RSSAlle reacties Tagged With: "islamistische"

Islam en het maken van de staatsmacht

Seyyed Vali Nasr Reza

In 1979 General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, de militaire leider van Pakistan, verklaarde dat Pakistan een islamitische staat zou worden. Islamitische waarden en normen zou dienen als de basis van de nationale identiteit, wet, economie, en sociale relaties, en zouden alle beleidsvorming inspireren. In 1980 Mahathir Mohammed, de nieuwe premier van Maleisië, introduceerde een soortgelijke brede plan om overheidsbeleid anker maken in islamitische waarden, en tot stand te brengen wetten en economische praktijken van zijn land in overeenstemming met de leer van de islam. Waarom heeft deze heersers kiezen voor de weg van de “islamisering” voor hun land? En hoe deed eenmalige seculiere postkoloniale staten worden de agenten van de islamisering en de voorbode van de “ware” islamitische staat?
Maleisië en Pakistan hebben sinds de late jaren 1970-begin 1980 een uniek pad naar ontwikkeling volgde dat afwijkt van de ervaringen van andere Derde Wereld landen. In deze twee landen werd religieuze identiteit geïntegreerd in staatsideologie om het doel en het proces van ontwikkeling met de islamitische waarden te informeren.
Deze verbintenis heeft presenteerde ook een heel ander beeld van de relatie tussen de islam en politiek in islamitische samenlevingen. In Maleisië en Pakistan, het heeft overheidsinstellingen in plaats van islamistische activisten (degenen die een politieke lezing van de islam pleiten; ook bekend als revivalisten of fundamentalisten) dat de bewakers van de islam en de verdedigers van de belangen van zijn geweest. Dit suggereert een
heel andere dynamiek in de eb en vloed van islampolitiek in het minst wijzen op het belang van de staat in de wee van dit verschijnsel.
Wat te denken van seculiere staten dat de islamitische draaien? Wat doet zo'n transformatie gemiddelde voor de staat als voor de islamitische politiek?
Dit boek worstelt met deze vragen. Dit is niet een volledig overzicht van de politiek van Maleisië of Pakistan, noch betrekking hebben op alle aspecten van de rol van de islam in de samenleving en de politiek, Hoewel de analytische verhaal stil bij deze punten aanzienlijk. Dit boek is eerder een sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar het fenomeen van de seculiere postkoloniale staten steeds agenten van islamisering, en meer in het algemeen hoe de cultuur en religie aan de behoeften van de staatsmacht en ontwikkeling. De analyse hier is gebaseerd op theoretische discussies
in de sociale wetenschappen van het gedrag van de overheid en de rol van cultuur en religie daarin. Belangrijker, trekt conclusies uit de onderzochte gevallen bredere conclusies van belang leveren aan de disciplines.

Voor het contact POLITIEKE ISLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA Kadlec

De politieke islam is tegenwoordig de meest actieve politieke kracht in het Midden-Oosten. De toekomst is nauw verbonden met die van de regio. Als de Verenigde Staten en de Europese Unie zich inzetten voor de ondersteuning van politieke hervormingen in de regio, ze zullen beton moeten bedenken, coherente strategieën om islamitische groeperingen te betrekken. Nog, de VS. was over het algemeen niet bereid een dialoog met deze bewegingen aan te gaan. evenzo, EU-betrokkenheid bij islamisten was de uitzondering, niet de regel. Waar contacten op laag niveau bestaan, ze dienen voornamelijk voor het verzamelen van informatie, geen strategische doelstellingen. de VS. en de EU hebben een aantal programma's die zich richten op de economische en politieke ontwikkeling in de regio, waaronder het Midden-Oostenpartnerschapsinitiatief (MEPI), de Millennium Challenge Corporation (Mijn Klantencentrum), de Unie voor de Middellandse Zee, en het Europees nabuurschapsbeleid (ENP) – toch hebben ze weinig te zeggen over hoe de uitdaging van de islamistische politieke oppositie past binnen bredere regionale doelstellingen. VS. en de EU-ondersteuning en programmering voor democratie zijn bijna volledig gericht op autoritaire regeringen zelf of seculiere maatschappelijke groeperingen met minimale steun in hun eigen samenlevingen.
De tijd is rijp voor een herijking van het huidige beleid. Sinds de terroristische aanslagen van september 11, 2001, het ondersteunen van democratie in het Midden-Oosten is belangrijker geworden voor westerse beleidsmakers, die een verband zien tussen gebrek aan democratie en politiek geweld. Er is meer aandacht besteed aan het begrijpen van de variaties binnen de politieke islam. De nieuwe Amerikaanse regering staat meer open voor verbreding van de communicatie met de moslimwereld. In de tussentijd, de overgrote meerderheid van de reguliere islamitische organisaties – waaronder de Moslimbroederschap in Egypte, Jordan's Islamitisch Actiefront (IAF), Marokko's Partij voor Rechtvaardigheid en Ontwikkeling (PJD), de islamitische constitutionele beweging van Koeweit, en de Jemenitische Islah-partij – hebben in toenemende mate steun voor politieke hervormingen en democratie tot een centraal onderdeel van hun politieke platforms gemaakt. In aanvulling, velen hebben sterke interesse getoond in het openen van een dialoog met de VS. en EU-regeringen.
De toekomst van de betrekkingen tussen westerse landen en het Midden-Oosten kan grotendeels worden bepaald door de mate waarin eerstgenoemde geweldloze islamitische partijen betrekken bij een brede dialoog over gedeelde belangen en doelstellingen. Er is recentelijk een wildgroei aan onderzoeken geweest over betrokkenheid bij islamisten, maar weinigen gaan duidelijk in op wat het in de praktijk kan inhouden. Als Zoë Nautre, visiting fellow bij de Duitse Raad voor Buitenlandse Betrekkingen, plaatst het, “de EU denkt aan engagement, maar weet niet goed hoe.”1 In de hoop de discussie te verhelderen, we onderscheiden drie niveaus van “betrokkenheid”,” elk met verschillende middelen en doelen: contacten op laag niveau, strategische dialoog, en partnerschap.

ISLAM, ISLAMISTEN, EN HET VERKIEZINGSPRINCIPE IN HET MIDDEN-OOSTEN

James Piscatori

Voor een idee waarvan de tijd zogenaamd is gekomen, ÒdemocratieÓ maskeert een verbazingwekkende

aantal onbeantwoorde vragen en, in de moslimwereld, heeft gegenereerd

een opmerkelijke hoeveelheid warmte. Is het een cultureel specifieke term?, weerspiegeling van westerse

Europese ervaringen gedurende meerdere eeuwen? Bezitten niet-westerse samenlevingen?

hun eigen normen voor deelname en verantwoording (en inderdaad die van henzelf)

ontwikkelingsritmes (die de aandacht trekken), als het geen respect is? Is de islam?,

met zijn nadruk op schriftuurlijk gezag en de centrale plaats van de heilige wet, toestaan

voor flexibele politiek en participatieve overheid?

De antwoorden op deze vragen maken deel uit van een verhalend en tegenverhaal

die zelf een integraal onderdeel zijn van een omstreden discours. Het grotere verhaal

betreft of de 'islam' al dan niet een bedreiging vormt voor het Westen, en de aanvullende

verhaal gaat over de verenigbaarheid van de islam met democratie. de intellectuele

bagage, om de metafoor te veranderen, is nauwelijks neutraal. De discussie zelf heeft

acuut gepolitiseerd worden, gevangen in de gerelateerde controverses over oriëntalisme,

het uitzonderlijke karakter van het Midden-Oosten in het bijzonder en de moslimwereld in het algemeen,

en het modernisme van religieuze 'fundamentalistische' bewegingen.

Het ontwerppartijplatform van de Egyptische Moslimbroederschap

Nathan J. Bruin
Amr Hamzawy

In the late summer 2007, amid great anticipation from Egypt’s ruling elite and opposition movements, the Muslim Brotherhood distributed the first draft of a party platform to a group of intellectuals and analysts. The platform was not to serve as a document for an existing political party or even one about to be founded: the Brotherhood remains without legal recognition in Egypt and Egypt’s rulers and the laws they have enacted make the prospect of legal recognition for a Brotherhood-founded party seem distant. But the Brotherhood’s leadership clearly wished to signal what sort of party they would found if allowed to do so.

With the circulation of the draft document, the movement opened its doors to discussion and even contentious debate about the main ideas of the platform, the likely course of the Brotherhood’s political role, and the future of its relationship with other political forces in the country.1 In this paper, we seek to answer four questions concerning the Brotherhood’s

party platform:

1. What are the specific controversies and divisions generated by the platform?


2. Why and how has the platform proved so divisive?


3. Given the divisions it caused as well as the inauspicious political environment,

why was a platform drafted at this time?


4. How will these controversies likely be resolved?


We also offer some observations about the Brotherhood’s experience with

drafting a party platform and demonstrate how its goals have only been partly

met. Ultimately, the integration of the Muslim Brotherhood as a normal political

actor will depend not only on the movement’s words but also on the deeds

of a regime that seems increasingly hostile to the Brotherhood’s political role.

ISLAMITISCHE MOBILISATIE

Ziad Munson

This article examines the emergence and growth of the Muslim Brotherhood inEgypt from the 1930s through the 1950s. It begins by outlining and empirically evaluatingpossible explanations for the organization’s growth based on (1) theories of politicalIslam and (2) the concept of political opportunity structure in social movementtheory. An extension of these approaches is suggested based on data from organizationaldocuments and declassiŽed U.S. State Department Žles from the period. Thesuccessful mobilization of the Muslim Brotherhood was possible because of the wayin which its Islamic message was tied to its organizational structure, activities, andstrategies and the everyday lives of Egyptians. The analysis suggests that ideas areintegrated into social movements in more ways than the concept of framing allows.It also expands our understanding of how organizations can arise in highly repressiveenvironments.

Zal Turkije een islamitische president hebben??

Michael Rubin


While the campaigns have not officially begun, election season in Turkey is heating up. This spring, de

Turkish parliament will select a president to replace current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose seven-year

term ends on May 16, 2007. On or before November 4, 2007, Turks will head to the polls to choose a new

Parlement. Not only does this year mark the first since 1973—and 1950 before that—in which Turks will

inaugurate a new president and parliament in the same year, but this year’s polls will also impact the future

of Turkey more than perhaps any election in the past half century. If Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan

wins the presidency and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, also known as

AKP) retains its parliamentary majority, Islamists would control all Turkish offices and be positioned to

erode secularism and redefine state and society.If Erdo˘gan ascends to Çankaya Palace—the

Turkish White House—Turks face the prospect if an Islamist president and a first lady who wears

a Saudi-style headscarf. Such a prospect has fueled speculation about intervention by the Turkish military,

which traditionally serves as the guardian of secularism and the Turkish constitution. In December

2006, bijvoorbeeld, Newsweek published an essay entitled “The Coming Coup d’Etat?” predicting

een 50 percent chance of the military seizing control in Turkey this year.1

While concern about the future of Turkish secularism is warranted, alarmism about military
intervention is not. There will be no more military coups in Turkey. Erdog˘ an may be prepared to
spark a constitutional crisis in pursuit of personal ambition and ideological agenda, but Turkey’s
civilian institutions are strong enough to confront the challenge. The greatest danger to Turkish
democracy will not be Turkish military intervention,but rather well-meaning but naïve interference
by U.S. diplomats seeking stability and downplaying the Islamist threat.

While the campaigns have not officially begun, election season in Turkey is heating up. This spring, theTurkish parliament will select a president to replace current president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose seven-yearterm ends on May 16, 2007. On or before November 4, 2007, Turks will head to the polls to choose a newparliament. Not only does this year mark the first since 1973—and 1950 before that—in which Turks willinaugurate a new president and parliament in the same year, but this year’s polls will also impact the futureof Turkey more than perhaps any election in the past half century. If Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan wins the presidency and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, also known asAKP) retains its parliamentary majority, Islamists would control all Turkish offices and be positioned toerode secularism and redefine state and society.If Erdo˘gan ascends to Çankaya Palace—theTurkish White House—Turks face the prospect if an Islamist president and a first lady who wearsa Saudi-style headscarf. Such a prospect has fueled speculation about intervention by the Turkish military,which traditionally serves as the guardian of secularism and the Turkish constitution. In December2006, bijvoorbeeld, Newsweek published an essay entitled “The Coming Coup d’Etat?” predictinga 50 percent chance of the military seizing control in Turkey this year.1While concern about the future of Turkish secularism is warranted, alarmism about militaryintervention is not. There will be no more military coups in Turkey. Erdog˘ an may be prepared tospark a constitutional crisis in pursuit of personal ambition and ideological agenda, but Turkey’scivilian institutions are strong enough to confront the challenge. The greatest danger to Turkishdemocracy will not be Turkish military intervention,but rather well-meaning but naïve interferenceby U.S. diplomats seeking stability and downplaying the Islamist threat.

Commentaar: Holle ring voor democratie

Arnaud de Borchgrave

WASHINGTON, June 24 (UPI) — The White House’s crusade for democracy, as President Bush sees it, has produceda critical mass of events taking that (Midden Oosten) region in a hopeful new direction.And Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice just toured the area, making clear at every stop whenever the United States has a choice between stability and democracy, the new ideological remedy would sacrifice stability.

Veteran Mideast hands who have dealt with five regional wars and two intifadas over the past half century shuddered. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger first among them.

For the U.S. to crusade in every part of the world to spread democracy may be beyond our capacity,” he says. de VS. system, he explains, “is the product of unique historical experiences, difficult to duplicate or to transplant into Muslim societies where secular democracy has seldom thrived.If ever.

If stability had been sacrificed for democracy, the former national security adviser and secretary of State to Presidents Nixon and Ford could not have negotiated major Arab-Israeli disengagement agreements: Sinai I, Golan and Sinai II. Without the undemocratic, benign dictatorial figure of Anwar Sadat at the helm in Egypt, or without the late Syrian dictator and master terror-broker Hafez Assad, yet another page of war history would have been written.

With a democratic parliament in Egypt in 1974, presumably dominated by the popular Muslim Brotherhood, Sadat could not have made his spectacular, death-defying trip to Jerusalemand suddenly become the most popular leader in Israel. A peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and between Jordan and Israel were possible only because absolute rulersSadat and the late King Hussein, led both Arab countries.

Sadat knew his courageous act of statesmanship was tantamount to signing his own death warrant. It was carried out in 1981 — by Islamist extremistson worldwide television.

Rice proudly proclaims it is no longer a war against terrorism but a struggle for democracy. She is proud the Bush administration no longer pursues stability at the expense of democracy. But already the democracy crusade is not only encountering speed bumps, but also roadblocks on a road to nowhere.

The much-vaunted Palestinian elections scheduled for July have been postponed indefinitely.

In Libanon, the ballot box has already been nullified by political machinations. Gen. Michael Aoun, a bright but aging prospect who came back from French exile to take on Syria’s underground machine, has already joined forces with Damascus. While denying any deal with Syria, the general’s henchmen concede he was compensated munificently for his retirement years in Paris from his post as army chief of staff and his time as premier. Aoun collected $22 million, which included compound interest.

In Egypte, Rice, presumably attempting to confer respectability on President Hosni Mubarak’s challengers, took time out to receive a known political charlatan who has over the years been exposed as someone who forged election results as he climbed the ladder of a number of political parties under a variety of labels.

Even Mubarak’s enemies concede Ayman Nour fabricated and forged the signatures of as many as 1,187 citizens to conform to regulations to legalize his Ghad (Tomorrow) partij. His career is dotted with phony academic credentials, plagiarism, a staged assassination attempt on himself, charges of embezzlement by his Saudi media employer, and scads of document forgeries.

Rice had canceled a previous trip to Egypt to protest the indictment and jailing of Nour pending trial. And before Rice’s most recent accolade, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had also gone out of her way to praise Egypt’s master political con man. Makes you wonder what kind of political reporting is coming out of the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.

With this double-headed endorsement by the United States, Nour is losing what little favor he still has in Egypt. He is now seen as a U.S. stooge, to add to a long list of failings.

De Moslim Broederschap, which is outlawed but tolerated since it renounced terrorism, is more representative of Egyptian opinion than Nour. There is also the Kifaya (Enough) movement that groups Egypt’s leading intellectuals. But they declined to meet with Rice.

The United States is seen throughout the Arab world as synonymous with Israel. This automatically limits the Bush administration’s ability to win friends and influence people. Those making the most out of U.S. pressure to democratize are organizations listed by the United States asterrorist.Both Hamas in the Palestinian territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon are now mining opportunities both above and underground. Islamic legislators in Jordan petitioned King Abdullah to allow Jordanian Hamas leaders, evicted six years ago, to come home. The king listened impassively.

It took Europe 500 years to reach the degree of political maturity witnessed by the recent collapse of the European Union’s plans for a common constitution. Winston Churchill said democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried. But Churchill also said, “The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter.This still applies in the souks of the Arab world, from Marrakech to Muscat.

Het probleem van de Egyptische Moslimbroederschap

Jeffrey Azarva

Samuel Tadros

On June 20, 2007, de VS. Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research convened ameeting ofU.S. intelligence officials to weigh the prospect of formal engagement with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,1known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin. The session was the result of several years of discussion aboutengaging the group considered by many to be the fountainhead of Sunni fundamentalism.Although the Bush administration established a diplomatic quarantine of the Brotherhood afterSeptember 11, 2001, members of the U.S. House of Representatives held several meetings in Egyptin the spring of 2007—almost three months before the State Department meeting—with MuhammadSaad al-Katatni, an independent member of the Egyptian parliament and the head of its Brotherhoodaffiliatedbloc. On April 5, 2007, House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) broke with conventionand met with Katatni at the Egyptian parliament building and at the residence ofU.S. ambassador to Egypt Francis J. Ricciardone. Dan, on May 27, 2007, a four-member U.S. congressionaldelegation led by Representative David Price (D-N.C.) met with Katatni in Cairo.Following Hoyer’s visit, de VS. Embassy in Cairo dismissed Egyptian criticism that his meetingspresaged a reversal of U.S. policy.2 In November 2007, Ricciardone also played down themeetings when he claimed that U.S. contacts with nominally independent Brotherhood members did“not imply American endorsement of the views of the individual parliamentarians or their politicalaffiliates.”3 Despite this reassurance, the meetings with Katatni are indicative of opinion leaders, bothinside and outside the U.S. regering, warming inevitable. Yet while the movement, established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, constitutes the most organizedand well-funded opposition in the country today—the byproduct of both its charitable services and da’wa (literally“call to God,” or preaching) network that operate outside state control—any examination of its rhetoricand political platforms shows U.S. outreach to be premature. Despite its professed commitment to pluralismand the rule of law, the Brotherhood continues to engage in dangerous doublespeak when it comes to the mostfundamental issues of democracy.

Democratie die zichzelf tegen zichzelf beschermt?

Ebru Erdem

Studies on government in Muslim societies and in the Middle East in particular have mostly focused on authoritarianism. They sought to answer why authoritarianism is the most often observed regime type, and why it persists. Recent work has looked at the role of elections and elected bodies under authoritarianism, explaining why they exist and what purposes they serve (Blaydes 2008; Lust-Okar 2006). The goal of this paper is to shift the spotlight onto the judiciary, and to the political role of high courts in Muslim societies with different levels of authoritarianism.Judiciaries and the judicial processes in Muslim societies have not caught much scholarly attention. Much of the work in this area has revolved around Shari’a. Shari’a law, incorporation of the Shari’a into western style judicial systems and legal codes, conflicts between western and Shari’a inspired codes of family law, and especially the impact of the latter on women’s rights are some of the extensively studied topics concerning the judicial processes in these societies. Aan de andere kant, work on judiciary as a political institution in the Muslim world is scarce, notable exceptions being Moustafa (2003) and Hirschl (2004). Judiciaries may take different institutional forms, be based on different legal traditions, or vary in the level of independence they enjoy, but they are still a political institutions.Why study the judiciary in the Muslim World? Is a focus on the judiciary meaningful given the dominance of the executives in countries with authoritarian regimes? The justification for a focus on the judiciary has different dimensions. From a rational choice-institutionalist perspective: if an institution exists, there must be a reason for it, and we think that investigating the raison d’être of the judiciaries will provide interesting insights about political processes and executive strategies. From an institutional-design perspective, the shape that an institution takes2is related to the strategies of the actors negotiating over that institution, and we would like to use the observed variance in judicial institutions and powers across countries and time periods to learn about different aspects of political bargains that scholars have studied in other political realms. From a democratic development perspective, the establishment of the checks and balances is central to a functioning and sustainable democracy, and we would argue that studying the judiciary is central to understanding the prospects towards establishment of rule of law and a credible commitment to democracy (Weingast 1997).

Wat gebeurde er met de "Arabische straat"?”

Neha Sahgal



Why do opposition movements engage in protest under some circumstances but not inothers? Why did the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt organize large scale protest during the 2005regime initiated political reforms while remaining largely off the streets during the United States’led war in Iraq in 2003? There is a common notion among Western public opinion and policymakers that United States’ policies in the Middle East have led to greater political activismamong Islamic fundamentalists. Nog, while citizens around the world protested the war in Iraq,Egypt remained largely quiet. The lack of protest and other acts of opposition were surprisinggiven the history of Arab-anti colonial struggle, the 1950s street politics in Egypt that broughtNasser to power and the flourishing civil society organizations in the region exemplified byIslamist parties, non governmental organizations and professional syndicates. More importantly,with the 2005 regime initiated political opening in Egypt, the country’s largest oppositionmovement, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood organized high levels of protests anddemonstrations exposing undemocratic practices of the current government and seeking greaterpolitical freedom. Het jaar 2005, was marked by a “wave of contention” in Egypt standing instark contrast to the lack of mobilization against the Iraq war. Clearly, Muslim Brotherhoodprotest activity is guided by factors other than the prevalence of “anti-Americanism.”Scholars of contentions politics have developed and tested various theories that explainand predict protest behavior. Strain and breakdown theories explain protest as an outcome ofeconomic conditions while resource mobilization theories have stressed the role of material andorganizational constraints in organizing protest. Yet others have argued that protests are spurredby structural changes, bijvoorbeeld, divisions or breakdown in the government. In this paper, Iargue that explaining the protest behavior of one group should take into account the group’sinteraction with other opposition actors. Opposition groups operate in a dense network of allies,adversaries as well as counter movements. Therefore their strategies influence each other intangible ways. I present an analysis of how the 2005 political opening in Egypt led to changes inlegal parties such as al-Ghad and al-Wafd that were allowed to contest presidential andparliamentary elections. Verder, the new movement Kifaya, originally formed to expressopposition to the Iraq war, also gained momentum as an anti-Mubarak, pro-democracy alliance.The changes in the parties that were allowed to contest elections and the emergence of newmovements altered the socio-political context for the “officially banned, yet tolerated,” MuslimBrotherhood. The Brotherhood tried to reassert itself as the main voice of political opposition inthe country by organizing greater protest activity and in this way established similarity with legalopposition parties. While legal opposition parties remain weak and ineffective in Egypt, andnewer opposition movements are still small in their membership, they may still influence eachothers’ strategies in tangible ways.

De Moslim Broederschap van Jordanië en Jama'at-i-Islam van Pakistan

Neha Sahgal

The study of Islamist activism is new to social movement theory. Socialmovement scholarship has ignored Islamist movements because of their unique faithbasednature. More recently scholars have recognized that the processes of contentionconceptualized by social movement theory can be applied to Islamist activism to seektheoretical refinements in both areas of study.In this paper, I examine variations in the strategies followed by Islamistmovements in response to government policies. States have followed various policies inmanaging the tide of Islamist opposition to their power. Some states have chosen to userepressive means (Egypte, Jordan before 1989), while others, at different times in theirhistory have used accommodative policies (Jordan after 1989, Pakistan, Maleisië). Iexamine the effects of government accommodation on Islamist movement strategies.I argue that accommodation can have varying effects on Islamist movementstrategies depending on the nature of accommodative policies followed. Governmentshave employed two different types of accommodative policies in their tenuousrelationship with Islamist opposition – Islamization and liberalization. Islamizationattempts to co-opt the movements through greater religiosity in state and society.Liberalization allows the movements to conduct their activities at both the state and thesocietal level without necessarily increasing the religiosity of the state1. Islamizationdisempowers Islamists while liberalization empowers them by providing a sphere ofinfluence.