RSSAlle Einträge Tagged With: "Islamic Movement"

Liberale Demokratie und politische Islam: die Search for Common Ground.

Mostapha Benhenda

Dieses Papier versucht, einen Dialog zwischen demokratischem und islamischem politischen theories.1 Das Zusammenspiel zwischen ihnen herzustellen ist rätselhaft: zum Beispiel, um die Beziehung, die zwischen Demokratie und ihre Vorstellung von der idealen islamischen politischen zu erklären
Regime, der pakistanische Gelehrte Abu ‚Ala Maududi den Neologismus‚theodemocracy‘, während der Französisch scholar Louis Massignon prägte den Oxymoron‚weltliche Theokratie‘vorgeschlagen. Diese Ausdrücke deuten darauf hin, dass einige Aspekte der Demokratie positiv bewertet und andere beurteilt negativ. Beispielsweise, Muslimische Gelehrte und Aktivisten unterstützen häufig das Prinzip der Verantwortlichkeit der Herrscher, das ist ein bestimmendes Merkmal der Demokratie. Andererseits, sie lehnen häufig das Prinzip der Trennung zwischen Religion und Staat, die oft als Teil der Demokratie sein (mindestens, in den Vereinigten Staaten von Demokratie als heute bekannt). diese gemischte Beurteilung der demokratischen Grundsätze gegeben, es scheint interessant, die Vorstellung von Demokratie zugrunde liegenden islamische politische Modelle zu bestimmen,. Mit anderen Worten, wir sollten versuchen, um herauszufinden, was in „theodemocracy“ demokratisch. Zu diesem Zweck, unter der beeindruckenden Vielfalt und Vielzahl von islamischen Traditionen des normativen politischen Denkens, wir im Wesentlichen auf dem breiten Strom des Denkens konzentrieren zu Abu ‚Ala Maududi und dem ägyptischen intellektuellen Sayyed Qutb.8 ist diese besondere Entwicklung des Denkens zurück interessant, weil in der muslimischen Welt, es liegt auf der Grundlage einiger der schwierigsten Einsprüche an der Verbreitung der Werte aus dem Westen stamm. Basierend auf religiösen Werten, Dieser Trend erarbeitet eine politische Modell Alternative zur liberalen Demokratie. Allgemein gesprochen, der Begriff der Demokratie in diesem islamischen politischen Modell enthalten ist verfahrens. Mit einigen Unterschieden, Diese Auffassung von demokratischen Theorien inspiriert wird von einigen Verfassungsrechtler und politischen scientists.10 befürwortete Es ist dünn und minimalistisch, bis zu einem bestimmten Punkt. Beispielsweise, es beruht nicht auf jedem Begriff der Volkssouveränität und es erfordert keine Trennung zwischen Religion und Politik. Das erste Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, diese minimalistische Konzeption zu erarbeiten. Wir machen eine detaillierte Anpassung der es um diese Vorstellung von ihrer moralischen zu isolieren (liberal) Stiftungen, die sind umstritten aus dem jeweiligen islamischen Standpunkt hier betrachteten. Tatsächlich, der demokratische Prozess ist in der Regel aus einem Prinzip der persönlichen Autonomie abgeleitet, die von dieser islamischen theories.11 wird hier nicht unterstützt, wir zeigen, dass solche grundsätzlich nicht erforderlich ist, einen demokratischen Prozess zu rechtfertigen.


Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,

In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Außerdem, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, nämlich, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, US-, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

Islamismus revisited

MAHA Azzam

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 years, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Juli 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

Islamische Politische Kultur, Demokratie, und Menschenrechte

Daniel E. Preis

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Folglich, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, jedoch, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, Demokratie, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.


Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; und (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

Demokratie, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
westliche Regierungen, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?



The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 Wahlen. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. At the same time, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

Ägypten am Tipping Point ?

David B. Ottaway
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 zu 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.



The First Islamic State
On the foundation of this virtuous Qur’anic social order the first Islamic state arose, having unshakeable faith in es, meticulously applying it, and spreading it throughout the world, so that the first Khilafah used to say: ‘If I should lose a camel’s lead, I would find it in Allah’s Book.’. He fought those who refused to pay zakah, regarding them as apostates because they had overthrown one of the pillars of this order, saying: ‘By Allah, if they refused me a lead which they would hand over to the Apostle of Allah (saw), I would fight them as soon as I have a sword in my hand!’ For unity, in all its meanings and manifestations, pervaded this new forthcoming nation.
Complete social unity arose from making the Qur’anic order and it’s language universal, while complete political unity was under the shadow of the Amir Al-Mumineen and beneath the standard of the Khilafah in the capital.
The fact that the Islamic ideology was one of decentralisation of the armed forces, the state treasuries, und provincial governors proved to be no obstacle to this, since all acted according to a single creed and a unified and comprehensive control. The Qur’anic principles dispelled and laid to rest the superstitious idolatry prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. They banished guileful Judaism and confined it to a narrow province, putting an end to its religious and political authority. They struggled with Christianity such that its influence was greatly diminished in the Asian and African continents, confined only to Europe under the guard of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Thus the Islamic state became the centre of spiritual and political dominance within the two largest continents. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Constantinople from the east and besieging it until the siege grew wearisome. Then it came at it from the west,
plunging into Spain, with its victorious soldiers reaching the heart of France and penetrating as far as northern and southern Italy. It established an imposing state in Western Europe, radiant with science and knowledge.
Afterwards, it ended the conquest of Constantinople itself and the confined Christianity within the restricted area of Central Europe. Islamic fleets ventured into the depths of the Mediterranean and Red seas, both became Islamic lakes. And so the armed forces of the Islamic state assumed supremacy of the seas both in the East and West, enjoying absolute mastery over land and sea. These Islamic nations had already combined and incorporated many things from other civilisations, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. Der Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.

Islamische Politische Kultur, Demokratie, und Menschenrechte

Daniel E. Preis

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Folglich, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, jedoch, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
Demokratie, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Islamistische Oppositionsparteien und das Potenzial für EU-Engagement

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Angesichts der zunehmenden Bedeutung islamistischer Bewegungen in der muslimischen Welt und

die Art und Weise, wie die Radikalisierung die globalen Ereignisse seit der Jahrhundertwende beeinflusst hat, es

Für die EU ist es wichtig, ihre Politik gegenüber Akteuren innerhalb dessen zu bewerten, was locker sein kann

als "islamische Welt" bezeichnet. Es ist besonders wichtig zu fragen, ob und wie man sich engagiert

mit den verschiedenen islamistischen Gruppen.

Dies bleibt auch innerhalb der EU umstritten. Einige glauben, dass der Islam das schätzt

hinter islamistischen Parteien liegen einfach unvereinbar mit westlichen Idealen der Demokratie und

Menschenrechte, während andere Engagement aufgrund des Wachstums als realistische Notwendigkeit ansehen

innerstaatliche Bedeutung islamistischer Parteien und ihr zunehmendes Engagement im internationalen Bereich

Angelegenheiten. Eine andere Perspektive ist, dass die Demokratisierung in der muslimischen Welt zunehmen würde

Europäische Sicherheit. Die Gültigkeit dieser und anderer Argumente darüber, ob und wie die

EU sollte sich engagieren kann nur durch das Studium der verschiedenen islamistischen Bewegungen und getestet werden

ihre politischen Umstände, Land für Land.

Demokratisierung ist ein zentrales Thema der gemeinsamen außenpolitischen Maßnahmen der EU, wie gelegt

in Artikel 11 des Vertrags über die Europäische Union. Viele der Staaten haben dies berücksichtigt

Bericht sind nicht demokratisch, oder nicht vollständig demokratisch. In den meisten dieser Länder, Islamist

Parteien und Bewegungen stellen einen erheblichen Widerstand gegen die vorherrschenden Regime dar, und

in einigen bilden sie den größten Oppositionsblock. Europäische Demokratien mussten lange

sich mit autoritären Regimen befassen, aber es ist ein neues Phänomen zu drücken

für demokratische Reformen in Staaten, in denen die wahrscheinlichsten Nutznießer haben könnten, von dem

Standpunkt der EU, unterschiedliche und manchmal problematische Ansätze zur Demokratie und ihren

verwandte Werte, wie Minderheiten- und Frauenrechte und Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Diese Gebühren sind

oft gegen islamistische Bewegungen gelegt, Daher ist es für die europäischen politischen Entscheidungsträger wichtig, dies zu tun

ein genaues Bild der Richtlinien und Philosophien potenzieller Partner haben.

Erfahrungen aus verschiedenen Ländern deuten darauf hin, dass der Islamist mehr Freiheit hat

Parteien sind erlaubt, Je gemäßigter sie in ihren Handlungen und Ideen sind. In vielen

Fälle Islamistische Parteien und Gruppen haben sich längst von ihrem ursprünglichen Ziel entfernt

der Errichtung eines islamischen Staates, der dem islamischen Recht unterliegt, und sind gekommen, um grundlegende zu akzeptieren

demokratische Prinzipien des Wahlkampfs um die Macht, die Existenz anderer politischer

Wettbewerber, und politischer Pluralismus.

Islamist Parties : going back to the origins

Husain Haqqani

Hillel Fradkin

How should we understand the emergence and the nature of Islamist parties? Can they reasonably be expected not just to participate in democratic politics but even to respect the norms of liberal democracy? These questions lie at the heart of the issues that we have been asked to address.
In our view, any response that is historically and thus practically relevant must begin with the following observation: Until very recently, even the idea of an Islamist party (let alone a democratic Islamist party) would have seemed, from the perspective of Islamism itself, a paradox if not a contradiction in terms. Islamism’s original conception of a healthy Islamic political life made no room for—indeed rejected—any role for parties of any sort. Islamist groups described themselves as the vanguard of Islamic revival, claiming that they represented the essence of Islam and reflected the aspiration of the global umma (community of believers) for an Islamic polity. Pluralism, which is a precondition for the operation of political parties, was rejected by most Islamist political
thinkers as a foreign idea.
As should be more or less obvious, the novelty not only of actually existing Islamist parties but of the very idea of such parties makes it exceptionally difficult to assess their democratic bona fides. But this difficulty merely adds another level of complication to a problem that stems from the very origins of Islamism and its conception of the true meaning of Islam and of Islam’s relationship to political life

STRATEGIEN FÜR Einbeziehung des politischen Islams



Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, den USA. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Ähnlich, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. die US-. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. US-. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. Außerdem, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

Islamist Parties : participation without power

Malika Zeghal

Over the last two decades, social and political movements grounding their ideologies in references to Islam have sought to become legal political parties in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Some of these Islamist movements have been authorized to take part lawfully in electoral competition. Among the best known is Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won a parliamentary majority in 2002 and has led the government ever since. Morocco’s own Party of Justice and Development (PJD) has been legal since the mid- 1990s and commands a significant bloc of seats in Parliament. In Ägypten, die Muslimbruderschaft (MB) has never been authorized to form a political party, but in spite of state repression it has successfully run candidates as nominal independents in both national and local elections.
Since the early 1990s, this trend has gone hand-in-hand with official policies of limited political liberalization. Together, the two trends have occasioned a debate about whether these movements are committed to “democracy.” A vast literature has sprung up to underline the paradoxes as well as the possible risks and benefits of including Islamist parties in the electoral process. The main paradigm found in this body of writing focuses on the consequences that might ensue when Islamists use democratic instruments, and seeks to divine the “true” intentions that Islamists will manifest if they come to power.

Islam and the West


John J. DeGioia

The remarkable feeling of proximity between people and nations is the unmistakable reality of our globalized world. Encounters with other peoples’ ways oflife, current affairs, Politik, welfare and faithsare more frequent than ever. We are not onlyable to see other cultures more clearly, butalso to see our differences more sharply. The information intensity of modern life has madethis diversity of nations part of our every dayconsciousness and has led to the centrality ofculture in discerning our individual and collectiveviews of the world.Our challenges have also become global.The destinies of nations have become deeply interconnected. No matter where in the world we live, we are touched by the successes and failures of today’s global order. Yet our responses to global problems remain vastly different, not only as a result of rivalry and competing interests,but largely because our cultural difference is the lens through which we see these global challenges.Cultural diversity is not necessarily a source of clashes and conflict. Tatsächlich, the proximity and cross-cultural encounters very often bring about creative change – a change that is made possible by well-organized social collaboration.Collaboration across borders is growing primarily in the area of business and economic activity. Collaborative networks for innovation,production and distribution are emerging as the single most powerful shaper of the global economy.

Islamic Movement: Politische Freiheit & Demokratie

Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi

Es ist die Pflicht des (Islamisch) Bewegung in der kommenden Phase tostand Unternehmen gegen totalitäre und diktatorische Herrschaft, politische Willkür und Anmaßung der Rechte der Menschen. Die Bewegung sollte immer zu politischer Freiheit stehen, wie durch wahr dargestellt,nicht falsch, Demokratie. Es sollte rundweg erklären, dass es Tyrannen ablehnt und sich von allen Diktatoren fernhält, selbst wenn ein Tyrann gute Absichten zu haben scheint, um etwas zu gewinnen und für eine Zeit, die normalerweise kurz ist, Wie die Erfahrung gezeigt hat. Der Prophet (SAWS) sagte, „Wenn du siehst, wie meine Nation der Angst zum Opfer fällt und nicht zu einem falschen Täter sagt, "Sie liegen falsch", Dann verlierst du vielleicht die Hoffnung auf sie. “ Wie wäre es also mit einem Regime, das die Menschen dazu zwingt, einem eingebildeten Übeltäter etwas zu sagen?, „Wie gerecht, wie großartig du bist. O unser Held, unser Retter und unser Befreier!Der Koran prangert Tyrannen wie Numrudh an, Pharao, Haman und andere, aber es verachtet auch diejenigen, die Tyrannen folgen und ihren Befehlen gehorchen. Deshalb verachtet Allah das Volk von Noahby und sagt:, „Aber sie folgen (Mindest) deren Reichtum und Kinder ihnen keinen Zuwachs, sondern nur Verlust bringen. “ [Der Brief von Noah; 21]Allah sagt auch von Ad, Leute von Hud, „Und folgte dem Befehl jedes Mächtigen, hartnäckiger Übertreter “. [Huds Brief:59]Siehe auch, was der Koran über die Menschen im Pharao sagt, „Aber sie folgten dem Befehl des Pharao, und der Befehl des Pharao wurde nicht richtig geleitet.[Huds Brief: 97] So machte er sein Volk zum Narren, und sie gehorchten ihm: Sie waren wirklich ein rebellisches Volk (gegen Allah)." [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]Ein genauerer Blick auf die Geschichte der muslimischen Nation und die islamische Bewegung in der Neuzeit sollte deutlich zeigen, dass die islamische Idee, Die islamische Bewegung und das islamische Erwachen haben niemals gediehen oder Früchte getragen, es sei denn in einer Atmosphäre der Demokratie und der Freiheit, und sind nur in Zeiten der Unterdrückung und Tyrannei verwelkt und unfruchtbar geworden, die über den Willen der Völker traten, die am Islam festhielten. Solche Unterdrückungsregime haben ihren Säkularismus aufgezwungen, Sozialismus oder Kommunismus gegen ihre Völker durch Gewalt und Zwang, mit verdeckter Folter und öffentlichen Exekutionen, und diese teuflischen Werkzeuge einzusetzen, die Fleisch zerrissen haben,Blut vergießen, Knochen zerquetscht und die Seele zerstört. Wir haben diese Praktiken in vielen muslimischen Ländern gesehen, einschließlich der Türkei, Ägypten, Syrien, Irak, (das Vorherige) Südjemen, Somalia und nordafrikanische Staaten für unterschiedliche Zeiträume, abhängig vom Alter oder der Regierungszeit des Diktators in jedem Land. Auf der anderen Seite, Wir haben gesehen, wie die Islamische Bewegung und das Islamische Erwachen in Zeiten von Freiheit und Demokratie Früchte tragen und gedeihen, und im Zuge des Zusammenbruchs imperialer Regime, die die Völker mit Angst und Unterdrückung regierten, Ich würde mir nicht vorstellen, dass die Islamische Bewegung etwas anderes als politische Freiheit und Demokratie unterstützen könnte. Die Tyrannen ließen jede Stimme erheben, außer der Stimme des Islam, und lassen Sie jeden Trend sich in Form einer politischen Partei oder einer Körperschaft ausdrücken, mit Ausnahme der islamischen Strömung, die der einzige Trend ist, der tatsächlich für diese Nation spricht und sie als Estrich ausdrückt, Werte, Essenz und Existenz.