RSSTodas as entradas etiquetadas con: "Ikhwanweb"

Islamic Political Culture, democracia, and Human Rights

Daniel e. prezo

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. En consecuencia, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, con todo, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

Political Islam in the Middle East

son Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, en

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). Isto

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

William Thomasson

Is Islam a religion of violence? Is the widely applied stereotype that all Muslims are violently opposed to “infidel” Western cultures accurate? Today’s world is confronted with two opposing faces of Islam; one being a peaceful, adaptive, modernized Islam, and the other strictly fundamentalist and against all things un-Islamic or that may corrupt Islamic culture. Both specimens, though seemingly opposed, mingle and inter-relate, and are the roots of the confusion over modern Islam’s true identity. Islam’s vastness makes it difficult to analyze, but one can focus on a particular Islamic region and learn much about Islam as a whole. Por suposto, one may do this with Egypt, particularly the relationship between the Fundamentalist society known as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and population. The two opposing faces of Islam are presented in Egypt in a manageable portion, offering a smaller model of the general multi-national struggle of today’s Islam. In an effort to exemplify the role of Islamic Fundamentalists, and their relationship with Islamic society as a whole in the current debate over what Islam is, this essay will offer a history of the Society of Muslim Brothers, a description of how the organization originated, functioned, and was organized, and a summary of the Brother’s activities and influences on Egyptian culture. Certainly, by doing so, one may gain a deeper understanding of how Islamic Fundamentalists interpret Islam


International Consultation of Muslim Intellectuals on Islam & política

Stimson Centro & Instituto de Estudos Políticos

This two-day discussion brought together experts and scholars from Bangladesh, Exipto, India,Indonesia, Kenya, Malaisia, Paquistán, the Philippines, Sudan and Sri Lanka representing academia,non-governmental organizations and think tanks. Among the participants were a number of former government officials and one sitting legislator. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. finalmente, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Pursuit of Legal Existence and Intellectual Development in Egypt

Manar Hassan


In the wake of the devastating earthquake that trembled the congested capital of Egyptand its neighboring cities in October of 1992, the Private Voluntary Organizations – dominatedby Islamists – managed to considerably lead the relief efforts within hours, leaving theincumbent regime afflicted with its bureaucratic inefficiencies. The government’s ownlimitations in providing the type of crucial operative services at time of mayhem is a mereexample of its declining credibility among the masses. Ademais, its response to this publicembarrassment was even more austere – passing a decree to ban any direct relief efforts by thePVOs therefore forcing all aid to materialize through the government only. But withgovernmental impediments still looming, the regime struggled to meet the needs of the victimsin time which led to riots and posed as a mere reminder of the incessant exasperation thatEgyptians have faced in their recent history. Hence, it became apparent that Mubarak’sattempts to salvage his image in order to corroborate his grip on power had by and largealienated vital forces within Egypt’s civil society.The civil society has, polo tanto, been a crucial source through which oppositionists –predominantly the Muslim Brotherhood – derive the power of popular appeal. Being one of thelargest and most influential oppositionist organization, the Muslim Brotherhood cuts acrossestranged social structures such as the modern working class, the urban poor, the young, and thenew middle class, which form a support base. Some of the most prominent Brotherhoodmembers themselves pertain to the new middle class and therefore network through al-niqabatal-mihaniyyah (Professional Associations). One example is Dr. Ahmad el-Malt, who was theformer Deputy Supreme Guide to the Brotherhood and also President of the Doctors’ syndicateprior to his death

Brothers in Arms?

Joshua Stacher
Within and between western governments, a heated policy debate is raging over the question of whether or not to engage with the world’s oldest and most influential political Islamist group: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. En 2006, publication of a series of leaked memos in the New Statesman magazine revealed that political analysts within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended an enhancement of informal contacts with members of the Brotherhood.
The authors of these documents argued that the UK government should be seeking to influence this group, given the extent of its grassroots support in Egypt. The British analysts further suggested that engagement could provide a valuable opportunity for challenging the Brotherhood’s perceptions of the West, including the UK, and for detailed questioning of their prescriptions for solving the challenges facing Egypt and the wider region.
The Bush administration in the United States has been far less open to the idea of direct engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that it would be inappropriate to enter into formal ties with a group that is not legally recognised by the Egyptian government. con todo, there are indications that the US position may be starting to shift. En 2007, it emerged that the State Department had approved a policy that would enable US diplomats to meet and coordinate with elected Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and other Arab states.

Within and between western governments, a heated policy debate is raging over the question of whether or not to engage with the world’s oldest and most influential political Islamist group: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. En 2006, publication of a series of leaked memos in the New Statesman magazine revealed that political analysts within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended an enhancement of informal contacts with members of the Brotherhood.

The authors of these documents argued that the UK government should be seeking to influence this group, given the extent of its grassroots support in Egypt. The British analysts further suggested that engagement could provide a valuable opportunity for challenging the Brotherhood’s perceptions of the West, including the UK, and for detailed questioning of their prescriptions for solving the challenges facing Egypt and the wider region.

The Bush administration in the United States has been far less open to the idea of direct engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that it would be inappropriate to enter into formal ties with a group that is not legally recognised by the Egyptian government. con todo, there are indications that the US position may be starting to shift. En 2007, it emerged that the State Department had approved a policy that would enable US diplomats to meet and coordinate with elected Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and other Arab states.

Mahmoud Ezzat nunha ampla entrevista con Ahmed Mansur de Al Jazeera

Mahmoud Ezzat

Dr. Mahmud Ezzat, Secretario xeral dos Irmáns Musulmáns, nunha ampla entrevista con Ahmed Mansour, de Al Jazeera, asegurou que as eleccións para presidente dos Irmáns Musulmáns que os membros da Mesa de Orientación están a realizar no próximo período están abertas a todos os que desexen presentar os seus documentos de candidatura como candidato..

Na súa declaración ao talk show Bila Hedood (Sen Fronteiras) é Al-Jazeera TV, Ezzat explicou que os documentos de nominación xeralmente non deben usarse para os candidatos dos Irmáns Musulmáns, senón que se presenta unha lista completa do Consello Shura de 100 membros da Irmandade para elixir o presidente e a Mesa de Orientación da Irmandade.. Negou que a Guía Xeral da Irmandade para o liderado do Consello Xeral de Shura non lle permita a liberdade de traballar por conta propia na toma da súa decisión final.. Tamén revelou que o Consello ten a facultade de responsabilizar ao presidente por calquera incumprimento e, se é necesario, destituílo en calquera momento..

Subliñou que o movemento está preparado para facer o sacrificio definitivo para practicar o principio da Shura (consulta) dentro das filas de, sinalando que o Consello de Shura elixirá o presidente e unha nova Mesa de Orientación no próximo ano.

Comentou a cobertura dos medios do que realmente aconteceu entre bastidores na Oficina de Orientación, citando que o comité que estaba formado por figuras destacadas como o Dr. Essam el-Erian e varios membros da Mesa de Orientación responsables de imprimir a declaración semanal do presidente opuxéronse ao Sr.. O desexo de Mahdi Akef dunha pequena diferenza de opinións. O primeiro mandato de Akef rematará en xaneiro 13, 2010 con todo o anunciou anteriormente; aínda tomará unha decisión sobre se permanecerá no cargo un segundo mandato como guía xeral do grupo.

Continuou dicindo que Akef, de 81 anos, informou antes aos membros da Mesa de Orientación que tiña intención de dimitir e que non ocupará un segundo mandato.. Os membros da Mesa responderon inmediatamente instándoo a seguir no seu cargo.

Na súa mensaxe semanal, Mahdi Akef referiuse vagamente ás súas intencións de non presentar un segundo mandato e agradeceu aos Irmáns Musulmáns e aos membros da Mesa de Orientación que compartiron con el a responsabilidade coma se quixese que fose o seu discurso de despedida.. O domingo, Outubro 17 os medios aseguraron que o presidente da Confraría anunciara a súa dimisión; con todo, o presidente negou repetidas veces as acusacións dos medios de que acudiu á oficina ao día seguinte e se reuniu cos membros. Posteriormente emitiu un comunicado no que divulgou a verdade. Alegacións dos medios sobre a falta de vontade da Oficina de Orientación para nomear ao Dr. Essam el-Erian son totalmente falsos.

Dr. Mahmoud Ezzat asegurou que o movemento ten o pracer de ofrecer aos membros a oportunidade de compartir as súas opinións, salientar que é unha manifestación de poder que coincide co seu gran tamaño e papel protagonista existentes, indicando que o presidente dos Irmáns Musulmáns está moi satisfeito de facelo.

Subliñou que todas as cuestións volven ao Gabinete de Orientación para a decisión final onde as súas resolucións sexan vinculantes e satisfactorias para todos., independentemente das diferenzas de opinión.

“Non subestimo o que xa pasou ou simplemente diría que non hai crise, ó mesmo tempo, non debemos explotar as cousas do seu contexto, estamos decididos a aplicar o principio de Shura”, engadiu.

Comentouse anteriormente na reunión posterior da Mesa de Orientación que o Consello de Shura do grupo ten o dereito exclusivo de elixir como membro da Mesa de Orientación a calquera membro., explicou. Dr. O propio Essam coincidiu en que non era conveniente nomear un novo membro na Mesa de Orientación da Irmandade xa que as eleccións estaban próximas..

Ezzat afirmou que o episodio foi presentado ao Consello Shura por recomendación da oficina de orientación no medio de frecuentes arrestos e detencións realizadas pola seguridade do Estado.. Esforzámonos moito para involucrar ao Consello de Shura para escoller o próximo presidente e os membros da Oficina de Orientación. Espérase que todo o asunto estea resolto, Deus quere, antes de xaneiro 13.

Nesta reunión o presidente e os membros da Mesa de Orientación de MB decidiron enviar unha carta ao Consello de Shura., salientando que a data destas eleccións non será posterior aos sextos meses. Supoñíase que os trámites se levarían a cabo antes ou durante as eleccións nas que 5 os novos membros foron elixidos o ano pasado. É unha decisión do Consello Shura e non da Mesa de Orientación de MB. En consecuencia, o Consello da Shura do grupo xeral chegou finalmente á súa decisión unánime de celebrar eleccións canto antes.

Destacou que os Irmáns Musulmáns, coa aplicación da Shura está organizada polo seu regulamento interno. Regulamentos que son adoptados e defendidos polas leis do Consello Shura e están suxeitos a cambios. A modificación máis recente en curso cunha das súas cláusulas é a duración do mandato dun membro do Gabinete de Orientación establece que un membro non debe desempeñar máis de dous mandatos consecutivos..

Algúns membros do Gabinete de Orientación foron acusados ​​da súa adhesión a permanecer no cargo durante moitos anos; Dr. Ezzat afirmou que as frecuentes detencións que non excluían a ninguén da Mesa do Executivo incitaron a modificar outro artigo do Regulamento interno que prevé que un membro manteña a súa condición de membro aínda que fose detido.. A ausencia dos honrados traballando polo benestar do seu país e a sublime misión levounos a insistir en que manteñan a súa adhesión.. O enxeñeiro Khayrat Al-Shater permanecerá como segundo vicepresidente do MB e o Dr. Mohammed Ali Bishr un membro da Mesa Executiva de MB. Espérase que Bishr sexa lanzado o próximo mes.

Dr. Mahmoud Ezzat negou completamente os rumores sobre conflitos internos dentro do grupo da oposición no que se refire ao liderado, salientando que os mecanismos, os regulamentos e os termos están abrindo o camiño para seleccionar os líderes do movemento. Tamén sinalou que a situación xeográfica de Exipto e o considerable peso moral dentro do mundo musulmán xustifican a necesidade de que o presidente do MB sexa exipcio..

“A Oficina de Orientación está a explorar a tendencia xeral do Consello de Shura da Irmandade, formado por 100 membros, no que se refire a nomear un candidato axeitado para asumir o cargo de presidente.”, el dixo.

“É moi difícil prever quen será o próximo presidente, notando que 5 minutos antes do nomeamento do Sr. Akef como presidente ninguén o sabía, as papeletas só decidiron quen sería o novo líder”, el dixo.

Dr. Mahmoud Ezzat atribuíu os aparentes informes conflitivos dos medios sobre as súas acusacións sobre comentarios sobre os principais dirixentes da Irmandade ás mesmas inconsistencias dos informes dos medios sobre altos dirixentes que varían dun xornal a outro..

Dr. Mahmoud Ezzat arroxou luz con cifras sobre as redadas de seguridade que levaron á detención dalgúns 2696 membros do grupo en 2007, 3674 en 2008 e 5022 en 2009. Isto provocou a incapacidade do Consello de Shura para celebrar reunións e concorrer ás eleccións.

Tamén subliñou que os Irmáns Musulmáns están moi interesados ​​en manter a seguridade nacional de Exipto e a súa’ interese por lograr unha reforma pacífica da sociedade. “Sabemos ben que as reunións da Oficina de Orientación están vixiadas pola seguridade aínda que só pretendemos practicar a democracia. Centrais, non queremos provocar a hostilidade e animosidade dos demais”.

Tamén subliñou que as diferenzas dentro da organización non están motivadas polo odio ou as diferenzas persoais, xa que os temperamentos decentes fomentados polas sublimes ensinanzas do Islam nos animan a tolerar as diferenzas de opinións.. Engadiu que a historia demostrou que o movemento dos Irmáns Musulmáns atopou circunstancias moito máis difíciles que a crise existente..

Os medios proxectaron unha imaxe negativa dos Irmáns Musulmáns onde se apoiaron nas investigacións do SSI para obter información. É imperativo que os xornalistas obteñan feitos das fontes orixinais se queren ter algún tipo de credibilidade. De feito o poder xudicial invalidou todas as acusacións denunciadas na investigación estatal, el dixo.

Dr. Mahmoud Ezzat mostrouse optimista de que a crise política actual pasará, afirmando que os acontecementos demostrarán que os Irmáns Musulmáns con todas as súas nobres maneiras, obxectividade, e a práctica da democracia brillará con nota.

Publicado o Ikhwanweb

The Internet and Islamist Politics in Jordan, Morocco and Egypt.

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a
dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and
commerce. The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the
researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the
Bedouin in Egypt. Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches
across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously
silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites. Political organizations
across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future,
and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, e
administrative papers through their sites. similarmente, religious groups display their beliefs online
through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of
eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues. Fusing the two, Islamista
political organizations have made their presence known through sophisticated websites detailing
their political platforms, relevant news stories, and religiously oriented material discussing their
theological views. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by
Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Morocco and
Exipto.
Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to
publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions
of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization. This paper will
examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in
2
Xordania, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home
and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes. Primeira, Islamista
organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere
through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.
Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which
officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media
restrictions imposed by the state. finalmente, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a
counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an
international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim
Irmandade, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western
style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, politicians and journalists. The MB
has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties
attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies
between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section
on the Muslim Brotherhood. These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and
desired outcomes; con todo, each goal targets a different actor: the public, the media, and the
réxime. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study
analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.
1

Andrew Helms

Ikhwanweb

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and commerce.

The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the Bedouin in Egypt.

Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites.

Political organizations across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future, and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, and administrative papers through their sites. similarmente, religious groups display their beliefs online through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues.

Fusing the two, Islamist political organizations have made their presence known through sophisticated websites detailing their political platforms, relevant news stories, and religiously oriented material discussing their theological views. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Morocco and Egypt.

Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization.

This paper will examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes.

Primeira, Islamist organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.

Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media restrictions imposed by the state.

finalmente, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim Brotherhood, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, politicians and journalists.

The MB has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section on the Muslim Brotherhood.

These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and desired outcomes; con todo, each goal targets a different actor: the public, the media, and the regime. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.