reformists who found their every effort to embrace democracy met with force and rejection.
After “independent” Brotherhood candidates scored sweeping victories in the first of three rounds of the 2005 Parliamentary elections, government forces began to intervene to prevent further gains. Despite well-documented fraud and heavy-handed security interference in Brotherhood strongholds, the movement emerged as the largest opposition bloc with 88 ที่นั่ง. As Deputy Supreme Guide Mohammed Habib ruefully told me, their mistake was that they did too well – had they won 50 ที่นั่ง, perhaps they would not have triggered such harsh reprisals.
The subsequent crackdown matched the magnitude of the Brotherhood victory. A series of media campaigns aimed to scare mainstream Egyptians with alleged nefarious Brotherhood schemes (they were supposedly training an underground militia, conspiring with Hizbollah, and more). A wide range of leading Brotherhood figures, including noted moderates such as the financier Khairat el Shater and the intellectual Abd el Monem Abou el Fattouh, were detained indefinitely on trumped up charges.
For a while, the Egyptian Brotherhood held fast in the face of these provocations. They continued to try to participate in elections even as the fraud and overt manipulation mounted. Their Parliamentarians performed well as an opposition. They routinely expressed their ongoing commitment to democracy to every audience which would listen. And they imposed discipline on their own members to prevent the explosion of frustration into violence.
But over time, the pressure began to take its toll. The leadership reined in its freewheeling young bloggers, whose public airing of internal issues was being exploited by the organisation’s opponents. It adopted tougher rhetoric on foreign policy issues such as the Gaza war – attacking the Egyptian government’s enforcement of the blockade of Gaza – in part to rally its demoralised membership. Considerable evidence suggests that the cadres of the organisation were growing disenchanted with politics and preferred to return to the core social and religious mission. And growing voices from inside and outside the movement began to suggest retreating from politics until a more propitious time.
Earlier this month the conflicts inside the Egyptian Brotherhood leapt into the pages of local newspapers, which reported that the movement’s leader, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, had abruptly resigned his post in protest after conservatives refused to appoint the leading reformist Essam el Erian to an open leadership seat. Akef has denied the reports – but the portrait of a movement in turmoil is clear.
The Jordanian, Egyptian and American governments may see all this as something of a success story: the influence of the Islamists has been curbed, both in formal politics and in the social sector, and the restraint exercised by the Brotherhood leadership has meant the states have not faced a backlash. But this is dangerously short-sighted. The campaigns against Islamists weaken the foundations of democracy as a whole, not just the appeal of one movement, and have had a corrosive effect on public freedoms, transparency and accountability. Regardless of the fortunes of the movements themselves, the crackdown on the Islamists contributes to the wider corruption of public life. The growing frustration within moderate Islamist groups with democratic participation cannot help but affect their future ideological trajectory.
Sowing disenchantment with democratic politics in the ranks of the Brotherhood could forfeit one of the signal developments in Islamist political thinking of the last few decades. The failure of the movement’s democratic experiment could empower more radical Islamists, including not only terrorist groups but also doctrinaire salafists less inclined to pragmatic politics. The degradation of its organisational strengths could open up space for al Qa’eda and other radical competitors to move in. The alternative to Ismail Haniya might be Osama bin Laden rather than Abu Mazen, and the exclusion of Essam el-Erian may not produce an Ayman Nour.
Marc Lynch is associate professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He writes a blog on Arab politics and media for Foreign Policy.

Moderate Islamist movements across the Arab world have made a decisive turn towards participation in democratic politics over the last 20 ปีที่. They have developed an elaborate ideological justification for contesting elections, which they have defended against intense criticism from more radical Islamist competitors. At the same time, they have demonstrated a commitment to internal democracy remarkable by the standards of the region, and have repeatedly proved their willingness to respect the results of elections even when they lose.

But rather than welcome this development, secular authoritarian regimes have responded with growing repression. Again and again, successful electoral participation by Islamists has triggered a backlash, often with the consent – if not the encouragement – of the United States. When Hamas prevailed in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, the response was boycott and political subversion. When the Egyptian government cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood after elections in 2005, few outsiders objected.

As the door to democracy is slammed in their faces, how have the Islamist groups that embraced participation responded? In some ways, they have passed the test with flying colours. They have remained committed to democratic participation even in the face of massive electoral fraud and harsh campaigns of repression. Their leaders have affirmed their democratic ideals, and have often spoken out to reiterate their ideological and strategic commitment to democracy. จริง, they have often emerged as the leading advocates for public freedoms and democratic reform. And there is as yet little sign of any such organisation turning to violence as an alternative.

But in other ways, the toll of repression is beginning to show. Doubts about the value of democratic participation inside these movements are growing. Splits in the top ranks have roiled movements in Jordan and Egypt, among others. In many of the cases, a Brotherhood leadership which prefers a moderate, accommodationist approach to the regime has struggled to find a way to respond to the escalating pressures of repression and the closing down of the paths towards democratic participation. In Egypt, frustration over extended detentions of the most moderate leaders have tarnished the coin of those calling for political participation, with a rising trend calling for a retreat from politics and a renewed focus upon social activism and religious work. In Jordan, the influence of those seeking to abandon worthless domestic politics and to focus instead on supporting Hamas has grown.

Critics of the Brotherhood have pointed to these recent struggles as evidence that Islamists cannot be trusted with democracy. But this profoundly misreads the current trends. These crises in fact reflect a delayed response to the blocked promise of democratic participation. The Islamist debate today is not about the legitimacy of democracy – it is about how to respond to frustrated efforts to play the democratic game.

********************************

I recently spent a week in Amman, talking to most of the senior leaders of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood as well as a cross-section of the country’s political and journalistic elite. The picture that emerged was one not simply of an Islamist movement in crisis, but also of a blocked and deteriorating political system. The government was in the process of declining to call the Parliament back into session in order to force through its desired legislation as temporary laws of dubious constitutionality. Stories of social conflict among the tribes and of crushing economic problems amid spiralling corruption filled daily conversation.

The Jordanian Brotherhood, ก่อตั้งขึ้นในปี 1946, is one of the oldest and most deeply rooted branches of the global Islamist organisation. Unlike in many other countries, where the Brotherhood worked in opposition to those in power, in Jordan it played a crucial role for decades in supporting the Hashemite throne against external and domestic challengers. In return, it enjoyed a privileged relationship with the Jordanian state, including control over key ministries, and good relations with King Hussein in spite of his friendly ties with Israel and the United States.

When Jordan lost the West Bank in the 1967 war, it struggled to maintain its role in the occupied territories. ใน 1988, อย่างไรก็ตาม, as the Palestinian Intifada raged and threatened to spread to the East Bank, Jordan formally renounced its claims, severing its ties and concentrating on developing the East Bank and “Jordanising” the truncated state, a decision that was not accepted by the Brotherhood, which maintained ties with its West Bank counterparts.

When riots broke out throughout the country the next year, King Hussein responded with a remarkable democratic opening which revitalised the Kingdom’s political life. The Brotherhood participated fully in this process, and emerged in the 1989 elections as the dominant bloc in Parliament. The years that followed are fondly remembered in Jordan as the apex of political life, with an effective Parliament, a “national pact” establishing the ground rules of democracy and a vibrant emerging press.

ใน 1993, อย่างไรก็ตาม, the Jordanian regime changed the electoral law in a way that served to limit Muslim Brotherhood success. As it moved rapidly towards a peace treaty with Israel, the state began to clamp down on the Brotherhood and on all other forms of political opposition. Its interventions in the political process grew so extreme that in 1997 the Brotherhood’s political party, the Islamic Action Front, decided to boycott elections. After King Hussein’s death in 1999, the crown passed to his son Abdullah, who showed little interest in democratic reform, และใน 2001 decided to suspend Parliament and rule by emergency law. While formal democracy returned in 2003, political reform efforts failed to gain traction. The extent of electoral fraud against the Brotherhood and other critics of the regime during the 2007 vote shocked even jaded observers.

The Jordanian crackdown has not reached the brutal levels of Syria or Tunisia (where the Islamist opposition was massacred or driven abroad). The Brotherhood continues to operate publicly, and the Islamic Action Front holds six seats in Parliament. But the gerrymandered electoral system and massive fraud has hamstrung Islamist political participation, to the degree that many believe that the Brotherhood is being dared to boycott.

Following the 2007 electoral debacle, the Brotherhood entered a period of intense internal unrest. It dissolved its Shura Council as penance for its fateful decision to participate in the election. The core issue was over how best to respond to the regime’s repression: through confrontation, or through a retreat and consolidation of the political strategy? In April 2008, the “hawkish” trend won the internal elections to the Shura Council by a single vote, and the pragmatic and domestically-orientated Salem Falahat was replaced by the fiery, Palestine-centric hawk Himmam Said. Said and the new head of the Islamic Action Front, Zaki Bani Arshid, steered the Islamist movement into more direct conflict with the regime, with little success. The reformist trend, led by the soft-spoken intellectual Ruheil Ghuraybeh, avoided open confrontation but advanced an ambitious programme to transform Jordan into a constitutional monarchy.

As the Brotherhood rank and file lost interest in a stalled domestic political process, they were simultaneously galvanised by the electoral success of Hamas and then by the visceral images of Israel’s war on Gaza. The growing interest in Palestinian issues at the expense of Jordanian politics worried not only the regime but also the traditional leadership of the Brotherhood. The leading Jordanian journalist Mohammed Abu Rumman argues that the issue of relations with Hamas has supplanted the traditional “hawk-dove” struggle within the organisation. While both trends support Hamas – “if you are not with Hamas, you are not with the Muslim Brotherhood”, explained one of the “dovish” leaders – they disagree over the appropriate organisational relationship. The “Hamasi” trend supports close ties and the prioritisation of Palestinian issues, and embraces a common Muslim identity over a narrowly Jordanian one. The “reformist” trend insists that Hamas, as the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, should have responsibility for Palestine while the Jordanian Brotherhood must be a national organisation focused upon domestic Jordanian issues.

This crisis came to a head over the issue of Hamas participation in the administrative structures of the Jordanian Brotherhood. Three leading reformists resigned from the Executive Office, triggering an as-yet-unresolved internal crisis that threatens one of the first serious internal splits in the history of the movement. The media has eagerly egged this conflict on; จริงๆ, a number of Brotherhood leaders told me that what made the current crisis unique was not the issues at stake or the intensity of the disagreement, but the fact that for the first time it had become public.

********************************

The story of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is many things, but certainly not a story of Islamists retreating from democracy. Similar dynamics can be seen in Egypt, where the Brotherhood’s leadership is similarly divided over how to respond to escalating repression. During multiple trips to Cairo in the last few years, I saw the growing frustration of a generation of reformists who found their every effort to embrace democracy met with force and rejection.

After “independent” Brotherhood candidates scored sweeping victories in the first of three rounds of the 2005 Parliamentary elections, government forces began to intervene to prevent further gains. Despite well-documented fraud and heavy-handed security interference in Brotherhood strongholds, the movement emerged as the largest opposition bloc with 88 ที่นั่ง. As Deputy Supreme Guide Mohammed Habib ruefully told me, their mistake was that they did too well – had they won 50 ที่นั่ง, perhaps they would not have triggered such harsh reprisals.

The subsequent crackdown matched the magnitude of the Brotherhood victory. A series of media campaigns aimed to scare mainstream Egyptians with alleged nefarious Brotherhood schemes (they were supposedly training an underground militia, conspiring with Hizbollah, and more). A wide range of leading Brotherhood figures, including noted moderates such as the financier Khairat el Shater and the intellectual Abd el Monem Abou el Fattouh, were detained indefinitely on trumped up charges.

For a while, the Egyptian Brotherhood held fast in the face of these provocations. They continued to try to participate in elections even as the fraud and overt manipulation mounted. Their Parliamentarians performed well as an opposition. They routinely expressed their ongoing commitment to democracy to every audience which would listen. And they imposed discipline on their own members to prevent the explosion of frustration into violence.

But over time, the pressure began to take its toll. The leadership reined in its freewheeling young bloggers, whose public airing of internal issues was being exploited by the organisation’s opponents. It adopted tougher rhetoric on foreign policy issues such as the Gaza war – attacking the Egyptian government’s enforcement of the blockade of Gaza – in part to rally its demoralised membership. Considerable evidence suggests that the cadres of the organisation were growing disenchanted with politics and preferred to return to the core social and religious mission. And growing voices from inside and outside the movement began to suggest retreating from politics until a more propitious time.

Earlier this month the conflicts inside the Egyptian Brotherhood leapt into the pages of local newspapers, which reported that the movement’s leader, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, had abruptly resigned his post in protest after conservatives refused to appoint the leading reformist Essam el Erian to an open leadership seat. Akef has denied the reports – but the portrait of a movement in turmoil is clear.

The Jordanian, Egyptian and American governments may see all this as something of a success story: the influence of the Islamists has been curbed, both in formal politics and in the social sector, and the restraint exercised by the Brotherhood leadership has meant the states have not faced a backlash. But this is dangerously short-sighted. The campaigns against Islamists weaken the foundations of democracy as a whole, not just the appeal of one movement, and have had a corrosive effect on public freedoms, transparency and accountability. Regardless of the fortunes of the movements themselves, the crackdown on the Islamists contributes to the wider corruption of public life. The growing frustration within moderate Islamist groups with democratic participation cannot help but affect their future ideological trajectory.

Sowing disenchantment with democratic politics in the ranks of the Brotherhood could forfeit one of the signal developments in Islamist political thinking of the last few decades. The failure of the movement’s democratic experiment could empower more radical Islamists, including not only terrorist groups but also doctrinaire salafists less inclined to pragmatic politics. The degradation of its organisational strengths could open up space for al Qa’eda and other radical competitors to move in. The alternative to Ismail Haniya might be Osama bin Laden rather than Abu Mazen, and the exclusion of Essam el-Erian may not produce an Ayman Nour.

Marc Lynch is associate professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He writes a blog on Arab politics and media for Foreign Policy.

From the National

Published on October 30, 2009

Internet และการเมือง Islamist ในจอร์แดน, โมร็อกโกและอียิปต์.

ปลายของศตวรรษที่ยี่สิบและจุดเริ่มต้นของ 21 เห็น
เผยแพร่ Internet เป็นศูนย์กลางในการติดต่อสื่อสาร, ข้อมูล, และความบันเทิง
ค้า. การแพร่กระจายของอินเทอร์เน็ตไปถึงทั้งสี่มุมของโลก, เชื่อมต่อ
นักวิจัยในแอนตาร์กติกากับเกษตรกรในกัวเตมาลาและผู้ประกาศข่าวในกรุงมอสโกไปยัง
Bedouin ในอียิปต์. ผ่านทางอินเทอร์เน็ต, การไหลของข้อมูลและเวลาจริงข่าวถึง
ข้ามทวีป, และเสียงของ subalternity มีศักยภาพในการงานของพวกเขาก่อนหน้านี้
เสียง silenced ผ่านบล็อก, เว็บไซต์และเว็บไซต์เครือข่ายสังคม. องค์กรทางการเมือง
ต่อเนื่องกันซ้ายขวาที่มีเป้าหมาย Internet เป็น mobilizer ทางการเมืองของอนาคต,
และรัฐบาลนี้ให้เข้าถึงเอกสารทางประวัติศาสตร์, แพลตฟอร์มอื่น, และ
เอกสารการบริหารผ่านเว็บไซต์ของตน. เหมือนกับ, กลุ่มศาสนาออนไลน์แสดงความเชื่อ
ผ่านเว็บไซต์อย่างเป็นทางการ, และบอร์ดให้สมาชิกจากทั่วโลกเพื่ออภิปรายประเด็นของ
eschatology, orthopraxy และจำนวนศาสนศาสตร์ nuanced ปัญหาใดๆ. Fusing สอง, Islamist
องค์กรทางการเมืองได้ทำให้สถานะของพวกเขาที่รู้จักกันผ่านเว็บไซต์รายละเอียดซับซ้อน
แพลตฟอร์มทางการเมือง, ข่าวที่เกี่ยวข้อง, และวัสดุเชิงเคร่งครัดคุยได้
views ศาสนศาสตร์. บทความนี้จะตรวจสอบเฉพาะ Nexus นี้ -- การใช้อินเทอร์เน็ตโดย
องค์กรทางการเมืองมุสลิมในตะวันออกกลางในประเทศจอร์แดน, และโมร็อกโก
อียิปต์.
แม้ว่าที่หลากหลายขององค์กรทางการเมือง Islamist ใช้อินเทอร์เน็ตเป็นเวทีให้
เผยแพร่ความคิดเห็นและสร้างชื่อเสียงระดับชาติหรือระดับนานาชาติ, วิธีการและความตั้งใจ
ของกลุ่มเหล่านี้แตกต่างกันมากและขึ้นอยู่กับลักษณะขององค์กร. กระดาษนี้จะ
ตรวจสอบการใช้อินเทอร์เน็ตสาม'บุคคล Islamist ปานกลาง': หน้า Action อิสลามใน
2
ประเทศจอร์แดน, ยุติธรรมและภาคีการพัฒนาในโมร็อกโกและภราดรภาพมุสลิมในอียิปต์.
เป็นสามเหล่านี้มีความซับซ้อนมากขึ้นทางการเมืองและชื่อเสียงของพวกเขา, ทั้งที่บ้าน
และต่างประเทศ, พวกเขาได้ใช้อินเทอร์เน็ตมากขึ้นสำหรับหลากหลายวัตถุประสงค์. แรก, Islamist
องค์กรได้ใช้อินเทอร์เน็ตเป็นส่วนขยายวงร่วมสมัยของประชาชน, ทรงกลม
ที่ผ่านกรอบบุคคล, สื่อสารและ institutionalize คิดเป็นสาธารณะกว้าง.
ในประการที่สอง, อินเทอร์เน็ตให้องค์กร Islamist forum ไม่กรองผ่านที่
เจ้าหน้าที่อาจส่งเสริมและโฆษณาตำแหน่งและมุมมองของพวกเขา, รวมทั้งหลีกเลี่ยงสื่อท้องถิ่น
ข้อ จำกัด ที่กำหนดโดยรัฐ. ในที่สุด, Internet จะช่วยให้องค์กร Islamist นำเสนอ
วาทกรรมต่อต้าน counterhegemonic ในระบอบปกครองหรือสถาบันพระมหากษัตริย์หรือบนจอแสดงผลไปยัง
ผู้ชมต่างประเทศ. แรงจูงใจที่สามนี้ใช้ส่วนใหญ่เฉพาะเพื่อมุสลิม
ภราดรภาพ, ซึ่งนำเสนอภาษาอังกฤษซับซ้อนเว็บไซต์ออกแบบในตะวันตก
รูปแบบและปรับแต่งให้เข้าถึงผู้ชมเลือกของนักวิชาการ, นักการเมืองและนักหนังสือพิมพ์. MB
มี excelled นี้เรียกว่า"bridgeblogging" 1 และได้กำหนดมาตรฐานสำหรับบุคคล Islamist
พยายามมีอิทธิพลต่อการรับรู้ระหว่างประเทศของตำแหน่งงานของพวกเขา. เนื้อหาจะแตกต่างกัน
ระหว่างอาหรับและเวอร์ชันภาษาอังกฤษของเว็บไซต์, และจะตรวจสอบเพิ่มเติมในส่วน
ในภราดรภาพมุสลิม. ทั้งสามลูกซ้อนกันอย่างมีนัยสำคัญทั้งในความตั้งใจและ
ผลลัพธ์ที่ต้องการ; อย่างไรก็ตาม, เป้าหมายแต่ละกลุ่มเป้าหมายเป็นนักแสดงที่แตกต่างกัน: สาธารณะ, สื่อมวลชน, และ
ระบบการปกครอง. ต่อไปนี้การวิเคราะห์ของทั้งสามพื้นที่, กระดาษนี้จะดำเนินการเป็นกรณีศึกษา
การวิเคราะห์เว็บไซต์ของ IAF, PJD และภราดรภาพมุสลิม.
1

Helms Andrew

Ikhwanweb

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, ข้อมูล, entertainment and commerce.

การแพร่กระจายของอินเทอร์เน็ตไปถึงทั้งสี่มุมของโลก, connecting the researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the Bedouin in Egypt.

ผ่านทางอินเทอร์เน็ต, the flow of information and real-time news reaches across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously silenced voices through blogs, เว็บไซต์และเว็บไซต์เครือข่ายสังคม.

Political organizations across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future, และรัฐบาลนี้ให้เข้าถึงเอกสารทางประวัติศาสตร์, แพลตฟอร์มอื่น, and administrative papers through their sites. เหมือนกับ, religious groups display their beliefs online through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of eschatology, orthopraxy และจำนวนศาสนศาสตร์ nuanced ปัญหาใดๆ.

Fusing สอง, องค์กรทางการเมืองมุสลิมได้ทำให้สถานะของพวกเขาที่รู้จักกันผ่านเว็บไซต์รายละเอียดซับซ้อนแพลตฟอร์มทางการเมือง, ข่าวที่เกี่ยวข้อง, และวัสดุเชิงเคร่งครัด views คุยเกี่ยวกับธรรมชาติของพวกเขา. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, โมร็อกโกและอียิปต์.

Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization.

This paper will examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, ยุติธรรมและภาคีการพัฒนาในโมร็อกโกและภราดรภาพมุสลิมในอียิปต์. เป็นสามเหล่านี้มีความซับซ้อนมากขึ้นทางการเมืองและชื่อเสียงของพวกเขา, both at home and abroad, พวกเขาได้ใช้อินเทอร์เน็ตมากขึ้นสำหรับหลากหลายวัตถุประสงค์.

แรก, Islamist organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere through which parties frame, สื่อสารและ institutionalize คิดเป็นสาธารณะกว้าง.

ในประการที่สอง, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media restrictions imposed by the state.

ในที่สุด, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim Brotherhood, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, นักการเมืองและนักหนังสือพิมพ์.

The MB has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section on the Muslim Brotherhood.

These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and desired outcomes; อย่างไรก็ตาม, เป้าหมายแต่ละกลุ่มเป้าหมายเป็นนักแสดงที่แตกต่างกัน: สาธารณะ, สื่อมวลชน, and the regime. ต่อไปนี้การวิเคราะห์ของทั้งสามพื้นที่, this paper will proceed into a case study analysis of the websites of the IAF, PJD และภราดรภาพมุสลิม.