Tout Entries Atenn Avèk: "Lòt bò larivyè Jouden"
Iraq and the Future of Political Islam
James Piscatori
Islam and Democracy
ITAC
Kilti politik Islamik, Demokrasi, ak Dwa Moun
Daniele. Pri
Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones
Natan J.. Brown, Amr Hamzawy,
Marina Ottaway
Frè Mizilman Modere a
Robert S.. Leiken
Steven Brooke
The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, The Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan
Faisal Ghori
What Leads Voters to Support the Opposition under Authoritarianism ?
Michael D.H. Robbins
Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan
The Islamic movement in Jordan came to international attention in thewake of the April 1989 disturbances and the subsequent November 1989 parliamentary elections. These developments highlighted the movement’s political clout and raised the spectre in the West of an Iranian-style Islamic revolution in Jordan, fuelled by radical Islamic movements such as those of Egypt and the Maghrib. While various political trends competed for influence during the months prior to the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood had a clear advantage; its infrastructure in the mosques, the Qur’anicschools and the universities gave it a ready-made political base. The leftistand pro-regime groups, nan lòt men an, had to create de facto politicalparties—still legally banned—and to build their organizational base almostex nihilo, or to transform a clandestine infrastructure into an overt politicalone. There should have been very little surprise, therefore, when the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist candidates won a windfall of 32 of the 80seats in Parliament.Politicization of Islam is not new in Jordan.1 Since the foundation of the Emirate of Trans jordan by ‘Abdallah, Islam has served as one of the building blocks of regime legitimacy and of nation-building. The genealogy of the Hashemite family as scions of the Prophet’s tribe was an important source of legitimacy for its rule in Syria, Iraq and Jordan, as it had been inthe Hijaz. The ideology of the “Great Arab Revolt” was no less Islamic than it was Arab, and the control of Jerusalem after 1948 was interpretedby the regime as an Islamic responsibility and not only an Arab one.2King ‘Abdallah and his grandson Hussein, took care to present themselvesas believing Muslims, appearing at rituals and prayers, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca and embellishing their speeches with Islamic motifs.3The status of Islam in the Kingdom was also formalized in the Jordanian constitution (1952) by stipulating that Islam is the religion of the kingdom and that the king must be a Muslim and of Muslim parents. Lwa Islamik(Shari‘a) is defined in the constitution as one of the pillars of legislation in the kingdom, while family law is in the exclusive hands of the Shari‘a courts.
Claiming the Center: Political Islam in Transition
Jan L.. Esposito
In the 1990s political Islam, what some call “Islamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (Iran, Sudan, Afganistan), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, Latiki, Iran, Liban, Kuwait, Yemen, Lòt bò larivyè Jouden, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malezi, Endonezi, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.
COMPARING THREE MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS: SYRIA, JORDAN, EGYPT
Barry Rubin
The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, and methods. Each, nan kou, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, and methods. Each, nan kou, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.First, it is important to understand the Brotherhood’s policy toward and relations with both jihadist groups (al-Qa'ida, the Zarqawi network, and others such as Hizb al-Tahrir and Hamas) and theorists (such as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi).The Brotherhoods do not have ongoing relationships with Hizb al-Tahrir—which is regarded by them as a small, cultish group of no importance. Other than in Jordan, they have had little contact with it at all.Regarding al-Qa’ida—both its theorists and its terrorist infrastructure—the Brotherhoods approve generally of its militancy, attacks on America, and ideology (or respect its ideologues), but view it as a rival.
The future of Islam after 9/11
Mansoor Moaddel
There is no consensus among historians and Islamicists about the nature of theIslamic belief system and the experience of historical Islam, on which one couldbase a definitive judgment concerning Islam’s compatibility with modernity. Nonetheless,the availability of both historical and value survey data allow us to analyzethe future of Islam in light of the horrific event of 9/11. The key factor that woulddetermine the level of societal visibility necessary for predicting the future developmentof a culture is the nature and clarity of the ideological targets in relation towhich new cultural discourses are produced. Based on this premise, I shall try toilluminate the nature of such targets that are confronted by Muslim activists inIran, Peyi Lejip, and Jordan.
Bati pon pa mi
Alex Glennie
Depi atak laterè yo nan 11 Septanm 2001 te gen yon eksplozyon enterè nan Islamis politik nan Mwayen Oryan ak Afrik Dinò (MENA) rejyon an. Jiska san patipri dènyèman,analis yo te konprann byen konsantre sou aktè sa yo ki opere nan fen vyolan nan spectre Islamis la, enkli Al-Qaeda, Taliban yo, kèk nan pati yo sektè nan Irak ak gwoup politik ki gen zèl ame tankou Hamas nan teritwa palestinyen yo okipe yo. (OPT)ak Hezbollah nan peyi Liban.Sepandan, sa te kache lefèt ke atravè rejyon MENA an politik kontanporen ap kondwi ak fòm pa yon koleksyon pi divèsifye nan 'endikap' mouvman islamis.. Nou defini kòm gwoup sa yo ki angaje oswa k ap chèche angaje yo nan pwosesis politik legal peyi yo epi ki te evite itilize vyolans piblikman pou ede reyalize objektif yo nan nivo nasyonal la., menm kote yo diskriminasyon kont oswa reprime. Definisyon sa a ta enkli gwoup tankou Frè Mizilman an nan peyi Lejip., Pati Jistis ak Devlopman (PJD) nan Maròk ak Fwon Aksyon Islamik la (IAF) nan lòt bò larivyè Jouden. Mouvman oswa pati islamis san vyolans sa yo souvan reprezante eleman ki pi byen òganize e ki pi popilè nan opozisyon an kont rejim ki egziste yo nan chak peyi., epi kòm sa, gen yon enterè ogmante sou pati nan fè politik lwès yo nan wòl yo ta ka jwe nan pwomosyon demokrasi nan rejyon an.. Men, diskisyon sou pwoblèm sa a sanble yo te bloke sou kesyon an si li ta apwopriye pou angaje ak gwoup sa yo sou yon baz pi sistematik ak fòmèl., olye ke sou pratik ki genyen nan aktyèlman fè sa., pliryalis politik ak yon seri de lòt pwoblèm. Li reflete tou konsiderasyon pragmatik sou enterè estratejik pouvwa lwès yo nan rejyon MENA yo ke yo pèrsu yo dwe menase pa popilarite a k ap monte ak enfliyans nan Islamis.. Pou pati yo, Pati ak mouvman islamis yo te montre yon repiyans klè pou yo tabli lyen pi sere ak pisans lwès sa yo ki gen politik nan rejyon an yo opoze fòtman., pa pi piti paske yo te pè ki jan rejim represif yo opere nan yo ta ka reyaji. Konsantre pwojè sa a sou mouvman islamis politik ki pa vyolan pa ta dwe mal entèprete kòm sipò implicite pou ajanda politik yo.. Angajman nan yon estrateji plis angajman ekspre ak pati islamis endikap yo ta enplike gwo risk ak konpwomi pou mizisyen politik Amerik di Nò ak Ewopeyen yo.. Sepandan, nou pran pozisyon ke tandans tou de bò yo wè angajman kòm yon sòm zewo jwèt "tout oswa anyen" pa itil., ak bezwen chanje si yon dyalòg pi konstriktif alantou refòm nan Mwayen Oryan an ak Afrik Dinò se parèt.
The Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan and Jama’at-i-Islam of Pakistan
Neha Sahgal
The study of Islamist activism is new to social movement theory. Socialmovement scholarship has ignored Islamist movements because of their unique faithbasednature. More recently scholars have recognized that the processes of contentionconceptualized by social movement theory can be applied to Islamist activism to seektheoretical refinements in both areas of study.In this paper, I examine variations in the strategies followed by Islamistmovements in response to government policies. States have followed various policies inmanaging the tide of Islamist opposition to their power. Some states have chosen to userepressive means (Peyi Lejip, Jordan before 1989), while others, at different times in theirhistory have used accommodative policies (Jordan after 1989, Pakistan, Malezi). Iexamine the effects of government accommodation on Islamist movement strategies.I argue that accommodation can have varying effects on Islamist movementstrategies depending on the nature of accommodative policies followed. Governmentshave employed two different types of accommodative policies in their tenuousrelationship with Islamist opposition – Islamization and liberalization. Islamizationattempts to co-opt the movements through greater religiosity in state and society.Liberalization allows the movements to conduct their activities at both the state and thesocietal level without necessarily increasing the religiosity of the state1. Islamizationdisempowers Islamists while liberalization empowers them by providing a sphere ofinfluence.
Spoilt ballots
Marc Lynch
Moderate Islamist movements across the Arab world have made a decisive turn towards participation in democratic politics over the last 20 years. They have developed an elaborate ideological justification for contesting elections, which they have defended against intense criticism from more radical Islamist competitors. At the same time, they have demonstrated a commitment to internal democracy remarkable by the standards of the region, and have repeatedly proved their willingness to respect the results of elections even when they lose.
But rather than welcome this development, secular authoritarian regimes have responded with growing repression. Again and again, successful electoral participation by Islamists has triggered a backlash, often with the consent – if not the encouragement – of the United States. When Hamas prevailed in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, the response was boycott and political subversion. When the Egyptian government cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood after elections in 2005, few outsiders objected.
As the door to democracy is slammed in their faces, how have the Islamist groups that embraced participation responded? In some ways, they have passed the test with flying colours. They have remained committed to democratic participation even in the face of massive electoral fraud and harsh campaigns of repression. Their leaders have affirmed their democratic ideals, and have often spoken out to reiterate their ideological and strategic commitment to democracy. Vreman vre, they have often emerged as the leading advocates for public freedoms and democratic reform. And there is as yet little sign of any such organisation turning to violence as an alternative.
But in other ways, the toll of repression is beginning to show. Doubts about the value of democratic participation inside these movements are growing. Splits in the top ranks have roiled movements in Jordan and Egypt, among others. In many of the cases, a Brotherhood leadership which prefers a moderate, accommodationist approach to the regime has struggled to find a way to respond to the escalating pressures of repression and the closing down of the paths towards democratic participation. In Egypt, frustration over extended detentions of the most moderate leaders have tarnished the coin of those calling for political participation, with a rising trend calling for a retreat from politics and a renewed focus upon social activism and religious work. In Jordan, the influence of those seeking to abandon worthless domestic politics and to focus instead on supporting Hamas has grown.
Critics of the Brotherhood have pointed to these recent struggles as evidence that Islamists cannot be trusted with democracy. But this profoundly misreads the current trends. These crises in fact reflect a delayed response to the blocked promise of democratic participation. The Islamist debate today is not about the legitimacy of democracy – it is about how to respond to frustrated efforts to play the democratic game.
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I recently spent a week in Amman, talking to most of the senior leaders of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood as well as a cross-section of the country’s political and journalistic elite. The picture that emerged was one not simply of an Islamist movement in crisis, but also of a blocked and deteriorating political system. The government was in the process of declining to call the Parliament back into session in order to force through its desired legislation as temporary laws of dubious constitutionality. Stories of social conflict among the tribes and of crushing economic problems amid spiralling corruption filled daily conversation.
The Jordanian Brotherhood, established in 1946, is one of the oldest and most deeply rooted branches of the global Islamist organisation. Unlike in many other countries, where the Brotherhood worked in opposition to those in power, in Jordan it played a crucial role for decades in supporting the Hashemite throne against external and domestic challengers. In return, it enjoyed a privileged relationship with the Jordanian state, including control over key ministries, and good relations with King Hussein in spite of his friendly ties with Israel and the United States.
When Jordan lost the West Bank in the 1967 war, it struggled to maintain its role in the occupied territories. Nan 1988, sepandan, as the Palestinian Intifada raged and threatened to spread to the East Bank, Jordan formally renounced its claims, severing its ties and concentrating on developing the East Bank and “Jordanising” the truncated state, a decision that was not accepted by the Brotherhood, which maintained ties with its West Bank counterparts.
When riots broke out throughout the country the next year, King Hussein responded with a remarkable democratic opening which revitalised the Kingdom’s political life. The Brotherhood participated fully in this process, and emerged in the 1989 elections as the dominant bloc in Parliament. The years that followed are fondly remembered in Jordan as the apex of political life, with an effective Parliament, a “national pact” establishing the ground rules of democracy and a vibrant emerging press.
Nan 1993, sepandan, the Jordanian regime changed the electoral law in a way that served to limit Muslim Brotherhood success. As it moved rapidly towards a peace treaty with Israel, the state began to clamp down on the Brotherhood and on all other forms of political opposition. Its interventions in the political process grew so extreme that in 1997 the Brotherhood’s political party, the Islamic Action Front, decided to boycott elections. After King Hussein’s death in 1999, the crown passed to his son Abdullah, who showed little interest in democratic reform, and in 2001 decided to suspend Parliament and rule by emergency law. While formal democracy returned in 2003, political reform efforts failed to gain traction. The extent of electoral fraud against the Brotherhood and other critics of the regime during the 2007 vote shocked even jaded observers.
The Jordanian crackdown has not reached the brutal levels of Syria or Tunisia (where the Islamist opposition was massacred or driven abroad). The Brotherhood continues to operate publicly, and the Islamic Action Front holds six seats in Parliament. But the gerrymandered electoral system and massive fraud has hamstrung Islamist political participation, to the degree that many believe that the Brotherhood is being dared to boycott.
Following the 2007 electoral debacle, the Brotherhood entered a period of intense internal unrest. It dissolved its Shura Council as penance for its fateful decision to participate in the election. The core issue was over how best to respond to the regime’s repression: through confrontation, or through a retreat and consolidation of the political strategy? In April 2008, the “hawkish” trend won the internal elections to the Shura Council by a single vote, and the pragmatic and domestically-orientated Salem Falahat was replaced by the fiery, Palestine-centric hawk Himmam Said. Said and the new head of the Islamic Action Front, Zaki Bani Arshid, steered the Islamist movement into more direct conflict with the regime, with little success. The reformist trend, led by the soft-spoken intellectual Ruheil Ghuraybeh, avoided open confrontation but advanced an ambitious programme to transform Jordan into a constitutional monarchy.
As the Brotherhood rank and file lost interest in a stalled domestic political process, they were simultaneously galvanised by the electoral success of Hamas and then by the visceral images of Israel’s war on Gaza. The growing interest in Palestinian issues at the expense of Jordanian politics worried not only the regime but also the traditional leadership of the Brotherhood. The leading Jordanian journalist Mohammed Abu Rumman argues that the issue of relations with Hamas has supplanted the traditional “hawk-dove” struggle within the organisation. While both trends support Hamas – “if you are not with Hamas, you are not with the Muslim Brotherhood”, explained one of the “dovish” leaders – they disagree over the appropriate organisational relationship. The “Hamasi” trend supports close ties and the prioritisation of Palestinian issues, and embraces a common Muslim identity over a narrowly Jordanian one. The “reformist” trend insists that Hamas, as the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, should have responsibility for Palestine while the Jordanian Brotherhood must be a national organisation focused upon domestic Jordanian issues.
This crisis came to a head over the issue of Hamas participation in the administrative structures of the Jordanian Brotherhood. Three leading reformists resigned from the Executive Office, triggering an as-yet-unresolved internal crisis that threatens one of the first serious internal splits in the history of the movement. The media has eagerly egged this conflict on; indeed, a number of Brotherhood leaders told me that what made the current crisis unique was not the issues at stake or the intensity of the disagreement, but the fact that for the first time it had become public.
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The story of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is many things, but certainly not a story of Islamists retreating from democracy. Similar dynamics can be seen in Egypt, where the Brotherhood’s leadership is similarly divided over how to respond to escalating repression. During multiple trips to Cairo in the last few years, I saw the growing frustration of a generation of reformists who found their every effort to embrace democracy met with force and rejection.
After “independent” Brotherhood candidates scored sweeping victories in the first of three rounds of the 2005 Parliamentary elections, government forces began to intervene to prevent further gains. Despite well-documented fraud and heavy-handed security interference in Brotherhood strongholds, the movement emerged as the largest opposition bloc with 88 seats. As Deputy Supreme Guide Mohammed Habib ruefully told me, their mistake was that they did too well – had they won 50 seats, perhaps they would not have triggered such harsh reprisals.
The subsequent crackdown matched the magnitude of the Brotherhood victory. A series of media campaigns aimed to scare mainstream Egyptians with alleged nefarious Brotherhood schemes (they were supposedly training an underground militia, conspiring with Hizbollah, and more). A wide range of leading Brotherhood figures, including noted moderates such as the financier Khairat el Shater and the intellectual Abd el Monem Abou el Fattouh, were detained indefinitely on trumped up charges.
For a while, the Egyptian Brotherhood held fast in the face of these provocations. They continued to try to participate in elections even as the fraud and overt manipulation mounted. Their Parliamentarians performed well as an opposition. They routinely expressed their ongoing commitment to democracy to every audience which would listen. And they imposed discipline on their own members to prevent the explosion of frustration into violence.
But over time, the pressure began to take its toll. The leadership reined in its freewheeling young bloggers, whose public airing of internal issues was being exploited by the organisation’s opponents. It adopted tougher rhetoric on foreign policy issues such as the Gaza war – attacking the Egyptian government’s enforcement of the blockade of Gaza – in part to rally its demoralised membership. Considerable evidence suggests that the cadres of the organisation were growing disenchanted with politics and preferred to return to the core social and religious mission. And growing voices from inside and outside the movement began to suggest retreating from politics until a more propitious time.
Earlier this month the conflicts inside the Egyptian Brotherhood leapt into the pages of local newspapers, which reported that the movement’s leader, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, had abruptly resigned his post in protest after conservatives refused to appoint the leading reformist Essam el Erian to an open leadership seat. Akef has denied the reports – but the portrait of a movement in turmoil is clear.
The Jordanian, Egyptian and American governments may see all this as something of a success story: the influence of the Islamists has been curbed, both in formal politics and in the social sector, and the restraint exercised by the Brotherhood leadership has meant the states have not faced a backlash. But this is dangerously short-sighted. The campaigns against Islamists weaken the foundations of democracy as a whole, not just the appeal of one movement, and have had a corrosive effect on public freedoms, transparency and accountability. Regardless of the fortunes of the movements themselves, the crackdown on the Islamists contributes to the wider corruption of public life. The growing frustration within moderate Islamist groups with democratic participation cannot help but affect their future ideological trajectory.
Sowing disenchantment with democratic politics in the ranks of the Brotherhood could forfeit one of the signal developments in Islamist political thinking of the last few decades. The failure of the movement’s democratic experiment could empower more radical Islamists, including not only terrorist groups but also doctrinaire salafists less inclined to pragmatic politics. The degradation of its organisational strengths could open up space for al Qa’eda and other radical competitors to move in. The alternative to Ismail Haniya might be Osama bin Laden rather than Abu Mazen, and the exclusion of Essam el-Erian may not produce an Ayman Nour.
Marc Lynch is associate professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He writes a blog on Arab politics and media for Foreign Policy.
Published on October 30, 2009
Entènèt la ak politik islamis nan lòt bò larivyè Jouden, Maròk ak peyi Lejip.
Andre Helms
Fen ventyèm syèk la ak kòmansman ventyèm syèk la te wè yon difizyon entènèt la kòm yon sant kominikasyon., enfòmasyon, amizman ak komès.
Pwopagasyon Entènèt la rive nan tout kat kwen glòb la, konekte chèchè a nan Antatik ak kiltivatè a nan Gwatemala ak nouvèl la nan Moskou ak Bedouin nan peyi Lejip la..
Through the Internet, koule enfòmasyon ak nouvèl an tan reyèl rive atravè kontinan yo, ak vwa yo nan subalternite gen potansyèl pou pwojè vwa yo te deja silans atravè blogs, sit entènèt ak sit rezo sosyal yo.
Òganizasyon politik yo atravè kontinyèl goch-dwa te vize Entènèt la kòm mobilizatè politik tan kap vini an, ak gouvènman kounye a bay aksè a dokiman istorik, platfòm pati yo, ak papye administratif atravè sit yo. Menm jan an tou, gwoup relijye yo montre kwayans yo sou entènèt atravè sit ofisyèl yo, ak fowòm pèmèt manm atravè mond lan deba sou pwoblèm eskatoloji, òtopraksi ak nenpòt kantite pwoblèm teyolojik nuans.
Fusion de la, Òganizasyon politik islamis yo te fè konnen prezans yo atravè sit entènèt sofistike ki detaye platfòm politik yo, nouvèl ki enpòtan, ak materyèl relijye oryante diskite opinyon teyolojik yo. Papye sa a pral espesyalman egzamine lyen sa a - itilizasyon entènèt la pa òganizasyon politik islamis nan Mwayen Oryan an nan peyi lòt bò larivyè Jouden., Maròk ak peyi Lejip.
Malgre ke yon pakèt òganizasyon politik islamis yo itilize entènèt la kòm yon fowòm pou pibliye opinyon yo epi kreye yon repitasyon nasyonal oswa entènasyonal., metòd ak entansyon gwoup sa yo varye anpil epi depann de nati òganizasyon an.
Papye sa a pral egzamine itilizasyon entènèt la pa twa pati islamis 'modere' yo: Fwon Aksyon Islamik nan lòt bò larivyè Jouden, Pati Jistis ak Devlopman nan Maròk ak Frè Mizilman an nan peyi Lejip. Kòm twa pati sa yo te ogmante sofistike politik yo ak repitasyon, tou de nan kay ak aletranje, yo te de pli zan pli itilize entènèt la pou plizyè rezon.
Premye, Òganizasyon islamis yo te itilize entènèt la kòm yon ekstansyon kontanporen nan esfè piblik la, yon esfè nan ki pati yo ankadre, kominike ak enstitisyonalize lide bay yon pi laj piblik.
Dezyèmman, Entènèt la bay òganizasyon islamis yo yon fowòm san filtè kote ofisyèl yo ka ankouraje ak fè piblisite pou pozisyon yo ak opinyon yo, osi byen ke kontourne restriksyon medya lokal yo enpoze pa eta a.
Finalman, Entènèt la pèmèt òganizasyon islamis yo prezante yon diskou counterhegemonic an opozisyon ak rejim dominan oswa monachi a oswa nan ekspozisyon nan yon odyans entènasyonal.. Twazyèm motivasyon sa a aplike pi espesyalman nan Frè Mizilman yo, ki prezante yon sit entènèt sofistike nan lang angle ki fèt nan yon style oksidantal ak pwepare pou rive jwenn yon odyans selektif nan entelektyèl., politisyen ak jounalis.
MB a ekselan nan sa yo rele "bridgeblogging" sa a. 1 e li te etabli estanda pou pati islamis yo eseye enfliyanse pèsepsyon entènasyonal yo sou pozisyon yo ak travay yo. Kontni an varye ant vèsyon an arab ak angle nan sit la, epi yo pral egzamine pi lwen nan seksyon an sou Frè Mizilman yo.
Twa objektif sa yo sipèpoze anpil nan tou de entansyon yo ak rezilta yo vle; sepandan, chak objektif vize yon aktè diferan: piblik la, medya yo, ak rejim nan. Apre yon analiz de twa zòn sa yo, papye sa a pral kontinye nan yon analiz etid ka sou sit entènèt IAF yo, PJD a ak Frè Mizilman yo.