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Iraq and the Future of Political Islam

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Islam i demokracija

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

Islamska politička kultura, Demokracija, i ljudska prava

Daniele. Cijena

Tvrdi se da islam olakšava autoritarizam, proturječi

vrijednostima zapadnih društava, te značajno utječe na važne političke ishode
u muslimanskim narodima. Slijedom toga, učenjaci, komentatori, i vlada
dužnosnici često ističu "islamski fundamentalizam" kao sljedeći
ideološka prijetnja liberalnim demokracijama. Ovaj pogled, međutim, temelji se prvenstveno
o analizi tekstova, Islamska politička teorija, i ad hoc studije
pojedinih zemalja, koji ne uzimaju u obzir druge faktore. To je moja tvrdnja
da tekstovi i tradicija islama, poput onih drugih religija,
može se koristiti za podršku različitim političkim sustavima i politikama. Zemlja
specifične i deskriptivne studije ne pomažu nam pronaći obrasce koji bi pomogli
objašnjavamo različite odnose između islama i politike diljem svijeta
zemalja muslimanskog svijeta. Stoga, novi pristup proučavanju
traži se veza između islama i politike.
predlažem, kroz rigoroznu evaluaciju odnosa između islama,
demokracija, i ljudska prava na međunacionalnoj razini, to previše
naglasak se stavlja na moć islama kao političke snage. ja prvi
koristiti komparativne studije slučaja, koji se usredotočuju na čimbenike koji se odnose na međuigru
između islamskih skupina i režima, ekonomski utjecaji, etnički rascjepi,

i društveni razvoj, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Islamističke oporbene stranke i potencijal za angažman u EU

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

U svjetlu sve veće važnosti islamističkih pokreta u muslimanskom svijetu i

način na koji je radikalizacija utjecala na globalna događanja od prijelaza stoljeća, to

važno je da EU ocijeni svoje politike prema akterima unutar onoga što može biti labavo

nazvan "islamski svijet". Osobito je važno postaviti pitanje treba li i kako se uključiti

s raznim islamističkim skupinama.

To ostaje kontroverzno čak i unutar EU. Neki smatraju da islam to cijeni

laži iza islamističkih stranaka jednostavno su nekompatibilne sa zapadnim idealima demokracije i

ljudska prava, dok drugi angažman vide kao realnu nužnost zbog rastućeg

domaća važnost islamističkih stranaka i njihova sve veća uključenost u međunarodne

poslova. Druga perspektiva je da bi se demokratizacija u muslimanskom svijetu povećala

europska sigurnost. Valjanost ovih i drugih argumenata o tome hoće li i kako

EU bi se trebao angažirati može se testirati samo proučavanjem različitih islamističkih pokreta i

njihove političke prilike, zemlja po zemlja.

Demokratizacija je središnja tema zajedničkog vanjskopolitičkog djelovanja EU-a, kako je položeno

u članku 11 Ugovora o Europskoj uniji. Mnoge države koje se u ovome razmatraju

izvješća nisu demokratska, ili ne potpuno demokratski. U većini ovih zemalja, islamistički

stranke i pokreti čine značajnu opoziciju vladajućim režimima, i

u nekima čine najveći oporbeni blok. Europske demokracije odavno su morale

nositi se s vladajućim režimima koji su autoritarni, ali to je nova pojava za tisak

za demokratsku reformu u državama u kojima bi najvjerojatnije mogli imati koristi, od

Gledište EU, različiti i ponekad problematični pristupi demokraciji i njezinim

povezane vrijednosti, kao što su prava manjina i žena te vladavina prava. Ove optužbe su

često protiv islamističkih pokreta, pa je za kreatore europske politike važno da

imati točnu sliku politika i filozofija potencijalnih partnera.

Iskustva iz različitih zemalja sugeriraju da je više slobode islamista

zabave su dopuštene, što su umjereniji u svojim postupcima i idejama. U mnogim

slučajevima islamističke stranke i skupine odavno su se udaljile od svog izvornog cilja

uspostavljanja islamske države kojom upravlja islamski zakon, i prihvatili su osnovne

demokratska načela izbornog nadmetanja za vlast, postojanje drugih političkih

natjecatelji, i politički pluralizam.

ISLAMISTIČKI POKRETI I DEMOKRATSKI PROCES U ARAPSKOM SVIJETU: Istraživanje sivih zona

Nathan J. Smeđa, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

Tijekom posljednjeg desetljeća, Islamistički pokreti etablirali su se kao glavni politički igrači na Bliskom istoku. Zajedno s vladama, islamistički pokreti, umjereni kao i radikalni, odredit će kako će se odvijati politika u regiji u doglednoj budućnosti. Pokazali su sposobnost ne samo za izradu poruka sa široko rasprostranjenom popularnom privlačnošću, već također, i što je najvažnije, stvoriti organizacije s istinskim društvenim osnovama i razviti koherentne političke strategije. Druge stranke,
uglavnom, nisu uspjeli na svim računima.
Javnost na Zapadu i, posebno, Sjedinjene Države, je tek nakon dramatičnih događaja postao svjestan važnosti islamističkih pokreta, poput revolucije u Iranu i ubojstva predsjednika Anwara al-Sadata u Egiptu. Pozornost je daleko veća od terorističkih napada u rujnu 11, 2001. Kao rezultat, Islamistički pokreti se općenito smatraju opasnima i neprijateljskima. Dok je takva karakterizacija točna u pogledu organizacija na radikalnom kraju islamističkog spektra, koji su opasni zbog svoje spremnosti da pribjegnu neselektivnom nasilju u ostvarivanju svojih ciljeva, to nije točna karakterizacija mnogih skupina koje su se odrekle ili izbjegle nasilje. Budući da terorističke organizacije predstavljaju neposrednu
prijetnja, međutim, kreatori politike u svim zemljama su posvetili nesrazmjernu pozornost nasilnim organizacijama.
To je glavna struja islamističkih organizacija, ne one radikalne, koji će imati najveći utjecaj na buduću političku evoluciju Bliskog istoka. Grandiozni ciljevi radikala o ponovnoj uspostavi kalifata koji bi ujedinio cijeli arapski svijet, ili čak nametanja pojedinim arapskim zemljama zakona i društvenih običaja nadahnutih fundamentalističkom interpretacijom islama jednostavno su predaleko od današnje stvarnosti da bi se ostvarili. To ne znači da terorističke skupine nisu opasne - mogle bi prouzročiti velike gubitke života čak i u potrazi za nemogućim ciljevima - ali da je malo vjerojatno da će promijeniti lice Bliskog istoka. Glavne struje islamističkih organizacija općenito su druga stvar. Oni su već imali snažan utjecaj na društvene običaje u mnogim zemljama, zaustavljanje i preokretanje sekularističkih trendova i mijenjanje načina na koji se mnogi Arapi odijevaju i ponašaju. I njihov neposredni politički cilj, postati moćna sila sudjelovanjem u normalnoj politici svoje zemlje, nije nemoguće. Već se realizira u zemljama poput Maroka, Jordan, pa čak i Egipat, koja još uvijek zabranjuje sve islamističke političke organizacije, ali sada ima osamdeset i osam Muslimanske braće u Parlamentu. Politika, ne nasilje, je ono što glavnim islamistima daje njihov utjecaj.

Umjereno muslimansko bratstvo

Robert S. Leiken

Steven Brooke

Muslimanska braća su najstarija na svijetu, najveći, i najutjecajnija islamistička organizacija. Ujedno je i najkontroverzniji,
osuđen i konvencionalnim mišljenjem na Zapadu i radikalnim mišljenjem na Bliskom istoku. Američki komentatori nazvali su Muslimansku braću "radikalnim islamistima" i "vitalnom komponentom neprijateljske napadačke snage … duboko neprijateljski raspoloženi prema Sjedinjenim Državama. " Ayman al-Zawahiri iz Al Kaide podsmjehuje im se zbog „lur[ing] tisuće mladića muslimana u redovima za izbore … umjesto u redove džihada. " Džihadisti se gnušaju Muslimanske braće (na arapskom poznat kao al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) za odbacivanje globalnog džihada i prihvaćanje demokracije. Čini se da ih ovi položaji čine umjerenima, upravo ono što Sjedinjene Države, kratka za saveznike u muslimanskom svijetu, traži.
Ali Ikhwan također napada SAD. vanjska politika, posebno podrška Washingtona Izraelu, i pitanja ostaju o njegovoj stvarnoj predanosti demokratskom procesu. Tijekom prošle godine, susreli smo se s desecima vođa i aktivista bratstva iz Egipta, Francuska, Jordan, Španjolska, Sirija,Tunis, i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo.

The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, The Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan

Faisal ghori

In his first book, The Management of Islamic Activism, Quintan Wiktorowicz examines the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis through the lens of social movement theory. Unlike some political scientists who dismiss Islamic movements because of their informal networks, Wiktorowicz contends that social movement theory is an apt framework through which Islamic movements can be examined and studied. In this regard, his work leads the field. Yet for all its promise, this book largely fails to deliver.
The book is divided into four primary sections, through which he tries to construct his conclusion: Jordanian political liberalization has occurred because of structural necessities, not because of its commitment to democratization. U Dodatku, the state has been masterful in what he dubs the “management of collective action, (str. 3) which has, for all practical purposes, stifled any real opposition. While his conclusion is certainly tenable, given his extensive fieldwork, the book is poorly organized and much of the evidence examined earlier in the work leaves many questions unanswered.

What Leads Voters to Support the Opposition under Authoritarianism ?

Michael D.H. Robbins

Elections have become commonplace in most authoritarian states. While this may seem to be a contradiction in terms, in reality elections play an important role in these regimes. While elections for positions of real power tend to be non-competitive, many
elections—including those for seemingly toothless parliaments—can be strongly contested.
The existing literature has focused on the role that elections play in supporting the regime. Na primjer, they can help let off steam, help the regime take the temperature of society, or can be used to help a dominant party know which individuals it should promote (Schedler 2002; Blaydes 2006). Još, while the literature has focused on the supply-side of elections in authoritarian states, there are relatively few systematic studies of voter behavior in these elections (see Lust-Okar 2006 for an exception). Rather, most analyses have argued that patronage politics are the norm in these societies and that ordinary citizens tend to be very cynical about these exercises given that they cannot bring any real change (Kassem 2004; Desposato 2001; Zaki 1995). While the majority of voters in authoritarian systems may behave in this manner, not all do. Zapravo, at times, even the majority vote against the regime leading to
significant changes as has occurred recently in Kenya, the Ukraine and Zimbabwe. Još, even in cases where opposition voters make up a much smaller percentage of voters, it is important to understand who these voters are and what leads them to vote against the
režim.

Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan

The Islamic movement in Jordan came to international attention in thewake of the April 1989 disturbances and the subsequent November 1989 parliamentary elections. These developments highlighted the movement’s political clout and raised the spectre in the West of an Iranian-style Islamic revolution in Jordan, fuelled by radical Islamic movements such as those of Egypt and the Maghrib. While various political trends competed for influence during the months prior to the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood had a clear advantage; its infrastructure in the mosques, the Qur’anicschools and the universities gave it a ready-made political base. The leftistand pro-regime groups, on the other hand, had to create de facto politicalparties—still legally banned—and to build their organizational base almostex nihilo, or to transform a clandestine infrastructure into an overt politicalone. There should have been very little surprise, stoga, when the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist candidates won a windfall of 32 of the 80seats in Parliament.Politicization of Islam is not new in Jordan.1 Since the foundation of the Emirate of Trans jordan by ‘Abdallah, Islam has served as one of the building blocks of regime legitimacy and of nation-building. The genealogy of the Hashemite family as scions of the Prophet’s tribe was an important source of legitimacy for its rule in Syria, Iraq and Jordan, as it had been inthe Hijaz. The ideology of the “Great Arab Revolt” was no less Islamic than it was Arab, and the control of Jerusalem after 1948 was interpretedby the regime as an Islamic responsibility and not only an Arab one.2King ‘Abdallah and his grandson Hussein, took care to present themselvesas believing Muslims, appearing at rituals and prayers, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca and embellishing their speeches with Islamic motifs.3The status of Islam in the Kingdom was also formalized in the Jordanian constitution (1952) by stipulating that Islam is the religion of the kingdom and that the king must be a Muslim and of Muslim parents. islamsko pravo(Shari‘a) is defined in the constitution as one of the pillars of legislation in the kingdom, while family law is in the exclusive hands of the Shari‘a courts.

Claiming the Center: Political Islam in Transition

Ivan L. Esposito

In the 1990s political Islam, what some callIslamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (Iran, Sudan, Afganistana), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, purica, Iran, Libanon, Kuvajt, Jemen, Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malezija, Indonezija, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.

COMPARING THREE MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS: SYRIA, JORDAN, EGYPT

Barry Rubin

The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, and methods. Each, of course, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, and methods. Each, of course, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.First, it is important to understand the Brotherhood’s policy toward and relations with both jihadist groups (al-Qa'ida, the Zarqawi network, and others such as Hizb al-Tahrir and Hamas) and theorists (such as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi).The Brotherhoods do not have ongoing relationships with Hizb al-Tahrir—which is regarded by them as a small, cultish group of no importance. Other than in Jordan, they have had little contact with it at all.Regarding al-Qa’ida—both its theorists and its terrorist infrastructure—the Brotherhoods approve generally of its militancy, attacks on America, and ideology (or respect its ideologues), but view it as a rival.

The future of Islam after 9/11

Mansoor Moaddel

There is no consensus among historians and Islamicists about the nature of theIslamic belief system and the experience of historical Islam, on which one couldbase a definitive judgment concerning Islam’s compatibility with modernity. Usprkos tome,the availability of both historical and value survey data allow us to analyzethe future of Islam in light of the horrific event of 9/11. The key factor that woulddetermine the level of societal visibility necessary for predicting the future developmentof a culture is the nature and clarity of the ideological targets in relation towhich new cultural discourses are produced. Based on this premise, I shall try toilluminate the nature of such targets that are confronted by Muslim activists inIran, Egipat, i Jordan.

Graditi mostove, a ne zidove

Alex Glennie

Od terorističkih napada na 11 rujan 2001 došlo je do eksplozije interesa za politički islamizam na Bliskom istoku i sjevernoj Africi (MENA) regija. Do relativno nedavno,analitičari su se razumljivo usredotočili na one aktere koji djeluju na nasilnom kraju islamističkog spektra, uključujući Al-Qaidu, talibani, neke od sektaških stranaka u Iraku i političke skupine s oružanim krilima poput Hamasa na okupiranim palestinskim područjima (OPT)a Hezbollah u Libanonu.Međutim, ovo je prikrilo činjenicu da diljem MENA regije suvremenu politiku pokreće i oblikuje puno raznolikija zbirka 'mainstream' islamističkih pokreta. Definiramo ih kao skupine koje su uključene ili se žele uključiti u legalne političke procese svojih zemalja i koje su javno izbjegavale upotrebu nasilja kako bi pomogle ostvarivanju svojih ciljeva na nacionalnoj razini, čak i tamo gdje su diskriminirani ili potisnuti. Ova definicija bi obuhvatila skupine poput Muslimanskog bratstva u Egiptu, Stranke pravde i razvoja (PJD) u Maroku i Front islamske akcije (IAF) u Jordanu. Ovi nenasilni islamistički pokreti ili stranke često predstavljaju najbolje organizirani i najpopularniji element opozicije postojećim režimima u svakoj zemlji, i kao takav postoji sve veći interes od strane zapadnih kreatora politike za ulogu koju bi oni mogli igrati u promicanju demokracije u regiji. Ipak, čini se da su rasprave o ovom pitanju zastale na pitanju bi li bilo primjereno surađivati ​​s tim skupinama na sustavnijoj i formalnijoj osnovi, nego na praktičnost toga da se to zapravo učini. Ovaj je stav djelomično povezan s opravdanom nespremnošću da se legitimiraju skupine koje bi mogle imati antidemokratska stajališta o pravima žena, politički pluralizam i niz drugih pitanja. Također odražava pragmatična razmatranja o strateškim interesima zapadnih sila u regiji MENA za koje se smatra da su ugroženi rastućom popularnošću i utjecajem islamista. Sa svoje strane, Islamističke stranke i pokreti pokazali su jasnu nevoljkost stvaranju bližih veza s onim zapadnim silama čijoj se politici u regiji snažno protive, ne samo zbog straha od toga kako bi represivni režimi unutar kojih djeluju mogli reagirati. Fokus ovog projekta na nenasilne političke islamističke pokrete ne bi se trebao pogrešno tumačiti kao implicitna potpora njihovim političkim programima. Opredjeljenje za strategiju namjernijeg angažmana s glavnim islamističkim strankama uključivalo bi značajne rizike i kompromise za sjevernoameričke i europske kreatore politike. Međutim, zauzimamo stav da je sklonost obiju strana da na angažman gledaju kao na igru ​​'sve ili ništa' s nultom sumom bila beskorisna, i mora se promijeniti ako se želi pojaviti konstruktivniji dijalog oko reforme na Bliskom istoku i u sjevernoj Africi.

The Muslim Brotherhood of Jordan and Jama’at-i-Islam of Pakistan

Neha Sahgal

The study of Islamist activism is new to social movement theory. Socialmovement scholarship has ignored Islamist movements because of their unique faithbasednature. More recently scholars have recognized that the processes of contentionconceptualized by social movement theory can be applied to Islamist activism to seektheoretical refinements in both areas of study.In this paper, I examine variations in the strategies followed by Islamistmovements in response to government policies. States have followed various policies inmanaging the tide of Islamist opposition to their power. Some states have chosen to userepressive means (Egipat, Jordan before 1989), while others, at different times in theirhistory have used accommodative policies (Jordan after 1989, Pakistan, Malezija). Iexamine the effects of government accommodation on Islamist movement strategies.I argue that accommodation can have varying effects on Islamist movementstrategies depending on the nature of accommodative policies followed. Governmentshave employed two different types of accommodative policies in their tenuousrelationship with Islamist opposition – Islamization and liberalization. Islamizationattempts to co-opt the movements through greater religiosity in state and society.Liberalization allows the movements to conduct their activities at both the state and thesocietal level without necessarily increasing the religiosity of the state1. Islamizationdisempowers Islamists while liberalization empowers them by providing a sphere ofinfluence.

Pokvareni glasački listići

Marc Lynch

marc-akef

Umjereni islamistički pokreti diljem arapskog svijeta napravili su odlučan zaokret prema sudjelovanju u demokratskoj politici tijekom posljednjih 20 godine. Razvili su razrađeno ideološko opravdanje za izlazak na izbore, koju su branili od intenzivnih kritika radikalnijih islamističkih konkurenata. U isto vrijeme, pokazali su predanost unutarnjoj demokraciji izvanrednu prema standardima regije, i više puta su dokazali svoju spremnost da poštuju rezultate izbora čak i kada gube.
Ali umjesto da pozdravi ovaj razvoj događaja, sekularni autoritarni režimi odgovorili su rastućom represijom. Opet i opet, uspješno sudjelovanje islamista na izborima izazvalo je reakciju, često uz pristanak – ako ne i poticaj – Sjedinjenih Država. Kada je Hamas pobijedio na palestinskim parlamentarnim izborima u 2006, odgovor je bio bojkot i politička subverzija. Kada je egipatska vlada srušila Muslimansko bratstvo nakon izbora u 2005, malo se autsajdera usprotivilo.
Dok su im pred nosom zalupljena vrata demokracije, kako su islamističke skupine koje su prihvatile sudjelovanje odgovorile? Na neki način, položili su test s najboljim ocjenama. Ostali su predani demokratskom sudjelovanju čak i usprkos golemim izbornim prijevarama i oštrim kampanjama represije. Njihovi su lideri afirmirali svoje demokratske ideale, i često su govorili kako bi ponovili svoju ideološku i stratešku predanost demokraciji. Doista, često su se pojavljivali kao vodeći zagovornici javnih sloboda i demokratskih reformi. I još uvijek ima malo znakova da bi se takva organizacija okrenula nasilju kao alternativi.
Ali na druge načine, počinje se pokazivati ​​danak represije. Sumnje u vrijednost demokratskog sudjelovanja unutar ovih pokreta rastu. Podjele u najvišim redovima uzburkale su pokrete u Jordanu i Egiptu, između ostalih. U mnogim slučajevima, vodstvo Bratstva koje preferira umjereno, akomodacijski pristup režimu borio se pronaći način da odgovori na sve veće pritiske represije i zatvaranje putova prema demokratskom sudjelovanju. U Egiptu, frustracije zbog produženih pritvora najumjerenijih vođa ocrnile su ugled onih koji pozivaju na političko sudjelovanje, s rastućim trendom koji poziva na povlačenje iz politike i ponovno fokusiranje na društveni aktivizam i vjerski rad. U Jordanu, porastao je utjecaj onih koji žele napustiti bezvrijednu domaću politiku i usredotočiti se umjesto toga na potporu Hamasu.
Kritičari Bratstva ukazali su na ove nedavne borbe kao na dokaz da se islamistima ne može vjerovati demokracija. Ali ovo duboko pogrešno tumači trenutne trendove. Ove krize zapravo odražavaju zakašnjeli odgovor na blokirano obećanje demokratskog sudjelovanja. Današnja islamistička rasprava nije o legitimnosti demokracije – radi se o tome kako odgovoriti na frustrirane napore da se igra demokratska igra.
********************************
Nedavno sam proveo tjedan dana u Ammanu, razgovarajući s većinom viših čelnika jordanskog Muslimanskog bratstva, kao i presjekom političke i novinarske elite zemlje. Slika koja se pojavila nije bila samo slika islamističkog pokreta u krizi, ali i blokiranog i propadajućeg političkog sustava. Vlada je odbijala ponovno pozvati parlament na sjednicu kako bi na silu provela svoje željene zakone kao privremene zakone sumnjive ustavnosti. Priče o društvenim sukobima među plemenima i ogromnim ekonomskim problemima usred rastuće korupcije ispunjavale su svakodnevne razgovore.
Jordansko bratstvo, osnovana u 1946, jedan je od najstarijih i najdublje ukorijenjenih ogranaka globalne islamističke organizacije. Za razliku od mnogih drugih zemalja, gdje je Bratstvo djelovalo u suprotnosti s onima na vlasti, u Jordanu je desetljećima igrao ključnu ulogu u podupiranju hašemitskog prijestolja protiv vanjskih i domaćih izazivača. Za uzvrat, uživala je povlašteni odnos s jordanskom državom, uključujući kontrolu nad ključnim ministarstvima, i dobre odnose s kraljem Husseinom usprkos njegovim prijateljskim vezama s Izraelom i Sjedinjenim Državama.
Kada je Jordan izgubio Zapadnu obalu u 1967 rat, borila se da zadrži svoju ulogu na okupiranim područjima. U 1988, međutim, dok je palestinska Intifada bjesnila i prijetila proširiti se na Istočnu obalu, Jordan se službeno odrekao svojih potraživanja, prekidajući svoje veze i koncentrirajući se na razvoj Istočne obale i "jordaniziranje" krnje države, odluka koju Bratstvo nije prihvatilo, koja je održavala veze sa svojim kolegama na Zapadnoj obali.
Kad su iduće godine u cijeloj zemlji izbili neredi, Kralj Hussein je odgovorio izvanrednim demokratskim otvaranjem koje je revitaliziralo politički život Kraljevstva. Bratstvo je u potpunosti sudjelovalo u ovom procesu, i pojavio se u 1989 elections as the dominant bloc in Parliament. The years that followed are fondly remembered in Jordan as the apex of political life, with an effective Parliament, a “national pact” establishing the ground rules of democracy and a vibrant emerging press.
U 1993, međutim, the Jordanian regime changed the electoral law in a way that served to limit Muslim Brotherhood success. As it moved rapidly towards a peace treaty with Israel, the state began to clamp down on the Brotherhood and on all other forms of political opposition. Its interventions in the political process grew so extreme that in 1997 the Brotherhood’s political party, the Islamic Action Front, decided to boycott elections. After King Hussein’s death in 1999, the crown passed to his son Abdullah, who showed little interest in democratic reform, and in 2001 decided to suspend Parliament and rule by emergency law. While formal democracy returned in 2003, political reform efforts failed to gain traction. The extent of electoral fraud against the Brotherhood and other critics of the regime during the 2007 vote shocked even jaded observers.
The Jordanian crackdown has not reached the brutal levels of Syria or Tunisia (where the Islamist opposition was massacred or driven abroad). The Brotherhood continues to operate publicly, and the Islamic Action Front holds six seats in Parliament. But the gerrymandered electoral system and massive fraud has hamstrung Islamist political participation, to the degree that many believe that the Brotherhood is being dared to boycott.
Following the 2007 electoral debacle, the Brotherhood entered a period of intense internal unrest. It dissolved its Shura Council as penance for its fateful decision to participate in the election. The core issue was over how best to respond to the regime’s repression: through confrontation, or through a retreat and consolidation of the political strategy? U travnju 2008, the “hawkish” trend won the internal elections to the Shura Council by a single vote, and the pragmatic and domestically-orientated Salem Falahat was replaced by the fiery, Palestine-centric hawk Himmam Said. Said and the new head of the Islamic Action Front, Zaki Bani Arshid, steered the Islamist movement into more direct conflict with the regime, with little success. The reformist trend, led by the soft-spoken intellectual Ruheil Ghuraybeh, avoided open confrontation but advanced an ambitious programme to transform Jordan into a constitutional monarchy.
As the Brotherhood rank and file lost interest in a stalled domestic political process, they were simultaneously galvanised by the electoral success of Hamas and then by the visceral images of Israel’s war on Gaza. The growing interest in Palestinian issues at the expense of Jordanian politics worried not only the regime but also the traditional leadership of the Brotherhood. The leading Jordanian journalist Mohammed Abu Rumman argues that the issue of relations with Hamas has supplanted the traditional “hawk-dove” struggle within the organisation. While both trends support Hamas – “if you are not with Hamas, you are not with the Muslim Brotherhood”, explained one of the “dovish” leaders – they disagree over the appropriate organisational relationship. The “Hamasi” trend supports close ties and the prioritisation of Palestinian issues, and embraces a common Muslim identity over a narrowly Jordanian one. The “reformist” trend insists that Hamas, as the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, should have responsibility for Palestine while the Jordanian Brotherhood must be a national organisation focused upon domestic Jordanian issues.
This crisis came to a head over the issue of Hamas participation in the administrative structures of the Jordanian Brotherhood. Three leading reformists resigned from the Executive Office, triggering an as-yet-unresolved internal crisis that threatens one of the first serious internal splits in the history of the movement. The media has eagerly egged this conflict on; indeed, a number of Brotherhood leaders told me that what made the current crisis unique was not the issues at stake or the intensity of the disagreement, but the fact that for the first time it had become public.
********************************
The story of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is many things, but certainly not a story of Islamists retreating from democracy. Similar dynamics can be seen in Egypt, where the Brotherhood’s leadership is similarly divided over how to respond to escalating repression. During multiple trips to Cairo in the last few years, I saw the growing frustration of a generation of reformists who found their every effort to embrace democracy met with force and rejection.
After “independent” Brotherhood candidates scored sweeping victories in the first of three rounds of the 2005 Parliamentary elections, government forces began to intervene to prevent further gains. Despite well-documented fraud and heavy-handed security interference in Brotherhood strongholds, the movement emerged as the largest opposition bloc with 88 seats. As Deputy Supreme Guide Mohammed Habib ruefully told me, their mistake was that they did too well – had they won 50 seats, perhaps they would not have triggered such harsh reprisals.
The subsequent crackdown matched the magnitude of the Brotherhood victory. A series of media campaigns aimed to scare mainstream Egyptians with alleged nefarious Brotherhood schemes (they were supposedly training an underground militia, conspiring with Hizbollah, and more). A wide range of leading Brotherhood figures, including noted moderates such as the financier Khairat el Shater and the intellectual Abd el Monem Abou el Fattouh, were detained indefinitely on trumped up charges.
For a while, the Egyptian Brotherhood held fast in the face of these provocations. They continued to try to participate in elections even as the fraud and overt manipulation mounted. Their Parliamentarians performed well as an opposition. They routinely expressed their ongoing commitment to democracy to every audience which would listen. And they imposed discipline on their own members to prevent the explosion of frustration into violence.
But over time, the pressure began to take its toll. The leadership reined in its freewheeling young bloggers, whose public airing of internal issues was being exploited by the organisation’s opponents. It adopted tougher rhetoric on foreign policy issues such as the Gaza war – attacking the Egyptian government’s enforcement of the blockade of Gaza – in part to rally its demoralised membership. Considerable evidence suggests that the cadres of the organisation were growing disenchanted with politics and preferred to return to the core social and religious mission. And growing voices from inside and outside the movement began to suggest retreating from politics until a more propitious time.
Earlier this month the conflicts inside the Egyptian Brotherhood leapt into the pages of local newspapers, which reported that the movement’s leader, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, had abruptly resigned his post in protest after conservatives refused to appoint the leading reformist Essam el Erian to an open leadership seat. Akef has denied the reports – but the portrait of a movement in turmoil is clear.
The Jordanian, Egyptian and American governments may see all this as something of a success story: the influence of the Islamists has been curbed, both in formal politics and in the social sector, and the restraint exercised by the Brotherhood leadership has meant the states have not faced a backlash. But this is dangerously short-sighted. The campaigns against Islamists weaken the foundations of democracy as a whole, not just the appeal of one movement, and have had a corrosive effect on public freedoms, transparency and accountability. Regardless of the fortunes of the movements themselves, the crackdown on the Islamists contributes to the wider corruption of public life. The growing frustration within moderate Islamist groups with democratic participation cannot help but affect their future ideological trajectory.
Sowing disenchantment with democratic politics in the ranks of the Brotherhood could forfeit one of the signal developments in Islamist political thinking of the last few decades. The failure of the movement’s democratic experiment could empower more radical Islamists, including not only terrorist groups but also doctrinaire salafists less inclined to pragmatic politics. The degradation of its organisational strengths could open up space for al Qa’eda and other radical competitors to move in. The alternative to Ismail Haniya might be Osama bin Laden rather than Abu Mazen, and the exclusion of Essam el-Erian may not produce an Ayman Nour.
Marc Lynch is associate professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He writes a blog on Arab politics and media for Foreign Policy.

Umjereni islamistički pokreti diljem arapskog svijeta napravili su odlučan zaokret prema sudjelovanju u demokratskoj politici tijekom posljednjih 20 godine. Razvili su razrađeno ideološko opravdanje za izlazak na izbore, koju su branili od intenzivnih kritika radikalnijih islamističkih konkurenata. U isto vrijeme, pokazali su predanost unutarnjoj demokraciji izvanrednu prema standardima regije, i više puta su dokazali svoju spremnost da poštuju rezultate izbora čak i kada gube.

Ali umjesto da pozdravi ovaj razvoj događaja, sekularni autoritarni režimi odgovorili su rastućom represijom. Opet i opet, uspješno sudjelovanje islamista na izborima izazvalo je reakciju, često uz pristanak – ako ne i poticaj – Sjedinjenih Država. Kada je Hamas pobijedio na palestinskim parlamentarnim izborima u 2006, odgovor je bio bojkot i politička subverzija. Kada je egipatska vlada srušila Muslimansko bratstvo nakon izbora u 2005, malo se autsajdera usprotivilo.

Dok su im pred nosom zalupljena vrata demokracije, kako su islamističke skupine koje su prihvatile sudjelovanje odgovorile? Na neki način, položili su test s najboljim ocjenama. Ostali su predani demokratskom sudjelovanju čak i usprkos golemim izbornim prijevarama i oštrim kampanjama represije. Njihovi su lideri afirmirali svoje demokratske ideale, i često su govorili kako bi ponovili svoju ideološku i stratešku predanost demokraciji. Doista, često su se pojavljivali kao vodeći zagovornici javnih sloboda i demokratskih reformi. I još uvijek ima malo znakova da bi se takva organizacija okrenula nasilju kao alternativi.

Ali na druge načine, počinje se pokazivati ​​danak represije. Sumnje u vrijednost demokratskog sudjelovanja unutar ovih pokreta rastu. Podjele u najvišim redovima uzburkale su pokrete u Jordanu i Egiptu, između ostalih. U mnogim slučajevima, vodstvo Bratstva koje preferira umjereno, akomodacijski pristup režimu borio se pronaći način da odgovori na sve veće pritiske represije i zatvaranje putova prema demokratskom sudjelovanju. U Egiptu, frustracije zbog produženih pritvora najumjerenijih vođa ocrnile su ugled onih koji pozivaju na političko sudjelovanje, s rastućim trendom koji poziva na povlačenje iz politike i ponovno fokusiranje na društveni aktivizam i vjerski rad. U Jordanu, porastao je utjecaj onih koji žele napustiti bezvrijednu domaću politiku i usredotočiti se umjesto toga na potporu Hamasu.

Kritičari Bratstva ukazali su na ove nedavne borbe kao na dokaz da se islamistima ne može vjerovati demokracija. Ali ovo duboko pogrešno tumači trenutne trendove. Ove krize zapravo odražavaju zakašnjeli odgovor na blokirano obećanje demokratskog sudjelovanja. Današnja islamistička rasprava nije o legitimnosti demokracije – radi se o tome kako odgovoriti na frustrirane napore da se igra demokratska igra.

********************************

Nedavno sam proveo tjedan dana u Ammanu, razgovarajući s većinom viših čelnika jordanskog Muslimanskog bratstva, kao i presjekom političke i novinarske elite zemlje. Slika koja se pojavila nije bila samo slika islamističkog pokreta u krizi, ali i blokiranog i propadajućeg političkog sustava. Vlada je odbijala ponovno pozvati parlament na sjednicu kako bi na silu provela svoje željene zakone kao privremene zakone sumnjive ustavnosti. Priče o društvenim sukobima među plemenima i ogromnim ekonomskim problemima usred rastuće korupcije ispunjavale su svakodnevne razgovore.

Jordansko bratstvo, osnovana u 1946, jedan je od najstarijih i najdublje ukorijenjenih ogranaka globalne islamističke organizacije. Za razliku od mnogih drugih zemalja, gdje je Bratstvo djelovalo u suprotnosti s onima na vlasti, u Jordanu je desetljećima igrao ključnu ulogu u podupiranju hašemitskog prijestolja protiv vanjskih i domaćih izazivača. Za uzvrat, uživala je povlašteni odnos s jordanskom državom, uključujući kontrolu nad ključnim ministarstvima, i dobre odnose s kraljem Husseinom usprkos njegovim prijateljskim vezama s Izraelom i Sjedinjenim Državama.

Kada je Jordan izgubio Zapadnu obalu u 1967 rat, borila se da zadrži svoju ulogu na okupiranim područjima. U 1988, međutim, dok je palestinska Intifada bjesnila i prijetila proširiti se na Istočnu obalu, Jordan se službeno odrekao svojih potraživanja, prekidajući svoje veze i koncentrirajući se na razvoj Istočne obale i "jordaniziranje" krnje države, odluka koju Bratstvo nije prihvatilo, koja je održavala veze sa svojim kolegama na Zapadnoj obali.

Kad su iduće godine u cijeloj zemlji izbili neredi, Kralj Hussein je odgovorio izvanrednim demokratskim otvaranjem koje je revitaliziralo politički život Kraljevstva. Bratstvo je u potpunosti sudjelovalo u ovom procesu, i pojavio se u 1989 elections as the dominant bloc in Parliament. The years that followed are fondly remembered in Jordan as the apex of political life, with an effective Parliament, a “national pact” establishing the ground rules of democracy and a vibrant emerging press.

U 1993, međutim, the Jordanian regime changed the electoral law in a way that served to limit Muslim Brotherhood success. As it moved rapidly towards a peace treaty with Israel, the state began to clamp down on the Brotherhood and on all other forms of political opposition. Its interventions in the political process grew so extreme that in 1997 the Brotherhood’s political party, the Islamic Action Front, decided to boycott elections. After King Hussein’s death in 1999, the crown passed to his son Abdullah, who showed little interest in democratic reform, and in 2001 decided to suspend Parliament and rule by emergency law. While formal democracy returned in 2003, political reform efforts failed to gain traction. The extent of electoral fraud against the Brotherhood and other critics of the regime during the 2007 vote shocked even jaded observers.

The Jordanian crackdown has not reached the brutal levels of Syria or Tunisia (where the Islamist opposition was massacred or driven abroad). The Brotherhood continues to operate publicly, and the Islamic Action Front holds six seats in Parliament. But the gerrymandered electoral system and massive fraud has hamstrung Islamist political participation, to the degree that many believe that the Brotherhood is being dared to boycott.

Following the 2007 electoral debacle, the Brotherhood entered a period of intense internal unrest. It dissolved its Shura Council as penance for its fateful decision to participate in the election. The core issue was over how best to respond to the regime’s repression: through confrontation, or through a retreat and consolidation of the political strategy? U travnju 2008, the “hawkish” trend won the internal elections to the Shura Council by a single vote, and the pragmatic and domestically-orientated Salem Falahat was replaced by the fiery, Palestine-centric hawk Himmam Said. Said and the new head of the Islamic Action Front, Zaki Bani Arshid, steered the Islamist movement into more direct conflict with the regime, with little success. The reformist trend, led by the soft-spoken intellectual Ruheil Ghuraybeh, avoided open confrontation but advanced an ambitious programme to transform Jordan into a constitutional monarchy.

As the Brotherhood rank and file lost interest in a stalled domestic political process, they were simultaneously galvanised by the electoral success of Hamas and then by the visceral images of Israel’s war on Gaza. The growing interest in Palestinian issues at the expense of Jordanian politics worried not only the regime but also the traditional leadership of the Brotherhood. The leading Jordanian journalist Mohammed Abu Rumman argues that the issue of relations with Hamas has supplanted the traditional “hawk-dove” struggle within the organisation. While both trends support Hamas – “if you are not with Hamas, you are not with the Muslim Brotherhood”, explained one of the “dovish” leaders – they disagree over the appropriate organisational relationship. The “Hamasi” trend supports close ties and the prioritisation of Palestinian issues, and embraces a common Muslim identity over a narrowly Jordanian one. The “reformist” trend insists that Hamas, as the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, should have responsibility for Palestine while the Jordanian Brotherhood must be a national organisation focused upon domestic Jordanian issues.

This crisis came to a head over the issue of Hamas participation in the administrative structures of the Jordanian Brotherhood. Three leading reformists resigned from the Executive Office, triggering an as-yet-unresolved internal crisis that threatens one of the first serious internal splits in the history of the movement. The media has eagerly egged this conflict on; indeed, a number of Brotherhood leaders told me that what made the current crisis unique was not the issues at stake or the intensity of the disagreement, but the fact that for the first time it had become public.

********************************

The story of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is many things, but certainly not a story of Islamists retreating from democracy. Similar dynamics can be seen in Egypt, where the Brotherhood’s leadership is similarly divided over how to respond to escalating repression. During multiple trips to Cairo in the last few years, I saw the growing frustration of a generation of reformists who found their every effort to embrace democracy met with force and rejection.

After “independent” Brotherhood candidates scored sweeping victories in the first of three rounds of the 2005 Parliamentary elections, government forces began to intervene to prevent further gains. Despite well-documented fraud and heavy-handed security interference in Brotherhood strongholds, the movement emerged as the largest opposition bloc with 88 seats. As Deputy Supreme Guide Mohammed Habib ruefully told me, their mistake was that they did too well – had they won 50 seats, perhaps they would not have triggered such harsh reprisals.

The subsequent crackdown matched the magnitude of the Brotherhood victory. A series of media campaigns aimed to scare mainstream Egyptians with alleged nefarious Brotherhood schemes (they were supposedly training an underground militia, conspiring with Hizbollah, and more). A wide range of leading Brotherhood figures, including noted moderates such as the financier Khairat el Shater and the intellectual Abd el Monem Abou el Fattouh, were detained indefinitely on trumped up charges.

For a while, the Egyptian Brotherhood held fast in the face of these provocations. They continued to try to participate in elections even as the fraud and overt manipulation mounted. Their Parliamentarians performed well as an opposition. They routinely expressed their ongoing commitment to democracy to every audience which would listen. And they imposed discipline on their own members to prevent the explosion of frustration into violence.

But over time, the pressure began to take its toll. The leadership reined in its freewheeling young bloggers, whose public airing of internal issues was being exploited by the organisation’s opponents. It adopted tougher rhetoric on foreign policy issues such as the Gaza war – attacking the Egyptian government’s enforcement of the blockade of Gaza – in part to rally its demoralised membership. Considerable evidence suggests that the cadres of the organisation were growing disenchanted with politics and preferred to return to the core social and religious mission. And growing voices from inside and outside the movement began to suggest retreating from politics until a more propitious time.

Earlier this month the conflicts inside the Egyptian Brotherhood leapt into the pages of local newspapers, which reported that the movement’s leader, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, had abruptly resigned his post in protest after conservatives refused to appoint the leading reformist Essam el Erian to an open leadership seat. Akef has denied the reports – but the portrait of a movement in turmoil is clear.

The Jordanian, Egyptian and American governments may see all this as something of a success story: the influence of the Islamists has been curbed, both in formal politics and in the social sector, and the restraint exercised by the Brotherhood leadership has meant the states have not faced a backlash. But this is dangerously short-sighted. The campaigns against Islamists weaken the foundations of democracy as a whole, not just the appeal of one movement, and have had a corrosive effect on public freedoms, transparency and accountability. Regardless of the fortunes of the movements themselves, the crackdown on the Islamists contributes to the wider corruption of public life. The growing frustration within moderate Islamist groups with democratic participation cannot help but affect their future ideological trajectory.

Sowing disenchantment with democratic politics in the ranks of the Brotherhood could forfeit one of the signal developments in Islamist political thinking of the last few decades. The failure of the movement’s democratic experiment could empower more radical Islamists, including not only terrorist groups but also doctrinaire salafists less inclined to pragmatic politics. The degradation of its organisational strengths could open up space for al Qa’eda and other radical competitors to move in. The alternative to Ismail Haniya might be Osama bin Laden rather than Abu Mazen, and the exclusion of Essam el-Erian may not produce an Ayman Nour.

Marc Lynch is associate professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He writes a blog on Arab politics and media for Foreign Policy.

From the National

Published on October 30, 2009

Internet i islamistička politika u Jordanu, Maroko i Egipat.

Kraj dvadesetog stoljeća i početak dvadeset prvog doživio je a
širenje Interneta kao središta komunikacije, informacija, zabava i
trgovina. Širenje interneta zahvatilo je sve četiri strane svijeta, povezivanje
istraživač na Antarktiku s farmerom u Gvatemali i spiker u Moskvi
Beduin u Egiptu. Preko Interneta, protok informacija i vijesti u stvarnom vremenu doseže
preko kontinenata, a glasovi podređenosti imaju potencijal projicirati svoje prethodno
utišane glasove kroz blogove, web stranice i stranice društvenih mreža. Političke organizacije
preko lijevo-desnog kontinuuma ciljali su na Internet kao političkog mobilizatora budućnosti,
a vlade sada omogućuju pristup povijesnim dokumentima, stranačke platforme, i
upravne papire putem svojih stranica. Na sličan način, religijske skupine prikazuju svoja uvjerenja na internetu
putem službenih stranica, i forumi omogućuju članovima iz cijelog svijeta da raspravljaju o pitanjima
eshatologija, ortopraksije i brojnih nijansiranih teoloških pitanja. Spajanje to dvoje, islamistički
političke organizacije objavile su svoju prisutnost putem sofisticiranih web stranica s detaljima
svoje političke platforme, relevantne vijesti, i religiozno usmjeren materijal koji raspravlja o njihovim
teološki pogledi. Ovaj rad će posebno ispitati ovaj neksus – korištenje interneta od strane
Islamističke političke organizacije na Bliskom istoku u zemljama Jordana, Maroko i
Egipat.
Iako širok raspon islamističkih političkih organizacija koristi internet kao forum za
objaviti svoje stavove i stvoriti nacionalni ili međunarodni ugled, metode i namjere
ovih skupina uvelike variraju i ovise o prirodi organizacije. Ovaj će rad
ispitati korištenje interneta od strane triju 'umjerenih' islamističkih stranaka: Front islamske akcije u
2
Jordan, Stranka pravde i razvoja u Maroku i Muslimansko bratstvo u Egiptu.
Kako su ove tri stranke povećale svoju političku sofisticiranost i ugled, oboje kod kuće
i inozemstvu, sve su više koristili Internet u razne svrhe. Prvi, islamistički
organizacije su koristile internet kao suvremeno proširenje javne sfere, sfera
kroz koje stranke okvir, komunicirati i institucionalizirati ideje široj javnosti.
Drugo, Internet pruža islamističkim organizacijama nefiltrirani forum kroz koji
dužnosnici mogu promovirati i reklamirati svoje pozicije i poglede, kao i zaobići lokalne medije
ograničenja koja nameće država. Konačno, Internet omogućuje islamističkim organizacijama da predstave a
kontrahegemonijski diskurs u suprotnosti s vladajućim režimom ili monarhijom ili izložen nekom
međunarodna publika. Ova treća motivacija se posebno odnosi na muslimana
Bratstvo, koji predstavlja sofisticiranu web stranicu na engleskom jeziku dizajniranu u zapadnom
stil i skrojen da dopre do selektivne publike znanstvenika, političari i novinari. MB
briljirao je u ovom takozvanom "bridgebloggingu" 1 i postavio je standard za islamističke stranke
pokušavajući utjecati na međunarodnu percepciju svojih pozicija i rada. Sadržaj varira
između arapske i engleske verzije stranice, i bit će ispitani dalje u odjeljku
o Muslimanskom bratstvu. Ova se tri cilja značajno preklapaju u svojim namjerama i
željene ishode; međutim, svaki cilj cilja na drugog aktera: javnost, mediji, i
režim. Nakon analize ova tri područja, ovaj će rad nastaviti u studiju slučaja
analiza web stranica IAF-a, PJD-a i Muslimanskog bratstva.
1

Andrew Helms

Ikhwanweb

Krajem 20. i početkom 21. stoljeća dolazi do širenja interneta kao središta komunikacije., informacija, zabavu i trgovinu.

Širenje interneta zahvatilo je sve četiri strane svijeta, povezujući istraživača na Antarktici s farmerom u Gvatemali i spikera u Moskvi s beduinima u Egiptu.

Preko Interneta, protok informacija i vijesti u stvarnom vremenu doseže preko kontinenata, a glasovi podređenosti imaju potencijal projicirati svoje prethodno ušutkane glasove kroz blogove, web stranice i stranice društvenih mreža.

Političke organizacije diljem lijevo-desnog kontinuuma ciljale su na Internet kao političkog mobilizatora budućnosti, a vlade sada omogućuju pristup povijesnim dokumentima, stranačke platforme, i upravne papire putem svojih stranica. Na sličan način, religijske skupine prikazuju svoja uvjerenja online putem službenih stranica, a forumi omogućuju članovima iz cijeloga svijeta da raspravljaju o pitanjima eshatologije, ortopraksije i brojnih nijansiranih teoloških pitanja.

Spajanje to dvoje, Islamističke političke organizacije objavile su svoju prisutnost putem sofisticiranih web stranica s detaljima svojih političkih platformi, relevantne vijesti, te religiozno orijentirani materijal koji govori o njihovim teološkim pogledima. Ovaj rad će posebno ispitati ovaj neksus – korištenje interneta od strane islamističkih političkih organizacija na Bliskom istoku u zemljama Jordana, Maroko i Egipat.

Iako širok raspon islamističkih političkih organizacija koristi internet kao forum za objavljivanje svojih stavova i stvaranje nacionalnog ili međunarodnog ugleda, metode i namjere tih skupina uvelike se razlikuju i ovise o prirodi organizacije.

Ovaj rad će ispitati korištenje interneta od strane tri 'umjerene' islamističke stranke: Front islamske akcije u Jordanu, Stranka pravde i razvoja u Maroku i Muslimansko bratstvo u Egiptu. Kako su ove tri stranke povećale svoju političku sofisticiranost i ugled, kako u zemlji tako i u inozemstvu, sve su više koristili Internet u razne svrhe.

Prvi, Islamističke organizacije koristile su internet kao suvremeno proširenje javne sfere, sfera kroz koju stranke okvir, komunicirati i institucionalizirati ideje široj javnosti.

Drugo, Internet pruža islamističkim organizacijama nefiltrirani forum putem kojeg dužnosnici mogu promovirati i oglašavati svoje pozicije i poglede, kao i zaobići lokalna medijska ograničenja koja nameće država.

Konačno, Internet omogućuje islamističkim organizacijama da predstave kontrahegemonistički diskurs u suprotnosti s vladajućim režimom ili monarhijom ili da ga izlože međunarodnoj publici. Ova treća motivacija se posebno odnosi na Muslimansko bratstvo, koja predstavlja sofisticirano web mjesto na engleskom jeziku dizajnirano u zapadnjačkom stilu i skrojeno da dosegne selektivnu publiku znanstvenika, političari i novinari.

MB je briljirao u ovom takozvanom "bridgebloggingu" 1 i postavio je standard za islamističke stranke koje pokušavaju utjecati na međunarodne percepcije njihovih pozicija i rada. Sadržaj se razlikuje između arapske i engleske verzije stranice, a bit će dalje ispitan u odjeljku o Muslimanskom bratstvu.

Ova tri cilja značajno se preklapaju u svojim namjerama i željenim ishodima; međutim, svaki cilj cilja na drugog aktera: javnost, mediji, i režima. Nakon analize ova tri područja, ovaj će rad nastaviti analizom studije slučaja web stranica IAF-a, PJD-a i Muslimanskog bratstva.