RSSAlle Einträge Tagged With: "Jordan"

Irak und die Zukunft des politischen Islam

James Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?", where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(ein) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Islam und Demokratie

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

Islamische Politische Kultur, Demokratie, und Menschenrechte

Daniel E. Preis

Es wurde argumentiert, dass der Islam den Autoritarismus erleichtert, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Folglich, Gelehrte, Kommentatoren, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. Diese Aussicht, jedoch, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamische politische Theorie, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, die andere Faktoren nicht berücksichtigen. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, wie die anderer Religionen,
kann verwendet werden, um eine Vielzahl von politischen Systemen und Richtlinien zu unterstützen. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Somit, Ein neuer Ansatz für das Studium der
Verbindung von Islam und Politik gefordert.
Ich schlage vor, durch strenge Bewertung der Beziehung zwischen dem Islam,
Demokratie, und Menschenrechte auf länderübergreifender Ebene, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, wirtschaftliche Einflüsse, ethnische Spaltungen,

und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Islamistische Oppositionsparteien und das Potenzial für EU-Engagement

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Angesichts der zunehmenden Bedeutung islamistischer Bewegungen in der muslimischen Welt und

die Art und Weise, wie die Radikalisierung die globalen Ereignisse seit der Jahrhundertwende beeinflusst hat, es

Für die EU ist es wichtig, ihre Politik gegenüber Akteuren innerhalb dessen zu bewerten, was locker sein kann

als "islamische Welt" bezeichnet. Es ist besonders wichtig zu fragen, ob und wie man sich engagiert

mit den verschiedenen islamistischen Gruppen.

Dies bleibt auch innerhalb der EU umstritten. Einige glauben, dass der Islam das schätzt

hinter islamistischen Parteien liegen einfach unvereinbar mit westlichen Idealen der Demokratie und

Menschenrechte, während andere Engagement aufgrund des Wachstums als realistische Notwendigkeit ansehen

innerstaatliche Bedeutung islamistischer Parteien und ihr zunehmendes Engagement im internationalen Bereich

Angelegenheiten. Eine andere Perspektive ist, dass die Demokratisierung in der muslimischen Welt zunehmen würde

Europäische Sicherheit. Die Gültigkeit dieser und anderer Argumente darüber, ob und wie die

EU sollte sich engagieren kann nur durch das Studium der verschiedenen islamistischen Bewegungen und getestet werden

ihre politischen Umstände, Land für Land.

Demokratisierung ist ein zentrales Thema der gemeinsamen außenpolitischen Maßnahmen der EU, wie gelegt

in Artikel 11 des Vertrags über die Europäische Union. Viele der Staaten haben dies berücksichtigt

Bericht sind nicht demokratisch, oder nicht vollständig demokratisch. In den meisten dieser Länder, Islamist

Parteien und Bewegungen stellen einen erheblichen Widerstand gegen die vorherrschenden Regime dar, und

in einigen bilden sie den größten Oppositionsblock. Europäische Demokratien mussten lange

sich mit autoritären Regimen befassen, aber es ist ein neues Phänomen zu drücken

für demokratische Reformen in Staaten, in denen die wahrscheinlichsten Nutznießer haben könnten, von dem

Standpunkt der EU, unterschiedliche und manchmal problematische Ansätze zur Demokratie und ihren

verwandte Werte, wie Minderheiten- und Frauenrechte und Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Diese Gebühren sind

oft gegen islamistische Bewegungen gelegt, Daher ist es für die europäischen politischen Entscheidungsträger wichtig, dies zu tun

ein genaues Bild der Richtlinien und Philosophien potenzieller Partner haben.

Erfahrungen aus verschiedenen Ländern deuten darauf hin, dass der Islamist mehr Freiheit hat

Parteien sind erlaubt, Je gemäßigter sie in ihren Handlungen und Ideen sind. In vielen

Fälle Islamistische Parteien und Gruppen haben sich längst von ihrem ursprünglichen Ziel entfernt

der Errichtung eines islamischen Staates, der dem islamischen Recht unterliegt, und sind gekommen, um grundlegende zu akzeptieren

demokratische Prinzipien des Wahlkampfs um die Macht, die Existenz anderer politischer

Wettbewerber, und politischer Pluralismus.

Islamistischen Bewegungen und den demokratischen Prozess in DER ARABISCHEN WELT: Exploring the Grauzonen

Nathan J. Braun, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

Während des letzten Jahrzehnts, Islamistische Bewegungen haben sich als wichtige politische Akteure im Nahen Osten etabliert. Zusammen mit den Regierungen, Islamistische Bewegungen, moderat und radikal, bestimmen, wie sich die Politik der Region in absehbarer Zeit entwickelt. Sie haben gezeigt, dass sie nicht nur Botschaften mit weit verbreiteter Beliebtheit verfassen können, sondern auch, und am wichtigsten, Organisationen mit echter sozialer Basis zu schaffen und kohärente politische Strategien zu entwickeln. Andere Parties,
im Großen und Ganzen, sind auf allen Konten gescheitert.
Die Öffentlichkeit im Westen und, im Speziellen, Die Vereinigten Staaten, ist sich der Bedeutung islamistischer Bewegungen erst nach dramatischen Ereignissen bewusst geworden, wie die Revolution im Iran und die Ermordung von Präsident Anwar al-Sadat in Ägypten. Seit den Terroranschlägen vom September ist die Aufmerksamkeit weitaus nachhaltiger geworden 11, 2001. Als Ergebnis, Islamistische Bewegungen gelten weithin als gefährlich und feindselig. Während eine solche Charakterisierung in Bezug auf Organisationen am radikalen Ende des islamistischen Spektrums zutreffend ist, die gefährlich sind, weil sie bereit sind, bei der Verfolgung ihrer Ziele auf wahllose Gewalt zurückzugreifen, es ist keine genaue Charakterisierung der vielen Gruppen, die auf Gewalt verzichtet oder sie vermieden haben. Denn terroristische Organisationen stellen einen unmittelbaren dar
Drohung, jedoch, politische Entscheidungsträger in allen Ländern haben den gewalttätigen Organisationen unverhältnismäßige Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt.
Es sind die etablierten islamistischen Organisationen, nicht die Radikalen, die den größten Einfluss auf die zukünftige politische Entwicklung des Nahen Ostens haben wird. Die grandiosen Ziele der Radikalen, ein Kalifat wiederherzustellen, das die gesamte arabische Welt vereint, oder gar einzelnen arabischen Ländern Gesetze und gesellschaftliche Bräuche aufzuerlegen, die von einer fundamentalistischen Interpretation des Islam inspiriert sind, sind einfach zu weit von der heutigen Realität entfernt, um verwirklicht zu werden. Das bedeutet nicht, dass terroristische Gruppen nicht gefährlich sind – sie könnten selbst bei der Verfolgung unmöglicher Ziele viele Menschenleben fordern –, aber dass sie das Gesicht des Nahen Ostens wahrscheinlich nicht verändern werden. Mainstream-islamistische Organisationen sind generell eine andere Sache. Sie haben in vielen Ländern bereits einen starken Einfluss auf die gesellschaftlichen Gepflogenheiten ausgeübt, säkularistische Trends zu stoppen und umzukehren und die Art und Weise zu ändern, wie sich viele Araber kleiden und verhalten. Und ihr unmittelbares politisches Ziel, eine mächtige Kraft zu werden, indem sie an der normalen Politik ihres Landes teilnehmen, ist nicht unmöglich. In Ländern wie Marokko wird es bereits umgesetzt, Jordan, und sogar Ägypten, die immer noch alle islamistischen politischen Organisationen verbietet, aber jetzt achtundachtzig Muslimbrüder im Parlament hat. Politik, nicht Gewalt, ist es, was Mainstream-Islamisten ihren Einfluss verleiht.

Die Moderate Muslimbruderschaft

Robert S. Aspekt

Steven Brooke

The Muslim Brotherhood is the world’s oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organization. It is also the most controversial,
condemned by both conventional opinion in the West and radical opinion in the Middle East. American commentators have called the Muslim Brothers “radical Islamists” and “a vital component of the enemy’s assault forcedeeply hostile to the United States.” Al Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri sneers at them for “lur[ing] thousands of young Muslim men into lines for electionsinstead of into the lines of jihad.” Jihadists loathe the Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) for rejecting global jihad and embracing democracy. These positions seem to make them moderates, the very thing the United States, short on allies in the Muslim world, seeks.
But the Ikhwan also assails U.S. Außenpolitik, especially Washington’s support for Israel, and questions linger about its actual commitment to the democratic process. Over the past year, we have met with dozens of Brotherhood leaders and activists from Egypt, Frankreich, Jordan, Spanien, Syrien,Tunesien, and the United Kingdom.

Das Management des islamischen Aktivismus: Salafisten, Die Muslimbruderschaft, und Staatsmacht in Jordanien

Faisal Ghori

In his first book, Das Management des islamischen Aktivismus, Quintan Wiktorowicz examines the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis through the lens of social movement theory. Unlike some political scientists who dismiss Islamic movements because of their informal networks, Wiktorowicz contends that social movement theory is an apt framework through which Islamic movements can be examined and studied. In this regard, his work leads the field. Yet for all its promise, this book largely fails to deliver.
The book is divided into four primary sections, through which he tries to construct his conclusion: Jordanian political liberalization has occurred because of structural necessities, not because of its commitment to democratization. Außerdem, the state has been masterful in what he dubs the “management of collective action," (p. 3) which has, for all practical purposes, stifled any real opposition. While his conclusion is certainly tenable, given his extensive fieldwork, the book is poorly organized and much of the evidence examined earlier in the work leaves many questions unanswered.

Was die Wähler dazu bringt, die Opposition im Autoritarismus zu unterstützen ?

Michael DH. Robbins

Elections have become commonplace in most authoritarian states. While this may seem to be a contradiction in terms, in reality elections play an important role in these regimes. While elections for positions of real power tend to be non-competitive, many
elections—including those for seemingly toothless parliaments—can be strongly contested.
The existing literature has focused on the role that elections play in supporting the regime. Beispielsweise, they can help let off steam, help the regime take the temperature of society, or can be used to help a dominant party know which individuals it should promote (Schedler 2002; Blaydes 2006). Noch, while the literature has focused on the supply-side of elections in authoritarian states, there are relatively few systematic studies of voter behavior in these elections (see Lust-Okar 2006 for an exception). Vielmehr, most analyses have argued that patronage politics are the norm in these societies and that ordinary citizens tend to be very cynical about these exercises given that they cannot bring any real change (Kassem 2004; Desposato 2001; Zaki 1995). While the majority of voters in authoritarian systems may behave in this manner, not all do. Tatsächlich, at times, even the majority vote against the regime leading to
significant changes as has occurred recently in Kenya, the Ukraine and Zimbabwe. Noch, even in cases where opposition voters make up a much smaller percentage of voters, it is important to understand who these voters are and what leads them to vote against the
Regime.

Muslimbruderschaft in Jordanien

The Islamic movement in Jordan came to international attention in thewake of the April 1989 disturbances and the subsequent November 1989 Parlamentswahlen. These developments highlighted the movement’s political clout and raised the spectre in the West of an Iranian-style Islamic revolution in Jordan, fuelled by radical Islamic movements such as those of Egypt and the Maghrib. While various political trends competed for influence during the months prior to the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood had a clear advantage; its infrastructure in the mosques, the Qur’anicschools and the universities gave it a ready-made political base. The leftistand pro-regime groups, auf der anderen Seite, had to create de facto politicalparties—still legally banned—and to build their organizational base almostex nihilo, or to transform a clandestine infrastructure into an overt politicalone. There should have been very little surprise, therefore, when the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist candidates won a windfall of 32 of the 80seats in Parliament.Politicization of Islam is not new in Jordan.1 Since the foundation of the Emirate of Trans jordan by ‘Abdallah, Islam has served as one of the building blocks of regime legitimacy and of nation-building. The genealogy of the Hashemite family as scions of the Prophet’s tribe was an important source of legitimacy for its rule in Syria, Iraq and Jordan, as it had been inthe Hijaz. The ideology of the “Great Arab Revolt” was no less Islamic than it was Arab, and the control of Jerusalem after 1948 was interpretedby the regime as an Islamic responsibility and not only an Arab one.2King ‘Abdallah and his grandson Hussein, took care to present themselvesas believing Muslims, appearing at rituals and prayers, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca and embellishing their speeches with Islamic motifs.3The status of Islam in the Kingdom was also formalized in the Jordanian constitution (1952) by stipulating that Islam is the religion of the kingdom and that the king must be a Muslim and of Muslim parents. Islamisches Gesetz(Shari‘a) is defined in the constitution as one of the pillars of legislation in the kingdom, while family law is in the exclusive hands of the Shari‘a courts.

Das Zentrum beanspruchen: Politischer Islam im Wandel

John L. Edwards

In den 1990er Jahren politischer Islam, was manche nennen “Islamischer Fundamentalismus,” bleibt eine wichtige Präsenz in der Regierung und in der Oppositionspolitik von Nordafrika bis Südostasien. Der politische Islam an der Macht und in der Politik hat viele Probleme und Fragen aufgeworfen: “Ist der Islam der Modernisierung entgegengesetzt??,” “Sind Islam und Demokratie unvereinbar??,” “Was bedeutet eine islamische Regierung für den Pluralismus?, Minderheiten- und Frauenrechte,” “Wie repräsentativ sind Islamisten,” “Gibt es islamische Gemäßigte??,” “Sollte der Westen eine transnationale islamische Bedrohung oder einen Zusammenprall der Zivilisationen befürchten??” Zeitgenössischer islamischer Wiederbelebungismus Die heutige Landschaft der muslimischen Welt zeigt die Entstehung neuer islamischer Republiken (Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan), die Verbreitung islamischer Bewegungen, die als wichtige politische und soziale Akteure innerhalb bestehender Systeme fungieren, und die Konfrontationspolitik radikaler gewalttätiger Extremisten. Im Gegensatz zu den 1980er Jahren, als der politische Islam einfach mit dem revolutionären Iran oder geheimen Gruppen mit Namen wie dem Islamischen Dschihad oder der Armee Gottes gleichgesetzt wurde, Die muslimische Welt in den neunziger Jahren ist eine Welt, in der Islamisten am Wahlprozess teilgenommen haben und als Premierminister sichtbar sind, Kabinettsbeamte, Sprecher von Nationalversammlungen, Parlamentarier, und Bürgermeister in so unterschiedlichen Ländern wie Ägypten, Sudan, Türkei, Iran, Libanon, Kuwait, Jemen, Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesch, Malaysia, Indonesien, und Israel / Palästina. Zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts, Der politische Islam ist weiterhin eine wichtige Kraft für Ordnung und Unordnung in der Weltpolitik, eine, die am politischen Prozess, aber auch an Terrorakten beteiligt ist, eine Herausforderung für die muslimische Welt und den Westen. Die Natur des politischen Islam heute verstehen, und insbesondere die Probleme und Fragen, die sich aus den Erfahrungen der jüngeren Vergangenheit ergeben haben, bleibt für die Regierungen kritisch, politische Entscheidungsträger, und Studenten der internationalen Politik gleichermaßen.

VERGLEICH drei muslimischen Bruderschaften: SYRIEN, JORDAN, ÄGYPTEN

Barry Rubin

Das Banner der islamistischen Revolution im Nahen Osten hat heute weitgehend auf Gruppen sponsored by weitergegeben oder abgeleitet aus der Muslimbruderschaft. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, and methods. Each, natürlich, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, and methods. Each, natürlich, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.First, it is important to understand the Brotherhood’s policy toward and relations with both jihadist groups (Al-Qaida, the Zarqawi network, and others such as Hizb al-Tahrir and Hamas) and theorists (such as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi).The Brotherhoods do not have ongoing relationships with Hizb al-Tahrir—which is regarded by them as a small, cultish group of no importance. Other than in Jordan, they have had little contact with it at all.Regarding al-Qa’ida—both its theorists and its terrorist infrastructure—the Brotherhoods approve generally of its militancy, attacks on America, and ideology (or respect its ideologues), but view it as a rival.

Die Zukunft des Islam nach 9/11

Mansoor Moaddel

Historiker und Islamisten sind sich nicht einig über die Natur des islamischen Glaubenssystems und die Erfahrung des historischen Islam, worauf man ein endgültiges Urteil über die Vereinbarkeit des Islam mit der Moderne stützen könnte. dennoch,Die Verfügbarkeit sowohl historischer als auch wertbezogener Umfragedaten ermöglicht es uns, die Zukunft des Islam im Lichte des schrecklichen Ereignisses von zu analysieren 9/11. Der Schlüsselfaktor, der das Maß an gesellschaftlicher Sichtbarkeit bestimmen würde, das für die Vorhersage der zukünftigen Entwicklung einer Kultur erforderlich ist, ist die Art und Klarheit der ideologischen Ziele in Bezug auf die Entstehung neuer kultureller Diskurse. Basierend auf dieser Prämisse, Ich werde versuchen, die Natur solcher Ziele zu beleuchten, mit denen muslimische Aktivisten im Iran konfrontiert sind, Ägypten, und Jordanien.

Brücken bauen, keine Mauern

Alex Glennie

Seit den Terroranschlägen von 11 September 2001 Im Nahen Osten und in Nordafrika ist das Interesse am politischen Islamismus explodiert (MENA) Region. Bis vor kurzem,Analysten haben sich verständlicherweise auf jene Akteure konzentriert, die am gewalttätigen Ende des islamistischen Spektrums agieren, einschließlich Al-Qaida, die Taliban, einige der sektiererischen Parteien im Irak und politische Gruppen mit bewaffneten Flügeln wie die Hamas in den besetzten palästinensischen Gebieten (OPT)und Hisbollah im Libanon.Allerdings, Dies hat die Tatsache verschleiert, dass die zeitgenössische Politik in der gesamten MENA-Region von einer viel vielfältigeren Sammlung islamistischer „Mainstream“-Bewegungen angetrieben und geformt wird. Wir definieren diese als Gruppen, die sich an den legalen politischen Prozessen ihrer Länder beteiligen oder dies versuchen und die öffentlich auf den Einsatz von Gewalt verzichtet haben, um ihre Ziele auf nationaler Ebene zu verwirklichen, selbst dort, wo sie diskriminiert oder unterdrückt werden. Diese Definition würde Gruppen wie die Muslimbruderschaft in Ägypten umfassen, die Partei für Gerechtigkeit und Entwicklung (PJD) in Marokko und der Islamischen Aktionsfront (IAF) in Jordanien. Diese gewaltfreien islamistischen Bewegungen oder Parteien stellen oft das am besten organisierte und populärste Element der Opposition gegen die bestehenden Regime in jedem Land dar, und als solche gibt es seitens westlicher Politiker ein zunehmendes Interesse an der Rolle, die sie bei der Förderung der Demokratie in der Region spielen könnten. Dennoch scheinen die Diskussionen zu diesem Thema bei der Frage ins Stocken geraten zu sein, ob es angebracht wäre, mit diesen Gruppen auf einer systematischeren und formelleren Basis zusammenzuarbeiten, und nicht auf die praktischen Aspekte, dies tatsächlich zu tun. Diese Haltung ist teilweise mit einer berechtigten mangelnden Bereitschaft verbunden, Gruppen zu legitimieren, die möglicherweise antidemokratische Ansichten zu Frauenrechten vertreten, politischer Pluralismus und eine Reihe anderer Themen. Es spiegelt auch pragmatische Überlegungen zu den strategischen Interessen westlicher Mächte in der MENA-Region wider, die durch die zunehmende Popularität und den wachsenden Einfluss von Islamisten bedroht werden. Für ihren Teil, Islamistische Parteien und Bewegungen haben einen deutlichen Widerwillen gezeigt, engere Beziehungen zu den westlichen Mächten zu knüpfen, deren Politik in der Region sie entschieden ablehnen, nicht zuletzt aus Angst vor der Reaktion der repressiven Regime, in denen sie operieren. Die Verpflichtung zu einer Strategie des bewussteren Engagements mit etablierten islamistischen Parteien würde erhebliche Risiken und Kompromisse für die nordamerikanischen und europäischen politischen Entscheidungsträger mit sich bringen. Aber, Wir vertreten die Position, dass die Tendenz beider Seiten, Engagement als Nullsummenspiel „Alles oder Nichts“ zu betrachten, nicht hilfreich war, und muss sich ändern, wenn ein konstruktiverer Dialog über Reformen im Nahen Osten und in Nordafrika entstehen soll.

Die Muslimbruderschaft von Jordanien und die Jama’at-i-Islam von Pakistan

Neha Sahgal

The study of Islamist activism is new to social movement theory. Socialmovement scholarship has ignored Islamist movements because of their unique faithbasednature. More recently scholars have recognized that the processes of contentionconceptualized by social movement theory can be applied to Islamist activism to seektheoretical refinements in both areas of study.In this paper, I examine variations in the strategies followed by Islamistmovements in response to government policies. States have followed various policies inmanaging the tide of Islamist opposition to their power. Some states have chosen to userepressive means (Ägypten, Jordan before 1989), while others, at different times in theirhistory have used accommodative policies (Jordan after 1989, Pakistan, Malaysia). Iexamine the effects of government accommodation on Islamist movement strategies.I argue that accommodation can have varying effects on Islamist movementstrategies depending on the nature of accommodative policies followed. Governmentshave employed two different types of accommodative policies in their tenuousrelationship with Islamist opposition – Islamization and liberalization. Islamizationattempts to co-opt the movements through greater religiosity in state and society.Liberalization allows the movements to conduct their activities at both the state and thesocietal level without necessarily increasing the religiosity of the state1. Islamizationdisempowers Islamists while liberalization empowers them by providing a sphere ofinfluence.

Qual der Stimmzettel

Marc Lynch

marc-akef

Moderate Islamist movements across the Arab world have made a decisive turn towards participation in democratic politics over the last 20 Jahre. They have developed an elaborate ideological justification for contesting elections, which they have defended against intense criticism from more radical Islamist competitors. Zur selben Zeit, they have demonstrated a commitment to internal democracy remarkable by the standards of the region, and have repeatedly proved their willingness to respect the results of elections even when they lose.
But rather than welcome this development, secular authoritarian regimes have responded with growing repression. Again and again, successful electoral participation by Islamists has triggered a backlash, often with the consent – if not the encouragement – of the United States. When Hamas prevailed in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, the response was boycott and political subversion. When the Egyptian government cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood after elections in 2005, few outsiders objected.
As the door to democracy is slammed in their faces, how have the Islamist groups that embraced participation responded? In some ways, they have passed the test with flying colours. They have remained committed to democratic participation even in the face of massive electoral fraud and harsh campaigns of repression. Their leaders have affirmed their democratic ideals, and have often spoken out to reiterate their ideological and strategic commitment to democracy. Tatsächlich, they have often emerged as the leading advocates for public freedoms and democratic reform. And there is as yet little sign of any such organisation turning to violence as an alternative.
But in other ways, the toll of repression is beginning to show. Doubts about the value of democratic participation inside these movements are growing. Splits in the top ranks have roiled movements in Jordan and Egypt, among others. In many of the cases, a Brotherhood leadership which prefers a moderate, accommodationist approach to the regime has struggled to find a way to respond to the escalating pressures of repression and the closing down of the paths towards democratic participation. In Ägypten, frustration over extended detentions of the most moderate leaders have tarnished the coin of those calling for political participation, with a rising trend calling for a retreat from politics and a renewed focus upon social activism and religious work. In Jordan, the influence of those seeking to abandon worthless domestic politics and to focus instead on supporting Hamas has grown.
Critics of the Brotherhood have pointed to these recent struggles as evidence that Islamists cannot be trusted with democracy. But this profoundly misreads the current trends. These crises in fact reflect a delayed response to the blocked promise of democratic participation. The Islamist debate today is not about the legitimacy of democracy – it is about how to respond to frustrated efforts to play the democratic game.
********************************
I recently spent a week in Amman, talking to most of the senior leaders of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood as well as a cross-section of the country’s political and journalistic elite. The picture that emerged was one not simply of an Islamist movement in crisis, but also of a blocked and deteriorating political system. The government was in the process of declining to call the Parliament back into session in order to force through its desired legislation as temporary laws of dubious constitutionality. Stories of social conflict among the tribes and of crushing economic problems amid spiralling corruption filled daily conversation.
The Jordanian Brotherhood, established in 1946, is one of the oldest and most deeply rooted branches of the global Islamist organisation. Unlike in many other countries, where the Brotherhood worked in opposition to those in power, in Jordan it played a crucial role for decades in supporting the Hashemite throne against external and domestic challengers. In return, it enjoyed a privileged relationship with the Jordanian state, including control over key ministries, and good relations with King Hussein in spite of his friendly ties with Israel and the United States.
When Jordan lost the West Bank in the 1967 war, it struggled to maintain its role in the occupied territories. In 1988, jedoch, as the Palestinian Intifada raged and threatened to spread to the East Bank, Jordan formally renounced its claims, severing its ties and concentrating on developing the East Bank and “Jordanising” the truncated state, a decision that was not accepted by the Brotherhood, which maintained ties with its West Bank counterparts.
When riots broke out throughout the country the next year, King Hussein responded with a remarkable democratic opening which revitalised the Kingdom’s political life. The Brotherhood participated fully in this process, and emerged in the 1989 elections as the dominant bloc in Parliament. The years that followed are fondly remembered in Jordan as the apex of political life, with an effective Parliament, a “national pact” establishing the ground rules of democracy and a vibrant emerging press.
In 1993, jedoch, the Jordanian regime changed the electoral law in a way that served to limit Muslim Brotherhood success. As it moved rapidly towards a peace treaty with Israel, the state began to clamp down on the Brotherhood and on all other forms of political opposition. Its interventions in the political process grew so extreme that in 1997 the Brotherhood’s political party, the Islamic Action Front, decided to boycott elections. After King Hussein’s death in 1999, the crown passed to his son Abdullah, who showed little interest in democratic reform, und in 2001 decided to suspend Parliament and rule by emergency law. While formal democracy returned in 2003, political reform efforts failed to gain traction. The extent of electoral fraud against the Brotherhood and other critics of the regime during the 2007 vote shocked even jaded observers.
The Jordanian crackdown has not reached the brutal levels of Syria or Tunisia (where the Islamist opposition was massacred or driven abroad). The Brotherhood continues to operate publicly, and the Islamic Action Front holds six seats in Parliament. But the gerrymandered electoral system and massive fraud has hamstrung Islamist political participation, to the degree that many believe that the Brotherhood is being dared to boycott.
Following the 2007 electoral debacle, the Brotherhood entered a period of intense internal unrest. It dissolved its Shura Council as penance for its fateful decision to participate in the election. The core issue was over how best to respond to the regime’s repression: through confrontation, or through a retreat and consolidation of the political strategy? Im April 2008, the “hawkish” trend won the internal elections to the Shura Council by a single vote, and the pragmatic and domestically-orientated Salem Falahat was replaced by the fiery, Palestine-centric hawk Himmam Said. Said and the new head of the Islamic Action Front, Zaki Bani Arshid, steered the Islamist movement into more direct conflict with the regime, with little success. The reformist trend, led by the soft-spoken intellectual Ruheil Ghuraybeh, avoided open confrontation but advanced an ambitious programme to transform Jordan into a constitutional monarchy.
As the Brotherhood rank and file lost interest in a stalled domestic political process, they were simultaneously galvanised by the electoral success of Hamas and then by the visceral images of Israel’s war on Gaza. The growing interest in Palestinian issues at the expense of Jordanian politics worried not only the regime but also the traditional leadership of the Brotherhood. The leading Jordanian journalist Mohammed Abu Rumman argues that the issue of relations with Hamas has supplanted the traditional “hawk-dove” struggle within the organisation. While both trends support Hamas – “if you are not with Hamas, you are not with the Muslim Brotherhood”, explained one of the “dovish” leaders – they disagree over the appropriate organisational relationship. The “Hamasi” trend supports close ties and the prioritisation of Palestinian issues, and embraces a common Muslim identity over a narrowly Jordanian one. The “reformist” trend insists that Hamas, as the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, should have responsibility for Palestine while the Jordanian Brotherhood must be a national organisation focused upon domestic Jordanian issues.
This crisis came to a head over the issue of Hamas participation in the administrative structures of the Jordanian Brotherhood. Three leading reformists resigned from the Executive Office, triggering an as-yet-unresolved internal crisis that threatens one of the first serious internal splits in the history of the movement. The media has eagerly egged this conflict on; in der Tat, a number of Brotherhood leaders told me that what made the current crisis unique was not the issues at stake or the intensity of the disagreement, but the fact that for the first time it had become public.
********************************
The story of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is many things, but certainly not a story of Islamists retreating from democracy. Similar dynamics can be seen in Egypt, where the Brotherhood’s leadership is similarly divided over how to respond to escalating repression. During multiple trips to Cairo in the last few years, I saw the growing frustration of a generation of reformists who found their every effort to embrace democracy met with force and rejection.
After “independent” Brotherhood candidates scored sweeping victories in the first of three rounds of the 2005 Parliamentary elections, government forces began to intervene to prevent further gains. Despite well-documented fraud and heavy-handed security interference in Brotherhood strongholds, the movement emerged as the largest opposition bloc with 88 Sitze. As Deputy Supreme Guide Mohammed Habib ruefully told me, their mistake was that they did too well – had they won 50 Sitze, perhaps they would not have triggered such harsh reprisals.
The subsequent crackdown matched the magnitude of the Brotherhood victory. A series of media campaigns aimed to scare mainstream Egyptians with alleged nefarious Brotherhood schemes (they were supposedly training an underground militia, conspiring with Hizbollah, and more). A wide range of leading Brotherhood figures, including noted moderates such as the financier Khairat el Shater and the intellectual Abd el Monem Abou el Fattouh, were detained indefinitely on trumped up charges.
For a while, the Egyptian Brotherhood held fast in the face of these provocations. They continued to try to participate in elections even as the fraud and overt manipulation mounted. Their Parliamentarians performed well as an opposition. They routinely expressed their ongoing commitment to democracy to every audience which would listen. And they imposed discipline on their own members to prevent the explosion of frustration into violence.
But over time, the pressure began to take its toll. The leadership reined in its freewheeling young bloggers, whose public airing of internal issues was being exploited by the organisation’s opponents. It adopted tougher rhetoric on foreign policy issues such as the Gaza war – attacking the Egyptian government’s enforcement of the blockade of Gaza – in part to rally its demoralised membership. Considerable evidence suggests that the cadres of the organisation were growing disenchanted with politics and preferred to return to the core social and religious mission. And growing voices from inside and outside the movement began to suggest retreating from politics until a more propitious time.
Earlier this month the conflicts inside the Egyptian Brotherhood leapt into the pages of local newspapers, which reported that the movement’s leader, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, had abruptly resigned his post in protest after conservatives refused to appoint the leading reformist Essam el Erian to an open leadership seat. Akef has denied the reports – but the portrait of a movement in turmoil is clear.
The Jordanian, Egyptian and American governments may see all this as something of a success story: the influence of the Islamists has been curbed, both in formal politics and in the social sector, and the restraint exercised by the Brotherhood leadership has meant the states have not faced a backlash. But this is dangerously short-sighted. The campaigns against Islamists weaken the foundations of democracy as a whole, not just the appeal of one movement, and have had a corrosive effect on public freedoms, transparency and accountability. Regardless of the fortunes of the movements themselves, the crackdown on the Islamists contributes to the wider corruption of public life. The growing frustration within moderate Islamist groups with democratic participation cannot help but affect their future ideological trajectory.
Sowing disenchantment with democratic politics in the ranks of the Brotherhood could forfeit one of the signal developments in Islamist political thinking of the last few decades. The failure of the movement’s democratic experiment could empower more radical Islamists, including not only terrorist groups but also doctrinaire salafists less inclined to pragmatic politics. The degradation of its organisational strengths could open up space for al Qa’eda and other radical competitors to move in. The alternative to Ismail Haniya might be Osama bin Laden rather than Abu Mazen, and the exclusion of Essam el-Erian may not produce an Ayman Nour.
Marc Lynch is associate professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He writes a blog on Arab politics and media for Foreign Policy.

Moderate Islamist movements across the Arab world have made a decisive turn towards participation in democratic politics over the last 20 Jahre. They have developed an elaborate ideological justification for contesting elections, which they have defended against intense criticism from more radical Islamist competitors. Zur selben Zeit, they have demonstrated a commitment to internal democracy remarkable by the standards of the region, and have repeatedly proved their willingness to respect the results of elections even when they lose.

But rather than welcome this development, secular authoritarian regimes have responded with growing repression. Again and again, successful electoral participation by Islamists has triggered a backlash, often with the consent – if not the encouragement – of the United States. When Hamas prevailed in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, the response was boycott and political subversion. When the Egyptian government cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood after elections in 2005, few outsiders objected.

As the door to democracy is slammed in their faces, how have the Islamist groups that embraced participation responded? In some ways, they have passed the test with flying colours. They have remained committed to democratic participation even in the face of massive electoral fraud and harsh campaigns of repression. Their leaders have affirmed their democratic ideals, and have often spoken out to reiterate their ideological and strategic commitment to democracy. Tatsächlich, they have often emerged as the leading advocates for public freedoms and democratic reform. And there is as yet little sign of any such organisation turning to violence as an alternative.

But in other ways, the toll of repression is beginning to show. Doubts about the value of democratic participation inside these movements are growing. Splits in the top ranks have roiled movements in Jordan and Egypt, among others. In many of the cases, a Brotherhood leadership which prefers a moderate, accommodationist approach to the regime has struggled to find a way to respond to the escalating pressures of repression and the closing down of the paths towards democratic participation. In Ägypten, frustration over extended detentions of the most moderate leaders have tarnished the coin of those calling for political participation, with a rising trend calling for a retreat from politics and a renewed focus upon social activism and religious work. In Jordan, the influence of those seeking to abandon worthless domestic politics and to focus instead on supporting Hamas has grown.

Critics of the Brotherhood have pointed to these recent struggles as evidence that Islamists cannot be trusted with democracy. But this profoundly misreads the current trends. These crises in fact reflect a delayed response to the blocked promise of democratic participation. The Islamist debate today is not about the legitimacy of democracy – it is about how to respond to frustrated efforts to play the democratic game.

********************************

I recently spent a week in Amman, talking to most of the senior leaders of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood as well as a cross-section of the country’s political and journalistic elite. The picture that emerged was one not simply of an Islamist movement in crisis, but also of a blocked and deteriorating political system. The government was in the process of declining to call the Parliament back into session in order to force through its desired legislation as temporary laws of dubious constitutionality. Stories of social conflict among the tribes and of crushing economic problems amid spiralling corruption filled daily conversation.

The Jordanian Brotherhood, established in 1946, is one of the oldest and most deeply rooted branches of the global Islamist organisation. Unlike in many other countries, where the Brotherhood worked in opposition to those in power, in Jordan it played a crucial role for decades in supporting the Hashemite throne against external and domestic challengers. In return, it enjoyed a privileged relationship with the Jordanian state, including control over key ministries, and good relations with King Hussein in spite of his friendly ties with Israel and the United States.

When Jordan lost the West Bank in the 1967 war, it struggled to maintain its role in the occupied territories. In 1988, jedoch, as the Palestinian Intifada raged and threatened to spread to the East Bank, Jordan formally renounced its claims, severing its ties and concentrating on developing the East Bank and “Jordanising” the truncated state, a decision that was not accepted by the Brotherhood, which maintained ties with its West Bank counterparts.

When riots broke out throughout the country the next year, King Hussein responded with a remarkable democratic opening which revitalised the Kingdom’s political life. The Brotherhood participated fully in this process, and emerged in the 1989 elections as the dominant bloc in Parliament. The years that followed are fondly remembered in Jordan as the apex of political life, with an effective Parliament, a “national pact” establishing the ground rules of democracy and a vibrant emerging press.

In 1993, jedoch, the Jordanian regime changed the electoral law in a way that served to limit Muslim Brotherhood success. As it moved rapidly towards a peace treaty with Israel, the state began to clamp down on the Brotherhood and on all other forms of political opposition. Its interventions in the political process grew so extreme that in 1997 the Brotherhood’s political party, the Islamic Action Front, decided to boycott elections. After King Hussein’s death in 1999, the crown passed to his son Abdullah, who showed little interest in democratic reform, und in 2001 decided to suspend Parliament and rule by emergency law. While formal democracy returned in 2003, political reform efforts failed to gain traction. The extent of electoral fraud against the Brotherhood and other critics of the regime during the 2007 vote shocked even jaded observers.

The Jordanian crackdown has not reached the brutal levels of Syria or Tunisia (where the Islamist opposition was massacred or driven abroad). The Brotherhood continues to operate publicly, and the Islamic Action Front holds six seats in Parliament. But the gerrymandered electoral system and massive fraud has hamstrung Islamist political participation, to the degree that many believe that the Brotherhood is being dared to boycott.

Following the 2007 electoral debacle, the Brotherhood entered a period of intense internal unrest. It dissolved its Shura Council as penance for its fateful decision to participate in the election. The core issue was over how best to respond to the regime’s repression: through confrontation, or through a retreat and consolidation of the political strategy? Im April 2008, the “hawkish” trend won the internal elections to the Shura Council by a single vote, and the pragmatic and domestically-orientated Salem Falahat was replaced by the fiery, Palestine-centric hawk Himmam Said. Said and the new head of the Islamic Action Front, Zaki Bani Arshid, steered the Islamist movement into more direct conflict with the regime, with little success. The reformist trend, led by the soft-spoken intellectual Ruheil Ghuraybeh, avoided open confrontation but advanced an ambitious programme to transform Jordan into a constitutional monarchy.

As the Brotherhood rank and file lost interest in a stalled domestic political process, they were simultaneously galvanised by the electoral success of Hamas and then by the visceral images of Israel’s war on Gaza. The growing interest in Palestinian issues at the expense of Jordanian politics worried not only the regime but also the traditional leadership of the Brotherhood. The leading Jordanian journalist Mohammed Abu Rumman argues that the issue of relations with Hamas has supplanted the traditional “hawk-dove” struggle within the organisation. While both trends support Hamas – “if you are not with Hamas, you are not with the Muslim Brotherhood”, explained one of the “dovish” leaders – they disagree over the appropriate organisational relationship. The “Hamasi” trend supports close ties and the prioritisation of Palestinian issues, and embraces a common Muslim identity over a narrowly Jordanian one. The “reformist” trend insists that Hamas, as the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, should have responsibility for Palestine while the Jordanian Brotherhood must be a national organisation focused upon domestic Jordanian issues.

This crisis came to a head over the issue of Hamas participation in the administrative structures of the Jordanian Brotherhood. Three leading reformists resigned from the Executive Office, triggering an as-yet-unresolved internal crisis that threatens one of the first serious internal splits in the history of the movement. The media has eagerly egged this conflict on; in der Tat, a number of Brotherhood leaders told me that what made the current crisis unique was not the issues at stake or the intensity of the disagreement, but the fact that for the first time it had become public.

********************************

The story of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is many things, but certainly not a story of Islamists retreating from democracy. Similar dynamics can be seen in Egypt, where the Brotherhood’s leadership is similarly divided over how to respond to escalating repression. During multiple trips to Cairo in the last few years, I saw the growing frustration of a generation of reformists who found their every effort to embrace democracy met with force and rejection.

After “independent” Brotherhood candidates scored sweeping victories in the first of three rounds of the 2005 Parliamentary elections, government forces began to intervene to prevent further gains. Despite well-documented fraud and heavy-handed security interference in Brotherhood strongholds, the movement emerged as the largest opposition bloc with 88 Sitze. As Deputy Supreme Guide Mohammed Habib ruefully told me, their mistake was that they did too well – had they won 50 Sitze, perhaps they would not have triggered such harsh reprisals.

The subsequent crackdown matched the magnitude of the Brotherhood victory. A series of media campaigns aimed to scare mainstream Egyptians with alleged nefarious Brotherhood schemes (they were supposedly training an underground militia, conspiring with Hizbollah, and more). A wide range of leading Brotherhood figures, including noted moderates such as the financier Khairat el Shater and the intellectual Abd el Monem Abou el Fattouh, were detained indefinitely on trumped up charges.

For a while, the Egyptian Brotherhood held fast in the face of these provocations. They continued to try to participate in elections even as the fraud and overt manipulation mounted. Their Parliamentarians performed well as an opposition. They routinely expressed their ongoing commitment to democracy to every audience which would listen. And they imposed discipline on their own members to prevent the explosion of frustration into violence.

But over time, the pressure began to take its toll. The leadership reined in its freewheeling young bloggers, whose public airing of internal issues was being exploited by the organisation’s opponents. It adopted tougher rhetoric on foreign policy issues such as the Gaza war – attacking the Egyptian government’s enforcement of the blockade of Gaza – in part to rally its demoralised membership. Considerable evidence suggests that the cadres of the organisation were growing disenchanted with politics and preferred to return to the core social and religious mission. And growing voices from inside and outside the movement began to suggest retreating from politics until a more propitious time.

Earlier this month the conflicts inside the Egyptian Brotherhood leapt into the pages of local newspapers, which reported that the movement’s leader, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, had abruptly resigned his post in protest after conservatives refused to appoint the leading reformist Essam el Erian to an open leadership seat. Akef has denied the reports – but the portrait of a movement in turmoil is clear.

The Jordanian, Egyptian and American governments may see all this as something of a success story: the influence of the Islamists has been curbed, both in formal politics and in the social sector, and the restraint exercised by the Brotherhood leadership has meant the states have not faced a backlash. But this is dangerously short-sighted. The campaigns against Islamists weaken the foundations of democracy as a whole, not just the appeal of one movement, and have had a corrosive effect on public freedoms, transparency and accountability. Regardless of the fortunes of the movements themselves, the crackdown on the Islamists contributes to the wider corruption of public life. The growing frustration within moderate Islamist groups with democratic participation cannot help but affect their future ideological trajectory.

Sowing disenchantment with democratic politics in the ranks of the Brotherhood could forfeit one of the signal developments in Islamist political thinking of the last few decades. The failure of the movement’s democratic experiment could empower more radical Islamists, including not only terrorist groups but also doctrinaire salafists less inclined to pragmatic politics. The degradation of its organisational strengths could open up space for al Qa’eda and other radical competitors to move in. The alternative to Ismail Haniya might be Osama bin Laden rather than Abu Mazen, and the exclusion of Essam el-Erian may not produce an Ayman Nour.

Marc Lynch is associate professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He writes a blog on Arab politics and media for Foreign Policy.

From the National

Published on October 30, 2009

Das Internet und islamistische Politik in Jordanien, Marokko und Ägypten.

Das Ende des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts und der Beginn des einundzwanzigsten sahen a
Verbreitung des Internets als Kommunikationszentrum, Information, Unterhaltung u
Handel. Die Verbreitung des Internets erreichte alle vier Ecken der Welt, verbinden die
Forscher in der Antarktis mit dem Farmer in Guatemala und dem Nachrichtensprecher in Moskau zum
Beduine in Ägypten. Über das Internet, der Informationsfluss und Nachrichten in Echtzeit erreicht
über Kontinente hinweg, und die Stimmen der Subalternität haben das Potenzial, ihre Vergangenheit zu projizieren
zum Schweigen gebrachte Stimmen durch Blogs, Websites und Websites sozialer Netzwerke. Politische Organisationen
quer durch das Links-Rechts-Kontinuum haben das Internet als politischen Mobilisierer der Zukunft ins Visier genommen,
und Regierungen gewähren nun Zugang zu historischen Dokumenten, Partei Plattformen, und
Verwaltungspapiere über ihre Websites. Ähnlich, religiöse Gruppen zeigen ihre Überzeugungen online
über offizielle Seiten, und Foren ermöglichen es Mitgliedern aus der ganzen Welt, über Themen zu debattieren
Eschatologie, Orthopraxie und jede Menge nuancierter theologischer Themen. Beides verschmelzen, Islamist
politische Organisationen haben ihre Präsenz durch ausgeklügelte Websites mit detaillierten Angaben bekannt gemacht
ihre politischen Plattformen, relevante Nachrichten, und religiös orientiertes Material, in dem sie diskutiert werden
theologische Ansichten. Dieses Papier wird speziell diesen Nexus untersuchen – die Nutzung des Internets durch
Islamistische politische Organisationen im Nahen Osten in den Ländern Jordaniens, Marokko u
Ägypten.
Obwohl eine breite Palette islamistischer politischer Organisationen das Internet als Forum nutzt
ihre Ansichten bekannt zu machen und sich national oder international einen Namen zu machen, die Methoden und Absichten
dieser Gruppen sind sehr unterschiedlich und hängen von der Art der Organisation ab. Dieses Papier wird
untersuchen die Nutzung des Internets durch drei „gemäßigte“ islamistische Parteien: die Islamische Aktionsfront in
2
Jordan, die Gerechtigkeits- und Entwicklungspartei in Marokko und die Muslimbruderschaft in Ägypten.
Da diese drei Parteien ihre politische Raffinesse und ihren Ruf gesteigert haben, beide zu hause
und im Ausland, Sie haben das Internet zunehmend für eine Vielzahl von Zwecken genutzt. Zuerst, Islamist
Organisationen haben das Internet als zeitgemäße Erweiterung der Öffentlichkeit genutzt, eine Sphäre
durch die Parteien Rahmen, Ideen einer breiteren Öffentlichkeit zu kommunizieren und zu institutionalisieren.
Zweitens, das Internet bietet islamistischen Organisationen ein ungefiltertes Forum
Beamte können ihre Positionen und Ansichten fördern und bekannt machen, sowie lokale Medien umgehen
Einschränkungen durch den Staat. Schließlich, das Internet ermöglicht es islamistischen Organisationen, a
gegenhegemonialer Diskurs in Opposition zum herrschenden Regime oder der Monarchie oder zur Anzeige an einen
internationales Publikum. Diese dritte Motivation trifft ganz besonders auf den Muslim zu
Brüderlichkeit, die eine anspruchsvolle englischsprachige Website präsentiert, die im Western-Stil gestaltet ist
Stil und darauf zugeschnitten, ein ausgewähltes Publikum von Gelehrten zu erreichen, Politiker und Journalisten. Der MB
hat sich in diesem sogenannten „Bridgeblogging“ hervorgetan 1 und hat den Standard für islamistische Parteien gesetzt
versuchen, die internationale Wahrnehmung ihrer Positionen und ihrer Arbeit zu beeinflussen. Der Inhalt variiert
zwischen der arabischen und der englischen Version der Website, und wird im Abschnitt weiter untersucht
über die Muslimbruderschaft. Diese drei Ziele überschneiden sich sowohl in ihren Absichten als auch in erheblichem Maße
gewünschte Ergebnisse; jedoch, Jedes Ziel zielt auf einen anderen Akteur ab: die Öffentlichkeit, die Medien, und die
Regime. Nach einer Analyse dieser drei Bereiche, Dieses Papier wird in eine Fallstudie übergehen
Analyse der Webseiten des IAF, die PJD und die Muslimbruderschaft.
1

Andrew Helms

Ikhwanweb

Ende des 20. und Anfang des 21. Jahrhunderts verbreitete sich das Internet als Kommunikationszentrum, Information, Unterhaltung und Handel.

Die Verbreitung des Internets erreichte alle vier Ecken der Welt, Er verbindet den Forscher in der Antarktis mit dem Bauern in Guatemala und den Nachrichtensprecher in Moskau mit dem Beduinen in Ägypten.

Über das Internet, Der Informationsfluss und die Nachrichten in Echtzeit reichen über Kontinente hinweg, und die Stimmen der Subalternität haben das Potenzial, ihre zuvor zum Schweigen gebrachten Stimmen durch Blogs zu projizieren, Websites und Websites sozialer Netzwerke.

Politische Organisationen im gesamten Links-Rechts-Kontinuum haben das Internet als politischen Mobilisierer der Zukunft ins Visier genommen, und Regierungen gewähren nun Zugang zu historischen Dokumenten, Partei Plattformen, und Verwaltungspapiere über ihre Websites. Ähnlich, Religiöse Gruppen zeigen ihre Überzeugungen online über offizielle Websites, und Foren ermöglichen es Mitgliedern aus der ganzen Welt, Fragen der Eschatologie zu diskutieren, Orthopraxie und jede Menge nuancierter theologischer Themen.

Beides verschmelzen, Islamistische politische Organisationen haben ihre Präsenz durch ausgeklügelte Websites bekannt gemacht, auf denen ihre politischen Plattformen aufgeführt sind, relevante Nachrichten, und religiös orientiertes Material, das ihre theologischen Ansichten diskutiert. Dieses Papier wird speziell diesen Nexus untersuchen – die Nutzung des Internets durch islamistische politische Organisationen im Nahen Osten in den Ländern Jordaniens, Marokko und Ägypten.

Obwohl eine breite Palette islamistischer politischer Organisationen das Internet als Forum nutzt, um ihre Ansichten zu veröffentlichen und sich national oder international einen Namen zu machen, Die Methoden und Absichten dieser Gruppen sind sehr unterschiedlich und hängen von der Art der Organisation ab.

Dieses Papier untersucht die Nutzung des Internets durch drei „gemäßigte“ islamistische Parteien: die Islamische Aktionsfront in Jordanien, die Gerechtigkeits- und Entwicklungspartei in Marokko und die Muslimbruderschaft in Ägypten. Da diese drei Parteien ihre politische Raffinesse und ihren Ruf gesteigert haben, sowohl im Inland als auch im Ausland, Sie haben das Internet zunehmend für eine Vielzahl von Zwecken genutzt.

Zuerst, Islamistische Organisationen nutzen das Internet als zeitgemäße Erweiterung der Öffentlichkeit, eine Sphäre, durch die Parteien rahmen, Ideen einer breiteren Öffentlichkeit zu kommunizieren und zu institutionalisieren.

Zweitens, das Internet bietet islamistischen Organisationen ein ungefiltertes Forum, über das Beamte ihre Positionen und Ansichten fördern und bekannt machen können, sowie die vom Staat auferlegten lokalen Medienbeschränkungen umgehen.

Schließlich, Das Internet ermöglicht es islamistischen Organisationen, einen gegenhegemonialen Diskurs gegen das herrschende Regime oder die Monarchie zu präsentieren oder einem internationalen Publikum vorzuführen. Diese dritte Motivation trifft ganz besonders auf die Muslimbruderschaft zu, die eine anspruchsvolle englischsprachige Website präsentiert, die im westlichen Stil gestaltet und darauf zugeschnitten ist, ein ausgewähltes Publikum von Gelehrten zu erreichen, Politiker und Journalisten.

Die MB hat sich in diesem sogenannten „Bridgeblogging“ hervorgetan. 1 und hat den Standard für islamistische Parteien gesetzt, die versuchen, die internationale Wahrnehmung ihrer Positionen und Arbeit zu beeinflussen. Der Inhalt variiert zwischen der arabischen und der englischen Version der Website, und wird im Abschnitt über die Muslimbruderschaft weiter untersucht.

Diese drei Ziele überschneiden sich sowohl in ihren Absichten als auch in ihren gewünschten Ergebnissen erheblich; jedoch, Jedes Ziel zielt auf einen anderen Akteur ab: die Öffentlichkeit, die Medien, und das Regime. Nach einer Analyse dieser drei Bereiche, Dieses Papier wird in eine Fallstudienanalyse der Websites des IAF übergehen, die PJD und die Muslimbruderschaft.