RSSसब साथ टैग की गईं प्रविष्टियां: "जॉर्डन"

इराक और राजनीतिक इस्लाम का भविष्य

जेम्स Piscatori

पैंसठ साल पहले एक आधुनिक इस्लाम का सबसे बड़ा विद्वानों के सरल सवाल पूछा, "जिधर इस्लाम?", इस्लामी दुनिया में जहाँ जा रहा था? साम्राज्यवाद के निधन और यूरोप के बाहर एक नए राज्य प्रणाली के crystallisation - यह दोनों पश्चिमी और मुस्लिम दुनिया में तीव्र अशांति का एक समय था; रचना और नव का परीक्षण- राष्ट्र की लीग में Wilsonian विश्व व्यवस्था; यूरोपीय फासीवाद के उद्भव. सर हैमिल्टन गिब ने माना कि मुस्लिम समाज, ऐसी दुनिया की प्रवृत्तियों से बचने में असमर्थ, राष्ट्रवाद की समान रूप से अपरिहार्य पैठ का भी सामना करना पड़ा, धर्मनिरपेक्षता, और पश्चिमीकरण. जबकि उन्होंने समझदारी से भविष्यवाणी करने के खिलाफ चेतावनी दी - मध्य पूर्वी और इस्लामी राजनीति में रुचि रखने वाले हम सभी के लिए खतरे - उन्होंने दो चीजों के बारे में निश्चित महसूस किया:
(ए) इस्लामी दुनिया एकजुटता के आदर्श और विभाजन की वास्तविकताओं के बीच आगे बढ़ेगी;
(बी) भविष्य की कुंजी नेतृत्व में निहित है, या जो इस्लाम के लिए आधिकारिक रूप से बोलता है.
आज जब हम इराक पर गहराते संकट का सामना कर रहे हैं तो गिब के पूर्वानुमानों की प्रासंगिकता नए सिरे से हो सकती है, आतंकवाद के खिलाफ एक विस्तृत और विवादास्पद युद्ध का खुलासा, और जारी फिलीस्तीनी समस्या. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

इस्लाम और लोकतंत्र

ITAC

एक प्रेस पढ़ता है या अंतरराष्ट्रीय मामलों पर टिप्पणीकारों को सुनता है तो, यह अक्सर कहा जाता है - और यहां तक ​​कि अधिक बार गर्भित लेकिन कहा नहीं - कि इस्लाम लोकतंत्र के साथ संगत नहीं है. नब्बे के दशक में, शमूएल हटिंगटन एक बौद्धिक अग्नि सेट जब वह प्रकाशित सभ्यताओं का संघर्ष, जिसमें उन्होंने दुनिया के लिए अपने पूर्वानुमान को प्रस्तुत करता है - पड़ने का खतरा बढ़ा. राजनीतिक दायरे में, उनका यह भी कहना है कि जब तक तुर्की और पाकिस्तान "लोकतांत्रिक वैधता" अन्य सभी "... करने के लिए कुछ छोटे दावा हो सकता है मुस्लिम देशों घने गैर लोकतांत्रिक थे: राजतंत्र, एक पार्टी सिस्टम, सैन्य शासनों, व्यक्तिगत तानाशाही या इनमें से कुछ संयोजन, आम तौर पर एक सीमित परिवार पर आराम, वंश, या आदिवासी आधार ". आधार है जिस पर अपने तर्क की स्थापना की है कि वे न केवल कर रहे हैं 'हमें पसंद नहीं', वे वास्तव में हमारे आवश्यक लोकतांत्रिक मूल्यों के खिलाफ़ हैं. उनका मानना ​​है कि, के रूप में दूसरों, कि जब तक पश्चिमी लोकतंत्रीकरण के विचार दुनिया के अन्य भागों में विरोध किया जा रहा है, टकराव उन क्षेत्रों में सबसे उल्लेखनीय है जहां इस्लाम प्रमुख विश्वास है.
तर्क भी रूप में अच्छी तरह दूसरी तरफ से किया गया है. एक ईरानी धार्मिक विद्वान, अपने देश में एक प्रारंभिक बीसवीं सदी के संवैधानिक संकट को दर्शाती, घोषणा की कि इस्लाम और लोकतंत्र संगत है क्योंकि लोगों को बराबर नहीं हैं और एक विधायी निकाय इस्लामी धार्मिक कानून के समावेशी प्रकृति की वजह से अनावश्यक है नहीं कर रहे हैं. ऐसा ही एक स्थिति अभी हाल ही में अली बेलज द्वारा लिया गया था, एक अल्जीरियाई उच्च विद्यालय शिक्षक, उपदेशक और (इस सन्दर्भ में) FIS के नेता, जब उन्होंने घोषणा की "लोकतंत्र एक इस्लामी अवधारणा नहीं थी". शायद इस आशय का सबसे नाटकीय बयान अबू मुसाब अल-जरकावी का था, इराक में सुन्नी विद्रोहियों के नेता, जो, जब एक चुनाव की संभावना के साथ सामना, "एक बुराई सिद्धांत" के रूप में लोकतंत्र की निंदा की.
लेकिन कुछ मुस्लिम विद्वानों के अनुसार, लोकतंत्र इस्लाम में एक महत्वपूर्ण आदर्श बनी हुई है, चेतावनी के साथ यह हमेशा धार्मिक कानून के अधीन है कि. शरिया की सर्वोपरि जगह पर जोर देने के लगभग प्रशासन पर हर इस्लामी टिप्पणी का एक तत्व है, मध्यम या अतिवादी. सिर्फ अगर शासक, जो परमेश्वर की ओर से अपने अधिकार प्राप्त करता है, "शरिया के प्रशासन की देखरेख करने के लिए" अपने कार्यों को सीमित करता है वह आज्ञा का पालन किया जा रहा है. वह इस के अलावा अन्य करता है, वह एक गैर आस्तिक है और प्रतिबद्ध मुसलमानों उसके खिलाफ विद्रोह करने हैं. इस के साथ साथ हिंसा की ज्यादा है कि 90 के दशक के दौरान अल्जीरिया में प्रचलित है कि के रूप में ऐसे संघर्षों में मुस्लिम दुनिया त्रस्त है के लिए औचित्य है

इस्लामी राजनीतिक संस्कृति, प्रजातंत्र, और मानव अधिकार

डैनियल ए. मूल्य

यह तर्क दिया है कि इस्लाम अधिनायकवाद की सुविधा, इसके विपरीत

पश्चिमी समाजों के मूल्य, और महत्वपूर्ण राजनीतिक परिणामों को महत्वपूर्ण रूप से प्रभावित करता है
मुस्लिम देशों में. फलस्वरूप, विद्वानों, टिप्पणीकारों, और सरकार
अधिकारी अक्सर ''इस्लामी कट्टरवाद'' की ओर इशारा करते हैं
उदार लोकतंत्रों के लिए वैचारिक खतरा. यह दृश्य, तथापि, मुख्य रूप से आधारित है
ग्रंथों के विश्लेषण पर, इस्लामी राजनीतिक सिद्धांत, और तदर्थ अध्ययन
अलग-अलग देशों के, जो अन्य कारकों पर विचार नहीं करता. यह मेरा विवाद है
कि इस्लाम के ग्रंथ और परंपराएं, अन्य धर्मों की तरह,
विभिन्न राजनीतिक प्रणालियों और नीतियों का समर्थन करने के लिए इस्तेमाल किया जा सकता है. देश
विशिष्ट और वर्णनात्मक अध्ययन हमें ऐसे पैटर्न खोजने में मदद नहीं करते हैं जो मदद करेंगे
हम इस्लाम और राजनीति के बीच अलग-अलग संबंधों की व्याख्या करते हैं
countries of the Muslim world. इसलिए, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
जनतंत्र, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

इस्लामी विपक्षी दलों और यूरोपीय संघ की सगाई के लिए संभावित

टोबी आर्चर

Heidi Huuhtanen

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, यह

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

मानव अधिकार, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

इस्लामी पार्टियों के घरेलू महत्व और अंतरराष्ट्रीय में उनकी बढ़ती भागीदारी

कार्य. एक और दृष्टिकोण यह है कि मुस्लिम दुनिया में लोकतंत्रीकरण बढ़ेगा

यूरोपीय सुरक्षा. इन और अन्य तर्कों की वैधता कि क्या और कैसे

यूरोपीय संघ को शामिल होना चाहिए केवल विभिन्न इस्लामी आंदोलनों का अध्ययन करके परीक्षण किया जा सकता है और

उनकी राजनीतिक परिस्थितियाँ, देश दर देश.

लोकतंत्रीकरण यूरोपीय संघ की सामान्य विदेश नीति कार्रवाइयों का एक केंद्रीय विषय है, जैसा रखा गया है

लेख में बाहर 11 यूरोपीय संघ पर संधि के. इसमें कई राज्यों पर विचार किया गया

रिपोर्ट लोकतांत्रिक नहीं है, या पूरी तरह से लोकतांत्रिक नहीं है. इनमें से अधिकांश देशों में, इस्लामी

पार्टियों और आंदोलनों ने मौजूदा शासन के लिए एक महत्वपूर्ण विरोध का गठन किया है, और

कुछ में वे सबसे बड़ा विपक्षी गुट बनाते हैं. यूरोपीय लोकतंत्रों को लंबे समय से करना पड़ा है

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

इस्लामी आंदोलनों और अरब दुनिया में लोकतांत्रिक प्रक्रिया: ग्रे जोन तलाश

नातान जम्मू. भूरा, Amr Hamzawy,

मरीना Ottaway

पिछले दशक के दौरान, इस्लामी आंदोलनों खुद को मध्य पूर्व में प्रमुख राजनीतिक खिलाड़ियों के रूप में स्थापित किया है. साथ में सरकारों के साथ, इस्लामी आंदोलनों, मध्यम के साथ ही कट्टरपंथी, यह निर्धारित करेगा कि क्षेत्र की राजनीति को निकट भविष्य में प्रकट. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, नाटकीय घटनाओं के बाद ही इस्लामी आंदोलनों के महत्व के बारे में पता चला है, जैसे ईरान में क्रांति और मिस्र में राष्ट्रपति अनवर अल-सादत की हत्या. सितंबर के आतंकवादी हमलों के बाद से कहीं अधिक ध्यान दिया गया है 11, 2001. नतीजतन, इस्लामी आंदोलनों को व्यापक रूप से खतरनाक और शत्रुतापूर्ण माना जाता है. जबकि इस तरह का लक्षण वर्णन इस्लामी स्पेक्ट्रम के कट्टरपंथी अंत में संगठनों के संबंध में सटीक है, जो अपने लक्ष्यों को प्राप्त करने में अंधाधुंध हिंसा का सहारा लेने की इच्छा के कारण खतरनाक हैं, यह उन कई समूहों का सटीक लक्षण वर्णन नहीं है जिन्होंने हिंसा छोड़ दी है या हिंसा से परहेज किया है. क्योंकि आतंकवादी संगठन तत्काल पोज देते हैं
धमकी, तथापि, सभी देशों के नीति निर्माताओं ने हिंसक संगठनों पर अधिक ध्यान दिया है.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. वे पहले से ही कई देशों में सामाजिक रीति-रिवाजों पर एक शक्तिशाली प्रभाव डाल चुके हैं, धर्मनिरपेक्षतावादी प्रवृत्तियों को रोकना और उलटना और कई अरबों के कपड़े और व्यवहार करने के तरीके को बदलना. और उनका तात्कालिक राजनीतिक लक्ष्य, अपने देश की सामान्य राजनीति में भाग लेकर एक शक्तिशाली शक्ति बनने के लिए, असंभव नहीं है. यह पहले से ही मोरक्को जैसे देशों में महसूस किया जा रहा है, जॉर्डन, और यहां तक ​​कि मिस्र, जो अभी भी सभी इस्लामी राजनीतिक संगठनों पर प्रतिबंध लगाता है लेकिन अब संसद में अस्सी-आठ मुस्लिम भाई हैं. राजनीति, हिंसा नहीं, वही है जो मुख्यधारा के इस्लामवादियों को अपना प्रभाव देता है.

मध्यम मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड

रॉबर्ट एस. पहलू

स्टीवन ब्रुक

The Muslim Brotherhood is the world’s oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organization. It is also the most controversial,
condemned by both conventional opinion in the West and radical opinion in the Middle East. American commentators have called the Muslim Brothers “radical Islamists” and “a vital component of the enemy’s assault forcedeeply hostile to the United States.” Al Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri sneers at them for “lur[ing] thousands of young Muslim men into lines for electionsinstead of into the lines of jihad.” Jihadists loathe the Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) for rejecting global jihad and embracing democracy. These positions seem to make them moderates, the very thing the United States, short on allies in the Muslim world, seeks.
But the Ikhwan also assails U.S. विदेश नीति, especially Washington’s support for Israel, and questions linger about its actual commitment to the democratic process. Over the past year, we have met with dozens of Brotherhood leaders and activists from Egypt, फ्रांस, जॉर्डन, स्पेन, सीरिया,टुनिशिया, and the United Kingdom.

इस्लामी सक्रियतावाद का प्रबंधन: Salafis, मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड, और जॉर्डन में राज्य विद्युत

फैसल घोरी

अपनी पहली पुस्तक में, इस्लामी सक्रियतावाद का प्रबंधन, Quintan Wiktorowicz examines the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis through the lens of social movement theory. Unlike some political scientists who dismiss Islamic movements because of their informal networks, Wiktorowicz contends that social movement theory is an apt framework through which Islamic movements can be examined and studied. इस संबंध में, his work leads the field. सभी के लिए अभी तक अपना वादा, इस किताब बड़े पैमाने पर वितरित करने के लिए विफल रहता है.
पुस्तक चार प्राथमिक वर्गों में विभाजित है, through which he tries to construct his conclusion: Jordanian political liberalization has occurred because of structural necessities, not because of its commitment to democratization. इसके साथ - साथ, the state has been masterful in what he dubs the “management of collective action," (पी. 3) जो है, सभी व्यावहारिक प्रयोजनों के लिए, stifled any real opposition. जबकि उसके निष्कर्ष निश्चित रूप से तर्कसंगत है, given his extensive fieldwork, the book is poorly organized and much of the evidence examined earlier in the work leaves many questions unanswered.

क्या मतदाता बिक्रीसूत्र निरंकुशवाद के तहत विपक्ष का समर्थन करने के ?

माइकल DH. रॉबिंस

Elections have become commonplace in most authoritarian states. While this may seem to be a contradiction in terms, in reality elections play an important role in these regimes. While elections for positions of real power tend to be non-competitive, many
elections—including those for seemingly toothless parliaments—can be strongly contested.
The existing literature has focused on the role that elections play in supporting the regime. उदाहरण के लिए, they can help let off steam, help the regime take the temperature of society, or can be used to help a dominant party know which individuals it should promote (Schedler 2002; Blaydes 2006). अभी तक, while the literature has focused on the supply-side of elections in authoritarian states, there are relatively few systematic studies of voter behavior in these elections (see Lust-Okar 2006 for an exception). बल्कि, most analyses have argued that patronage politics are the norm in these societies and that ordinary citizens tend to be very cynical about these exercises given that they cannot bring any real change (Kassem 2004; Desposato 2001; Zaki 1995). While the majority of voters in authoritarian systems may behave in this manner, not all do. In fact, at times, even the majority vote against the regime leading to
significant changes as has occurred recently in Kenya, the Ukraine and Zimbabwe. अभी तक, even in cases where opposition voters make up a much smaller percentage of voters, it is important to understand who these voters are and what leads them to vote against the
शासन.

जॉर्डन में मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड

जॉर्डन में इस्लामी आंदोलन अप्रैल के thewake में अंतरराष्ट्रीय ध्यान में आया 1989 गड़बड़ी और बाद में नवम्बर 1989 संसदीय चुनाव. These developments highlighted the movement’s political clout and raised the spectre in the West of an Iranian-style Islamic revolution in Jordan, fuelled by radical Islamic movements such as those of Egypt and the Maghrib. While various political trends competed for influence during the months prior to the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood had a clear advantage; its infrastructure in the mosques, the Qur’anicschools and the universities gave it a ready-made political base. The leftistand pro-regime groups, on the other hand, had to create de facto politicalparties—still legally banned—and to build their organizational base almostex nihilo, or to transform a clandestine infrastructure into an overt politicalone. There should have been very little surprise, therefore, when the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist candidates won a windfall of 32 of the 80seats in Parliament.Politicization of Islam is not new in Jordan.1 Since the foundation of the Emirate of Trans jordan by ‘Abdallah, Islam has served as one of the building blocks of regime legitimacy and of nation-building. The genealogy of the Hashemite family as scions of the Prophet’s tribe was an important source of legitimacy for its rule in Syria, Iraq and Jordan, as it had been inthe Hijaz. The ideology of the “Great Arab Revolt” was no less Islamic than it was Arab, and the control of Jerusalem after 1948 was interpretedby the regime as an Islamic responsibility and not only an Arab one.2King ‘Abdallah and his grandson Hussein, took care to present themselvesas believing Muslims, appearing at rituals and prayers, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca and embellishing their speeches with Islamic motifs.3The status of Islam in the Kingdom was also formalized in the Jordanian constitution (1952) by stipulating that Islam is the religion of the kingdom and that the king must be a Muslim and of Muslim parents. इस्लामी कानून(Shari‘a) is defined in the constitution as one of the pillars of legislation in the kingdom, while family law is in the exclusive hands of the Shari‘a courts.

केन्द्र का दावा: संक्रमण के दौर में राजनीतिक इस्लाम

जॉन एल. एडवर्ड्स

1990 के दशक के राजनीतिक इस्लाम में, कुछ कहते हैं क्या “इस्लामी कट्टरवाद,” उत्तरी अफ्रीका से दक्षिण पूर्व एशिया के लिए सरकार में और oppositional राजनीति में एक प्रमुख उपस्थिति बनी हुई है. सत्ता में और राजनीति में राजनीतिक इस्लाम के कई मुद्दों और सवाल उठाया गया है: “इस्लाम इस आधुनिकीकरण को antithetical?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (ईरान, सूडान, अफ़ग़ानिस्तान), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, सूडान, टर्की, ईरान, लेबनान, Kuwait, Yemen, जॉर्डन, पाकिस्तान, बांग्लादेश, मलेशिया, इंडोनेशिया, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.

तीन मुस्लिम brotherhoods तुलना: सीरिया, जोर्डन, मिस्र

बैरी रुबिन

The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, और तरीके. Each, बेशक, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, और तरीके. Each, बेशक, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.First, it is important to understand the Brotherhood’s policy toward and relations with both jihadist groups (अल क़ायदा, the Zarqawi network, and others such as Hizb al-Tahrir and Hamas) and theorists (such as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi).The Brotherhoods do not have ongoing relationships with Hizb al-Tahrir—which is regarded by them as a small, cultish group of no importance. Other than in Jordan, they have had little contact with it at all.Regarding al-Qa’ida—both its theorists and its terrorist infrastructure—the Brotherhoods approve generally of its militancy, attacks on America, and ideology (or respect its ideologues), but view it as a rival.

इस्लाम के भविष्य के बाद 9/11

मंसूर Moaddel

There is no consensus among historians and Islamicists about the nature of theIslamic belief system and the experience of historical Islam, on which one couldbase a definitive judgment concerning Islam’s compatibility with modernity. Nonetheless,the availability of both historical and value survey data allow us to analyzethe future of Islam in light of the horrific event of 9/11. The key factor that woulddetermine the level of societal visibility necessary for predicting the future developmentof a culture is the nature and clarity of the ideological targets in relation towhich new cultural discourses are produced. Based on this premise, I shall try toilluminate the nature of such targets that are confronted by Muslim activists inIran, मिस्र, and Jordan.

इमारत की दीवारों नहीं पुलों

एलेक्स ग्लेनी

के आतंकी हमलों के बाद से 11 सितंबर 2001 मध्य पूर्व और उत्तरी अफ्रीका में राजनीतिक इस्लामवाद में रुचि का विस्फोट हुआ है (मेना) क्षेत्र. काफी समय पहले तक,विश्लेषकों ने स्पष्ट रूप से उन अभिनेताओं पर ध्यान केंद्रित किया है जो इस्लामवादी स्पेक्ट्रम के हिंसक अंत में काम करते हैं, अल-कायदा सहित, तालिबान, इराक में कुछ सांप्रदायिक दल और अधिकृत फिलिस्तीनी क्षेत्रों में हमास जैसे सशस्त्र पंखों वाले राजनीतिक समूह (चुनना)और लेबनान में हिज़्बुल्लाह। हालाँकि, इसने इस तथ्य को अस्पष्ट कर दिया है कि मेना क्षेत्र में समकालीन राजनीति को 'मुख्यधारा' के इस्लामी आंदोलनों के अधिक विविध संग्रह द्वारा संचालित और आकार दिया जा रहा है।. हम इन समूहों को ऐसे समूहों के रूप में परिभाषित करते हैं जो अपने देशों की कानूनी राजनीतिक प्रक्रियाओं में संलग्न या संलग्न होना चाहते हैं और जिन्होंने राष्ट्रीय स्तर पर अपने उद्देश्यों को प्राप्त करने में मदद करने के लिए सार्वजनिक रूप से हिंसा के उपयोग से परहेज किया है।, यहां तक ​​कि जहां उनके साथ भेदभाव या दमन किया जाता है। इस परिभाषा में मिस्र में मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड जैसे समूह शामिल होंगे, न्याय और विकास की पार्टी (PJD) मोरक्को में और इस्लामिक एक्शन फ्रंट (भारतीय वायु सेना) जॉर्डन में। ये अहिंसक इस्लामी आंदोलन या दल अक्सर प्रत्येक देश में मौजूदा शासन के विरोध के सबसे अच्छे संगठित और सबसे लोकप्रिय तत्व का प्रतिनिधित्व करते हैं।, और इस तरह पश्चिमी नीति निर्माताओं की उस भूमिका में रुचि बढ़ रही है जो वे क्षेत्र में लोकतंत्र को बढ़ावा देने में निभा सकते हैं. फिर भी इस मुद्दे पर चर्चा इस सवाल पर रुकी हुई प्रतीत होती है कि क्या इन समूहों के साथ अधिक व्यवस्थित और औपचारिक आधार पर जुड़ना उचित होगा या नहीं, वास्तव में ऐसा करने की व्यावहारिकता के बजाय। यह रवैया आंशिक रूप से उन समूहों को वैध बनाने के लिए एक उचित अनिच्छा से जुड़ा हुआ है जो महिलाओं के अधिकारों पर लोकतंत्र विरोधी विचार रख सकते हैं।, राजनीतिक बहुलवाद और अन्य मुद्दों की एक श्रृंखला। यह मेना क्षेत्र में पश्चिमी शक्तियों के रणनीतिक हितों के बारे में व्यावहारिक विचारों को भी दर्शाता है जिन्हें इस्लामवादियों की बढ़ती लोकप्रियता और प्रभाव से खतरा माना जाता है।. उनके हिस्से के लिए, इस्लामी दलों और आंदोलनों ने उन पश्चिमी शक्तियों के साथ घनिष्ठ संबंध बनाने के लिए स्पष्ट अनिच्छा दिखाई है, जिनकी नीतियों का वे इस क्षेत्र में कड़ा विरोध करते हैं।, कम से कम इस डर के लिए नहीं कि उनके भीतर संचालित दमनकारी शासन कैसे प्रतिक्रिया दे सकते हैं। अहिंसक राजनीतिक इस्लामी आंदोलनों पर इस परियोजना का ध्यान उनके राजनीतिक एजेंडा के लिए निहित समर्थन के रूप में गलत व्याख्या नहीं किया जाना चाहिए।. मुख्यधारा के इस्लामी दलों के साथ अधिक जानबूझकर जुड़ाव की रणनीति के लिए उत्तर अमेरिकी और यूरोपीय नीति निर्माताओं के लिए महत्वपूर्ण जोखिम और व्यापार शामिल होंगे. तथापि, हम यह मानते हैं कि सगाई को शून्य राशि के रूप में देखने के लिए दोनों पक्षों की प्रवृत्ति 'सभी या कुछ भी नहीं' खेल अनुपयोगी रही है, और अगर मध्यपूर्व और उत्तरी अफ्रीका में सुधार के इर्द-गिर्द एक अधिक रचनात्मक संवाद उभरना है, तो इसे बदलने की जरूरत है.

जॉर्डन और पाकिस्तान के Jama'at-i-इस्लाम के मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड

नेहा सहगल

The study of Islamist activism is new to social movement theory. Socialmovement scholarship has ignored Islamist movements because of their unique faithbasednature. More recently scholars have recognized that the processes of contentionconceptualized by social movement theory can be applied to Islamist activism to seektheoretical refinements in both areas of study.In this paper, I examine variations in the strategies followed by Islamistmovements in response to government policies. States have followed various policies inmanaging the tide of Islamist opposition to their power. Some states have chosen to userepressive means (मिस्र, Jordan before 1989), while others, at different times in theirhistory have used accommodative policies (Jordan after 1989, पाकिस्तान, मलेशिया). Iexamine the effects of government accommodation on Islamist movement strategies.I argue that accommodation can have varying effects on Islamist movementstrategies depending on the nature of accommodative policies followed. Governmentshave employed two different types of accommodative policies in their tenuousrelationship with Islamist opposition – Islamization and liberalization. Islamizationattempts to co-opt the movements through greater religiosity in state and society.Liberalization allows the movements to conduct their activities at both the state and thesocietal level without necessarily increasing the religiosity of the state1. Islamizationdisempowers Islamists while liberalization empowers them by providing a sphere ofinfluence.

Spoilt मतपत्र

मार्क लिंच

marc-akef

Moderate Islamist movements across the Arab world have made a decisive turn towards participation in democratic politics over the last 20 साल. They have developed an elaborate ideological justification for contesting elections, which they have defended against intense criticism from more radical Islamist competitors. एक ही समय पर, they have demonstrated a commitment to internal democracy remarkable by the standards of the region, and have repeatedly proved their willingness to respect the results of elections even when they lose.
But rather than welcome this development, secular authoritarian regimes have responded with growing repression. Again and again, successful electoral participation by Islamists has triggered a backlash, often with the consent – if not the encouragement – of the United States. When Hamas prevailed in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, the response was boycott and political subversion. When the Egyptian government cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood after elections in 2005, few outsiders objected.
As the door to democracy is slammed in their faces, how have the Islamist groups that embraced participation responded? In some ways, they have passed the test with flying colours. They have remained committed to democratic participation even in the face of massive electoral fraud and harsh campaigns of repression. Their leaders have affirmed their democratic ideals, and have often spoken out to reiterate their ideological and strategic commitment to democracy. वास्तव में, they have often emerged as the leading advocates for public freedoms and democratic reform. And there is as yet little sign of any such organisation turning to violence as an alternative.
But in other ways, the toll of repression is beginning to show. Doubts about the value of democratic participation inside these movements are growing. Splits in the top ranks have roiled movements in Jordan and Egypt, among others. In many of the cases, a Brotherhood leadership which prefers a moderate, accommodationist approach to the regime has struggled to find a way to respond to the escalating pressures of repression and the closing down of the paths towards democratic participation. In Egypt, frustration over extended detentions of the most moderate leaders have tarnished the coin of those calling for political participation, with a rising trend calling for a retreat from politics and a renewed focus upon social activism and religious work. In Jordan, the influence of those seeking to abandon worthless domestic politics and to focus instead on supporting Hamas has grown.
Critics of the Brotherhood have pointed to these recent struggles as evidence that Islamists cannot be trusted with democracy. But this profoundly misreads the current trends. These crises in fact reflect a delayed response to the blocked promise of democratic participation. The Islamist debate today is not about the legitimacy of democracy – it is about how to respond to frustrated efforts to play the democratic game.
********************************
I recently spent a week in Amman, talking to most of the senior leaders of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood as well as a cross-section of the country’s political and journalistic elite. The picture that emerged was one not simply of an Islamist movement in crisis, but also of a blocked and deteriorating political system. The government was in the process of declining to call the Parliament back into session in order to force through its desired legislation as temporary laws of dubious constitutionality. Stories of social conflict among the tribes and of crushing economic problems amid spiralling corruption filled daily conversation.
The Jordanian Brotherhood, established in 1946, is one of the oldest and most deeply rooted branches of the global Islamist organisation. Unlike in many other countries, where the Brotherhood worked in opposition to those in power, in Jordan it played a crucial role for decades in supporting the Hashemite throne against external and domestic challengers. In return, it enjoyed a privileged relationship with the Jordanian state, including control over key ministries, and good relations with King Hussein in spite of his friendly ties with Israel and the United States.
When Jordan lost the West Bank in the 1967 war, it struggled to maintain its role in the occupied territories. में 1988, तथापि, as the Palestinian Intifada raged and threatened to spread to the East Bank, Jordan formally renounced its claims, severing its ties and concentrating on developing the East Bank and “Jordanising” the truncated state, a decision that was not accepted by the Brotherhood, which maintained ties with its West Bank counterparts.
When riots broke out throughout the country the next year, King Hussein responded with a remarkable democratic opening which revitalised the Kingdom’s political life. The Brotherhood participated fully in this process, and emerged in the 1989 elections as the dominant bloc in Parliament. The years that followed are fondly remembered in Jordan as the apex of political life, with an effective Parliament, a “national pact” establishing the ground rules of democracy and a vibrant emerging press.
में 1993, तथापि, the Jordanian regime changed the electoral law in a way that served to limit Muslim Brotherhood success. As it moved rapidly towards a peace treaty with Israel, the state began to clamp down on the Brotherhood and on all other forms of political opposition. Its interventions in the political process grew so extreme that in 1997 the Brotherhood’s political party, the Islamic Action Front, decided to boycott elections. After King Hussein’s death in 1999, the crown passed to his son Abdullah, who showed little interest in democratic reform, and in 2001 decided to suspend Parliament and rule by emergency law. While formal democracy returned in 2003, political reform efforts failed to gain traction. The extent of electoral fraud against the Brotherhood and other critics of the regime during the 2007 vote shocked even jaded observers.
The Jordanian crackdown has not reached the brutal levels of Syria or Tunisia (where the Islamist opposition was massacred or driven abroad). The Brotherhood continues to operate publicly, and the Islamic Action Front holds six seats in Parliament. But the gerrymandered electoral system and massive fraud has hamstrung Islamist political participation, to the degree that many believe that the Brotherhood is being dared to boycott.
Following the 2007 electoral debacle, the Brotherhood entered a period of intense internal unrest. It dissolved its Shura Council as penance for its fateful decision to participate in the election. The core issue was over how best to respond to the regime’s repression: through confrontation, or through a retreat and consolidation of the political strategy? In April 2008, the “hawkish” trend won the internal elections to the Shura Council by a single vote, and the pragmatic and domestically-orientated Salem Falahat was replaced by the fiery, Palestine-centric hawk Himmam Said. Said and the new head of the Islamic Action Front, Zaki Bani Arshid, steered the Islamist movement into more direct conflict with the regime, with little success. The reformist trend, led by the soft-spoken intellectual Ruheil Ghuraybeh, avoided open confrontation but advanced an ambitious programme to transform Jordan into a constitutional monarchy.
As the Brotherhood rank and file lost interest in a stalled domestic political process, they were simultaneously galvanised by the electoral success of Hamas and then by the visceral images of Israel’s war on Gaza. The growing interest in Palestinian issues at the expense of Jordanian politics worried not only the regime but also the traditional leadership of the Brotherhood. The leading Jordanian journalist Mohammed Abu Rumman argues that the issue of relations with Hamas has supplanted the traditional “hawk-dove” struggle within the organisation. While both trends support Hamas – “if you are not with Hamas, you are not with the Muslim Brotherhood”, explained one of the “dovish” leaders – they disagree over the appropriate organisational relationship. The “Hamasi” trend supports close ties and the prioritisation of Palestinian issues, and embraces a common Muslim identity over a narrowly Jordanian one. The “reformist” trend insists that Hamas, as the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, should have responsibility for Palestine while the Jordanian Brotherhood must be a national organisation focused upon domestic Jordanian issues.
This crisis came to a head over the issue of Hamas participation in the administrative structures of the Jordanian Brotherhood. Three leading reformists resigned from the Executive Office, triggering an as-yet-unresolved internal crisis that threatens one of the first serious internal splits in the history of the movement. The media has eagerly egged this conflict on; indeed, a number of Brotherhood leaders told me that what made the current crisis unique was not the issues at stake or the intensity of the disagreement, but the fact that for the first time it had become public.
********************************
The story of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is many things, but certainly not a story of Islamists retreating from democracy. Similar dynamics can be seen in Egypt, where the Brotherhood’s leadership is similarly divided over how to respond to escalating repression. During multiple trips to Cairo in the last few years, I saw the growing frustration of a generation of reformists who found their every effort to embrace democracy met with force and rejection.
After “independent” Brotherhood candidates scored sweeping victories in the first of three rounds of the 2005 Parliamentary elections, government forces began to intervene to prevent further gains. Despite well-documented fraud and heavy-handed security interference in Brotherhood strongholds, the movement emerged as the largest opposition bloc with 88 सीटों. As Deputy Supreme Guide Mohammed Habib ruefully told me, their mistake was that they did too well – had they won 50 सीटों, perhaps they would not have triggered such harsh reprisals.
The subsequent crackdown matched the magnitude of the Brotherhood victory. A series of media campaigns aimed to scare mainstream Egyptians with alleged nefarious Brotherhood schemes (they were supposedly training an underground militia, conspiring with Hizbollah, and more). A wide range of leading Brotherhood figures, including noted moderates such as the financier Khairat el Shater and the intellectual Abd el Monem Abou el Fattouh, were detained indefinitely on trumped up charges.
For a while, the Egyptian Brotherhood held fast in the face of these provocations. They continued to try to participate in elections even as the fraud and overt manipulation mounted. Their Parliamentarians performed well as an opposition. They routinely expressed their ongoing commitment to democracy to every audience which would listen. And they imposed discipline on their own members to prevent the explosion of frustration into violence.
But over time, the pressure began to take its toll. The leadership reined in its freewheeling young bloggers, whose public airing of internal issues was being exploited by the organisation’s opponents. It adopted tougher rhetoric on foreign policy issues such as the Gaza war – attacking the Egyptian government’s enforcement of the blockade of Gaza – in part to rally its demoralised membership. Considerable evidence suggests that the cadres of the organisation were growing disenchanted with politics and preferred to return to the core social and religious mission. And growing voices from inside and outside the movement began to suggest retreating from politics until a more propitious time.
Earlier this month the conflicts inside the Egyptian Brotherhood leapt into the pages of local newspapers, which reported that the movement’s leader, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, had abruptly resigned his post in protest after conservatives refused to appoint the leading reformist Essam el Erian to an open leadership seat. Akef has denied the reports – but the portrait of a movement in turmoil is clear.
The Jordanian, Egyptian and American governments may see all this as something of a success story: the influence of the Islamists has been curbed, both in formal politics and in the social sector, and the restraint exercised by the Brotherhood leadership has meant the states have not faced a backlash. But this is dangerously short-sighted. The campaigns against Islamists weaken the foundations of democracy as a whole, not just the appeal of one movement, and have had a corrosive effect on public freedoms, transparency and accountability. Regardless of the fortunes of the movements themselves, the crackdown on the Islamists contributes to the wider corruption of public life. The growing frustration within moderate Islamist groups with democratic participation cannot help but affect their future ideological trajectory.
Sowing disenchantment with democratic politics in the ranks of the Brotherhood could forfeit one of the signal developments in Islamist political thinking of the last few decades. The failure of the movement’s democratic experiment could empower more radical Islamists, including not only terrorist groups but also doctrinaire salafists less inclined to pragmatic politics. The degradation of its organisational strengths could open up space for al Qa’eda and other radical competitors to move in. The alternative to Ismail Haniya might be Osama bin Laden rather than Abu Mazen, and the exclusion of Essam el-Erian may not produce an Ayman Nour.
Marc Lynch is associate professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He writes a blog on Arab politics and media for Foreign Policy.

Moderate Islamist movements across the Arab world have made a decisive turn towards participation in democratic politics over the last 20 साल. They have developed an elaborate ideological justification for contesting elections, which they have defended against intense criticism from more radical Islamist competitors. एक ही समय पर, they have demonstrated a commitment to internal democracy remarkable by the standards of the region, and have repeatedly proved their willingness to respect the results of elections even when they lose.

But rather than welcome this development, secular authoritarian regimes have responded with growing repression. Again and again, successful electoral participation by Islamists has triggered a backlash, often with the consent – if not the encouragement – of the United States. When Hamas prevailed in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, the response was boycott and political subversion. When the Egyptian government cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood after elections in 2005, few outsiders objected.

As the door to democracy is slammed in their faces, how have the Islamist groups that embraced participation responded? In some ways, they have passed the test with flying colours. They have remained committed to democratic participation even in the face of massive electoral fraud and harsh campaigns of repression. Their leaders have affirmed their democratic ideals, and have often spoken out to reiterate their ideological and strategic commitment to democracy. वास्तव में, they have often emerged as the leading advocates for public freedoms and democratic reform. And there is as yet little sign of any such organisation turning to violence as an alternative.

But in other ways, the toll of repression is beginning to show. Doubts about the value of democratic participation inside these movements are growing. Splits in the top ranks have roiled movements in Jordan and Egypt, among others. In many of the cases, a Brotherhood leadership which prefers a moderate, accommodationist approach to the regime has struggled to find a way to respond to the escalating pressures of repression and the closing down of the paths towards democratic participation. In Egypt, frustration over extended detentions of the most moderate leaders have tarnished the coin of those calling for political participation, with a rising trend calling for a retreat from politics and a renewed focus upon social activism and religious work. In Jordan, the influence of those seeking to abandon worthless domestic politics and to focus instead on supporting Hamas has grown.

Critics of the Brotherhood have pointed to these recent struggles as evidence that Islamists cannot be trusted with democracy. But this profoundly misreads the current trends. These crises in fact reflect a delayed response to the blocked promise of democratic participation. The Islamist debate today is not about the legitimacy of democracy – it is about how to respond to frustrated efforts to play the democratic game.

********************************

I recently spent a week in Amman, talking to most of the senior leaders of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood as well as a cross-section of the country’s political and journalistic elite. The picture that emerged was one not simply of an Islamist movement in crisis, but also of a blocked and deteriorating political system. The government was in the process of declining to call the Parliament back into session in order to force through its desired legislation as temporary laws of dubious constitutionality. Stories of social conflict among the tribes and of crushing economic problems amid spiralling corruption filled daily conversation.

The Jordanian Brotherhood, established in 1946, is one of the oldest and most deeply rooted branches of the global Islamist organisation. Unlike in many other countries, where the Brotherhood worked in opposition to those in power, in Jordan it played a crucial role for decades in supporting the Hashemite throne against external and domestic challengers. In return, it enjoyed a privileged relationship with the Jordanian state, including control over key ministries, and good relations with King Hussein in spite of his friendly ties with Israel and the United States.

When Jordan lost the West Bank in the 1967 war, it struggled to maintain its role in the occupied territories. में 1988, तथापि, as the Palestinian Intifada raged and threatened to spread to the East Bank, Jordan formally renounced its claims, severing its ties and concentrating on developing the East Bank and “Jordanising” the truncated state, a decision that was not accepted by the Brotherhood, which maintained ties with its West Bank counterparts.

When riots broke out throughout the country the next year, King Hussein responded with a remarkable democratic opening which revitalised the Kingdom’s political life. The Brotherhood participated fully in this process, and emerged in the 1989 elections as the dominant bloc in Parliament. The years that followed are fondly remembered in Jordan as the apex of political life, with an effective Parliament, a “national pact” establishing the ground rules of democracy and a vibrant emerging press.

में 1993, तथापि, the Jordanian regime changed the electoral law in a way that served to limit Muslim Brotherhood success. As it moved rapidly towards a peace treaty with Israel, the state began to clamp down on the Brotherhood and on all other forms of political opposition. Its interventions in the political process grew so extreme that in 1997 the Brotherhood’s political party, the Islamic Action Front, decided to boycott elections. After King Hussein’s death in 1999, the crown passed to his son Abdullah, who showed little interest in democratic reform, and in 2001 decided to suspend Parliament and rule by emergency law. While formal democracy returned in 2003, political reform efforts failed to gain traction. The extent of electoral fraud against the Brotherhood and other critics of the regime during the 2007 vote shocked even jaded observers.

The Jordanian crackdown has not reached the brutal levels of Syria or Tunisia (where the Islamist opposition was massacred or driven abroad). The Brotherhood continues to operate publicly, and the Islamic Action Front holds six seats in Parliament. But the gerrymandered electoral system and massive fraud has hamstrung Islamist political participation, to the degree that many believe that the Brotherhood is being dared to boycott.

Following the 2007 electoral debacle, the Brotherhood entered a period of intense internal unrest. It dissolved its Shura Council as penance for its fateful decision to participate in the election. The core issue was over how best to respond to the regime’s repression: through confrontation, or through a retreat and consolidation of the political strategy? In April 2008, the “hawkish” trend won the internal elections to the Shura Council by a single vote, and the pragmatic and domestically-orientated Salem Falahat was replaced by the fiery, Palestine-centric hawk Himmam Said. Said and the new head of the Islamic Action Front, Zaki Bani Arshid, steered the Islamist movement into more direct conflict with the regime, with little success. The reformist trend, led by the soft-spoken intellectual Ruheil Ghuraybeh, avoided open confrontation but advanced an ambitious programme to transform Jordan into a constitutional monarchy.

As the Brotherhood rank and file lost interest in a stalled domestic political process, they were simultaneously galvanised by the electoral success of Hamas and then by the visceral images of Israel’s war on Gaza. The growing interest in Palestinian issues at the expense of Jordanian politics worried not only the regime but also the traditional leadership of the Brotherhood. The leading Jordanian journalist Mohammed Abu Rumman argues that the issue of relations with Hamas has supplanted the traditional “hawk-dove” struggle within the organisation. While both trends support Hamas – “if you are not with Hamas, you are not with the Muslim Brotherhood”, explained one of the “dovish” leaders – they disagree over the appropriate organisational relationship. The “Hamasi” trend supports close ties and the prioritisation of Palestinian issues, and embraces a common Muslim identity over a narrowly Jordanian one. The “reformist” trend insists that Hamas, as the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, should have responsibility for Palestine while the Jordanian Brotherhood must be a national organisation focused upon domestic Jordanian issues.

This crisis came to a head over the issue of Hamas participation in the administrative structures of the Jordanian Brotherhood. Three leading reformists resigned from the Executive Office, triggering an as-yet-unresolved internal crisis that threatens one of the first serious internal splits in the history of the movement. The media has eagerly egged this conflict on; indeed, a number of Brotherhood leaders told me that what made the current crisis unique was not the issues at stake or the intensity of the disagreement, but the fact that for the first time it had become public.

********************************

The story of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is many things, but certainly not a story of Islamists retreating from democracy. Similar dynamics can be seen in Egypt, where the Brotherhood’s leadership is similarly divided over how to respond to escalating repression. During multiple trips to Cairo in the last few years, I saw the growing frustration of a generation of reformists who found their every effort to embrace democracy met with force and rejection.

After “independent” Brotherhood candidates scored sweeping victories in the first of three rounds of the 2005 Parliamentary elections, government forces began to intervene to prevent further gains. Despite well-documented fraud and heavy-handed security interference in Brotherhood strongholds, the movement emerged as the largest opposition bloc with 88 सीटों. As Deputy Supreme Guide Mohammed Habib ruefully told me, their mistake was that they did too well – had they won 50 सीटों, perhaps they would not have triggered such harsh reprisals.

The subsequent crackdown matched the magnitude of the Brotherhood victory. A series of media campaigns aimed to scare mainstream Egyptians with alleged nefarious Brotherhood schemes (they were supposedly training an underground militia, conspiring with Hizbollah, and more). A wide range of leading Brotherhood figures, including noted moderates such as the financier Khairat el Shater and the intellectual Abd el Monem Abou el Fattouh, were detained indefinitely on trumped up charges.

For a while, the Egyptian Brotherhood held fast in the face of these provocations. They continued to try to participate in elections even as the fraud and overt manipulation mounted. Their Parliamentarians performed well as an opposition. They routinely expressed their ongoing commitment to democracy to every audience which would listen. And they imposed discipline on their own members to prevent the explosion of frustration into violence.

But over time, the pressure began to take its toll. The leadership reined in its freewheeling young bloggers, whose public airing of internal issues was being exploited by the organisation’s opponents. It adopted tougher rhetoric on foreign policy issues such as the Gaza war – attacking the Egyptian government’s enforcement of the blockade of Gaza – in part to rally its demoralised membership. Considerable evidence suggests that the cadres of the organisation were growing disenchanted with politics and preferred to return to the core social and religious mission. And growing voices from inside and outside the movement began to suggest retreating from politics until a more propitious time.

Earlier this month the conflicts inside the Egyptian Brotherhood leapt into the pages of local newspapers, which reported that the movement’s leader, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, had abruptly resigned his post in protest after conservatives refused to appoint the leading reformist Essam el Erian to an open leadership seat. Akef has denied the reports – but the portrait of a movement in turmoil is clear.

The Jordanian, Egyptian and American governments may see all this as something of a success story: the influence of the Islamists has been curbed, both in formal politics and in the social sector, and the restraint exercised by the Brotherhood leadership has meant the states have not faced a backlash. But this is dangerously short-sighted. The campaigns against Islamists weaken the foundations of democracy as a whole, not just the appeal of one movement, and have had a corrosive effect on public freedoms, transparency and accountability. Regardless of the fortunes of the movements themselves, the crackdown on the Islamists contributes to the wider corruption of public life. The growing frustration within moderate Islamist groups with democratic participation cannot help but affect their future ideological trajectory.

Sowing disenchantment with democratic politics in the ranks of the Brotherhood could forfeit one of the signal developments in Islamist political thinking of the last few decades. The failure of the movement’s democratic experiment could empower more radical Islamists, including not only terrorist groups but also doctrinaire salafists less inclined to pragmatic politics. The degradation of its organisational strengths could open up space for al Qa’eda and other radical competitors to move in. The alternative to Ismail Haniya might be Osama bin Laden rather than Abu Mazen, and the exclusion of Essam el-Erian may not produce an Ayman Nour.

Marc Lynch is associate professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He writes a blog on Arab politics and media for Foreign Policy.

From the National

Published on October 30, 2009

जॉर्डन में इंटरनेट और इस्लामी राजनीति, मोरक्को और मिस्र.

बीसवीं सदी और इक्कीसवीं की शुरुआत के अंत में एक देखा था
इंटरनेट का संचार का एक केन्द्र के रूप में प्रसार, जानकारी, मनोरंजन और
व्यापार. इंटरनेट का प्रसार दुनिया के सभी चार कोनों तक पहुँच, जोड़ने
अंटार्कटिका में ग्वाटेमाला में किसान के साथ शोधकर्ता और मास्को में करने के लिए newscaster
मिस्र में Bedouin. इंटरनेट के माध्यम से, सूचना और वास्तविक समय खबर के प्रवाह तक पहुँचता
महाद्वीपों के पार, और subalternity की आवाज को परियोजना की क्षमता है उनके पहले
ब्लॉग के माध्यम से आवाज खामोश, वेबसाइटों और सामाजिक नेटवर्किंग साइटों. राजनीतिक संगठनों
बाएँ सही सातत्य भर में भविष्य की राजनीतिक mobilizer के रूप में इंटरनेट को लक्षित किया है,
और सरकारें अब ऐतिहासिक दस्तावेजों के लिए पहुँच प्रदान, पार्टी प्लेटफॉर्म, और
अपनी साइटों के माध्यम से प्रशासनिक कागजात. इसी तरह, धार्मिक समूहों में अपनी मान्यताओं ऑनलाइन प्रदर्शन
सरकारी साइटों के माध्यम से, और मंचों में दुनिया भर से सदस्यों मुद्दों पर बहस करने की अनुमति
eschatology, orthopraxy और सूक्ष्म धार्मिक मुद्दों के किसी भी संख्या. दो Fusing, इस्लामी
राजनीतिक संगठनों उनकी उपस्थिति ज्ञात वेबसाइटों के माध्यम से परिष्कृत बना दिया है का विवरण
उनकी राजनीतिक प्लेटफार्म, प्रासंगिक समाचार कथाएँ, और धार्मिक उन्मुख सामग्री पर चर्चा उनके
धार्मिक विचारों. इस कागज विशेष रूप से इस गठजोड़ की जांच करेंगे - इंटरनेट के उपयोग के द्वारा
जॉर्डन के देशों में इस्लामी राजनीतिक संगठनों के मध्य पूर्व में, मोरक्को और
मिस्र.
हालांकि इस्लामी राजनीतिक संगठनों की एक विस्तृत श्रृंखला के लिए एक मंच के रूप में इंटरनेट का उपयोग
उनके विचारों के प्रचार और एक राष्ट्रीय या अंतर्राष्ट्रीय ख्याति बना, तरीके और इरादे
इन समूहों में काफी भिन्नता है और संगठन की प्रकृति पर निर्भर. इस पत्र होगा
तीन 'उदारवादी' इस्लामी पार्टियों द्वारा इंटरनेट के उपयोग की जांच: इस्लामी ऐक्शन फ्रंट में
2
जॉर्डन, मोरक्को में जस्टिस एंड डेवलपमेंट पार्टी और मिस्र में मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड.
के रूप में इन तीन दलों ने अपने राजनीतिक परिष्कार और प्रतिष्ठा में वृद्धि हुई है, दोनों घर में
और विदेश में, वे तेजी से विभिन्न प्रयोजनों के लिए इंटरनेट का उपयोग. पहले, इस्लामी
संगठनों सार्वजनिक क्षेत्र के समकालीन विस्तार के रूप में इंटरनेट का इस्तेमाल किया है, एक क्षेत्र
पार्टियों के फ्रेम के माध्यम से जो, संवाद और एक व्यापक जनता के लिए विचारों को संस्थागत रूप.
दूसरे, इंटरनेट इस्लामवादी संगठनों प्रदान करता है एक मंच है जिसके माध्यम से अनफ़िल्टर्ड
अधिकारियों को बढ़ावा देने और उनके पदों को विज्ञापित और विचार हो सकता है, साथ ही स्थानीय मीडिया दरकिनार
राज्य द्वारा लगाए गए प्रतिबंध. अंत में, इंटरनेट इस्लामवादी संगठनों पेश करने के लिए अनुमति देता है एक
सत्तारूढ़ शासन या राजशाही के विरोध में या एक प्रदर्शन पर counterhegemonic प्रवचन
अंतरराष्ट्रीय दर्शकों. यह तीसरी प्रेरणा मुस्लिम के लिए सबसे विशेष रूप से लागू होता है
भाईचारा, जो एक परिष्कृत अंग्रेजी भाषा में एक पश्चिमी डिजाइन वेबसाइट प्रस्तुत
शैली और सिलवाया विद्वानों के एक चुनिंदा दर्शकों तक पहुंचने के लिए, नेताओं और पत्रकारों. एमबी
में उत्कृष्ट प्रदर्शन किया है इस तथाकथित "bridgeblogging" 1 और इस्लामी पार्टियों के लिए मानक निर्धारित किया है
करने के लिए अपने पदों और काम के अंतरराष्ट्रीय धारणाओं को प्रभावित करने का प्रयास. सामग्री बदलता है
स्थल का अरबी और अंग्रेजी संस्करण के बीच, और अनुभाग में आगे जांच की जाएगी
मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड पर. इन तीनों लक्ष्यों को उनके इरादों में दोनों काफी ओवरलैप और
वांछित परिणाम; तथापि, प्रत्येक लक्ष्य एक अलग अभिनेता लक्ष्य: सार्वजनिक, मीडिया, और
शासन. इन तीन क्षेत्रों के विश्लेषण के बाद, यह पत्र एक मामले का अध्ययन में आगे बढ़ना होगा
भारतीय वायु सेना की वेबसाइट का विश्लेषण, PJD और मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड.
1

एंड्रयू Helms

Ikhwanweb

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, जानकारी, entertainment and commerce.

इंटरनेट का प्रसार दुनिया के सभी चार कोनों तक पहुँच, connecting the researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the Bedouin in Egypt.

इंटरनेट के माध्यम से, the flow of information and real-time news reaches across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously silenced voices through blogs, वेबसाइटों और सामाजिक नेटवर्किंग साइटों.

Political organizations across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future, और सरकारें अब ऐतिहासिक दस्तावेजों के लिए पहुँच प्रदान, पार्टी प्लेटफॉर्म, and administrative papers through their sites. इसी तरह, religious groups display their beliefs online through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of eschatology, orthopraxy और सूक्ष्म धार्मिक मुद्दों के किसी भी संख्या.

दो Fusing, Islamist political organizations have made their presence known through sophisticated websites detailing their political platforms, प्रासंगिक समाचार कथाएँ, and religiously oriented material discussing their theological views. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, मोरक्को और मिस्र.

Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization.

This paper will examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, मोरक्को में जस्टिस एंड डेवलपमेंट पार्टी और मिस्र में मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड. के रूप में इन तीन दलों ने अपने राजनीतिक परिष्कार और प्रतिष्ठा में वृद्धि हुई है, both at home and abroad, वे तेजी से विभिन्न प्रयोजनों के लिए इंटरनेट का उपयोग.

पहले, Islamist organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere through which parties frame, संवाद और एक व्यापक जनता के लिए विचारों को संस्थागत रूप.

दूसरे, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media restrictions imposed by the state.

अंत में, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim Brotherhood, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, नेताओं और पत्रकारों.

The MB has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section on the Muslim Brotherhood.

These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and desired outcomes; तथापि, प्रत्येक लक्ष्य एक अलग अभिनेता लक्ष्य: सार्वजनिक, मीडिया, and the regime. इन तीन क्षेत्रों के विश्लेषण के बाद, this paper will proceed into a case study analysis of the websites of the IAF, PJD और मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड.