RSSTous les articles taggés avec: "Jordanie"

L'Irak et l'avenir de l'islam politique

James Piscatori

Il y a soixante-cinq ans, l'un des plus grands savants de l'islam moderne posait la question simple, «Où l'islam?", où allait le monde islamique? C'était une période de troubles intenses dans les mondes occidental et musulman - la disparition de l'impérialisme et la cristallisation d'un nouveau système étatique en dehors de l'Europe; la création et le test du néo- L'ordre mondial wilsonien à la Société des Nations; l'émergence du fascisme européen. Sir Hamilton Gibb a reconnu que les sociétés musulmanes, incapable d'éviter de telles tendances mondiales, ont également été confrontés à la pénétration tout aussi incontournable du nationalisme, laïcité, et occidentalisation. Alors qu'il mettait prudemment en garde contre les prédictions - risques pour nous tous intéressés par la politique du Moyen-Orient et de l'islam - il était sûr de deux choses.:
(une) le monde islamique évoluerait entre l'idéal de solidarité et les réalités de la division;
(b) la clé de l'avenir réside dans le leadership, ou qui parle avec autorité pour l'Islam.
Aujourd'hui, les pronostics de Gibb pourraient bien avoir une pertinence renouvelée alors que nous sommes confrontés à une crise de plus en plus grave en Irak, le déroulement d'une guerre expansive et controversée contre le terrorisme, et le problème palestinien persistant. Dans cette conférence, je voudrais examiner les facteurs qui peuvent affecter le cours de la politique musulmane dans la période actuelle et dans un avenir proche.. Bien que les points que je vais soulever sont susceptibles d'avoir une pertinence plus large, Je m'appuierai principalement sur le cas du monde arabe.
Hypothèses sur l'islam politique Les prédictions ne manquent pas en ce qui concerne l'islam politisé ou l'islamisme. «L’islamisme» est mieux compris comme le sentiment que quelque chose ne va pas dans les sociétés musulmanes contemporaines et que la solution doit résider dans une série d’actions politiques.. Souvent utilisé de manière interchangeable avec «fondamentalisme», L’islamisme est mieux assimilé à «l’islam politique». Plusieurs commentateurs ont proclamé sa disparition et l'avènement de l'ère post-islamiste. Ils soutiennent que l'appareil répressif de l'État s'est avéré plus durable que l'opposition islamique et que l'incohérence idéologique des islamistes les a rendus inadaptés à la concurrence politique moderne.. Les événements du 11 septembre semblent contredire cette prédiction, encore, inébranlable, ils ont fait valoir qu'un tel spectaculaire, des actes pratiquement anarchiques ne font que prouver la faillite des idées islamistes et suggèrent que les radicaux ont abandonné tout espoir réel de s'emparer du pouvoir.

Islam et Démocratie

ITAC

Si l'on lit la presse ou écoute des commentateurs sur les affaires internationales, on dit souvent - et encore plus souvent sous-entendu mais pas dit - que l'islam n'est pas compatible avec la démocratie. Dans les années 90, Samuel Huntington a déclenché une tempête intellectuelle en publiant The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, dans lequel il présente ses prévisions pour le monde - en gros. Dans le domaine politique, il note que si la Turquie et le Pakistan peuvent prétendre à une «légitimité démocratique», tous les autres «… les pays musulmans étaient majoritairement non démocratiques: monarchies, systèmes à un seul parti, régimes militaires, dictatures personnelles ou une combinaison de celles-ci, reposant généralement sur une famille limitée, clan, ou base tribale ». La prémisse sur laquelle se fonde son argument est qu’ils ne sont pas seulement «pas comme nous», ils sont en fait opposés à nos valeurs démocratiques essentielles. Il croit, comme les autres, que tandis que l'idée de démocratisation occidentale est combattue dans d'autres parties du monde, la confrontation est la plus notable dans les régions où l'islam est la religion dominante.
L'argument a également été avancé de l'autre côté. Un érudit religieux iranien, réflexion sur une crise constitutionnelle du début du XXe siècle dans son pays, a déclaré que l'islam et la démocratie ne sont pas compatibles parce que les gens ne sont pas égaux et qu'un organe législatif n'est pas nécessaire en raison de la nature inclusive de la loi religieuse islamique. Une position similaire a été prise plus récemment par Ali Belhadj, un professeur de lycée algérien, prédicateur et (dans ce contexte) leader du FIS, lorsqu'il a déclaré que «la démocratie n'était pas un concept islamique». La déclaration la plus dramatique à cet effet est peut-être celle d'Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, chef des insurgés sunnites en Irak qui, face à la perspective d'une élection, a dénoncé la démocratie comme «un principe diabolique».
Mais selon certains érudits musulmans, la démocratie reste un idéal important de l'islam, avec la mise en garde qu'il est toujours soumis à la loi religieuse. L'accent mis sur la place primordiale de la charia est un élément de presque tous les commentaires islamiques sur la gouvernance, modéré ou extrémiste. Seulement si la règle, qui reçoit son autorité de Dieu, limite ses actions à la «supervision de l’administration de la charia» est-il à obéir. S'il fait autre chose que ça, il est un non-croyant et les musulmans engagés doivent se rebeller contre lui. C'est là que réside la justification d'une grande partie de la violence qui a frappé le monde musulman dans des luttes telles que celle qui prévalait en Algérie dans les années 90.

La culture islamique politiques, Démocratie, et droits de l'homme

Daniel E. Prix

Il a été avancé que l'islam facilite l'autoritarisme, contredit le

valeurs des sociétés occidentales, et affecte de manière significative des résultats politiques importants
dans les pays musulmans. par conséquent, savants, commentateurs, et gouvernement
les responsables désignent fréquemment le «fondamentalisme islamique» comme le prochain
menace idéologique pour les démocraties libérales. Cette vue, cependant, est basé principalement
sur l'analyse des textes, Théorie politique islamique, et études ad hoc
de pays individuels, qui ne tiennent pas compte d'autres facteurs. C'est mon argument
que les textes et traditions de l'islam, comme ceux des autres religions,
peut être utilisé pour soutenir une variété de systèmes politiques et de politiques. De campagne
des études spécifiques et descriptives ne nous aident pas à trouver des modèles qui aideront
nous expliquons les relations variables entre l'islam et la politique à travers le
pays du monde musulman. D'où, une nouvelle approche de l'étude des
un lien entre l'islam et la politique est nécessaire.
je suggère, par une évaluation rigoureuse de la relation entre l'Islam,
la démocratie, et les droits de l'homme au niveau transnational, trop
l'accent est mis sur le pouvoir de l'islam en tant que force politique. Je l'ai fait en premier
utiliser des études de cas comparatives, qui se concentrent sur les facteurs liés à l'interaction
entre groupes et régimes islamiques, influences économiques, clivages ethniques,

et développement sociétal, pour expliquer la variance de l'influence de

L'Islam et la politique dans huit pays.

Les partis d'opposition islamistes et le potentiel d'engagement de l'UE

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Face à l'importance croissante des mouvements islamistes dans le monde musulman et

la façon dont la radicalisation a influencé les événements mondiaux depuis le début du siècle, il

est important pour l'UE d'évaluer ses politiques envers les acteurs dans ce qui peut être vaguement

appelé le « monde islamique ». Il est particulièrement important de se demander si et comment s'engager

avec les différents groupes islamistes.

Cela reste controversé même au sein de l'UE. Certains pensent que les valeurs islamiques qui

derrière les partis islamistes sont tout simplement incompatibles avec les idéaux occidentaux de démocratie et

droits de l'homme, tandis que d'autres voient l'engagement comme une nécessité réaliste en raison de la croissance

l'importance nationale des partis islamistes et leur implication croissante dans les

affaires. Une autre perspective est que la démocratisation dans le monde musulman augmenterait

Sécurité européenne. La validité de ces arguments et d'autres sur la question de savoir si et comment la

L'UE devrait s'engager ne peut être testée qu'en étudiant les différents mouvements islamistes et

leur situation politique, pays par pays.

La démocratisation est un thème central des actions de politique étrangère commune de l'UE, comme prévu

dans l'article 11 du traité sur l'Union européenne. De nombreux États considérés dans ce

le rapport n'est pas démocratique, ou pas entièrement démocratique. Dans la plupart de ces pays, islamiste

les partis et mouvements constituent une opposition significative aux régimes en place, et

dans certains, ils forment le plus grand bloc d'opposition. Les démocraties européennes ont longtemps dû

faire face à des régimes autoritaires, mais c'est un phénomène nouveau d'appuyer

pour une réforme démocratique dans les États où les bénéficiaires les plus probables pourraient avoir, du

Le point de vue de l'UE, approches différentes et parfois problématiques de la démocratie et de ses

valeurs liées, tels que les droits des minorités et des femmes et l’état de droit. Ces frais sont

souvent portées contre les mouvements islamistes, il est donc important que les décideurs politiques européens

avoir une image précise des politiques et des philosophies des partenaires potentiels.

Les expériences de différents pays tendent à suggérer que plus les islamistes sont libres

les fêtes sont autorisées, plus ils sont modérés dans leurs actions et leurs idées. Dans de nombreux

cas, les partis et groupes islamistes se sont éloignés depuis longtemps de leur objectif initial

d'établir un État islamique régi par la loi islamique, et en sont venus à accepter les bases

principes démocratiques de la compétition électorale pour le pouvoir, l'existence d'autres politiques

concurrents, et pluralisme politique.

MOUVEMENTS ISLAMISTES ET PROCESSUS DEMOCRATIQUE DANS LE MONDE ARABE: Explorer les zones grises

Nathan J. Brun, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

Au cours de la dernière décennie, Les mouvements islamistes se sont imposés comme des acteurs politiques majeurs au Moyen-Orient. En collaboration avec les gouvernements, Mouvements islamistes, modérée comme radicale, déterminera comment la politique de la région se déroulera dans un avenir prévisible. Ils ont montré leur capacité non seulement à élaborer des messages avec un large attrait populaire, mais aussi, et, surtout, créer des organisations avec de véritables bases sociales et développer des stratégies politiques cohérentes. Autres parties,
dans l'ensemble, ont échoué sur tous les comptes.
Le public occidental et, en particulier, les États Unis, n'a pris conscience de l'importance des mouvements islamistes qu'après des événements dramatiques, comme la révolution en Iran et l'assassinat du président Anwar al-Sadate en Égypte. L'attention est beaucoup plus soutenue depuis les attentats terroristes de septembre 11, 2001. Par conséquent, Les mouvements islamistes sont largement considérés comme dangereux et hostiles. Bien qu'une telle caractérisation soit exacte en ce qui concerne les organisations à l'extrémité radicale du spectre islamiste, qui sont dangereux en raison de leur volonté de recourir à la violence aveugle dans la poursuite de leurs objectifs, ce n'est pas une caractérisation précise des nombreux groupes qui ont renoncé à la violence ou qui l'ont évitée. Parce que les organisations terroristes posent un problème immédiat
menace, cependant, les décideurs politiques de tous les pays ont accordé une attention disproportionnée aux organisations violentes.
Ce sont les principales organisations islamistes, pas les radicaux, qui aura le plus grand impact sur l'évolution politique future du Moyen-Orient. Les objectifs grandioses des radicaux de rétablir un califat unissant tout le monde arabe, ou même d'imposer à chaque pays arabe des lois et des coutumes sociales inspirées par une interprétation fondamentaliste de l'islam sont tout simplement trop éloignées de la réalité d'aujourd'hui pour être réalisées. Cela ne signifie pas que les groupes terroristes ne sont pas dangereux - ils pourraient causer de grandes pertes de vie même dans la poursuite d'objectifs impossibles - mais qu'ils ne sont pas susceptibles de changer la face du Moyen-Orient.. Les organisations islamistes dominantes sont généralement une autre affaire. Ils ont déjà eu un impact puissant sur les coutumes sociales dans de nombreux pays, arrêter et inverser les tendances laïques et changer la façon dont de nombreux Arabes s'habillent et se comportent. Et leur objectif politique immédiat, devenir une force puissante en participant à la politique normale de leur pays, n'est pas impossible. Il se réalise déjà dans des pays comme le Maroc, Jordanie, et même l'Egypte, qui interdit toujours toutes les organisations politiques islamistes mais compte désormais quatre-vingt-huit Frères musulmans au Parlement. Politique, pas violent, est ce qui donne aux islamistes dominants leur influence.

Les Frères musulmans modérés

Robert S. aspect

Steven Brooke

Les Frères musulmans sont les plus anciens du monde, le plus grand, et l'organisation islamiste la plus influente. C'est aussi la plus controversée,
condamné à la fois par l'opinion conventionnelle en Occident et l'opinion radicale au Moyen-Orient. Les commentateurs américains ont qualifié les Frères musulmans d'« islamistes radicaux » et de « composante vitale de la force d'assaut ennemie ». … profondément hostile aux États-Unis. Ayman al-Zawahiri d'Al-Qaïda se moque d'eux pour "lur[ing] des milliers de jeunes hommes musulmans dans les files d'attente pour les élections … plutôt que dans les lignes du jihad. Les djihadistes détestent les Frères musulmans (connu en arabe sous le nom d'al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) pour avoir rejeté le djihad mondial et embrassé la démocratie. Ces positions semblent en faire des modérés, la chose même que les États-Unis, à court d'alliés dans le monde musulman, cherche.
Mais l'Ikhwan attaque aussi les États-Unis. politique extérieure, en particulier le soutien de Washington à Israël, et des questions subsistent quant à son engagement réel dans le processus démocratique. Au cours de l'année écoulée, nous avons rencontré des dizaines de dirigeants et militants de la confrérie d'Egypte, France, Jordanie, Espagne, Syrie,Tunisie, et le Royaume-Uni.

La gestion de l'activisme islamique: salafistes, Les Frères musulmans, et le pouvoir de l'État en Jordanie

Faisal Ghori

Dans son premier livre, La gestion de l'activisme islamique, Quintan Wiktorowicz examine les Frères musulmans jordaniens et les salafistes à travers le prisme de la théorie du mouvement social. Contrairement à certains politologues qui rejettent les mouvements islamiques en raison de leurs réseaux informels, Wiktorowicz soutient que la théorie du mouvement social est un cadre approprié à travers lequel les mouvements islamiques peuvent être examinés et étudiés. À cet égard, son travail mène le champ. Pourtant malgré toutes ses promesses, ce livre échoue largement à livrer.
Le livre est divisé en quatre sections principales, à travers lequel il essaie de construire sa conclusion: La libéralisation politique jordanienne s'est produite en raison de nécessités structurelles, pas à cause de son engagement envers la démocratisation. en outre, l'État a été magistral dans ce qu'il appelle la « gestion de l'action collective," (p. 3) qui a, à toutes fins pratiques, étouffé toute véritable opposition. Bien que sa conclusion soit certainement défendable, compte tenu de son vaste travail de terrain, le livre est mal organisé et une grande partie des preuves examinées plus tôt dans le travail laisse de nombreuses questions sans réponse.

Ce qui conduit les électeurs à soutenir l'opposition sous l'autoritarisme ?

Michael DH. Robbins

Les élections sont devenues monnaie courante dans la plupart des États autoritaires. Bien que cela puisse sembler être une contradiction dans les termes, en réalité les élections jouent un rôle important dans ces régimes. Alors que les élections pour les postes de pouvoir réel ont tendance à être non compétitives, de nombreux
les élections, y compris celles des parlements apparemment édentés, peuvent être fortement contestées.
La littérature existante s'est concentrée sur le rôle que jouent les élections dans le soutien du régime. Par exemple, ils peuvent aider à se défouler, aider le régime à prendre la température de la société, ou peut être utilisé pour aider une partie dominante à savoir quels individus elle doit promouvoir (Des horaires 2002; Blaydes 2006). Encore, alors que la littérature s'est concentrée sur l'offre d'élections dans les États autoritaires, il existe relativement peu d'études systématiques sur le comportement des électeurs lors de ces élections (voir Lust-Okar 2006 pour une exception). Plutôt, most analyses have argued that patronage politics are the norm in these societies and that ordinary citizens tend to be very cynical about these exercises given that they cannot bring any real change (Kassem 2004; Desposato 2001; Zaki 1995). While the majority of voters in authoritarian systems may behave in this manner, not all do. En réalité, at times, even the majority vote against the regime leading to
significant changes as has occurred recently in Kenya, the Ukraine and Zimbabwe. Encore, even in cases where opposition voters make up a much smaller percentage of voters, it is important to understand who these voters are and what leads them to vote against the
régime.

Frères musulmans en Jordanie

The Islamic movement in Jordan came to international attention in thewake of the April 1989 disturbances and the subsequent November 1989 élections parlementaires. These developments highlighted the movement’s political clout and raised the spectre in the West of an Iranian-style Islamic revolution in Jordan, fuelled by radical Islamic movements such as those of Egypt and the Maghrib. While various political trends competed for influence during the months prior to the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood had a clear advantage; its infrastructure in the mosques, the Qur’anicschools and the universities gave it a ready-made political base. The leftistand pro-regime groups, on the other hand, had to create de facto politicalparties—still legally banned—and to build their organizational base almostex nihilo, or to transform a clandestine infrastructure into an overt politicalone. There should have been very little surprise, donc, when the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist candidates won a windfall of 32 of the 80seats in Parliament.Politicization of Islam is not new in Jordan.1 Since the foundation of the Emirate of Trans jordan by ‘Abdallah, Islam has served as one of the building blocks of regime legitimacy and of nation-building. The genealogy of the Hashemite family as scions of the Prophet’s tribe was an important source of legitimacy for its rule in Syria, Iraq and Jordan, as it had been inthe Hijaz. The ideology of the “Great Arab Revolt” was no less Islamic than it was Arab, and the control of Jerusalem after 1948 was interpretedby the regime as an Islamic responsibility and not only an Arab one.2King ‘Abdallah and his grandson Hussein, took care to present themselvesas believing Muslims, appearing at rituals and prayers, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca and embellishing their speeches with Islamic motifs.3The status of Islam in the Kingdom was also formalized in the Jordanian constitution (1952) by stipulating that Islam is the religion of the kingdom and that the king must be a Muslim and of Muslim parents. loi islamique(Shari‘a) is defined in the constitution as one of the pillars of legislation in the kingdom, while family law is in the exclusive hands of the Shari‘a courts.

Réclamer le centre: L'Islam politique en transition

John L. Edwards

Dans les années 90, l'islam politique, ce que certains appellent “Fondamentalisme islamique,” reste une présence majeure au gouvernement et dans la politique d'opposition de l'Afrique du Nord à l'Asie du Sud-Est. L'islam politique au pouvoir et en politique a soulevé de nombreuses questions et questions: “L'islam est-il antithétique à la modernisation?,” “L'islam et la démocratie sont-ils incompatibles?,” “Quelles sont les implications d'un gouvernement islamique pour le pluralisme, droits des minorités et des femmes,” “À quel point les islamistes sont-ils représentatifs,” “Y a-t-il des modérés islamiques?,” “L'Occident devrait-il craindre une menace islamique transnationale ou un choc des civilisations??” Revivalisme islamique contemporain Le paysage du monde musulman révèle aujourd'hui l'émergence de nouvelles républiques islamiques (Iran, Soudan, Afghanistan), la prolifération des mouvements islamiques qui fonctionnent comme des acteurs politiques et sociaux majeurs au sein des systèmes existants, et la politique de confrontation des extrémistes violents radicaux. Contrairement aux années 80, quand l'islam politique était simplement assimilé à l'Iran révolutionnaire ou à des groupes clandestins portant des noms comme le jihad islamique ou l'Armée de Dieu, le monde musulman des années 1990 est celui dans lequel les islamistes ont participé au processus électoral et sont visibles en tant que premiers ministres, officiers du cabinet, orateurs d'assemblées nationales, parlementaires, et maires dans des pays aussi divers que l'Égypte, Soudan, Turquie, Iran, Liban, Koweit, Yémen, Jordanie, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaisie, Indonésie, et Israël / Palestine. À l'aube du XXIe siècle, L'islam politique continue d'être une force majeure pour l'ordre et le désordre dans la politique mondiale, celui qui participe au processus politique mais aussi aux actes de terrorisme, un défi au monde musulman et à l'Occident. Comprendre la nature de l'islam politique aujourd'hui, et en particulier les problèmes et questions qui ont émergé de l'expérience du passé récent, reste critique pour les gouvernements, créateurs de politiques, et les étudiants en politique internationale.

Comparant trois confréries musulmanes: SYRIE, JORDAN, EGYPTE

Barry Rubin

The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, et méthodes. Each, bien sûr, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, et méthodes. Each, bien sûr, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.First, it is important to understand the Brotherhood’s policy toward and relations with both jihadist groups (Al-Qaïda, the Zarqawi network, and others such as Hizb al-Tahrir and Hamas) and theorists (such as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi).The Brotherhoods do not have ongoing relationships with Hizb al-Tahrir—which is regarded by them as a small, cultish group of no importance. Other than in Jordan, they have had little contact with it at all.Regarding al-Qa’ida—both its theorists and its terrorist infrastructure—the Brotherhoods approve generally of its militancy, attacks on America, and ideology (or respect its ideologues), but view it as a rival.

L'avenir de l'Islam après 9/11

Mansoor Moaddel

There is no consensus among historians and Islamicists about the nature of theIslamic belief system and the experience of historical Islam, on which one couldbase a definitive judgment concerning Islam’s compatibility with modernity. Néanmoins,the availability of both historical and value survey data allow us to analyzethe future of Islam in light of the horrific event of 9/11. The key factor that woulddetermine the level of societal visibility necessary for predicting the future developmentof a culture is the nature and clarity of the ideological targets in relation towhich new cultural discourses are produced. Based on this premise, I shall try toilluminate the nature of such targets that are confronted by Muslim activists inIran, Egypte, et la Jordanie.

Bâtir des ponts pas des murs

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 Septembre 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MOAN) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Cependant, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.

Les Frères musulmans de Jordanie et Jama'at-i-Islam du Pakistan

Neha Sahgal

The study of Islamist activism is new to social movement theory. Socialmovement scholarship has ignored Islamist movements because of their unique faithbasednature. More recently scholars have recognized that the processes of contentionconceptualized by social movement theory can be applied to Islamist activism to seektheoretical refinements in both areas of study.In this paper, I examine variations in the strategies followed by Islamistmovements in response to government policies. States have followed various policies inmanaging the tide of Islamist opposition to their power. Some states have chosen to userepressive means (Egypte, Jordan before 1989), while others, at different times in theirhistory have used accommodative policies (Jordan after 1989, Pakistan, Malaisie). Iexamine the effects of government accommodation on Islamist movement strategies.I argue that accommodation can have varying effects on Islamist movementstrategies depending on the nature of accommodative policies followed. Governmentshave employed two different types of accommodative policies in their tenuousrelationship with Islamist opposition – Islamization and liberalization. Islamizationattempts to co-opt the movements through greater religiosity in state and society.Liberalization allows the movements to conduct their activities at both the state and thesocietal level without necessarily increasing the religiosity of the state1. Islamizationdisempowers Islamists while liberalization empowers them by providing a sphere ofinfluence.

Bulletins annulés

Marc Lynch

marc-akef

Moderate Islamist movements across the Arab world have made a decisive turn towards participation in democratic politics over the last 20 ans. They have developed an elaborate ideological justification for contesting elections, which they have defended against intense criticism from more radical Islamist competitors. À la fois, they have demonstrated a commitment to internal democracy remarkable by the standards of the region, and have repeatedly proved their willingness to respect the results of elections even when they lose.
But rather than welcome this development, secular authoritarian regimes have responded with growing repression. Again and again, successful electoral participation by Islamists has triggered a backlash, often with the consent – if not the encouragement – of the United States. When Hamas prevailed in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, the response was boycott and political subversion. When the Egyptian government cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood after elections in 2005, few outsiders objected.
As the door to democracy is slammed in their faces, how have the Islamist groups that embraced participation responded? In some ways, they have passed the test with flying colours. They have remained committed to democratic participation even in the face of massive electoral fraud and harsh campaigns of repression. Their leaders have affirmed their democratic ideals, and have often spoken out to reiterate their ideological and strategic commitment to democracy. En effet, they have often emerged as the leading advocates for public freedoms and democratic reform. And there is as yet little sign of any such organisation turning to violence as an alternative.
But in other ways, the toll of repression is beginning to show. Doubts about the value of democratic participation inside these movements are growing. Splits in the top ranks have roiled movements in Jordan and Egypt, among others. In many of the cases, a Brotherhood leadership which prefers a moderate, accommodationist approach to the regime has struggled to find a way to respond to the escalating pressures of repression and the closing down of the paths towards democratic participation. En Egypte, frustration over extended detentions of the most moderate leaders have tarnished the coin of those calling for political participation, with a rising trend calling for a retreat from politics and a renewed focus upon social activism and religious work. In Jordan, the influence of those seeking to abandon worthless domestic politics and to focus instead on supporting Hamas has grown.
Critics of the Brotherhood have pointed to these recent struggles as evidence that Islamists cannot be trusted with democracy. But this profoundly misreads the current trends. These crises in fact reflect a delayed response to the blocked promise of democratic participation. The Islamist debate today is not about the legitimacy of democracy – it is about how to respond to frustrated efforts to play the democratic game.
********************************
I recently spent a week in Amman, talking to most of the senior leaders of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood as well as a cross-section of the country’s political and journalistic elite. The picture that emerged was one not simply of an Islamist movement in crisis, but also of a blocked and deteriorating political system. The government was in the process of declining to call the Parliament back into session in order to force through its desired legislation as temporary laws of dubious constitutionality. Stories of social conflict among the tribes and of crushing economic problems amid spiralling corruption filled daily conversation.
The Jordanian Brotherhood, established in 1946, is one of the oldest and most deeply rooted branches of the global Islamist organisation. Unlike in many other countries, where the Brotherhood worked in opposition to those in power, in Jordan it played a crucial role for decades in supporting the Hashemite throne against external and domestic challengers. In return, it enjoyed a privileged relationship with the Jordanian state, including control over key ministries, and good relations with King Hussein in spite of his friendly ties with Israel and the United States.
When Jordan lost the West Bank in the 1967 war, it struggled to maintain its role in the occupied territories. Dans 1988, cependant, as the Palestinian Intifada raged and threatened to spread to the East Bank, Jordan formally renounced its claims, severing its ties and concentrating on developing the East Bank and “Jordanising” the truncated state, a decision that was not accepted by the Brotherhood, which maintained ties with its West Bank counterparts.
When riots broke out throughout the country the next year, King Hussein responded with a remarkable democratic opening which revitalised the Kingdom’s political life. The Brotherhood participated fully in this process, and emerged in the 1989 elections as the dominant bloc in Parliament. The years that followed are fondly remembered in Jordan as the apex of political life, with an effective Parliament, a “national pact” establishing the ground rules of democracy and a vibrant emerging press.
Dans 1993, cependant, the Jordanian regime changed the electoral law in a way that served to limit Muslim Brotherhood success. As it moved rapidly towards a peace treaty with Israel, the state began to clamp down on the Brotherhood and on all other forms of political opposition. Its interventions in the political process grew so extreme that in 1997 the Brotherhood’s political party, the Islamic Action Front, decided to boycott elections. After King Hussein’s death in 1999, the crown passed to his son Abdullah, who showed little interest in democratic reform, and in 2001 decided to suspend Parliament and rule by emergency law. While formal democracy returned in 2003, political reform efforts failed to gain traction. The extent of electoral fraud against the Brotherhood and other critics of the regime during the 2007 vote shocked even jaded observers.
The Jordanian crackdown has not reached the brutal levels of Syria or Tunisia (where the Islamist opposition was massacred or driven abroad). The Brotherhood continues to operate publicly, and the Islamic Action Front holds six seats in Parliament. But the gerrymandered electoral system and massive fraud has hamstrung Islamist political participation, to the degree that many believe that the Brotherhood is being dared to boycott.
Following the 2007 electoral debacle, the Brotherhood entered a period of intense internal unrest. It dissolved its Shura Council as penance for its fateful decision to participate in the election. The core issue was over how best to respond to the regime’s repression: through confrontation, or through a retreat and consolidation of the political strategy? En avril 2008, the “hawkish” trend won the internal elections to the Shura Council by a single vote, and the pragmatic and domestically-orientated Salem Falahat was replaced by the fiery, Palestine-centric hawk Himmam Said. Said and the new head of the Islamic Action Front, Zaki Bani Arshid, steered the Islamist movement into more direct conflict with the regime, with little success. The reformist trend, led by the soft-spoken intellectual Ruheil Ghuraybeh, avoided open confrontation but advanced an ambitious programme to transform Jordan into a constitutional monarchy.
As the Brotherhood rank and file lost interest in a stalled domestic political process, they were simultaneously galvanised by the electoral success of Hamas and then by the visceral images of Israel’s war on Gaza. The growing interest in Palestinian issues at the expense of Jordanian politics worried not only the regime but also the traditional leadership of the Brotherhood. The leading Jordanian journalist Mohammed Abu Rumman argues that the issue of relations with Hamas has supplanted the traditional “hawk-dove” struggle within the organisation. While both trends support Hamas – “if you are not with Hamas, you are not with the Muslim Brotherhood”, explained one of the “dovish” leaders – they disagree over the appropriate organisational relationship. The “Hamasi” trend supports close ties and the prioritisation of Palestinian issues, and embraces a common Muslim identity over a narrowly Jordanian one. The “reformist” trend insists that Hamas, as the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, should have responsibility for Palestine while the Jordanian Brotherhood must be a national organisation focused upon domestic Jordanian issues.
This crisis came to a head over the issue of Hamas participation in the administrative structures of the Jordanian Brotherhood. Three leading reformists resigned from the Executive Office, triggering an as-yet-unresolved internal crisis that threatens one of the first serious internal splits in the history of the movement. The media has eagerly egged this conflict on; indeed, a number of Brotherhood leaders told me that what made the current crisis unique was not the issues at stake or the intensity of the disagreement, but the fact that for the first time it had become public.
********************************
The story of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is many things, but certainly not a story of Islamists retreating from democracy. Similar dynamics can be seen in Egypt, where the Brotherhood’s leadership is similarly divided over how to respond to escalating repression. During multiple trips to Cairo in the last few years, I saw the growing frustration of a generation of reformists who found their every effort to embrace democracy met with force and rejection.
After “independent” Brotherhood candidates scored sweeping victories in the first of three rounds of the 2005 Parliamentary elections, government forces began to intervene to prevent further gains. Despite well-documented fraud and heavy-handed security interference in Brotherhood strongholds, the movement emerged as the largest opposition bloc with 88 des places. As Deputy Supreme Guide Mohammed Habib ruefully told me, their mistake was that they did too well – had they won 50 des places, perhaps they would not have triggered such harsh reprisals.
The subsequent crackdown matched the magnitude of the Brotherhood victory. A series of media campaigns aimed to scare mainstream Egyptians with alleged nefarious Brotherhood schemes (they were supposedly training an underground militia, conspiring with Hizbollah, and more). A wide range of leading Brotherhood figures, including noted moderates such as the financier Khairat el Shater and the intellectual Abd el Monem Abou el Fattouh, were detained indefinitely on trumped up charges.
For a while, the Egyptian Brotherhood held fast in the face of these provocations. They continued to try to participate in elections even as the fraud and overt manipulation mounted. Their Parliamentarians performed well as an opposition. They routinely expressed their ongoing commitment to democracy to every audience which would listen. And they imposed discipline on their own members to prevent the explosion of frustration into violence.
But over time, the pressure began to take its toll. The leadership reined in its freewheeling young bloggers, whose public airing of internal issues was being exploited by the organisation’s opponents. It adopted tougher rhetoric on foreign policy issues such as the Gaza war – attacking the Egyptian government’s enforcement of the blockade of Gaza – in part to rally its demoralised membership. Considerable evidence suggests that the cadres of the organisation were growing disenchanted with politics and preferred to return to the core social and religious mission. And growing voices from inside and outside the movement began to suggest retreating from politics until a more propitious time.
Earlier this month the conflicts inside the Egyptian Brotherhood leapt into the pages of local newspapers, which reported that the movement’s leader, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, had abruptly resigned his post in protest after conservatives refused to appoint the leading reformist Essam el Erian to an open leadership seat. Akef has denied the reports – but the portrait of a movement in turmoil is clear.
The Jordanian, Egyptian and American governments may see all this as something of a success story: the influence of the Islamists has been curbed, both in formal politics and in the social sector, et la retenue exercée par la direction des Frères musulmans a permis aux États de ne pas faire face à un contrecoup. Mais c'est dangereusement myope. Les campagnes contre les islamistes fragilisent les fondements de la démocratie dans son ensemble, pas seulement l'appel d'un mouvement, et ont eu un effet corrosif sur les libertés publiques, transparence et responsabilité. Indépendamment de la fortune des mouvements eux-mêmes, la répression contre les islamistes contribue à la corruption plus large de la vie publique. La frustration croissante au sein des groupes islamistes modérés à participation démocratique ne peut qu'affecter leur future trajectoire idéologique.
Semer le désenchantement vis-à-vis de la politique démocratique dans les rangs des Frères musulmans pourrait faire perdre l'un des développements les plus marquants de la pensée politique islamiste des dernières décennies. The failure of the movement’s democratic experiment could empower more radical Islamists, including not only terrorist groups but also doctrinaire salafists less inclined to pragmatic politics. The degradation of its organisational strengths could open up space for al Qa’eda and other radical competitors to move in. The alternative to Ismail Haniya might be Osama bin Laden rather than Abu Mazen, and the exclusion of Essam el-Erian may not produce an Ayman Nour.
Marc Lynch is associate professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He writes a blog on Arab politics and media for Foreign Policy.

Moderate Islamist movements across the Arab world have made a decisive turn towards participation in democratic politics over the last 20 ans. They have developed an elaborate ideological justification for contesting elections, which they have defended against intense criticism from more radical Islamist competitors. À la fois, they have demonstrated a commitment to internal democracy remarkable by the standards of the region, and have repeatedly proved their willingness to respect the results of elections even when they lose.

But rather than welcome this development, secular authoritarian regimes have responded with growing repression. Again and again, successful electoral participation by Islamists has triggered a backlash, often with the consent – if not the encouragement – of the United States. When Hamas prevailed in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, the response was boycott and political subversion. When the Egyptian government cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood after elections in 2005, few outsiders objected.

As the door to democracy is slammed in their faces, how have the Islamist groups that embraced participation responded? In some ways, they have passed the test with flying colours. They have remained committed to democratic participation even in the face of massive electoral fraud and harsh campaigns of repression. Their leaders have affirmed their democratic ideals, and have often spoken out to reiterate their ideological and strategic commitment to democracy. En effet, they have often emerged as the leading advocates for public freedoms and democratic reform. And there is as yet little sign of any such organisation turning to violence as an alternative.

But in other ways, the toll of repression is beginning to show. Doubts about the value of democratic participation inside these movements are growing. Splits in the top ranks have roiled movements in Jordan and Egypt, among others. In many of the cases, a Brotherhood leadership which prefers a moderate, accommodationist approach to the regime has struggled to find a way to respond to the escalating pressures of repression and the closing down of the paths towards democratic participation. En Egypte, frustration over extended detentions of the most moderate leaders have tarnished the coin of those calling for political participation, with a rising trend calling for a retreat from politics and a renewed focus upon social activism and religious work. In Jordan, the influence of those seeking to abandon worthless domestic politics and to focus instead on supporting Hamas has grown.

Critics of the Brotherhood have pointed to these recent struggles as evidence that Islamists cannot be trusted with democracy. But this profoundly misreads the current trends. These crises in fact reflect a delayed response to the blocked promise of democratic participation. The Islamist debate today is not about the legitimacy of democracy – it is about how to respond to frustrated efforts to play the democratic game.

********************************

I recently spent a week in Amman, talking to most of the senior leaders of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood as well as a cross-section of the country’s political and journalistic elite. The picture that emerged was one not simply of an Islamist movement in crisis, but also of a blocked and deteriorating political system. The government was in the process of declining to call the Parliament back into session in order to force through its desired legislation as temporary laws of dubious constitutionality. Stories of social conflict among the tribes and of crushing economic problems amid spiralling corruption filled daily conversation.

The Jordanian Brotherhood, established in 1946, is one of the oldest and most deeply rooted branches of the global Islamist organisation. Unlike in many other countries, where the Brotherhood worked in opposition to those in power, in Jordan it played a crucial role for decades in supporting the Hashemite throne against external and domestic challengers. In return, it enjoyed a privileged relationship with the Jordanian state, including control over key ministries, and good relations with King Hussein in spite of his friendly ties with Israel and the United States.

When Jordan lost the West Bank in the 1967 war, it struggled to maintain its role in the occupied territories. Dans 1988, cependant, as the Palestinian Intifada raged and threatened to spread to the East Bank, Jordan formally renounced its claims, severing its ties and concentrating on developing the East Bank and “Jordanising” the truncated state, a decision that was not accepted by the Brotherhood, which maintained ties with its West Bank counterparts.

When riots broke out throughout the country the next year, King Hussein responded with a remarkable democratic opening which revitalised the Kingdom’s political life. The Brotherhood participated fully in this process, and emerged in the 1989 elections as the dominant bloc in Parliament. The years that followed are fondly remembered in Jordan as the apex of political life, with an effective Parliament, a “national pact” establishing the ground rules of democracy and a vibrant emerging press.

Dans 1993, cependant, the Jordanian regime changed the electoral law in a way that served to limit Muslim Brotherhood success. As it moved rapidly towards a peace treaty with Israel, the state began to clamp down on the Brotherhood and on all other forms of political opposition. Its interventions in the political process grew so extreme that in 1997 the Brotherhood’s political party, the Islamic Action Front, decided to boycott elections. After King Hussein’s death in 1999, the crown passed to his son Abdullah, who showed little interest in democratic reform, and in 2001 decided to suspend Parliament and rule by emergency law. While formal democracy returned in 2003, political reform efforts failed to gain traction. The extent of electoral fraud against the Brotherhood and other critics of the regime during the 2007 vote shocked even jaded observers.

The Jordanian crackdown has not reached the brutal levels of Syria or Tunisia (where the Islamist opposition was massacred or driven abroad). The Brotherhood continues to operate publicly, and the Islamic Action Front holds six seats in Parliament. But the gerrymandered electoral system and massive fraud has hamstrung Islamist political participation, to the degree that many believe that the Brotherhood is being dared to boycott.

Following the 2007 electoral debacle, the Brotherhood entered a period of intense internal unrest. It dissolved its Shura Council as penance for its fateful decision to participate in the election. The core issue was over how best to respond to the regime’s repression: through confrontation, or through a retreat and consolidation of the political strategy? En avril 2008, the “hawkish” trend won the internal elections to the Shura Council by a single vote, and the pragmatic and domestically-orientated Salem Falahat was replaced by the fiery, Palestine-centric hawk Himmam Said. Said and the new head of the Islamic Action Front, Zaki Bani Arshid, steered the Islamist movement into more direct conflict with the regime, with little success. The reformist trend, led by the soft-spoken intellectual Ruheil Ghuraybeh, avoided open confrontation but advanced an ambitious programme to transform Jordan into a constitutional monarchy.

As the Brotherhood rank and file lost interest in a stalled domestic political process, they were simultaneously galvanised by the electoral success of Hamas and then by the visceral images of Israel’s war on Gaza. The growing interest in Palestinian issues at the expense of Jordanian politics worried not only the regime but also the traditional leadership of the Brotherhood. The leading Jordanian journalist Mohammed Abu Rumman argues that the issue of relations with Hamas has supplanted the traditional “hawk-dove” struggle within the organisation. While both trends support Hamas – “if you are not with Hamas, you are not with the Muslim Brotherhood”, explained one of the “dovish” leaders – they disagree over the appropriate organisational relationship. The “Hamasi” trend supports close ties and the prioritisation of Palestinian issues, and embraces a common Muslim identity over a narrowly Jordanian one. The “reformist” trend insists that Hamas, as the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, should have responsibility for Palestine while the Jordanian Brotherhood must be a national organisation focused upon domestic Jordanian issues.

This crisis came to a head over the issue of Hamas participation in the administrative structures of the Jordanian Brotherhood. Three leading reformists resigned from the Executive Office, triggering an as-yet-unresolved internal crisis that threatens one of the first serious internal splits in the history of the movement. The media has eagerly egged this conflict on; indeed, a number of Brotherhood leaders told me that what made the current crisis unique was not the issues at stake or the intensity of the disagreement, but the fact that for the first time it had become public.

********************************

The story of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is many things, but certainly not a story of Islamists retreating from democracy. Similar dynamics can be seen in Egypt, where the Brotherhood’s leadership is similarly divided over how to respond to escalating repression. During multiple trips to Cairo in the last few years, I saw the growing frustration of a generation of reformists who found their every effort to embrace democracy met with force and rejection.

After “independent” Brotherhood candidates scored sweeping victories in the first of three rounds of the 2005 Parliamentary elections, government forces began to intervene to prevent further gains. Despite well-documented fraud and heavy-handed security interference in Brotherhood strongholds, the movement emerged as the largest opposition bloc with 88 des places. As Deputy Supreme Guide Mohammed Habib ruefully told me, their mistake was that they did too well – had they won 50 des places, perhaps they would not have triggered such harsh reprisals.

The subsequent crackdown matched the magnitude of the Brotherhood victory. A series of media campaigns aimed to scare mainstream Egyptians with alleged nefarious Brotherhood schemes (they were supposedly training an underground militia, conspiring with Hizbollah, and more). A wide range of leading Brotherhood figures, including noted moderates such as the financier Khairat el Shater and the intellectual Abd el Monem Abou el Fattouh, were detained indefinitely on trumped up charges.

For a while, the Egyptian Brotherhood held fast in the face of these provocations. They continued to try to participate in elections even as the fraud and overt manipulation mounted. Their Parliamentarians performed well as an opposition. They routinely expressed their ongoing commitment to democracy to every audience which would listen. And they imposed discipline on their own members to prevent the explosion of frustration into violence.

But over time, the pressure began to take its toll. The leadership reined in its freewheeling young bloggers, whose public airing of internal issues was being exploited by the organisation’s opponents. It adopted tougher rhetoric on foreign policy issues such as the Gaza war – attacking the Egyptian government’s enforcement of the blockade of Gaza – in part to rally its demoralised membership. Considerable evidence suggests that the cadres of the organisation were growing disenchanted with politics and preferred to return to the core social and religious mission. And growing voices from inside and outside the movement began to suggest retreating from politics until a more propitious time.

Earlier this month the conflicts inside the Egyptian Brotherhood leapt into the pages of local newspapers, which reported that the movement’s leader, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, had abruptly resigned his post in protest after conservatives refused to appoint the leading reformist Essam el Erian to an open leadership seat. Akef has denied the reports – but the portrait of a movement in turmoil is clear.

The Jordanian, Egyptian and American governments may see all this as something of a success story: the influence of the Islamists has been curbed, both in formal politics and in the social sector, et la retenue exercée par la direction des Frères musulmans a permis aux États de ne pas faire face à un contrecoup. Mais c'est dangereusement myope. Les campagnes contre les islamistes fragilisent les fondements de la démocratie dans son ensemble, pas seulement l'appel d'un mouvement, et ont eu un effet corrosif sur les libertés publiques, transparence et responsabilité. Indépendamment de la fortune des mouvements eux-mêmes, la répression contre les islamistes contribue à la corruption plus large de la vie publique. La frustration croissante au sein des groupes islamistes modérés à participation démocratique ne peut qu'affecter leur future trajectoire idéologique.

Semer le désenchantement vis-à-vis de la politique démocratique dans les rangs des Frères musulmans pourrait faire perdre l'un des développements les plus marquants de la pensée politique islamiste des dernières décennies. The failure of the movement’s democratic experiment could empower more radical Islamists, including not only terrorist groups but also doctrinaire salafists less inclined to pragmatic politics. The degradation of its organisational strengths could open up space for al Qa’eda and other radical competitors to move in. The alternative to Ismail Haniya might be Osama bin Laden rather than Abu Mazen, and the exclusion of Essam el-Erian may not produce an Ayman Nour.

Marc Lynch is associate professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He writes a blog on Arab politics and media for Foreign Policy.

From the National

Published on October 30, 2009

L'Internet et la politique islamiste en Jordanie, Maroc et l'Egypte.

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a
dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and
commerce. The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the
researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the
Bedouin in Egypt. Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches
across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously
silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites. Political organizations
across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future,
and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, et
administrative papers through their sites. De la même manière, religious groups display their beliefs online
through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of
eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues. Fusing the two, islamiste
political organizations have made their presence known through sophisticated websites detailing
their political platforms, relevant news stories, and religiously oriented material discussing their
theological views. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by
Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Morocco and
Egypte.
Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to
publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions
of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization. Ce papier va
examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in
2
Jordanie, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home
and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes. Première, islamiste
organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere
through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.
Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which
officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media
restrictions imposed by the state. Pour terminer, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a
counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an
international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim
Fraternité, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western
style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, politicians and journalists. The MB
has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties
attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies
between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section
on the Muslim Brotherhood. These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and
desired outcomes; cependant, each goal targets a different actor: the public, the media, et le
régime. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study
analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.
1

Andrew Helms

Ikhwanweb

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and commerce.

The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the Bedouin in Egypt.

Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites.

Political organizations across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future, and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, and administrative papers through their sites. De la même manière, religious groups display their beliefs online through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues.

Fusing the two, Islamist political organizations have made their presence known through sophisticated websites detailing their political platforms, relevant news stories, and religiously oriented material discussing their theological views. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Maroc et l'Egypte.

Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization.

This paper will examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes.

Première, Islamist organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.

Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media restrictions imposed by the state.

Pour terminer, Internet permet aux organisations islamistes de présenter un discours contre-hégémonique en opposition au régime en place ou à la monarchie ou de s'afficher devant un public international. Cette troisième motivation s'applique plus particulièrement aux Frères musulmans, qui présente un site Web sophistiqué en anglais conçu dans un style occidental et conçu pour atteindre un public sélectif d'érudits, politicians and journalists.

Le MB a excellé dans ce soi-disant « bridgeblogging » 1 et a établi la norme pour les partis islamistes qui tentent d'influencer la perception internationale de leurs positions et de leur travail. Le contenu varie entre les versions arabe et anglaise du site, et seront examinés plus loin dans la section sur les Frères musulmans.

Ces trois objectifs se chevauchent de manière significative à la fois dans leurs intentions et les résultats souhaités; cependant, each goal targets a different actor: the public, the media, and the regime. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.