所有条目标记为: "伊斯兰教"
伊斯兰教与国家权力的形成
赛义德·瓦利·雷扎·纳瑟
在 1979 穆罕默德·齐亚·哈克将军, 巴基斯坦的军事统治者, 宣布巴基斯坦将成为伊斯兰国家. 伊斯兰价值观和规范将成为民族认同的基础, 法律, 经济, 和社会关系, 并将激发所有政策制定. 在 1980 马哈蒂尔·穆罕默德, 马来西亚新首相, 引入了一项类似的基础广泛的计划，以将国家政策制定锚定在伊斯兰价值观中, 并使他的国家的法律和经济实践符合伊斯兰教义. 为什么这些统治者要为自己的国家选择“伊斯兰化”的道路? 曾经的世俗后殖民国家如何成为伊斯兰化的代理人和“真正的”伊斯兰国家的先兆?
自 1970 年代末至 1980 年代初以来，马来西亚和巴基斯坦走上了一条与其他第三世界国家不同的独特发展道路. 在这两个国家，宗教身份被整合到国家意识形态中，以伊斯兰价值观为发展目标和进程提供信息.
这项工作还呈现了一幅非常不同的图景，即伊斯兰教与穆斯林社会中的政治之间的关系. 在马来西亚和巴基斯坦, 是国家机构而不是伊斯兰活动家 (那些主张对伊斯兰教进行政治解读的人; 也被称为复兴主义者或原教旨主义者) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, 更广泛地说，文化和宗教如何服务于国家权力和发展的需要. 这里的分析依赖于理论讨论
在国家行为的社会科学以及文化和宗教在其中的作用. 更重要, 它从正在审查的案例中得出推论，以得出学科感兴趣的更广泛的结论.
伊斯兰革命后的伊朗妇女
安西娅·卡兹·阿里
伊朗伊斯兰革命胜利至今已三十多年, 然而还有一个 关于伊斯兰共和国及其法律处理方式的问题和模棱两可的数量 当代问题和现状, 特别是在妇女和妇女权利方面. 这篇简短的论文将阐明这些问题并研究女性在各个领域的当前地位, 将此与伊斯兰革命之前的情况进行比较. 已使用可靠且经过验证的数据 尽可能. 引言总结了一些理论和法律研究，提供了 为后续更实际的分析奠定基础，并且是获得数据的来源.
第一部分考虑伊朗伊斯兰共和国领导人对妇女和 妇女权利, 然后全面审视伊斯兰革命以来颁布的法律 关于妇女及其在社会中的地位. 第二部分考虑妇女的文化和 educational developments since the Revolution and compares these to the pre-revolutionary situation. 这 third section looks at women’s political, social and economic participation and considers both quantative and qualitative aspects of their employment. 第四部分然后检查家庭的问题, 这 妇女与家庭的关系, 以及家庭在限制或增加妇女权利方面的作用 伊朗伊斯兰共和国.
伊斯兰教中的妇女
阿米拉（Amira Burghul）
尽管许多哲学家和历史学家达成了重大共识，即
伊斯兰教的原则和教义使妇女的地位发生了根本性的变化
与当时东西方国家的普遍情况相比, 尽管
大量思想家和立法者一致认为，在当时的妇女
预言家 (PBUH) 被授予人为法律未授予的权利和法律特权，直到
最近, 西方人和西方人的宣传活动
一直指责伊斯兰教对女性不公平, 对他们施加限制, 和
边缘化他们在社会中的角色.
整个地区普遍存在的气氛和条件使这种情况变得更糟
穆斯林世界, 无知和贫穷导致对宗教的理解有限
以及阻碍正义和文明生活方式的家庭和人际关系, 特别
男女之间. 被授予机会的一小群人
受过教育和能力也落入了相信实现正义的陷阱
对女性而言，利用她们的能力取决于拒绝宗教和虔诚，
接受西方生活方式, 一方面是由于他们对伊斯兰教的肤浅研究
以及生活消遣对他人的影响.
这两个群体中只有极少数人设法逃脱并摆脱了
他们披着无知和传统的外衣. 这些人深入研究了他们的遗产
和细节, 并以开放的心态看待西方经验的结果. 他们有
区分过去和现在的小麦和谷壳, 并处理了
科学客观地处理出现的问题. 他们驳斥了错误的
以雄辩的论据对伊斯兰教提出指控, 并承认了隐瞒的缺陷.
他们还重新审视了无误者的说法和习俗，以便
区分什么是确定的和神圣的，什么是改变的和扭曲的.
这个群体的负责任的行为确立了新的方向和新的交易方式
伊斯兰社会中的妇女问题. 他们显然还没有解决所有问题
并找到了许多立法空白和缺陷的最终解决方案, 但他们已经奠定了
穆斯林妇女新模式出现的基础, 谁既强大又
致力于其社会的合法和有效基础.
随着伊朗伊斯兰革命的胜利和领导人的祝福, 哪一个是
妇女参与及其有效政治和社会活动的主要宗教权威
参与, 对伊斯兰教妇女进行激烈辩论的范围已显着扩大.
The model of Muslim women in Iran has spread to Islamic resistance movements in Lebanon,
Palestine other Arab countries and even the Western world, and as a result, propaganda
campaigns against Islam have abated to some extent.
The emergence of Salafi Islamic movements such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and similar
Salafi movements in Saudi Arabia and North Africa, and their fanatical way of treating women,
have provoked nervous onlookers fearing an Islamic resurgence into launching new propaganda
campaigns accusing Islam of inspiring terrorism and being backwards and unjust towards
women.
伊斯兰教, 民主 & 美国:
科尔多瓦基金会
阿卜杜拉·法利克 |
介绍 ,
尽管这是一场长期而复杂的辩论, Arches Quarterly 从神学和实践的角度重新审视, 关于伊斯兰教与民主之间的关系和兼容性的重要辩论, 正如巴拉克奥巴马的希望和变革议程所呼应的那样. 虽然许多人庆祝奥巴马登上椭圆形办公室作为美国的全国宣泄者, 其他人对国际舞台上意识形态和方法的转变仍然不乐观. 虽然穆斯林世界和美国之间的许多紧张局势和不信任可归因于促进民主的方法, 通常偏爱专制政权和伪造政权，这些政权为民主价值观和人权提供口红, 余震 9/11 通过美国在政治伊斯兰上的立场，确实进一步加剧了担忧. 它创造了由worldpublicopinion.org发现的负面墙, 根据该 67% 的埃及人认为，全球范围内，美国正在扮演“主要消极”角色.
因此，美国的反应很贴切. 通过选举奥巴马, 世界各地的许多人都寄希望于发展一个不太好战的人, 但对穆斯林世界更公平的外交政策. 奥巴马的考验, 当我们讨论, 是美国及其盟友促进民主的方式. 它会促进还是强加?
而且, 它能否成为长期冲突地区的诚实经纪人？? 吸收 prolifi 的专业知识和洞察力
c学者, 学者, 经验丰富的记者和政治家, Arches Quarterly 揭示了伊斯兰教与民主之间的关系以及美国的角色——以及奥巴马带来的变化, 在寻求共同点. 阿纳斯·阿尔蒂克里蒂, The e Cordoba Foundation 的首席执行官为这次讨论提供了开场白, 他反思了奥巴马道路上的希望和挑战. 跟随 Altikriti, 尼克松总统的前顾问, 罗伯特·克莱恩（Robert Craneoff）博士对伊斯兰自由权原则进行了透彻的分析. 安瓦尔·易卜拉欣, 马来西亚前副总理, 通过在穆斯林占主导地位的社会中实施民主的实际现实来丰富讨论, 即, 在印度尼西亚和马来西亚.
我们也有Shireen Hunter博士, 乔治敦大学, 美国, 探索落后于民主化和现代化的穆斯林国家. 恐怖主义作家对此予以补充, 纳菲兹·艾哈迈德（Nafeez Ahmed）博士对后现代危机和
民主的灭亡. Daud Abdullah博士 (中东媒体监控总监), 艾伦·哈特 (前ITN和BBC Panorama通讯员; 犹太复国主义的作者: 犹太人的真正敌人) 和Asem Sondos (埃及《 Sawt Al Omma》杂志编辑) 专注于奥巴马及其在穆斯林世界促进民主方面的作用, 以及美国与以色列和穆斯林兄弟会的关系.
外交部长, 马尔代夫, 艾哈迈德·沙希德 (Ahmed Shaheed) 推测伊斯兰教和民主的未来; 克莱尔. 格里·麦克洛克林
– 因爱尔兰共和党活动而入狱四年的新芬党成员和吉尔福德的活动家 4 和伯明翰 6, 反映了他最近去加沙的旅行，在那里他目睹了对巴勒斯坦人的残暴和不公正的影响; 玛丽·布林-史密斯博士, 激进化和当代政治暴力研究中心主任讨论批判性研究政治恐怖的挑战; 哈立德·穆巴拉克博士, 作家和剧作家, 讨论达尔富尔和平的前景; 最后，记者和人权活动家 Ashur Shamis 批判性地审视了当今穆斯林的民主化和政治化.
我们希望所有这些都有助于在新的希望曙光中对影响我们所有人的问题进行全面的阅读和反思.
谢谢
伊斯兰政治文化, 民主, 和人权
丹尼尔（Daniele）. 价钱
有人认为伊斯兰教助长了威权主义, 与西方社会的价值观相矛盾, 并显着影响穆斯林国家的重要政治成果. 最后, 学者, 评论员, 政府官员经常指出“伊斯兰原教旨主义”是对自由民主国家的下一个意识形态威胁. 这种观点, 然而, 主要基于文本分析, 伊斯兰政治理论, 和个别国家的特别研究, 不考虑其他因素. 我的论点是伊斯兰教的文本和传统, 像其他宗教一样, 可用于支持各种政治制度和政策. 特定国家和描述性研究无法帮助我们找到有助于我们解释穆斯林世界各国伊斯兰教与政治之间不同关系的模式. 因此, 一种新的研究方法
伊斯兰教与政治之间的联系被要求.
我建议, 通过严格评估伊斯兰教之间的关系, 民主, 和跨国一级的人权, 过分强调伊斯兰教作为一种政治力量的力量. 我首先使用比较案例研究, 重点关注与伊斯兰团体和政权之间的相互作用有关的因素, 经济影响, 种族分裂, 和社会发展, 解释伊斯兰教对八个国家政治影响的差异. 我认为大部分的权力
归因于伊斯兰教作为穆斯林国家政策和政治制度背后的驱动力，可以通过前面提到的因素更好地解释. 我也发现, 与普遍看法相反, 伊斯兰政治团体的日益强大往往与政治体系的适度多元化有关.
我构建了一个伊斯兰政治文化指数, 基于伊斯兰法律的使用程度以及是否和, 如果是这样, 如何,西方观念, 机构, 和技术被实施, 检验伊斯兰教与民主以及伊斯兰教与人权之间关系的性质. 该指标用于统计分析, 其中包括 23 个以穆斯林为主的国家的样本和 23 个非穆斯林发展中国家的对照组. 除了比较
伊斯兰国家到非伊斯兰发展中国家, 统计分析使我能够控制已发现影响民主水平和保护个人权利的其他变量的影响. 结果应该是对伊斯兰教对政治和政策的影响的更现实和准确的描述.
寻找伊斯兰宪政
纳迪西亚·霍根
While constitutionalism in the West is mostly identified with secular thought, Islamic constitutionalism, which incorporates some religious elements, has attracted growing interest in recent years. 例如, the Bush administration’s response to the events of 9/11 radically transformed the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both countries are now rewriting their constitutions. As
Ann Elizabeth Mayer points out, Islamic constitutionalism is constitutionalism that is, in some form, based on Islamic principles, as opposed to the constitutionalism developed in countries that happen to be Muslim but which has not been informed by distinctively Islamic principles. Several Muslim scholars, among them Muhammad Asad3 and Abul A`la al-Maududi, have written on such aspects of constitutional issues as human rights and the separation of powers. 然而, in general their works fall into apologetics, as Chibli Mallat points out:
Whether for the classical age or for the contemporary Muslim world, scholarly research on public law must respect a set of axiomatic requirements.
First, the perusal of the tradition cannot be construed as a mere retrospective reading. By simply projecting present-day concepts backwards, it is all too easy to force the present into the past either in an apologetically contrived or haughtily dismissive manner. The approach is apologetic and contrived when Bills of Rights are read into, say, the Caliphate of `Umar, with the presupposition that the “just” qualities of `Umar included the complex and articulate precepts of constitutional balance one finds in modern texts
阿富汗的伊斯兰教和伊斯兰教
克里斯汀·门多萨
The last half-century in particular has seen the recurrent use of religious Islam as
思想, often referred to as political Islam or Islamism, in groups espousing the
establishment of an Islamic state. Attention was drawn to Afghanistan when it became
the rallying point for Islamists in the 1980s. 然而, the earlier appearance of an
Islamist movement in Afghanistan in the 1960s and its subsequent development offer an
instructive, unique lesson in understanding Islam and Islamism in Afghan society.
This overview of the Islamist movement in Afghanistan is divided into three
parts: It begins by defining the differing manifestations of Islam in Afghanistan,
indicating how Islamism differs from or draws upon each manifestation in constructing
its own vision. Then, the broader context of Islamism elsewhere in the Muslim world is
discussed and analyzed. Although the theoretical basis for Islamism was constructed in
the 1960s by Abu ‘Ala Mawdudi in Pakistan and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt, this paper will
show that the Islamist movement in Afghanistan did not mirror those in either of these
countries. To this end, this paper reviews the thought of the above-mentioned
theoreticians of Islamism, and outlines historical and social conditions that colored the
implementation of their models in their respective countries. This leads back to a
discussion of the Afghan context, which makes up the final part of the paper. It is
necessary to review salient aspects of the traditional structure of Afghan society, and the
role Islam has historically played in Afghanistan to understand how the Islamist
experience was shaped and constrained by this structure, as well as how the Islamist
experience has altered it.
As Afghanistan is now faced with the monumental task of rebuilding a state and
legal system, Islamists are attempting to influence the reconstruction. This overview will
underscore for those observing and participating in this process the importance of
understanding the Afghan Islamist perspective, its historical underpinnings, and current
demands.
埃及处于临界点 ?
大卫·B. 奥特韦
In the early 1980s, I lived in Cairo as bureau chief of The Washington Post covering such historic events as the withdrawal of the last
Israeli forces from Egyptian territory occupied during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the assassination of President
Anwar Sadat by Islamic fanatics in October 1981.
The latter national drama, which I witnessed personally, had proven to be a wrenching milestone. It forced Sadat’s successor, 霍斯尼·穆巴拉克（Hosni Mubarak）, to turn inwards to deal with an Islamist challenge of unknown proportions and effectively ended Egypt’s leadership role in the Arab world.
Mubarak immediately showed himself to be a highly cautious, unimaginative leader, maddeningly reactive rather than pro-active in dealing with the social and economic problems overwhelming his nation like its explosive population growth (1.2 million more Egyptians a year) and economic decline.
In a four-part Washington Post series written as I was departing in early 1985, I noted the new Egyptian leader was still pretty much
a total enigma to his own people, offering no vision and commanding what seemed a rudderless ship of state. The socialist economy
inherited from the era of President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952 至 1970) was a mess. The country’s currency, the pound, was operating
on eight different exchange rates; its state-run factories were unproductive, uncompetitive and deep in debt; and the government was heading for bankruptcy partly because subsidies for food, electricity and gasoline were consuming one-third ($7 billion) of its budget. Cairo had sunk into a hopeless morass of gridlocked traffic and teeming humanity—12 million people squeezed into a narrow band of land bordering the Nile River, most living cheek by jowl in ramshackle tenements in the city’s ever-expanding slums.
穆斯林世界民族主义的根源
沙比尔·艾哈迈德（Shabir Ahmed）
The Muslim world has been characterised by failure, disunity, bloodshed, oppression and backwardness. At present, no Muslim country in the world can rightly claim to be a leader in any field of human activity. 的确, the non-Muslims of the East and the West
now dictate the social, economic and political agenda for the Muslim Ummah.
Furthermore, the Muslims identify themselves as Turkish, 阿拉伯, African and Pakistani. If this is not enough, Muslims are further sub-divided within each country or continent. 例如, in Pakistan people are classed as Punjabis, Sindhis, Balauchis and
Pathans. The Muslim Ummah was never faced with such a dilemma in the past during Islamic rule. They never suffered from disunity, widespread oppression, stagnation in science and technology and certainly not from the internal conflicts that we have witnessed this century like the Iran-Iraq war. So what has gone wrong with the Muslims this century? Why are there so many feuds between them and why are they seen to be fighting each other? What has caused their weakness and how will they ever recover from the present stagnation?
There are many factors that contributed to the present state of affairs, but the main ones are the abandoning of the Arabic language as the language of understanding Islam correctly and performing ijtihad, the absorption of foreign cultures such as the philosophies of the Greeks, Persian and the Hindus, the gradual loss of central authority over some of the provinces, and the rise of nationalism since the 19th Century.
This book focuses on the origins of nationalism in the Muslim world. Nationalism did not arise in the Muslim world naturally, nor did it came about in response to any hardships faced by the people, nor due to the frustration they felt when Europe started to dominate the world after the industrial revolution. Rather, nationalism was implanted in the minds of the Muslims through a well thought out scheme by the European powers, after their failure to destroy the Islamic State by force. The book also presents the Islamic verdict on nationalism and practical steps that can be taken to eradicate the disease of nationalism from the Muslim Ummah so as to restore it back to its former glory.
美国的伊斯兰信仰
詹姆斯·A. 贝弗利
AMERICA BEGINS A NEW MILLENNIUM AS ONE OF THE MOST RELIGIOUSLY diverse nations of all time. Nowhere else in the world do so many people—offered a choice free from government influence—identify with such a wide range of religious and spiritual communities. Nowhere else has the human search for meaning been so varied. In America today, there are communities and centers for worship representing all of the world’s religions.
The American landscape is dotted with churches, temples, synagogues, and mosques. Zen Buddhist zendos sit next to Pentecostal tabernacles. Hasidic Jews walk the streets with Hindu swamis. Most amazing of all, relatively little conflict has occurred among religions in America. This fact, combined with a high level of tolerance of each other’s beliefs and practices, has let America produce people of goodwill ready to try to resolve any tensions that might emerge. The Faith in America series celebrates America’s diverse religious heritage.
People of faith and ideals who longed for a better world have created a unique society where freedom of religious expression is a keynote of culture. The freedom that America offers to people of faith means that not only have ancient religions found a home
here, but that newer ways of expressing spirituality have also taken root. From huge churches in large cities to small spiritual communities in towns and villages, faith in America has never been stronger. The paths that different religions have taken through
American history is just one of the stories readers will find in this series. Like anything people create, religion is far from perfect. 然而, its contribution to the culture and its ability to help people are impressive, and these accomplishments will be found in all the books in the series. 同时, awareness and tolerance of the different paths our neighbors take to the spiritual life has become an increasingly important part of citizenship in America.
Today, more than ever, America as a whole puts its faith in freedom—the freedom to believe.
伊斯兰反对党和欧盟参与的潜力
托比·阿切尔
海蒂·休塔宁（Heidi Huuhtanen）
鉴于伊斯兰运动在穆斯林世界和
自世纪之交以来，激进化对全球事件的影响方式, 它
对于欧盟来说，在可以松散的范围内评估其对参与者的政策很重要
被称为“伊斯兰世界”. 询问是否以及如何参与尤为重要
与各种伊斯兰团体.
即使在欧盟内部，这仍然存在争议. 有些人认为伊斯兰价值观
落后于伊斯兰政党与西方的民主理想和
人权, 而其他人则将参与视为现实的必要性，因为日益增长的
伊斯兰政党在国内的重要性及其日益参与国际事务
事务. 另一种观点是，穆斯林世界的民主化将会增加
欧洲安全. 这些和其他关于是否以及如何
欧盟是否应该参与只能通过研究不同的伊斯兰运动和
他们的政治环境, 逐个国家.
民主化是欧盟共同外交政策行动的中心主题, 铺设
在文章中 11 欧盟条约. 在此考虑的许多州
举报不民主, 或不完全民主. 在这些国家中的大多数, 伊斯兰主义者
政党和运动构成了对现行政权的重大反对, 和
在一些地区，他们形成了最大的反对派集团. 欧洲民主国家长期以来不得不
处理专制的统治政权, 但这是一个新现象
在最有可能受益者可能拥有的国家进行民主改革, 来自
欧盟的观点, 不同的，有时是有问题的民主方法及其
相关值, 例如少数民族和妇女权利和法治. 这些费用是
经常反对伊斯兰运动, 因此，对于欧洲政策制定者来说，重要的是
准确了解潜在合作伙伴的政策和理念.
来自不同国家的经验往往表明，更自由的伊斯兰主义者
允许聚会, 他们的行动和想法越温和. 在许多
伊斯兰政党和团体早已偏离了最初的目标
建立一个受伊斯兰法律管辖的伊斯兰国家, 并开始接受基本的
选举权力的民主原则, 其他政治的存在
竞争对手, 和政治多元化.
中东的政治伊斯兰教
是努森
This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly
referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, 在
particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may
be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report
回顾一些用来解释中东伊斯兰复兴的主要理论
(数字 1). 简单来说, 报告表明，伊斯兰教不必与民主和
有一种趋势是忽视许多中东国家已经
参与了对伊斯兰运动的残酷镇压, 导致他们, 有人争辩, 占用
反对国家的武器, 更罕见的是, 外国. 使用政治暴力是
广泛分布于中东, 但既不不合逻辑也不非理性. 在很多情况下甚至
以使用暴力而闻名的伊斯兰团体已转变为和平的政治组织
政党成功参加市政和全国选举. 尽管如此, 伊斯兰主义者
尽管有许多理论试图
说明它的增长和受欢迎的吸引力. 一般来说, 大多数理论认为伊斯兰主义是
对相对剥夺的反应, 尤其是社会不平等和政治压迫. 选择
理论在宗教本身和宗教的范围内寻求伊斯兰复兴的答案
强大的, 宗教象征的唤起潜力.
结论主张超越“悲观与厄运”的方法，即
将伊斯兰主义描绘成一种非法的政治表达和对西方的潜在威胁 (“老的
伊斯兰主义”), 以及对当前伊斯兰主义民主化的更细致入微的理解
现在正在整个中东发生的运动 (“新伊斯兰主义”). 这个
importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded
along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their
adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on
understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only
社会中较贫穷的阶层，但也属于中产阶级.伊斯兰教, 伊斯兰主义者, 和中东的选举原则
詹姆斯·皮斯卡托里
对于一个时间应该已经到来的想法, ÒdemocracyÓ 掩盖了一个惊人的
未回答的问题数量和, 在穆斯林世界, 产生了
大量的热量. 这是一个文化特定的术语, 反映西方
几个世纪以来的欧洲经验? 非西方社会是否拥有
他们自己的参与和问责标准——实际上是他们自己的
需要注意的发展节奏, 如果不尊重? 伊斯兰教,
强调圣经权威和神圣律法的中心地位, 允许
灵活的政治和参与式政府?
这些问题的答案构成了叙述和反叙述的一部分
他们自己是有争议的话语的一个组成部分. 更大的故事
关注 ÒIslamÓ 是否对西方构成威胁, 和补充
故事涉及伊斯兰教与民主的相容性. 知识分子
行李, 改变比喻, 几乎不中立. 讨论本身有
变得尖锐政治化, 陷入有关东方主义的相关争议,
尤其是中东和整个穆斯林世界的例外论,
和宗教“原教旨主义”运动的现代主义.
重新思考伊斯兰教中的国际关系理论
穆罕默德·阿博·卡兹莱（Mohammad Abo-Kazleh）
The legal foundation of foreign relations in Islam is based on Sharīy’ah. The original sources ofSharīy’ah are the Quran and the Prophetic traditions (Sunnah). Derived from Sharīy’ah is theFiqh or Islamic jurisprudence which covers the myriad of problems and issues that arise in thecourse of man’s life. (al-Mawdūdī, 2002) Among the main issues which the contemporaryIslamic jurisprudence attempt to deal with are foreign relations in Islam. Muslim jurists havedeveloped different opinions about the organizing principle of foreign relations in Islam. Some(hereafter referred to as traditionalists) who were influenced by the realistic tendency of Islamicstate, particularly during the periods of Conquest, believe that foreign relations in Islamoriginally depend on the attitude of non-Muslim groups or states toward Islam and Muslims.Therefore, the basis of foreign relations of Islamic state is fight, but under certain conditions. Incontrast, other jurists (hereafter referred to as pacifists or non-traditionalists) believe that theorigin of foreign relations in Islam is peace, because the Quran unambiguously states “there isno compulsion in religion.”(2: 256) Accordingly, the principle of war advocated bytraditionalists is, non-traditionalists believe, not compatible with this unrelenting Quranic rule.The differences over the original principle of foreign relations in Islam are usually attributed tothe fact that exegetes of the Quran most often diverge in their approach to analyze andunderstand the related Quranic verses, and this create a dilemma in Islamic jurisprudence. Theproblem is complicated because proponents of both approaches depend on Quranic verses tojustify their claims.
德国人皈依伊斯兰教及其与移民穆斯林的矛盾关系
EsraÖzyürek
“I would never have become a Muslim if I had met Muslims before I met Islam.” I heard these words over and over again during my yearlong ethnographic research among ethnic German converts to Islam in Berlin.1 The first time, it was uttered by a self-declared German imam who had converted to Islam while trying to convert Arabs and Turks to Christianity. The second time, the speaker was a twenty-five-year-old former East German woman who came to Islam through her Bosnian boyfriend, whose family never accepted her. The third time, the comment was made by a fifty-year-old man who converted to Islam about thirty years ago after meeting Iranians who came to Europe to collect money and organize for the Iranian revolution. After that I stopped counting. Although all of the several dozen German converts I talked to (and the dozens of converts whose narratives I read on the internet) claim that they embraced Islam in a context of significant personal relationships with Muslims,2 a substantial portion of German Muslims are quite discontented with born Muslims, especially those of immigrant backgrounds. This paper is an attempt to comprehend the paradoxical feelings of love and hate for Islam and Muslims that many German Muslims experience. My aim in exploring this issue is to understand what it takes to be a (supposed) Islamophile in a political and social context that is highly Islamophobic.
当代伊斯兰教的进步思想
Prof. 博士. 克里斯蒂安·W. 巨魔
It seems sensible to start by shedding light on the background context and then to define the broader framework within which the “progressive thinking” in contemporary Islam which we want to discuss is embedded. The movements and trends which are shaping the contemporary Islamic world can be analyzed and assessed in the light of two conflicting forces, namely the notions of authenticity on the one hand and modernity on the other.
Such an approach perceives contemporary Islam as being torn between the authenticity in matters of life and doctrine which it derives from its past and the modernity which refers it to a present (and a future) in which Muslims no longer hold the reins of power and are therefore no longer able to control the development of thought.
Islam is centred on a scripture which it holds in faith to be the revelation of God. This scripture, the Qur’an, is believed to be eternal and immutable in form and content and thus to be valid for every place and time, to contain a truth which obtains for ever. Modernity, by contrast, is characterized by the relativity and the progressive nature of all truth. For the modernists there is nothing, spoken or written, which cannot be construed and questioned, which cannot and indeed should not be further refined by the human mind.
Islam thus sees itself positioned between the authenticity of a truth – that of the Qur’an as a – so to speak – naked, irrefutable fact – and a modernity whose knowledge in all fields is constantly being reconstructed. Is the solution to be found in modernizing Islam or in Islamizing modernity? It is the task of the Muslims to answer this question.
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