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Либеральная демократия и политический ислам: Поиски Common Ground.

Мустафа Benhenda

Эта статья направлена ​​на установление диалога между демократической и исламской политическими теориями. Взаимодействие между ними вызывает недоумение: например, чтобы объяснить отношения, существующие между демократией и их концепцией идеального исламского политического
режим, Пакистанский ученый Абу-Ала Модуди придумал неологизм «теодемократия», в то время как французский ученый Луи Массиньон предложил оксюморон «светская теократия». Эти выражения предполагают, что некоторые аспекты демократии оцениваются положительно, а другие - отрицательно. Например, Мусульманские ученые и активисты часто поддерживают принцип ответственности правителей, которая является определяющей чертой демократии. Наоборот, они часто отвергают принцип разделения религии и государства, который часто считается частью демократии (по крайней мере, демократии, как известно в Соединенных Штатах сегодня). Учитывая эту смешанную оценку демократических принципов, кажется интересным определить концепцию демократии, лежащую в основе исламских политических моделей. Другими словами, мы должны попытаться выяснить, что является демократическим в «теодемократии». С этой целью, среди внушительного разнообразия и многообразия исламских традиций нормативной политической мысли, мы в основном фокусируемся на широком распространении мыслей, восходящих к Абу-Ала-Маудуди и египетскому интеллектуалу Сайеду Кутбу. Эта особая тенденция мышления интересна тем, что в мусульманском мире, оно лежит в основе некоторых наиболее сложных оппозиций распространению ценностей, исходящих с Запада. На основе религиозных ценностей, эта тенденция разработала политическую модель, альтернативную либеральной демократии. Говоря в широком смысле, концепция демократии, включенная в эту исламскую политическую модель, является процедурной. С некоторыми отличиями, эта концепция основана на демократических теориях, отстаиваемых некоторыми конституционалистами и политологами10. Она тонкая и минималистская, до определенной точки. Например, он не опирается на какое-либо понятие народного суверенитета и не требует какого-либо разделения между религией и политикой. Первой целью этой статьи является разработка этой минималистской концепции.. Мы подробно излагаем его, чтобы отделить эту концепцию от ее моральной (либеральный) устои, которые являются противоречивыми с конкретной исламской точки зрения, рассматриваемой здесь. Верно, демократический процесс обычно основывается на принципе личной автономии, который не поддерживается этими исламскими теориями. 11 Здесь, мы показываем, что такой принцип не является необходимым для оправдания демократического процесса.

ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Абдулла Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
более того, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, а именно, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, США, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

Islamism revisited

МАХА Аззам

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 лет, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Июль 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

Исламская политическая культура, Демократия, и права человека

Даниэль E. Цена

Утверждалось, что ислам способствует авторитаризму., contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. как следствие, ученые, комментаторы, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. Этот вид, однако, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Исламская политическая теория, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, которые не учитывают другие факторы. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, как представители других религий, может использоваться для поддержки различных политических систем и политик.. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Следовательно, новый подход к изучению
связь между исламом и политикой призвана.
Я предлагаю, через тщательную оценку отношений между исламом, демократия, и права человека на межнациональном уровне, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, экономические влияния, этнические расколы, и общественное развитие, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Зухур

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; а также (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

Демократия, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (МБ), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 выборы. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. В то же время, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

Египет на Tipping Point ?

Дэвид Б. Оттауэй
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Хосни Мубарак, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 к 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.

BETWEEN YESTERDAY AND TODAY

HASAN AL-BANNA

The First Islamic State
On the foundation of this virtuous Qur’anic social order the first Islamic state arose, having unshakeable faith in Это, meticulously applying it, and spreading it throughout the world, so that the first Khilafah used to say: ‘If I should lose a camel’s lead, I would find it in Allah’s Book.’. He fought those who refused to pay zakah, regarding them as apostates because they had overthrown one of the pillars of this order, saying: ‘By Allah, if they refused me a lead which they would hand over to the Apostle of Allah (PBUH), I would fight them as soon as I have a sword in my hand!’ For unity, in all its meanings and manifestations, pervaded this new forthcoming nation.
Complete social unity arose from making the Qur’anic order and it’s language universal, while complete political unity was under the shadow of the Amir Al-Mumineen and beneath the standard of the Khilafah in the capital.
The fact that the Islamic ideology was one of decentralisation of the armed forces, the state treasuries, а также provincial governors proved to be no obstacle to this, since all acted according to a single creed and a unified and comprehensive control. The Qur’anic principles dispelled and laid to rest the superstitious idolatry prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. They banished guileful Judaism and confined it to a narrow province, putting an end to its religious and political authority. They struggled with Christianity such that its influence was greatly diminished in the Asian and African continents, confined only to Europe under the guard of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Thus the Islamic state became the centre of spiritual and political dominance within the two largest continents. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Constantinople from the east and besieging it until the siege grew wearisome. Then it came at it from the west,
plunging into Spain, with its victorious soldiers reaching the heart of France and penetrating as far as northern and southern Italy. It established an imposing state in Western Europe, radiant with science and knowledge.
Afterwards, it ended the conquest of Constantinople itself and the confined Christianity within the restricted area of Central Europe. Islamic fleets ventured into the depths of the Mediterranean and Red seas, both became Islamic lakes. And so the armed forces of the Islamic state assumed supremacy of the seas both in the East and West, enjoying absolute mastery over land and sea. These Islamic nations had already combined and incorporated many things from other civilisations, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. The Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.

Исламская политическая культура, Демократия, и права человека

Даниэль E. Цена

Утверждалось, что ислам способствует авторитаризму., противоречит

ценности западных обществ, и существенно влияет на важные политические результаты
в мусульманских странах. как следствие, ученые, комментаторы, и правительство
официальные лица часто указывают на «исламский фундаментализм» как на следующее
идеологическая угроза либеральным демократиям. Этот вид, однако, основан в первую очередь
по анализу текстов, Исламская политическая теория, и специальные исследования
отдельных стран, которые не учитывают другие факторы. Это мое мнение
что тексты и традиции ислама, как представители других религий,
может использоваться для поддержки различных политических систем и политик.. Страна
конкретные и описательные исследования не помогают нам найти закономерности, которые помогут
мы объясняем различные отношения между исламом и политикой в ​​разных странах.
страны мусульманского мира. Следовательно, новый подход к изучению
связь между исламом и политикой призвана.
Я предлагаю, через тщательную оценку отношений между исламом,
демократия, и права человека на межнациональном уровне, это слишком много
акцент делается на силе ислама как политической силы. я первый
использовать сравнительные тематические исследования, которые сосредоточены на факторах, связанных с взаимодействием
между исламскими группами и режимами, экономические влияния, этнические расколы,

и общественное развитие, чтобы объяснить разницу во влиянии

Ислам в политике восьми стран.

Исламистские оппозиционные партии и потенциал взаимодействия с ЕС

Тоби Арчер

Хайди Huuhtanen

В свете растущего значения исламистских движений в мусульманском мире и

как радикализация повлияла на глобальные события с начала века, Это

ЕС важно оценить свою политику по отношению к акторам в рамках того, что может быть свободно

называют «исламским миром».. Особенно важно задаться вопросом, следует ли и как привлекать

с различными исламистскими группировками.

Это остается спорным даже в ЕС.. Некоторые считают, что исламские ценности, которые

лежащие за исламистскими партиями, просто несовместимы с западными идеалами демократии и

права человека, в то время как другие рассматривают взаимодействие как реальную необходимость в связи с растущим

значение исламистских партий внутри страны и их растущее участие в международной

дела. Другая точка зрения состоит в том, что демократизация в мусульманском мире усилится.

Европейская безопасность. Справедливость этих и других аргументов относительно того,

ЕС должен участвовать, можно проверить только путем изучения различных исламистских движений и

их политические обстоятельства, страна за страной.

Демократизация является центральной темой общих внешнеполитических действий ЕС., как положено

в статье 11 Договора о Европейском Союзе. Многие из государств, рассматриваемых в этом

доклад не демократичен, или не совсем демократично. В большинстве этих стран, исламист

партии и движения составляют значительную оппозицию господствующим режимам, а также

в некоторых они образуют крупнейший оппозиционный блок. Европейские демократии давно вынуждены

иметь дело с правящими режимами, которые являются авторитарными, но это новое явление, чтобы нажать

демократических реформ в штатах, где наиболее вероятные бенефициары могли, от

точка зрения ЕС, различные и иногда проблематичные подходы к демократии и ее

связанные значения, такие как права меньшинств и женщин и верховенство закона. Эти обвинения

часто выдвигается против исламистских движений, поэтому для европейских политиков важно

иметь точное представление о политике и философии потенциальных партнеров.

Опыт разных стран свидетельствует о том, что чем больше свободы исламисты

вечеринки разрешены, тем более они умеренны в своих действиях и идеях. Во многих

случаи, когда исламистские партии и группы уже давно отошли от своей первоначальной цели

создания исламского государства, основанного на исламском праве, и пришли к принятию основных

демократические принципы избирательной борьбы за власть, наличие других политических

конкуренты, и политический плюрализм.

исламистские Стороны : вернуться к истокам

Хусейн Хаккани

Гилель Фрадкин

Как мы должны понять возникновение и характер исламистских партий? Могут ли они разумно ожидать не только участвовать в демократической политике, но и уважать нормы либеральной демократии? Эти вопросы лежат в основе вопросов, которые мы попросили обратиться.
In our view, any response that is historically and thus practically relevant must begin with the following observation: Until very recently, even the idea of an Islamist party (let alone a democratic Islamist party) would have seemed, from the perspective of Islamism itself, a paradox if not a contradiction in terms. Islamism’s original conception of a healthy Islamic political life made no room for—indeed rejected—any role for parties of any sort. Islamist groups described themselves as the vanguard of Islamic revival, claiming that they represented the essence of Islam and reflected the aspiration of the global umma (community of believers) for an Islamic polity. Pluralism, which is a precondition for the operation of political parties, was rejected by most Islamist political
thinkers as a foreign idea.
As should be more or less obvious, the novelty not only of actually existing Islamist parties but of the very idea of such parties makes it exceptionally difficult to assess their democratic bona fides. But this difficulty merely adds another level of complication to a problem that stems from the very origins of Islamism and its conception of the true meaning of Islam and of Islam’s relationship to political life

СТРАТЕГИИ ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИЯ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО ИСЛАМА

ШАДИ ХАМИД

AMANDA Kadlec

Политический ислам - самая активная политическая сила на Ближнем Востоке сегодня. Его будущее тесно связано с будущим региона.. Если Соединенные Штаты и Европейский Союз привержены поддержке политических реформ в регионе, им нужно будет разработать бетон, согласованные стратегии взаимодействия с исламистскими группировками. Еще, Соединенные штаты. обычно не желал вступать в диалог с этими движениями. по аналогии, Взаимодействие ЕС с исламистами было исключением, не правило. Где существуют контакты на низком уровне, в основном они служат целям сбора информации, не стратегические цели. Соединенные штаты. и ЕС имеют ряд программ, направленных на экономическое и политическое развитие в регионе, в том числе Инициативу ближневосточного партнерства. (МИФИ), Корпорация "Вызовы тысячелетия" (MCC), Союз Средиземноморья, и Европейская политика соседства (ЕПС) - но они мало что могут сказать о том, как вызов исламистской политической оппозиции вписывается в более широкие региональные цели.. США. помощь и программы ЕС в области демократии почти полностью направлены либо самим авторитарным правительствам, либо светским группам гражданского общества с минимальной поддержкой в ​​их собственных обществах..
Пришло время для переоценки текущей политики.. С сентябрьских терактов 11, 2001, поддержка демократии на Ближнем Востоке приобрела большее значение для западных политиков., кто видит связь между отсутствием демократии и политическим насилием. Большее внимание было уделено пониманию различий в политическом исламе.. Новая американская администрация более открыта для расширения контактов с мусульманским миром.. тем временем, подавляющее большинство основных исламистских организаций, включая Братья-мусульмане в Египте, Исламский фронт действий Иордании (IAF), Партия справедливости и развития Марокко (ПСР), Исламское конституционное движение Кувейта, и Йеменская партия ислах - все чаще делают поддержку политической реформы и демократии центральным компонентом своих политических платформ.. В дополнение, многие выразили сильную заинтересованность в открытии диалога с США.. и правительства ЕС.
Будущее отношений между западными странами и Ближним Востоком может во многом определяться степенью, в которой первые вовлекают ненасильственные исламистские партии в широкий диалог об общих интересах и целях.. В последнее время наблюдается рост исследований взаимодействия с исламистами., но немногие четко рассматривают, что это может повлечь за собой на практике. В роли Зои Наутре, приглашенный научный сотрудник Немецкого совета по международным отношениям, кладет это, «ЕС думает о взаимодействии, но на самом деле не знает, как это сделать» 1. В надежде прояснить дискуссию, мы различаем три уровня «вовлеченности,"Каждый с разными средствами и целями: низкоуровневые контакты, стратегический диалог, и партнерство.

исламистские Стороны : participation without power

Malika Zeghal

Over the last two decades, social and political movements grounding their ideologies in references to Islam have sought to become legal political parties in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Some of these Islamist movements have been authorized to take part lawfully in electoral competition. Among the best known is Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won a parliamentary majority in 2002 and has led the government ever since. Morocco’s own Party of Justice and Development (ПСР) has been legal since the mid- 1990s and commands a significant bloc of seats in Parliament. В Египте, Братья-мусульмане (МБ) has never been authorized to form a political party, but in spite of state repression it has successfully run candidates as nominal independents in both national and local elections.
Since the early 1990s, this trend has gone hand-in-hand with official policies of limited political liberalization. Together, the two trends have occasioned a debate about whether these movements are committed to “democracy.” A vast literature has sprung up to underline the paradoxes as well as the possible risks and benefits of including Islamist parties in the electoral process. The main paradigm found in this body of writing focuses on the consequences that might ensue when Islamists use democratic instruments, and seeks to divine the “true” intentions that Islamists will manifest if they come to power.

Islam and the West

Preface

John J. DeGioia

The remarkable feeling of proximity between people and nations is the unmistakable reality of our globalized world. Encounters with other peoples’ ways oflife, current affairs, politics, welfare and faithsare more frequent than ever. We are not onlyable to see other cultures more clearly, butalso to see our differences more sharply. The information intensity of modern life has madethis diversity of nations part of our every dayconsciousness and has led to the centrality ofculture in discerning our individual and collectiveviews of the world.Our challenges have also become global.The destinies of nations have become deeply interconnected. No matter where in the world we live, we are touched by the successes and failures of today’s global order. Yet our responses to global problems remain vastly different, not only as a result of rivalry and competing interests,but largely because our cultural difference is the lens through which we see these global challenges.Cultural diversity is not necessarily a source of clashes and conflict. по факту, the proximity and cross-cultural encounters very often bring about creative change – a change that is made possible by well-organized social collaboration.Collaboration across borders is growing primarily in the area of business and economic activity. Collaborative networks for innovation,production and distribution are emerging as the single most powerful shaper of the global economy.

Исламское движение: Политические свободы & Демократия

Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi

Это обязанность (Исламский) Движение на предстоящем этапе tostand твердую позицию против тоталитарной диктатуры и, Политический деспотизм и злоупотребление правами людей. The Movement should always stand by political freedom, as represented by true,not false, демократия. It should flatly declare it refusal of tyrantsand steer clear of all dictators, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah).” [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere ofdemocracy and freedom, and have withered and become barren only at the times of oppression and tyranny that trod over the willof the peoples which clung to Islam. Such oppressive regimesimposed their secularism, socialism or communism on their peoples by force and coercion, using covert torture and publicexecutions, and employing those devilish tools that tore flesh,shed blood, crushed bone and destroyed the soul.We saw these practices in many Muslim countries, including Turkey, Египет, Сирия, Ирак, (the former) South Yemen, Somaliaand northern African States for varying periods of time, depending on the age or reign of the dictator in each country.On the other hand, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, values, essence and very existence.