RSSL-Entrati Kollha Tikkettati Bi: "Fratellanza"

Iżlamiżmu rivedut

MAHA AZZAM

Hemm kriżi politika u ta’ sigurtà madwar dak li jissejjaħ l-Iżlamiżmu, kriżi li l-anteċedenti tagħha ħafna qabel 9/11. Matul il-passat 25 snin, kien hemm enfasi differenti dwar kif tispjega u tiġġieled l-Iżlamiżmu. Analisti u dawk li jfasslu l-politika
fis-snin tmenin u disgħin tkellmu dwar il-kawżi ewlenin tal-militanza Iżlamika bħala mard ekonomiku u emarġilizzazzjoni. Iktar reċentement kien hemm enfasi fuq ir-riforma politika bħala mezz biex jimmina l-appell tar-radikaliżmu. Illum dejjem aktar, l-aspetti ideoloġiċi u reliġjużi tal-Iżlamiżmu jeħtieġ li jiġu indirizzati għaliex saru karatteristiċi ta’ dibattitu politiku u ta’ sigurtà usa’. Kemm jekk b’rabta mat-terroriżmu tal-Al-Qaeda, riforma politika fid-dinja Musulmana, il-kwistjoni nukleari fl-Iran jew żoni ta’ kriżi bħall-Palestina jew il-Libanu, sar komuni li ssib li l-ideoloġija u r-reliġjon jintużaw minn partiti opposti bħala sorsi ta’ leġittimizzazzjoni, ispirazzjoni u mibdija.
Is-sitwazzjoni hija kkumplikata aktar illum bl-antagoniżmu dejjem jikber lejn u l-biża’ tal-Iżlam fil-Punent minħabba attakki terroristiċi li mbagħad jolqtu l-attitudnijiet lejn l-immigrazzjoni., reliġjon u kultura. Il-konfini tal-umma jew tal-komunità tal-fidili jiġġebbed lil hinn mill-istati Musulmani għal bliet Ewropej. L-umma potenzjalment teżisti kull fejn hemm komunitajiet Musulmani. Is-sens kondiviż ta’ appartenenza għal fidi komuni jiżdied f’ambjent fejn is-sens ta’ integrazzjoni fil-komunità tal-madwar mhuwiex ċar u fejn id-diskriminazzjoni tista’ tkun apparenti. Iktar ma jkun kbir iċ-ċaħda tal-valuri tas-soċjetà,
kemm jekk fil-Punent jew anke fi stat Musulman, akbar tkun il-konsolidazzjoni tal-forza morali tal-Iżlam bħala identità kulturali u sistema ta’ valuri.
Wara l-bumbardamenti f’Londra fuq 7 Lulju 2005 deher aktar ċar li xi żgħażagħ kienu qed jasserixxu l-impenn reliġjuż bħala mod kif jesprimu l-etniċità. Ir-rabtiet bejn il-Musulmani madwar id-dinja u l-perċezzjoni tagħhom li l-Musulmani huma vulnerabbli wasslu lil ħafna f’partijiet differenti ħafna tad-dinja biex jingħaqdu l-qagħdiet lokali tagħhom stess f’wieħed Musulman usa’., wara li identifika kulturalment, jew primarjament jew parzjalment, b’Islam definit b’mod wiesa’.

Kultura Politika Iżlamika, Demokrazija, u Drittijiet tal-Bniedem

Daniele. Prezz

Ġie argumentat li l-Iżlam jiffaċilita l-awtoritarjaniżmu, jikkontradixxi l-valuri tas-soċjetajiet tal-Punent, u taffettwa b'mod sinifikanti riżultati politiċi importanti fin-nazzjonijiet Musulmani. Konsegwentement, studjużi, kummentaturi, u l-uffiċjali tal-gvern ta’ spiss jindikaw ‘‘fundamentaliżmu Iżlamiku’’ bħala t-theddida ideoloġika li jmiss għad-demokraziji liberali. Din il-fehma, madankollu, hija bbażata primarjament fuq l-analiżi tat-testi, Teorija politika Islamika, u studji ad hoc ta’ pajjiżi individwali, li ma jqisux fatturi oħra. Hija l-argument tiegħi li t-testi u t-tradizzjonijiet tal-Islam, bħal dawk ta’ reliġjonijiet oħra, jistgħu jintużaw biex jappoġġjaw varjetà ta’ sistemi u politiki politiċi. Studji speċifiċi għall-pajjiż u deskrittivi ma jgħinunax insibu mudelli li jgħinuna nispjegaw ir-relazzjonijiet differenti bejn l-Islam u l-politika madwar il-pajjiżi tad-dinja Musulmana.. Għalhekk, approċċ ġdid għall-istudju tal-
konnessjoni bejn l-Islam u l-politika hija mitluba.
Nissuġġerixxi, permezz ta’ evalwazzjoni rigoruża tar-relazzjoni bejn l-Islam, demokrazija, u d-drittijiet tal-bniedem fil-livell transnazzjonali, li qed titpoġġa wisq enfasi fuq il-qawwa tal-Iżlam bħala forza politika. L-ewwel nuża studji ta' każijiet komparattivi, li jiffokaw fuq fatturi relatati mal-interazzjoni bejn gruppi u reġimi Iżlamiċi, influwenzi ekonomiċi, qsim etniku, u l-iżvilupp tas-soċjetà, biex tispjega l-varjanza fl-influwenza tal-Islam fuq il-politika madwar tmien nazzjonijiet. Nargumenta li ħafna mill-poter
attribwit lill-Iżlam bħala l-mutur wara l-politiki u s-sistemi politiċi fin-nazzjonijiet Musulmani jistgħu jiġu spjegati aħjar mill-fatturi msemmija qabel. Insib ukoll, kuntrarju għat-twemmin komuni, li s-saħħa dejjem tikber tal-gruppi politiċi Iżlamiċi spiss ġiet assoċjata ma’ pluralizzazzjoni modesta tas-sistemi politiċi.
Bnejt indiċi tal-kultura politika Iżlamika, ibbażat fuq il-punt sa fejn il-liġi Iżlamika tiġi utilizzata u jekk u, jekk iva, kif,Ideat tal-Punent, istituzzjonijiet, u t-teknoloġiji huma implimentati, biex tittestja n-natura tar-relazzjoni bejn l-Islam u d-demokrazija u l-Islam u d-drittijiet tal-bniedem. Dan l-indikatur jintuża fl-analiżi statistika, li jinkludi kampjun ta’ tlieta u għoxrin pajjiż fil-biċċa l-kbira Musulmani u grupp ta’ kontroll ta’ tlieta u għoxrin pajjiż li qed jiżviluppaw mhux Musulmani. Minbarra li tqabbel
Nazzjonijiet Iżlamiċi għal nazzjonijiet li qed jiżviluppaw mhux Iżlamiċi, analiżi statistika tippermettili nikkontrolla għall-influwenza ta’ varjabbli oħra li nstabu li jaffettwaw il-livelli ta’ demokrazija u l-protezzjoni tad-drittijiet individwali. Ir-riżultat għandu jkun stampa aktar realistika u preċiża tal-influwenza tal-Islam fuq il-politika u l-politiki.

Democracy in Islamic Political Thought

Azzam S. Tamimi

Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, fi 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, fi 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.

Kultura Politika Iżlamika, Demokrazija, u Drittijiet tal-Bniedem

Daniele. Prezz

Ġie argumentat li l-Iżlam jiffaċilita l-awtoritarjaniżmu, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. Konsegwentement, studjużi, kummentaturi, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. Din il-fehma, madankollu, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Teorija politika Islamika, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, li ma jqisux fatturi oħra. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, bħal dawk ta’ reliġjonijiet oħra,

jistgħu jintużaw biex jappoġġjaw varjetà ta’ sistemi u politiki politiċi. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Għalhekk, approċċ ġdid għall-istudju tal-

konnessjoni bejn l-Islam u l-politika hija mitluba.
Nissuġġerixxi, permezz ta’ evalwazzjoni rigoruża tar-relazzjoni bejn l-Islam,

demokrazija, u d-drittijiet tal-bniedem fil-livell transnazzjonali, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, influwenzi ekonomiċi, qsim etniku,

u l-iżvilupp tas-soċjetà, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Partiti tal-Oppożizzjoni Iżlamiċi u l-Potenzjal għall-Impenn tal-UE

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Fid-dawl tal-importanza dejjem tikber tal-movimenti Iżlamiċi fid-dinja Musulmana u

il-mod kif ir-radikalizzazzjoni influwenzat avvenimenti globali mill-bidu tas-seklu, dan

huwa importanti għall-UE li tevalwa l-politiki tagħha lejn atturi fi ħdan dak li jista' jkun laxk

imsejħa d-'dinja Islamika'. Huwa partikolarment importanti li wieħed jistaqsi jekk u kif jimpenja ruħu

mad-diversi gruppi Iżlamiċi.

Dan jibqa’ kontroversjali anke fi ħdan l-UE. Xi wħud iħossu li l-Iżlamiċi jgħollu dan

jinsabu wara partiti Iżlamiċi huma sempliċement inkompatibbli mal-ideali tal-punent tad-demokrazija u

drittijiet umani, filwaqt li oħrajn jaraw l-ingaġġ bħala ħtieġa realistika minħabba t-tkabbir

importanza domestika tal-partiti Iżlamiċi u l-involviment dejjem akbar tagħhom fil-qasam internazzjonali

affarijiet. Perspettiva oħra hija li d-demokratizzazzjoni fid-dinja Musulmana tiżdied

sigurtà Ewropea. Il-validità ta’ dawn u argumenti oħra dwar jekk u kif il-

L-UE għandha timpenja ruħha tista' tiġi ttestjata biss billi tistudja l-movimenti Iżlamiċi differenti u

iċ-ċirkostanzi politiċi tagħhom, pajjiż b’pajjiż.

Id-demokratizzazzjoni hija tema ċentrali tal-azzjonijiet tal-politika barranija komuni tal-UE, kif imqiegħda

fl-Artikolu 11 tat-Trattat dwar l-Unjoni Ewropea. Ħafna mill-istati kkunsidrati f'dan

rapport mhumiex demokratiċi, jew mhux kompletament demokratiku. F'ħafna minn dawn il-pajjiżi, Iżlamiku

partiti u movimenti jikkostitwixxu oppożizzjoni sinifikanti għar-reġimi prevalenti, u

f’xi wħud jiffurmaw l-akbar blokk ta’ oppożizzjoni. Id-demokraziji Ewropej ilhom jagħmlu

jittrattaw reġimi governattivi li huma awtoritarji, iżda huwa fenomenu ġdid għall-istampa

għal riforma demokratika fi stati fejn l-aktar benefiċjarji probabbli jista' jkollhom, minn

l-opinjoni tal-UE, approċċi differenti u kultant problematiċi għad-demokrazija u tagħha

valuri relatati, bħall-minoranzi u d-drittijiet tan-nisa u l-istat tad-dritt. Dawn il-ħlasijiet huma

spiss imqiegħda kontra movimenti Iżlamiċi, għalhekk huwa importanti għal dawk li jfasslu l-politika Ewropej li

ikollhom stampa preċiża tal-politiki u l-filosofiji tal-imsieħba potenzjali.

Esperjenzi minn pajjiżi differenti għandhom it-tendenza li jissuġġerixxu li l-iżlamista aktar libertà

partijiet huma permessi, aktar ikunu moderati fl-azzjonijiet u l-ideat tagħhom. F'ħafna

każi partiti u gruppi Iżlamiċi ilhom li tbiegħdu mill-għan oriġinali tagħhom

tat-twaqqif ta’ stat Iżlamiku rregolat mil-liġi Iżlamika, u waslu biex jaċċettaw bażiku

prinċipji demokratiċi tal-kompetizzjoni elettorali għall-poter, l-eżistenza ta’ politika oħra

kompetituri, u pluraliżmu politiku.

In the Shadow of an Arab Caesar: Sayyid Qutb and the Radicalization of Modern Islamic Fundamentalism

Research

“We are the umma of the believers, living within a jahili society. As a community of believers we should see ourselves in a state of war with the state and the society. The territory we dwell in is the House of War.”1 These were the words of Sayyid Qutb in an Egyptian military court in April, 1966 before he and two of his companions were sentenced to death by hanging. The offense; conspiring against the government and plotting its overthrow, the evidence used by the state prosecutors in the trial, besides ‘confessions,’ a book, Qutb’s final piece of literature, Ma‘alim fi al-Turuq, Signposts.2 This study does not set out to be a thorough analysis of the political and religious ideology of Sayyid Qutb. Rather it is an attempt to identify the political and social climate in Egypt as the primary motivation which led to the development of Qutb’s radical interpretations of Islam. Notions of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism dominated the political discourse of Qutb’s Egypt and hearts and minds were enraptured by promises of its populist leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser. This chapter in Arab history from the early 1950’s until the late 1960’s is etched in historical memory as the era of pan-Arabism. Madankollu, it was also a vital period in the evolution of fundamentalist Islam into its more radical form which first expressed itself in the 1970’s and is until today at the base of radical fundamentalist Islamic thought worldwide. This piece will
demonstrate the principal role played by Sayyid Qutb in this transformation and reveal that radical interpretations of Islam were given impetus to develop in Egypt during this period due to the nature of Nasser’s regime

Islam politiku fil-Lvant Nofsani

Huma Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, fi

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

armi kontra l-istat, u aktar rari, pajjiżi barranin. L-użu tal-vjolenza politika huwa

mifruxa fil-Lvant Nofsani, imma la hija illoġika u lanqas irrazzjonali. F'ħafna każijiet anke

Gruppi Iżlamiċi magħrufa għall-użu tagħhom tal-vjolenza ġew trasformati f’politiċi paċifiċi

partiti li kkontestaw b’suċċess l-elezzjonijiet muniċipali u nazzjonali. Madankollu, l-Iżlamista

qawmien mill-ġdid fil-Lvant Nofsani jibqa’ parzjalment mhux spjegat minkejja numru ta’ teoriji li qed ifittxu

kont għat-tkabbir tagħha u l-appell popolari. Ġeneralment, il-biċċa l-kbira tat-teoriji jsostnu li l-Iżlamiżmu huwa a

reazzjoni għal deprivazzjoni relattiva, speċjalment l-inugwaljanza soċjali u l-oppressjoni politika. Alternattiva

teoriji jfittxu t-tweġiba għall-qawmien mill-ġdid Iżlamiku fil-konfini tar-reliġjon nnifisha u l-

qawwija, potenzjal evokattiv tas-simboliżmu reliġjuż.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

tas-sezzjonijiet ifqar tas-soċjetà imma wkoll tal-klassi tan-nofs.

Partiti Iżlamiċi : why they can’t be democratic

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, it has

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, demokrazija, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. Il-propensità li jitwettaq riformi bħal dawn huwa dak

Nara bħala nieqes fl-Iżlam politiku. L-interess dikjarat tiegħi stess—bħala Għarbija-

Teorist u prattikant tal-prodemokrazija Musulmana - huwa li jippromwovi l-istabbiliment

tad-demokrazija sekulari fl-ambitu taċ-ċivilizzazzjoni Iżlamika.

Sabiex tgħin tneħħi l-konfużjoni li ħafna drabi madwar

dan is-suġġett, Se nagħmel diversi punti bażiċi li wieħed għandu jżomm f'moħħu. L-ewwel huwa

dak, s'issa, Il-prattiċi tal-Punent vis-`a-vis l-Islam politiku kienu difettużi

għaliex ma kellhomx is-sostenn ta’ valutazzjoni b’bażi tajba.

Sakemm ma tintervjenix ix-xorti għomja, ebda politika ma tista' tkun aħjar mill-valutazzjoni

li fuqha hija bbażata. Valutazzjoni xierqa hija l-bidu ta '

kull għerf prattiku.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

William Thomasson

Is Islam a religion of violence? Is the widely applied stereotype that all Muslims are violently opposed to “infidel” Western cultures accurate? Today’s world is confronted with two opposing faces of Islam; one being a peaceful, adaptive, modernized Islam, and the other strictly fundamentalist and against all things un-Islamic or that may corrupt Islamic culture. Both specimens, though seemingly opposed, mingle and inter-relate, and are the roots of the confusion over modern Islam’s true identity. Islam’s vastness makes it difficult to analyze, but one can focus on a particular Islamic region and learn much about Islam as a whole. Tabilħaqq, one may do this with Egypt, particularly the relationship between the Fundamentalist society known as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and population. The two opposing faces of Islam are presented in Egypt in a manageable portion, offering a smaller model of the general multi-national struggle of today’s Islam. In an effort to exemplify the role of Islamic Fundamentalists, and their relationship with Islamic society as a whole in the current debate over what Islam is, this essay will offer a history of the Society of Muslim Brothers, a description of how the organization originated, functioned, and was organized, and a summary of the Brother’s activities and influences on Egyptian culture. Certainly, by doing so, one may gain a deeper understanding of how Islamic Fundamentalists interpret Islam


L-Evoluzzjoni Politika tal-Fratellanza Musulmana fl-Eġittu

Stephen Bennett

“Allah huwa l-objettiv tagħna. Il-Profeta huwa l-mexxej tagħna. Il-Koran huwa l-liġi tagħna. Jihad huwa mod tagħna. Il-mewt fit-triq ta’ Allah hija l-ogħla tama tagħna.”

Sa mill-bidu tagħha fl-Eġittu l-Fratellanza Musulmana ħolqot ħafna kontroversja, peress li xi wħud jargumentaw li l-organizzazzjoni hija favur il-vjolenza f'isem l-Islam. Skont Dr. Mamoun Fandy tal-James A. Baker III Istitut tal-Politika Pubblika, “ġiħadiżmu u l-attivazzjoni tal-fehmiet tad-dinja tad-dar tal-Islam u d-dar tal-gwerra huma l-ideat li ħarġu mill-kitbiet u t-tagħlim tal-Fratellanza Musulmana” (Livesy, 2005). L-evidenza primarja għal dan l-argument hija membru notevoli tal-Fratellanza, Sayeed Qutb, li huwa akkreditat li jiżviluppa l-interpretazzjoni reviżjonista u kontroversjali ta’ jihad li pprovdew ġustifikazzjonijiet reliġjużi għall-vjolenza mwettqa minn organizzazzjonijiet offshoot tal-Fratellanza bħal al-jihad, al-Takfir wa al-Hijra, Hamas, u al-Qaeda.

Madankollu dik għadha pożizzjoni dibattibbli, għax minkejja li hu l-ġenitur ideoloġiku ta’ dawn l-għaqdiet vjolenti, il-Fratellanza Musulmana stess dejjem żammet pożizzjoni uffiċjali kontra l-vjolenza u minflok ippromwoviet azzjoni ċivili u soċjali Iżlamika fil-livell tal-bażi. Fl-ewwel għoxrin sena tal-eżistenza tagħha l-Fratellanza Musulmana kisbet status bħala l-aktar influwenti mill-gruppi ewlenin kollha fil-Lvant Nofsani permezz tal-attiviżmu popolari tagħha.. It also spread from Egypt into other nations throughout the region and served as the catalyst for many of the successful popular liberation movements against Western colonialism in the Middle East.

While it has retained most of its founding principles from its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has made a dramatic transformation in some crucial aspects of its political ideology. Formerly denounced by many as a terrorist organization, as of late the Muslim Brotherhood has been labeled by most current scholars of the Middle East as politically “moderate”, “politically centrist”, and “accommodationist” to Egypt’s political and governmental structures (Abed-Kotob, 1995, p. 321-322). Sana Abed-Kotob tgħidilna wkoll li mill-gruppi attwali tal-oppożizzjoni Iżlamika li jeżistu llum “aktar ‘radikali’ jew militanti ta’ dawn il-gruppi jinsistu fuq bidla rivoluzzjonarja li għandha tiġi imposta fuq il-massa u s-sistema politika., billi... il-Fratellanza Musulmana l-ġdida tal-Eġittu, sejħa għal bidla gradwali li għandha ssir minn ġewwa s-sistema politika u bl-ingaġġ tal-mases Musulmani”

Resolving America’s Islamist Dilemma

Shadi Hamid

L-Istati Uniti. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East have long been paralyzed by the “Islamist dilemma”: in theory, we want democracy, but, in practice, fear that Islamist parties will be the prime beneficiaries of any political opening. The most tragic manifestation of this was the Algerian debacle of 1991 u 1992, when the United States stood silently while the staunchly secular military canceled elections after an Islamist party won a parliamentary majority. More recently, the Bush administration backed away from its “freedom agenda” after Islamists did surprisingly well in elections throughout region, including in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Palestinian territories.
But even our fear of Islamist parties—and the resulting refusal to engage with them—has itself been inconsistent, holding true for some countries but not others. The more that a country is seen as vital to American national security interests, the less willing the United States has been to accept Islamist groups having a prominent political role there. Madankollu, in countries seen as less strategically relevant, and where less is at stake, the United States has occasionally taken a more nuanced approach. But it is precisely where more is at stake that recognizing a role for nonviolent Islamists is most important, u, here, American policy continues to fall short.
Throughout the region, the United States has actively supported autocratic regimes and given the green light for campaigns of repression against groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential political movement in the region. In March 2008, during what many observers consider to be the worst period of anti-Brotherhood repression since the 1960s, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice waived a $100 million congressionally mandated reduction of military aid to Egypt.

International Consultation of Muslim Intellectuals on Islam & Politika

Ċentru Stimson & Istitut tal-Istudji tal-Politika

This two-day discussion brought together experts and scholars from Bangladesh, L-Eġittu, India,L-Indoneżja, Kenya, Il-Malasja, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sudan and Sri Lanka representing academia,non-governmental organizations and think tanks. Among the participants were a number of former government officials and one sitting legislator. The participants were also chosen to comprise abroad spectrum of ideologies, including the religious and the secular, cultural, political andeconomic conservatives, liberals and radicals.The following themes characterized the discussion:1. Western and US (Mis)Understanding There is a fundamental failure by the West to understand the rich variety of intellectual currents andcross-currents in the Muslim world and in Islamic thought. What is underway in the Muslim worldis not a simple opposition to the West based on grievance (though grievances there also are), but are newal of thought and culture and an aspiration to seek development and to modernize withoutlosing their identity. This takes diverse forms, and cannot be understood in simple terms. There is particular resentment towards Western attempts to define the parameters of legitimate Islamicdiscourse. There is a sense that Islam suffers from gross over generalization, from its champions asmuch as from its detractors. It is strongly urged that in order to understand the nature of the Muslim renaissance, the West should study all intellectual elements within Muslim societies, and not only professedly Islamic discourse.US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 has had several effects. It has led to a hardening andradicalization on both sides of the Western-Muslim encounter. It has led to mutual broad brush(mis)characterization of the other and its intentions. It has contributed to a sense of pan-Islamicsolidarity unprecedented since the end of the Khilafat after World War I. It has also produced adegeneration of US policy, and a diminution of US power, influence and credibility. Fl-aħħarnett, theUS’ dualistic opposition of terror and its national interests has made the former an appealing instrument for those intent on resistance to the West.

Political Transitions in the Arab World

Dina Shehata

The year 2007 marked the end of a brief interval of political liberalization in the Arab world which began shortly after the occupation of Iraq and which resulted primarily from external pressures on Arab regimes to reform and democratize. External pressures during the 2003-2006 period created a political opening which activists across the region used to press for longstanding demands for political and constitutional reform.Faced with a combination of growing external and internal pressures to reform, Arab regimes were forced to make some concessions to their challengers.In Egypt, upon the request of the President, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment to allowfor direct competitive presidential elections. In September2005, Egypt witnessed its first competitive presidential election ever and as expected Mubarak was elected for a fifth term with 87%of the vote. Barra minn hekk,during the November 2005 parliamentary elections,which were freer than previous elections, il-Fratellanza Musulmana, the largest opposition movement in Egypt, won 88 seats. This was the largest number of seats won by an opposition group in Egypt since the 1952 revolution.Similarly, in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas won a majority of the seats.Hamas was thereby able to establish control over the Palestinian Legislative Council which had been dominated by Fatah since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1996. In Lebanon, in the wake of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri on 14th February2005, a coalition of pro-Hariri political forces was ablet hrough broad-based mass mobilization and external support to force Syrian troops to pull out from Lebanon and the pro-Syrian Government to resign. Elections were held, and the 14th February coalition was able to win a plurality of the votes and to form a new government.In Morocco, King Mohamed VI oversaw the establishment of a truth and reconciliation committee which sought to address the grievances of those who had been abused under the reign of his father.The Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC) also under took some important reforms during the 2003-2006 period. Fil 2003 Qatar promulgated a written constitution for the first time in its history. In 2005,Saudi Arabia convened municipal elections for the firsttime in five decades. And in 2006, Bahrain held parliamentaryelections in which the Shiite society of AlWefaqwon 40%of the seats. Subsequently, the first Shiitedeputy prime minister in Bahrain was appointed.Theses events, which came to be known as ‘the Arab Spring,’ led some optimists to believe that the Arabworld was on the brink of a democratic transformation similar to those experienced in Latin American and Eastern and Central Europe during the 1980s and1990s. Madankollu, fi 2007, as political liberalization gave way to heightened polarization and to renewed repression,these hopes were dispelled. The failure ofthe openings of the 2003-2006 period to create a sustained momentum towards democratization can beat tributed to a number of factors. The deteriorating security situation in Iraq and the failure of the United States to create a stable and democratic regime dampened support for democracy promotion efforts within the American administration and reinforced the views ofthose who held that security and stability must come before democracy. Barra minn hekk, the electoral successes of Islamists in Egypt and in Palestine further dampened Western support for democracy promotion efforts in the region since the principals of thesemovements were perceived to be at odds with the interestsof theWest.

Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Dr. Israel Elad Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last twoyears has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up fordissent. Maghna. u appoġġ Ewropew, local opposition groups have been able to takeinitiative, javvanzaw il-kawżi tagħhom u estratt konċessjonijiet mill-istat. The EgyptianMuslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a politicalorganization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities and new risks.Western governments, inkluż il-gvern tal-Istati Uniti, are consideringthe MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advancedemocracy in their countries, u forsi wkoll fil-qerda tat-terroriżmu Iżlamiku. Couldthe Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice andDevelopment Party (AKP) u l-Partit tal-Ġustizzja Prospera Indoneżjan (PKS), twoIslamist parties that, skond xi analisti, are successfully adapting to the rules ofliberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with,rispettivament, Ewropa u Asja "pagana".?Dan l-artikolu jeżamina kif l-MB wieġeb għar-realtà l-ġdida, how it has handledthe ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the pasttwo years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to newcircumstances? X'inhuma l-għanijiet tagħha u l-viżjoni tagħha tal-ordni politiku? How has itreacted to U.S. overtures u għall-kampanja ta' riforma u demokratizzazzjoni? How has itnavigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forceson the other, hekk kif il-pajjiż mexxa lejn żewġ elezzjonijiet drammatiċi fil-ħarifa 2005? Towhat extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt toward liberaldemocracy?

L-Ikhwan fl-Amerika ta 'Fuq: Storja Qasira

Douglas Farah

Ron Sandee


Il-każ attwali tal-qorti federali kontra l-Fondazzjoni tal-Art Imqaddsa għall-Għajnuna u l-Iżvilupp (HLF) f’Dallas, Texas,1 joffri ħarsa minn ġewwa bla preċedent lejn l-istorja tal-Fratellanza Musulmana fl-Istati Uniti, kif ukoll l-għanijiet u l-istruttura tagħha. Id-dokumenti jiddiskutu r-reklutaġġ, organizzazzjoni, ideoloġija u l-iżvilupp tal-organizzazzjoni f'fażijiet differenti fl-Istati Uniti. Il-prosekuzzjoni fil-każ ippreżentat ħafna dokumenti interni tal-Fratellanza Musulmana mis-snin tmenin u l-bidu tad-disgħinijiet li jagħtu l-ewwel darba., ħarsa pubblika tal-istorja u l-ideoloġija wara l-operazzjonijiet tal-Aħwa Musulmani (magħrufa bħala l-Ikhwan jew Il-Grupp) fl-Istati Uniti. matul l-aħħar erba’ deċennji. Għar-riċerkaturi, id-dokumenti għandhom il-piż miżjud li jinkitbu mill-mexxejja Ikhwan infushom, aktar milli interpretazzjonijiet ta’ sorsi sekondarji.

Brothers in Arms?

Joshua Stacher
Within and between western governments, a heated policy debate is raging over the question of whether or not to engage with the world’s oldest and most influential political Islamist group: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Fil 2006, publication of a series of leaked memos in the New Statesman magazine revealed that political analysts within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended an enhancement of informal contacts with members of the Brotherhood.
The authors of these documents argued that the UK government should be seeking to influence this group, given the extent of its grassroots support in Egypt. The British analysts further suggested that engagement could provide a valuable opportunity for challenging the Brotherhood’s perceptions of the West, including the UK, and for detailed questioning of their prescriptions for solving the challenges facing Egypt and the wider region.
The Bush administration in the United States has been far less open to the idea of direct engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that it would be inappropriate to enter into formal ties with a group that is not legally recognised by the Egyptian government. Madankollu, there are indications that the US position may be starting to shift. Fil 2007, it emerged that the State Department had approved a policy that would enable US diplomats to meet and coordinate with elected Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and other Arab states.

Within and between western governments, a heated policy debate is raging over the question of whether or not to engage with the world’s oldest and most influential political Islamist group: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Fil 2006, publication of a series of leaked memos in the New Statesman magazine revealed that political analysts within the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended an enhancement of informal contacts with members of the Brotherhood.

The authors of these documents argued that the UK government should be seeking to influence this group, given the extent of its grassroots support in Egypt. The British analysts further suggested that engagement could provide a valuable opportunity for challenging the Brotherhood’s perceptions of the West, including the UK, and for detailed questioning of their prescriptions for solving the challenges facing Egypt and the wider region.

The Bush administration in the United States has been far less open to the idea of direct engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that it would be inappropriate to enter into formal ties with a group that is not legally recognised by the Egyptian government. Madankollu, there are indications that the US position may be starting to shift. Fil 2007, it emerged that the State Department had approved a policy that would enable US diplomats to meet and coordinate with elected Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and other Arab states.