RSS所有帶有標籤的條目: "人權"

伊斯蘭教結構中的運動原理

博士. 穆罕默德·伊克巴勒

作為一種文化運動,伊斯蘭教拒絕舊的靜態宇宙觀, 並達到動態視圖. 作為一個統一的情感系統,它承認個人的價值, 並拒絕將血緣關係作為人類團結的基礎. 血緣是地根. 只有認識到所有人類生命的起源都是精神性的,才能尋找人類統一的純粹心理基礎。 1 這種認識是對新的忠誠的創造,而無需任何儀式來維持他們的生命。, 並使人有可能將自己從地球上解放出來. 最初以修道院秩序出現的基督教被君士坦丁嘗試作為一種統一體系。 2 它未能作為這樣的體係發揮作用,促使朱利安皇帝 3 回到羅馬的舊神,他試圖對其進行哲學解釋. 一位現代文明史家由此描繪了伊斯蘭教出現在歷史舞台上的文明世界狀況: 那個用了四千年才建立起來的偉大文明,似乎在瓦解的邊緣, 人類很可能會回到野蠻狀態,每個部落和教派都反對下一個, 法律和秩序是未知的 . . . 該
舊的部落制裁失去了效力. 因此,舊的帝國方法將不再適用. 新的製裁措施由
基督教正在分裂和破壞,而不是團結和秩序. 這是一個充滿悲劇的時代. 文明, 就像一棵巨樹,它的枝葉覆蓋了世界,它的枝條結出了藝術、科學和文學的金色果實, 蹣跚而行, 它的樹幹不再流淌著虔誠和崇敬的汁液, 但腐爛到核心, 被戰爭風暴撕裂, 只由古老的習俗和法律的繩索維繫在一起, 隨時可能會突然出現. 有沒有可以帶入的情感文化, 讓人類再次團結起來,拯救文明? 這種文化一定是一種新的類型, 因為舊的製裁和儀式已經死了, 並且建立其他同類將是工作
幾個世紀。'然後作者繼續告訴我們,世界需要一種新的文化來取代王位的文化, 以及基於血緣關係的統一制度.
太棒了, 他補充說, 這種文化應該在最需要的時候從阿拉伯興起. 有, 然而, 這種現像沒什麼了不起的. 世界生活直觀地看到自己的需求, 並在關鍵時刻確定自己的方向. 這是什麼, 用宗教語言, 我們稱之為預言啟示. 很自然,伊斯蘭教應該閃過一個不受任何古代文化影響的簡單民族的意識, 並佔據三大洲交彙的地理位置. 新文化在 Tauhâd 的原則中找到了世界統一的基礎。'5 伊斯蘭教, 作為一個政體, 只是使這一原則成為人類智力和情感生活中的一個活生生的因素的一種實際手段. 它要求對上帝忠誠, 不去寶座. 因為上帝是所有生命的終極精神基礎, 對上帝的忠誠實際上等於人對自己理想本性的忠誠. 所有生命的終極精神基礎, 正如伊斯蘭教所設想的那樣, 是永恆的,並在變化和變化中展現自己. 一個基於這種現實概念的社會必須調和, 在它的生活中, 恆常與變化的範疇. 它必須擁有永恆的原則來規範它的集體生活, 因為永恆給了我們在不斷變化的世界中的立足點.

伊斯蘭反對黨和歐盟參與的潛力

托比·阿徹

海蒂Huuhtanen

鑑於伊斯蘭運動在穆斯林世界和

自世紀之交以來,激進化對全球事件的影響方式, 它

對於歐盟來說,在可以鬆散的範圍內評估其對參與者的政策很重要

被稱為“伊斯蘭世界”. 詢問是否以及如何參與尤為重要

與各種伊斯蘭團體.

即使在歐盟內部,這仍然存在爭議. 有些人認為伊斯蘭價值觀

落後於伊斯蘭政黨與西方的民主理想和

人權, 而其他人則將參與視為現實的必要性,因為日益增長的

伊斯蘭政黨在國內的重要性及其日益參與國際事務

事務. 另一種觀點是,穆斯林世界的民主化將會增加

歐洲安全. 這些和其他關於是否以及如何

歐盟是否應該參與只能通過研究不同的伊斯蘭運動和

他們的政治環境, 逐個國家.

民主化是歐盟共同外交政策行動的中心主題, 鋪設

在文章中 11 歐盟條約. 在此考慮的許多州

舉報不民主, 或不完全民主. 在這些國家中的大多數, 伊斯蘭主義者

政黨和運動構成了對現行政權的重大反對, 和

在一些地區,他們形成了最大的反對派集團. 歐洲民主國家長期以來不得不

處理專制的統治政權, 但這是一個新現象

在最有可能受益者可能擁有的國家進行民主改革, 來自

歐盟的觀點, 不同的,有時是有問題的民主方法及其

相關值, 例如少數民族和婦女權利和法治. 這些費用是

經常反對伊斯蘭運動, 因此,對於歐洲政策制定者來說,重要的是

準確了解潛在合作夥伴的政策和理念.

來自不同國家的經驗往往表明,更自由的伊斯蘭主義者

允許聚會, 他們的行動和想法越溫和. 在許多

伊斯蘭政黨和團體早已偏離了最初的目標

建立一個受伊斯蘭法律管轄的伊斯蘭國家, 並開始接受基本的

選舉權力的民主原則, 其他政治的存在

競爭對手, 和政治多元化.

伊斯蘭政黨 : 回到原點

侯賽因·哈卡尼

希勒爾Fradkin

How should we understand the emergence and the nature of Islamist parties? Can they reasonably be expected not just to participate in democratic politics but even to respect the norms of liberal democracy? These questions lie at the heart of the issues that we have been asked to address.
In our view, any response that is historically and thus practically relevant must begin with the following observation: Until very recently, even the idea of an Islamist party (let alone a democratic Islamist party) would have seemed, from the perspective of Islamism itself, a paradox if not a contradiction in terms. Islamism’s original conception of a healthy Islamic political life made no room for—indeed rejected—any role for parties of any sort. Islamist groups described themselves as the vanguard of Islamic revival, claiming that they represented the essence of Islam and reflected the aspiration of the global umma (community of believers) for an Islamic polity. Pluralism, which is a precondition for the operation of political parties, was rejected by most Islamist political
thinkers as a foreign idea.
As should be more or less obvious, the novelty not only of actually existing Islamist parties but of the very idea of such parties makes it exceptionally difficult to assess their democratic bona fides. But this difficulty merely adds another level of complication to a problem that stems from the very origins of Islamism and its conception of the true meaning of Islam and of Islam’s relationship to political life

敘利亞反對派

約書亞·蘭迪斯

喬·佩斯


For decades, 我們. policy toward Syria has been single-mindedly focused on Syria’s president, Hafiz al-Asad, 從 1970 至 2000, followed by his son Bashar. Because they perceived the Syrian opposition to be too weak and anti-American, 我們. officials preferred to work with the Asad regime. Washington thus had no relations with the Syrian opposition until its invasion of Iraq in 2003. 即使這樣, the Bush administration reached out only to Washington-based opponents of the Syrian regime. They were looking for a Syrian counterpart to Ahmad Chalabi, the pro-U.S. Iraqi opposition leader who helped build the case for invading Iraq.
Washington was not interested in engaging Islamists, whom it considered the only opposition with a demonstrated popular base in Syria. As for the secular opposition in Syria, 我們. embassy officials in Damascus considered them to “have a weak back bench,” without a popular constituency or connection to Syrian youth.2 Moreover, contact between opposition members and embassy officials could be dangerous for opponents of the regime and leave them open to accusations of treason. For these reasons, the difficult terrain of opposition figures within Syria remained terra incognita.

阿拉伯世界的公民社會和民主化

薩阿德·埃丁·易卜拉欣
即使伊斯蘭教是答案, 阿拉伯穆斯林是問題

在五月 2008, 阿拉伯國家經歷了多次火災, 更確切地說, 武裝衝突—在

黎巴嫩, 伊拉克, 巴勒斯坦, 也門, 和索馬里. 在這些衝突中,

交戰各方使用伊斯蘭教作為動員工具

並積累支持. 集體, 穆斯林是

對穆斯林發動戰爭.

在一些穆斯林提出“伊斯蘭是解決之道”的口號後,”

很明顯,“他們的伊斯蘭教是問題所在。”他們中的一些人剛獲得武器,

而不是他們提出反對國家及其統治政權,不管

該政權是否以伊斯蘭教的名義統治.

我們有

近年來在奧薩馬·本·拉登的追隨者之間看到了這一點

一方面是基地組織, 和當局

沙特阿拉伯王國, 在另一. 我們還看到了一個

摩洛哥這種現象的爆炸性例子, 其國王以伊斯蘭教的名義統治

他的頭銜是“忠實的王子”。’ 因此,每個穆斯林派別在

伊斯蘭教的名字.
快速瀏覽一下媒體的內容可以確認

伊斯蘭教一詞及其相關符號已成為這些穆斯林手中的工具.

這些利用伊斯蘭教的派系的突出例子是:
穆斯林兄弟會, 埃及伊斯蘭聖戰, 和Jamiat al-Islamiyya, 在埃及

哈馬斯和伊斯蘭聖戰運動, 在巴勒斯坦真主黨, 伊斯蘭法塔赫,

和伊斯蘭聖戰組織, 在黎巴嫩胡塞扎亞迪叛軍和伊斯蘭改革集團

(更正), 在也門伊斯蘭法院, 在索馬里伊斯蘭陣線 ,

埃及博客圈: 新女權主義之家

勞拉Pitel

Has there been a time in your life when you experienced, felt or even heard about a story at the heart of which lay the oppression of a woman because she, a female, lives in a male society?1These were the first words of an email sent in 2006 to Egypt‟s female bloggers, calling upon them to speak out about the problems faced by women in their society. The authors of the invitation were a group of five female Egyptian bloggers who, weeks earlier, had begun We are all Laila – a blogging initiative set-up in order to shed light on the frustrations of being a woman in a patriarchal society. On 9th September, over 70 bloggers contributed to We are all Laila day, successfully creating a storm both in the world of blogging and beyond.The group formed at a time of enormous growth in Egypt‟s online sphere. The popularity of blogs – websites usually run by an individual, made public for anyone to read – took off in the three years up to 2007: pre-2005 there were around 40 Egyptian blogs,2 by 2005 there were about 400,3 and by September 2006 that number is estimated to have been 1800.4 This parallels the growth in the global blogosphere5 which was home to 70 million blogs by April 2007.

政治伊斯蘭正在崛起

邁克爾. 長

characteristics of the democratic order. Their newly-discovered acceptance of elections andparliamentary processes results not least from a gradual democratisation of the formerlyauthoritarian regimes these groups had fought by terrorist means even in their home countries.The prime example of this development is Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, which started out as acharitable social movement and has now become the most powerful political opposition force inEgypt.Founded in the 1920s, the Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest Islamic organisation of the Arabworld today. Following the ideas of its founder Al-Banna, it intended to return to a state of ‘trueIslam’, 即. to return to the way of life of the early Islamic congregation at the time of theProphet, and to establish a community of social justice. This vision was increasingly viewed as acounterweight to the Western social model that was marked by secularisation, moral decay, andgreed. During World War II, the Muslim Brotherhood even founded a secret military arm, whoseactivities, 然而, were uncovered, leading to the execution of Mr Al-Banna by Egypt’s secretpolice

在兄弟的陰影下

Omayma阿卜杜勒 - 拉蒂夫

In September 2007, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt released its fi rst politicalparty platform draft. Among the heavily criticized clauses was one that deniedwomen (and Copts) the right to be head of state. “Duties and responsibilities assumed by the head of state, such as army commanding, are in contradictionwith the socially acceptable roles for women,” the draft stated. In previousBrotherhood documents there was no specifi c mention of the position of headof state; rather, they declared that women were allowed to occupy all postsexcept for al-imama al-kubra, the position of caliph, which is the equivalentof a head of state in modern times. Many were surprised that despite severalprogressive moves the Brotherhood had made in previous years to empowerwomen, it ruled out women’s right to the country’s top position.Although the platform was only a fi rst draft, the Muslim Brotherhood’s banon women in Egypt’s top offi ce revived old, but serious, questions regardingthe Islamist movement’s stand on the place and role of the “Sisters” inside themovement. The Brotherhood earlier had taken an advanced position concerningwomen, as refl ected in its naming of women candidates for parliamentaryand municipal elections in 2000, 2005, 和 2007, as well as the growingnumbers of women involved in Brotherhood political activities, such as streetprotests and elections. Although the platform recognizes women as key politicalactors, it was considered a retreat from the movement’s advanced positionin some earlier electoral platforms.

埃及穆斯林兄弟會黨綱草案

彌敦道Ĵ. 棕色
阿穆爾·哈薩

In the late summer 2007, amid great anticipation from Egypt’s ruling elite and opposition movements, the Muslim Brotherhood distributed the first draft of a party platform to a group of intellectuals and analysts. The platform was not to serve as a document for an existing political party or even one about to be founded: the Brotherhood remains without legal recognition in Egypt and Egypt’s rulers and the laws they have enacted make the prospect of legal recognition for a Brotherhood-founded party seem distant. But the Brotherhood’s leadership clearly wished to signal what sort of party they would found if allowed to do so.

With the circulation of the draft document, the movement opened its doors to discussion and even contentious debate about the main ideas of the platform, the likely course of the Brotherhood’s political role, and the future of its relationship with other political forces in the country.1 In this paper, we seek to answer four questions concerning the Brotherhood’s

party platform:

1. What are the specific controversies and divisions generated by the platform?


2. Why and how has the platform proved so divisive?


3. Given the divisions it caused as well as the inauspicious political environment,

why was a platform drafted at this time?


4. How will these controversies likely be resolved?


We also offer some observations about the Brotherhood’s experience with

drafting a party platform and demonstrate how its goals have only been partly

met. Ultimately, the integration of the Muslim Brotherhood as a normal political

actor will depend not only on the movement’s words but also on the deeds

of a regime that seems increasingly hostile to the Brotherhood’s political role.

呼籲正義

易卜拉欣薩爾瓦多Houdaiby

It was over 12 years ago that I watched CNN to follow the trial of O J Simpson. Although being thousands of miles away, I was still able to see what was going on inside the court room, listen to
persecutor and defence arguments, and read transcripts of that in newspapers. I even remember arguing with family members and friends in Egypt on whether or not he was guilty.

Regardless of the verdict, I sincerely believe that this trial had all foundations and necessary guarantees and requirements of a fair trial. Most importantly: it was held publicly so that people all over the world could follow its procedures.

今天, 12 years later, opposition leaders belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood are standing before asecretmilitary tribunal in Egypt. Sixteen sessions have been held so far, while all journalists, reporters, domestic or international human rights observers have
been denied access. Defendants belonging to the country’s largest opposition group, and the region’s largest Islamist movement with moderate orientation and peaceful approach, are standing before this tribunal despite civilian courts acquitting them four times of all charges brought by the notorious State Security Prosecutor, describing them asfabricated, groundless, and politically motivated.They are standing before the tribunal despite a court’s ruling that found the President’s decision to transfer them to a military tribunalunconstitutional,” as they are civilian opposition leaders who should be tried by civilian courts. The decision to transfer them to military tribunals disrespecting civilian courts’ verdicts was condemned by international human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.
而且, the case was brought to military tribunal even before charges were prepared. After the third acquittal of the detainees by civilian courts, the regime had no legal excuse to extend their detention, and therefore had to commence trial sessions within a couple of days so that it could keep them behind bars. The regime never attempted to justify that, and the judge (a military officer who has no option but to follow the orders of his seniors; the President and the Minister of Defence) only adjourned the session till charges were prepared in a clear violation of due legal processes.

Forty defendants, including the group’s Deputy Chairman Khayrat El Shater, are facing false accusations of money laundering and financing a ‘banned organisation’. The only witness in the case is the State Security officer who presided over investigations. In his testimony, he
failed to present any substantial evidence to support his claims.

He made some fatal mistakes that should undermine his testimony altogether. This included not knowing the names and professions of some of the defendants, refusing to respond to most of the defence questions and providing contradictory answers for the other questions. He failed to provide a single piece of evidence that would support the charges.
But all this took place behind closed doors. The only people granted access to the court room were the detaineesfamilies. The justification was rather silly; the sessions were being held in a military base which required a special permit to enter. This does not explain why families are allowed to enter without a permit, nor does it explain why civilian opposition leaders are being tried in a military base!! Strict procedures were imposed in order to guarantee that no account of what happens inside the court room would not reach the outside world except through families and lawyers who could be easily discredited.
The motives for all this are patently clear. Mubarak’s regime is suffering eroding popularity due to its political, social and economic failures both domestically and internationally at a time when there is a pressing need to speed up the devilish inheritance plan by which
Jamal Mubarak is expected to take over the presidency from his 80-years-old father despite the strong popular opposition. With mounting public discontent and unprecedented wave of strikes, most recent are raging protests by around 30,000 cotton factory workers protesting unimaginable living conditions resulting from a $27 per month salary, it was necessary that the regime attempts to silence its strong opposition groups by resorting to extralegal measures,and the list is endless.
艾曼·努爾, a young articulate politician and a potential opponent for Jamal Mubarak in any upcoming elections was sentenced to 5 years in prison, MP Talaat El Sadat, nephew of late President Sadat and an outspoken parliamentarian was sentenced to one year in prison by a military tribunal, hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood activists have been detained and kept behind bars with no accusations, and now 40 influential leaders and members of the group are facing an unknown fate in military tribunal which lacks all basic guarantees of a fair trial. In the past few weeks, four independent newspaper editors were sentenced to prison term after being found guilty of ‘defaming ruling figures’.
Twelve years ago, American courts set O J Simson free, and yet later on had to pay restitution as he was foundliablefor the deaths by a civil suit. The underpinning idea was clear: you need to be certain to take away a person’s freedom, but maybe less certain to
take away some of his money. Today in Egypt, there is an oppressive regime imposing draconian measures against its people and depriving many of their freedom despite the ruling of court of justice, while the vast majority of Western governments, writers and civil society organisations remain silent. Only very few have spoken out and acted against this assault on human rights and democracy. It is high time for those interested in bringing justice and freedom to Egypt to manifest this interest through actions as well as words.

埃及的異議與改革: 民主化的挑戰

Ayat M. 阿布 - Futouh

Over the last two years, Egypt has witnessed large demonstrations led by newdemocratic civil society movements, including Kefaya (Arabic for “enough”), the JudgesClub of Egypt, journalist advocacy groups, civil society coalitions, and other human rightsactivists.These groups have championed a number of causes including an independentjudiciary, contested presidential elections, presidential term limits, and the annulment ofemergency law. While most of these demands have yet to be met, some gains, asexemplified by the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections, have been made.However, it remains to be seen whether or not this surge of democratic fervor willsucceed in pressuring President Hosni Mubarak’s regime to take meaningful steps towardopening the system and allowing for broader democratic participation. Egypt’s rulers havenot been seriously challenged by a domestic opposition for over five decades. Behind afortress of restrictive laws, the regime has managed to undermine nascent political partiesand keep them weak, fragmented, and unable to develop any constituency among thepeople. Civil society is likewise shackled by laws that have constrained their formation andactivities.Since the late 1970s, following Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel, the Egyptiangovernment has received unwavering financial and moral support from Westerndemocracies—particularly the United States. Egypt is seen as a staunch ally in the region, apartner in managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Arab-Israeli relations, 和, after the9/11 attacks, a valuable source of intelligence in the war on terror. The regime has usedthis support to maintain its suffocating grip on political activity.Then, starting in 2004, it seemed a new day had dawned for Egyptian reformers.Calls by the United States for Arab governments to democratize resonated strongly withincivil society, rapidly escalating domestic demands for radical political reforms. PresidentBush has often cited Egypt as an example of a developing democracy in the region. But theEgyptian regime is a hybrid of deeply rooted authoritarian elements and pluralistic andliberal aspects. There are strong state security forces, but also an outspoken oppositionpress and an active, albeit constrained, civil society. In short, Egypt is the perfect model of a“semi-authoritarian” state, rather than a “transitional democracy.”President Mubarak’s government continues to proclaim its commitment to liberaldemocracy, pointing to a vast array of formal democratic institutions. The reality, 然而,is that these institutions are highly deficient. The ruling elite maintains an absolutemonopoly over political power. President Hosni Mubarak was elected last September for afifth six-year term in office. In order for democratic reforms to advance in Egypt,substantial institutional and legal changes must be made.