RSSسب کے ساتھ ٹیگ کردہ تحاریر درآمد کریں: "اسلامی"

اسلام اور ریاستی طاقت کے میکنگ

seyyed لہروں نصر کٹ

میں 1979 جنرل محمد ضیاء الحق, پاکستان کے فوجی حکمران, پاکستان ایک اسلامی ریاست بن جائے گا کہ اعلان کر دیا. اسلامی اقدار اور معیار کے قومی تشخص کی بنیاد پر کام کرے گا, قانون, معیشت, اور سماجی تعلقات, اور تمام پالیسی سازی حوصلہ افزائی کرے گا. میں 1980 Mahathir Muhammad, the new prime minister of Malaysia, introduced a similar broad-based plan to anchor state policy making in Islamic values, and to bring his country’s laws and economic practices in line with the teachings of Islam. Why did these rulers choose the path of “Islamization” for their countries? And how did one-time secular postcolonial states become the agents of Islamization and the harbinger of the “true” Islamic state?
Malaysia and Pakistan have since the late 1970s–early 1980s followed a unique path to development that diverges from the experiences of other Third World states. In these two countries religious identity was integrated into state ideology to inform the goal and process of development with Islamic values.
This undertaking has also presented a very different picture of the relation between Islam and politics in Muslim societies. In Malaysia and Pakistan, it has been state institutions rather than Islamist activists (those who advocate a political reading of Islam; also known as revivalists or fundamentalists) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, and more broadly how culture and religion serve the needs of state power and development. The analysis here relies on theoretical discussions
in the social sciences of state behavior and the role of culture and religion therein. More important, it draws inferences from the cases under examination to make broader conclusions of interest to the disciplines.

سیاسی اسلام احوال کے لئے حکمت عملی

شادی حمید

Amanda Kadlec

سیاسی اسلام سے مشرق وسطی میں سب سے زیادہ ایک فعال سیاسی طاقت آج ہے. اس کے مستقبل سے مباشرت اس علاقے کی ہے کہ سے بندھا ہوا ہے. ریاست ہائے متحدہ امریکہ اور یورپی یونین کے اگر اس خطے میں سیاسی اصلاحات کے لئے حمایت کرتے ہیں, انہیں کنکریٹ وضع کرنے کی ضرورت ہوگی, اسلام پسند گروہوں کو شامل کرنے کے لئے مربوط حکمت عملی. ابھی تک, امریکہ. عام طور پر ان تحریکوں کے ساتھ بات چیت کرنے کو تیار نہیں ہے. اسی طرح, اسلام پسندوں کے ساتھ یورپی یونین کی شمولیت مستثنیٰ رہی ہے, اصول نہیں. جہاں نچلے درجے کے رابطے موجود ہیں, وہ بنیادی طور پر معلومات جمع کرنے کے مقاصد کو پورا کرتے ہیں, اسٹریٹجک مقاصد نہیں. امریکہ. اور یورپی یونین کے متعدد پروگرام رکھتے ہیں جو خطے میں معاشی اور سیاسی ترقی کی نشاندہی کرتے ہیں - ان میں مشرق وسطی کی شراکت کا پہل (MEPI), ملینیم چیلنج کارپوریشن (ایم سی سی), بحیرہ روم کے لئے یونین, اور یورپی ہمسایہ پالیسی (ENP) - پھر بھی ان کے بارے میں یہ کہنا بہت کم ہے کہ اسلام پسند سیاسی مخالفت کا چیلنج وسیع علاقائی مقاصد میں کس حد تک فٹ ہے. U.S. اور یوروپی یونین کی جمہوریت کی مدد اور پروگرامنگ کی مکمل طور پر یا تو خود مختار حکومتیں یا سیکولر سول سوسائٹی کے گروپوں کو ہدایت کی جاتی ہے جن کے اپنے معاشروں میں کم سے کم حمایت حاصل ہو۔.
موجودہ پالیسیوں کے تجزیے کا وقت مناسب ہے. ستمبر کے دہشت گردانہ حملوں کے بعد سے 11, 2001, مشرق وسطی کی جمہوریت کی حمایت کرنا مغربی پالیسی سازوں کے لئے زیادہ اہمیت کا حامل ہے, جو جمہوریت کی کمی اور سیاسی تشدد کے درمیان ایک ربط دیکھتے ہیں. سیاسی اسلام کے مختلف فرقوں کو سمجھنے کے لئے زیادہ توجہ دی گئی ہے. نئی امریکی انتظامیہ مسلم دنیا کے ساتھ مواصلات کو وسیع کرنے کے لئے زیادہ کھلا ہے. اسی دوران, مرکزی دھارے میں شامل اسلامی تنظیموں کی اکثریت - بشمول مصر میں اخوان المسلمون, اردن کا اسلامک ایکشن فرنٹ (ہوا بھارتی فوج), مراکش کی انصاف اور ترقی پارٹی (PJD), اسلامی آئینی تحریک کویت, اور یمنی اصلاح پارٹی - نے اپنے سیاسی پلیٹ فارم میں سیاسی اصلاحات اور جمہوریت کے لئے تیزی سے حمایت حاصل کی ہے. اس کے علاوہ, بہت سے لوگوں نے امریکہ کے ساتھ بات چیت کے آغاز میں مضبوط دلچسپی کا اشارہ کیا ہے. اور یورپی یونین کی حکومتیں.
مغربی ممالک اور مشرق وسطی کے مابین تعلقات کا مستقبل بڑی حد تک اس حد تک طے کیا جاسکتا ہے کہ سابقہ ​​متشدد اسلام پسند جماعتوں کو مشترکہ مفادات اور مقاصد کے بارے میں ایک وسیع گفت و شنید میں شریک کرتے ہیں۔. اسلام پسندوں کے ساتھ مشغولیت کے بارے میں حالیہ مطالعات کا پھیلاؤ ہوا ہے, لیکن کچھ ہی واضح طور پر اس کی نشاندہی کرتے ہیں جو عملی طور پر اس میں شامل ہوسکتی ہے. بطور زو نوٹری, جرمن کونسل برائے خارجہ تعلقات میں ساتھی کا دورہ کرنا, رکھتا ہے, "یوروپی یونین مشغولیت کے بارے میں سوچ رہا ہے لیکن واقعتا نہیں جانتا ہے کہ کیسے۔" 1 اس بحث کو واضح کرنے کی امید میں, ہم "منگنی" کے تین درجات میں فرق کرتے ہیں,"ہر ایک مختلف وسائل اور ختم ہونے والا ہے: نچلے درجے کے رابطے, اسٹریٹجک بات چیت, اور شراکت داری.

اسلام, اسلام, اور انتخابی اصول میں (ن) مشرق وسطی

جیمز Piscator

For an idea whose time has supposedly come, ÒdemocracyÓ masks an astonishing

number of unanswered questions and, مسلم دنیا میں, has generated

a remarkable amount of heat. یہ ایک ثقافتی خاص اصطلاح, reflecting Western

European experiences over several centuries? Do non-Western societies possess

their own standards of participation and accountabilityÑand indeed their own

rhythms of developmentÑwhich command attention, if not respect? Does Islam,

with its emphasis on scriptural authority and the centrality of sacred law, allow

for flexible politics and participatory government?

The answers to these questions form part of a narrative and counter-narrative

that themselves are an integral part of a contested discourse. The larger story

concerns whether or not ÒIslamÓ constitutes a threat to the West, and the supplementary

story involves IslamÕs compatibility with democracy. The intellectual

baggage, to change the metaphor, is scarcely neutral. The discussion itself has

become acutely politicised, caught in the related controversies over Orientalism,

the exceptionalism of the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general,

and the modernism of religious ÒfundamentalistÓ movements.

The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

ناتھن جے. براؤن
عمرو Hamzawy

In the late summer 2007, amid great anticipation from Egypt’s ruling elite and opposition movements, the Muslim Brotherhood distributed the first draft of a party platform to a group of intellectuals and analysts. The platform was not to serve as a document for an existing political party or even one about to be founded: the Brotherhood remains without legal recognition in Egypt and Egypt’s rulers and the laws they have enacted make the prospect of legal recognition for a Brotherhood-founded party seem distant. But the Brotherhood’s leadership clearly wished to signal what sort of party they would found if allowed to do so.

With the circulation of the draft document, the movement opened its doors to discussion and even contentious debate about the main ideas of the platform, the likely course of the Brotherhood’s political role, and the future of its relationship with other political forces in the country.1 In this paper, we seek to answer four questions concerning the Brotherhood’s

party platform:

1. What are the specific controversies and divisions generated by the platform?


2. Why and how has the platform proved so divisive?


3. Given the divisions it caused as well as the inauspicious political environment,

why was a platform drafted at this time?


4. How will these controversies likely be resolved?


We also offer some observations about the Brotherhood’s experience with

drafting a party platform and demonstrate how its goals have only been partly

met. Ultimately, the integration of the Muslim Brotherhood as a normal political

actor will depend not only on the movement’s words but also on the deeds

of a regime that seems increasingly hostile to the Brotherhood’s political role.

ISLAMIC MOBILIZATION

زیاد Munson

This article examines the emergence and growth of the Muslim Brotherhood inEgypt from the 1930s through the 1950s. It begins by outlining and empirically evaluatingpossible explanations for the organization’s growth based on (1) theories of politicalIslam and (2) the concept of political opportunity structure in social movementtheory. An extension of these approaches is suggested based on data from organizationaldocuments and declassiŽed U.S. State Department Žles from the period. Thesuccessful mobilization of the Muslim Brotherhood was possible because of the wayin which its Islamic message was tied to its organizational structure, activities, andstrategies and the everyday lives of Egyptians. The analysis suggests that ideas areintegrated into social movements in more ways than the concept of framing allows.It also expands our understanding of how organizations can arise in highly repressiveenvironments.

ترکی ایک اسلامی کے صدر ہوں گے?

مائیکل روبن


While the campaigns have not officially begun, election season in Turkey is heating up. This spring, the

Turkish parliament will select a president to replace current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose seven-year

term ends on May 16, 2007. On or before November 4, 2007, Turks will head to the polls to choose a new

پارلیمنٹ. Not only does this year mark the first since 1973—and 1950 before that—in which Turks will

inaugurate a new president and parliament in the same year, but this year’s polls will also impact the future

of Turkey more than perhaps any election in the past half century. If Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan

wins the presidency and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, also known as

AKP) retains its parliamentary majority, Islamists would control all Turkish offices and be positioned to

erode secularism and redefine state and society.If Erdo˘gan ascends to Çankaya Palace—the

Turkish White House—Turks face the prospect if an Islamist president and a first lady who wears

a Saudi-style headscarf. Such a prospect has fueled speculation about intervention by the Turkish military,

which traditionally serves as the guardian of secularism and the Turkish constitution. In December

2006, مثال کے طور پر, Newsweek published an essay entitled “The Coming Coup d’Etat?” predicting

ایک 50 percent chance of the military seizing control in Turkey this year.1

While concern about the future of Turkish secularism is warranted, alarmism about military
intervention is not. There will be no more military coups in Turkey. Erdog˘ an may be prepared to
spark a constitutional crisis in pursuit of personal ambition and ideological agenda, but Turkey’s
civilian institutions are strong enough to confront the challenge. The greatest danger to Turkish
democracy will not be Turkish military intervention,but rather well-meaning but naïve interference
by U.S. diplomats seeking stability and downplaying the Islamist threat.

While the campaigns have not officially begun, election season in Turkey is heating up. This spring, theTurkish parliament will select a president to replace current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose seven-yearterm ends on May 16, 2007. On or before November 4, 2007, Turks will head to the polls to choose a newparliament. Not only does this year mark the first since 1973—and 1950 before that—in which Turks willinaugurate a new president and parliament in the same year, but this year’s polls will also impact the futureof Turkey more than perhaps any election in the past half century. If Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan wins the presidency and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, also known asAKP) retains its parliamentary majority, Islamists would control all Turkish offices and be positioned toerode secularism and redefine state and society.If Erdo˘gan ascends to Çankaya Palace—theTurkish White House—Turks face the prospect if an Islamist president and a first lady who wearsa Saudi-style headscarf. Such a prospect has fueled speculation about intervention by the Turkish military,which traditionally serves as the guardian of secularism and the Turkish constitution. In December2006, مثال کے طور پر, Newsweek published an essay entitled “The Coming Coup d’Etat?” predictinga 50 percent chance of the military seizing control in Turkey this year.1While concern about the future of Turkish secularism is warranted, alarmism about militaryintervention is not. There will be no more military coups in Turkey. Erdog˘ an may be prepared tospark a constitutional crisis in pursuit of personal ambition and ideological agenda, but Turkey’scivilian institutions are strong enough to confront the challenge. The greatest danger to Turkishdemocracy will not be Turkish military intervention,but rather well-meaning but naïve interferenceby U.S. diplomats seeking stability and downplaying the Islamist threat.

شروحات: جمہوریت کے لئے رنگ کھوکھلی

Arnaud ڈے BORCHGRAVE

WASHINGTON, جون 24 (UPI) — The White House’s crusade for democracy, as President Bush sees it, has produceda critical mass of events taking that (Middle Eastern) region in a hopeful new direction.And Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice just toured the area, making clear at every stop whenever the United States has a choice between stability and democracy, the new ideological remedy would sacrifice stability.

Veteran Mideast hands who have dealt with five regional wars and two intifadas over the past half century shuddered. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger first among them.

For the U.S. to crusade in every part of the world to spread democracy may be beyond our capacity,” he says. امریکہ. system, he explains, “is the product of unique historical experiences, difficult to duplicate or to transplant into Muslim societies where secular democracy has seldom thrived.If ever.

If stability had been sacrificed for democracy, the former national security adviser and secretary of State to Presidents Nixon and Ford could not have negotiated major Arab-Israeli disengagement agreements: Sinai I, Golan and Sinai II. Without the undemocratic, benign dictatorial figure of Anwar Sadat at the helm in Egypt, or without the late Syrian dictator and master terror-broker Hafez Assad, yet another page of war history would have been written.

With a democratic parliament in Egypt in 1974, presumably dominated by the popular Muslim Brotherhood, Sadat could not have made his spectacular, death-defying trip to Jerusalemand suddenly become the most popular leader in Israel. A peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and between Jordan and Israel were possible only because absolute rulersSadat and the late King Hussein, led both Arab countries.

Sadat knew his courageous act of statesmanship was tantamount to signing his own death warrant. It was carried out in 1981 — by Islamist extremistson worldwide television.

Rice proudly proclaims it is no longer a war against terrorism but a struggle for democracy. She is proud the Bush administration no longer pursues stability at the expense of democracy. But already the democracy crusade is not only encountering speed bumps, but also roadblocks on a road to nowhere.

The much-vaunted Palestinian elections scheduled for July have been postponed indefinitely.

In Lebanon, the ballot box has already been nullified by political machinations. Gen. Michael Aoun, a bright but aging prospect who came back from French exile to take on Syria’s underground machine, has already joined forces with Damascus. While denying any deal with Syria, the general’s henchmen concede he was compensated munificently for his retirement years in Paris from his post as army chief of staff and his time as premier. Aoun collected $22 دس لاکھ, which included compound interest.

مصر میں, Rice, presumably attempting to confer respectability on President Hosni Mubarak’s challengers, took time out to receive a known political charlatan who has over the years been exposed as someone who forged election results as he climbed the ladder of a number of political parties under a variety of labels.

Even Mubarak’s enemies concede Ayman Nour fabricated and forged the signatures of as many as 1,187 citizens to conform to regulations to legalize his Ghad (Tomorrow) party. His career is dotted with phony academic credentials, plagiarism, a staged assassination attempt on himself, charges of embezzlement by his Saudi media employer, and scads of document forgeries.

Rice had canceled a previous trip to Egypt to protest the indictment and jailing of Nour pending trial. And before Rice’s most recent accolade, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had also gone out of her way to praise Egypt’s master political con man. Makes you wonder what kind of political reporting is coming out of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.

With this double-headed endorsement by the United States, Nour is losing what little favor he still has in Egypt. He is now seen as a U.S. stooge, to add to a long list of failings.

اخوان المسلمون, which is outlawed but tolerated since it renounced terrorism, is more representative of Egyptian opinion than Nour. There is also the Kifaya (Enough) movement that groups Egypt’s leading intellectuals. But they declined to meet with Rice.

The United States is seen throughout the Arab world as synonymous with Israel. This automatically limits the Bush administration’s ability to win friends and influence people. Those making the most out of U.S. pressure to democratize are organizations listed by the United States asterrorist.Both Hamas in the Palestinian territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon are now mining opportunities both above and underground. Islamic legislators in Jordan petitioned King Abdullah to allow Jordanian Hamas leaders, evicted six years ago, to come home. The king listened impassively.

It took Europe 500 years to reach the degree of political maturity witnessed by the recent collapse of the European Union’s plans for a common constitution. Winston Churchill said democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried. But Churchill also said, “The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.This still applies in the souks of the Arab world, from Marrakech to Muscat.

The Problem of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

جیفری Azarva

سیموئیل Tadros

On June 20, 2007, امریکہ. Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research convened ameeting ofU.S. intelligence officials to weigh the prospect of formal engagement with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,1known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin. The session was the result of several years of discussion aboutengaging the group considered by many to be the fountainhead of Sunni fundamentalism.Although the Bush administration established a diplomatic quarantine of the Brotherhood afterSeptember 11, 2001, members of the U.S. House of Representatives held several meetings in Egyptin the spring of 2007—almost three months before the State Department meeting—with MuhammadSaad al-Katatni, an independent member of the Egyptian parliament and the head of its Brotherhoodaffiliatedbloc. On April 5, 2007, House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) broke with conventionand met with Katatni at the Egyptian parliament building and at the residence ofU.S. ambassador to Egypt Francis J. Ricciardone. Then, on May 27, 2007, a four-member U.S. congressionaldelegation led by Representative David Price (D-N.C.) met with Katatni in Cairo.Following Hoyer’s visit, امریکہ. Embassy in Cairo dismissed Egyptian criticism that his meetingspresaged a reversal of U.S. policy.2 In November 2007, Ricciardone also played down themeetings when he claimed that U.S. contacts with nominally independent Brotherhood members did“not imply American endorsement of the views of the individual parliamentarians or their politicalaffiliates.”3 Despite this reassurance, the meetings with Katatni are indicative of opinion leaders, bothinside and outside the U.S. government, warming inevitable. Yet while the movement, established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, constitutes the most organizedand well-funded opposition in the country today—the byproduct of both its charitable services and da’wa (literally“call to God,” or preaching) network that operate outside state control—any examination of its rhetoricand political platforms shows U.S. outreach to be premature. Despite its professed commitment to pluralismand the rule of law, the Brotherhood continues to engage in dangerous doublespeak when it comes to the mostfundamental issues of democracy.

جمہوریت خود سے خود کی حفاظت?

Ebru Erdem

Studies on government in Muslim societies and in the Middle East in particular have mostly focused on authoritarianism. They sought to answer why authoritarianism is the most often observed regime type, and why it persists. Recent work has looked at the role of elections and elected bodies under authoritarianism, explaining why they exist and what purposes they serve (Blaydes 2008; Lust-Okar 2006). The goal of this paper is to shift the spotlight onto the judiciary, and to the political role of high courts in Muslim societies with different levels of authoritarianism.Judiciaries and the judicial processes in Muslim societies have not caught much scholarly attention. Much of the work in this area has revolved around Shari’a. Shari’a law, incorporation of the Shari’a into western style judicial systems and legal codes, conflicts between western and Shari’a inspired codes of family law, and especially the impact of the latter on women’s rights are some of the extensively studied topics concerning the judicial processes in these societies. دوسری طرف, work on judiciary as a political institution in the Muslim world is scarce, notable exceptions being Moustafa (2003) and Hirschl (2004). Judiciaries may take different institutional forms, be based on different legal traditions, or vary in the level of independence they enjoy, but they are still a political institutions.Why study the judiciary in the Muslim World? Is a focus on the judiciary meaningful given the dominance of the executives in countries with authoritarian regimes? The justification for a focus on the judiciary has different dimensions. From a rational choice-institutionalist perspective: if an institution exists, there must be a reason for it, and we think that investigating the raison d’être of the judiciaries will provide interesting insights about political processes and executive strategies. From an institutional-design perspective, the shape that an institution takes2is related to the strategies of the actors negotiating over that institution, and we would like to use the observed variance in judicial institutions and powers across countries and time periods to learn about different aspects of political bargains that scholars have studied in other political realms. From a democratic development perspective, the establishment of the checks and balances is central to a functioning and sustainable democracy, and we would argue that studying the judiciary is central to understanding the prospects towards establishment of rule of law and a credible commitment to democracy (Weingast 1997).

What Happened to the “Arab Street?"

نیہا سہگل



Why do opposition movements engage in protest under some circumstances but not inothers? Why did the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt organize large scale protest during the 2005regime initiated political reforms while remaining largely off the streets during the United States’led war in Iraq in 2003? There is a common notion among Western public opinion and policymakers that United States’ policies in the Middle East have led to greater political activismamong Islamic fundamentalists. ابھی تک, while citizens around the world protested the war in Iraq,Egypt remained largely quiet. The lack of protest and other acts of opposition were surprisinggiven the history of Arab-anti colonial struggle, the 1950s street politics in Egypt that broughtNasser to power and the flourishing civil society organizations in the region exemplified byIslamist parties, non governmental organizations and professional syndicates. More importantly,with the 2005 regime initiated political opening in Egypt, the country’s largest oppositionmovement, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood organized high levels of protests anddemonstrations exposing undemocratic practices of the current government and seeking greaterpolitical freedom. اس سال 2005, was marked by a “wave of contention” in Egypt standing instark contrast to the lack of mobilization against the Iraq war. Clearly, Muslim Brotherhoodprotest activity is guided by factors other than the prevalence of “anti-Americanism.”Scholars of contentions politics have developed and tested various theories that explainand predict protest behavior. Strain and breakdown theories explain protest as an outcome ofeconomic conditions while resource mobilization theories have stressed the role of material andorganizational constraints in organizing protest. Yet others have argued that protests are spurredby structural changes, مثال کے طور پر, divisions or breakdown in the government. In this paper, Iargue that explaining the protest behavior of one group should take into account the group’sinteraction with other opposition actors. Opposition groups operate in a dense network of allies,adversaries as well as counter movements. Therefore their strategies influence each other intangible ways. I present an analysis of how the 2005 political opening in Egypt led to changes inlegal parties such as al-Ghad and al-Wafd that were allowed to contest presidential andparliamentary elections. Further, the new movement Kifaya, originally formed to expressopposition to the Iraq war, also gained momentum as an anti-Mubarak, pro-democracy alliance.The changes in the parties that were allowed to contest elections and the emergence of newmovements altered the socio-political context for the “officially banned, yet tolerated,” MuslimBrotherhood. The Brotherhood tried to reassert itself as the main voice of political opposition inthe country by organizing greater protest activity and in this way established similarity with legalopposition parties. While legal opposition parties remain weak and ineffective in Egypt, andnewer opposition movements are still small in their membership, they may still influence eachothers’ strategies in tangible ways.

اخوان المسلمین کا اردن اور پاکستان کا جماعت اسلامی

نیہا سہگل

اسلام پسندانہ سرگرمی کا مطالعہ معاشرتی تحریک کے نظریہ میں نیا ہے. سوشل موومنٹ اسکالرشپ نے ان کی انفرادیت پر مبنی منفرد اعتقاد کی وجہ سے اسلام پسندانہ تحریکوں کو نظرانداز کیا ہے. ابھی حال ہی میں علماء کرام نے تسلیم کیا ہے کہ معاشرتی تحریک کے نظریہ کے ذریعہ ماننے والے تنازعات کے عمل کو مطالعہ کے دونوں شعبوں میں نظریاتی تطہیر کے لئے اسلام پسندانہ سرگرمی پر لاگو کیا جاسکتا ہے۔, میں حکومتی پالیسیوں کے جواب میں اسلام پسند اقدامات کے بعد حکمت عملی میں مختلف حالتوں کی جانچ کرتا ہوں. ریاستوں نے اپنے اقتدار کے خلاف اسلام پسندوں کی مخالفت کو بڑھاوا دینے میں متعدد پالیسیوں کی پیروی کی ہے. کچھ ریاستوں نے متاثر کن ذرائع کو منتخب کیا ہے (مصر, اردن پہلے 1989), جبکہ دوسروں کو, ان کی تاریخ میں مختلف اوقات میں سازگار پالیسیاں استعمال کی گئیں (اردن کے بعد 1989, پاکستان, ملائیشیا). اسلام پسند تحریک کی حکمت عملیوں پر سرکاری رہائش کے اثرات کی جانچ پڑتال کریں۔ میں یہ استدلال کرتا ہوں کہ رہائش کے بعد اسلام آباد کی تحریکوں پر مختلف اثرات مرتب ہو سکتے ہیں جن کی پیروی ایڈجسٹ پالیسیوں کی نوعیت پر ہے۔. حکومتوں نے اسلام پسند حزب اختلاف سے تعلق رکھنے میں دو مختلف قسم کی ایڈجسٹ پالیسیاں ملازمت کی ہیں - اسلامائزیشن اور لبرلائزیشن. اسلامائزیشن نے ریاست اور معاشرے میں زیادہ سے زیادہ مذہبی مذہب کے ذریعہ تحریکوں کا باہمی موافقت کرنے کی کوشش کی۔ لبرلائزیشن کی وجہ سے تحریکوں کو ریاست اور مذہبی سطح پر اپنی سرگرمیاں چلانے کی اجازت دیتی ہے بغیر ضروری ہے کہ ریاست کے مذہب کو بڑھایا جائے۔. اسلامائزیشن جنت اسلام پسندوں کو تقویت دیتی ہے جبکہ لبرلائزیشن انفلوژن کا دائرہ فراہم کرکے ان کو طاقت دیتی ہے.