RSSが付けられているすべてのエントリー: "人権"

イスラム教の構造における運動の原理

ディーアール. して、Muhammad Iqbalさん

文化運動としてイスラムは宇宙の古い静的なビューを拒否します, そして、動的ビューに到達. 統一の感情的なシステムとしては、以下のような個々の価値を認識し、, そして不良品は、人間の団結の基礎としてbloodrelationship. 血縁は大地の絆. 人間の団結の純粋に心理的な基盤の探求は、すべての人間の生命がその起源において精神的であるという認識によってのみ可能になります., 人間が地球から自分自身を解放することを可能にする. もともと修道会として登場したキリスト教は、統一の体系としてコンスタンティヌスによって試みられました.2 そのような体系として機能しなかったことで、ユリアヌス帝はローマの古い神々に戻り、哲学的解釈を試みました.. このように、現代の文明史家は、イスラームが歴史の舞台に現れた頃の文明世界の状態を描写しました。: 四千年の歳月をかけて築き上げた偉大な文明は、崩壊の危機に瀕していると思われた。, そしてその人類は、すべての部族と宗派が次の部族に反対する野蛮の状態に戻る可能性が高い., そして法と秩序は知られていませんでした . . . The
古い部族制裁はその力を失っていた. したがって、古い帝国の方法はもはや機能しません。. によって作成された新しい制裁
キリスト教は、統一と秩序ではなく、分裂と破壊を行っていた. 悲劇に満ちた時代だった. 文明, 葉が世界を覆い、その枝が芸術と科学と文学の黄金の実を結んだ巨大な木のように, よろめいて立っていた, その幹はもはや献身と畏敬の念の流れる樹液で生きていない, でも芯まで腐ってる, 戦争の嵐に引き裂かれる, 古代の慣習と法律の紐によってのみ結び付けられている, いつでも壊れるかもしれない. 持ち込むことができる感情的な文化はありましたか, 人類を再び団結させ、文明を救うために? この文化は新しいタイプのものでなければなりません, 古い制裁と儀式は死んでいたからです, そして、同じ種類の他のものを構築することが仕事になります
その後、作家は、世界が王位の文化に取って代わる新しい文化を必要としていると私たちに伝えます., そして血縁関係に基づく統一システム.
それは素晴らしいです, 彼は付け加えます, そのような文化は、それが最も必要とされたちょうどその時にアラビアから生まれるべきだった. がある, しかし、, この現象には何も驚くべきことはありません. 世界生活は直感的に自分自身のニーズを理解する, そして重要な瞬間には、それ自身の方向性を定義します. これは何, 宗教用語で, 私たちは預言的啓示と呼んでいます. イスラム教が古代文化の影響を受けていない単純な人々の意識に閃いたのは当然のことです, 3つの大陸が出会う地理的位置を占める. 新しい文化は、タウハドの原則に世界統一の基盤を見いだしている。」5 イスラーム, 政治として, この原則を人類の知的および感情的な生活の生きた要素にするための実際的な手段にすぎません. それは神への忠誠を要求する, 王位に就かない. そして、神はすべての生命の究極の精神的基盤であるため、, 神への忠誠は事実上、自分自身の理想的な性質への人間の忠誠に等しい. すべての生命の究極の精神的基盤, イスラム教が考えたように, 永遠であり、多様性と変化の中に姿を現す. そのような現実の概念に基づく社会は、和解しなければなりません, その生活の中で, 永続性と変化のカテゴリー. 集団生活を規制するための永遠の原則を持たなければならない, 永遠は、絶え間なく変化する世界への足がかりを与えてくれるからです。.

イスラム野党とEUの婚約の可能性

トビーアーチャー

ハイディHuuhtanen

イスラム世界におけるイスラム主義運動の重要性の高まりに照らして、

世紀の変わり目以来、急進化が世界的な出来事に影響を与えてきた方法, それ

EUにとって、大まかになり得る範囲内の関係者に対する政策を評価することは重要です。

「イスラム世界」と呼ばれる. 従事するかどうか、そしてどのように従事するかを尋ねることは特に重要です

さまざまなイスラム教徒グループと.

これはEU内でも物議を醸しています. 一部の人々は、イスラムの価値観は

イスラム主義政党の背後にあるのは、単に民主主義の西洋の理想と両立せず、

人権, 他の人は、成長のためにエンゲージメントを現実的な必要性と見なしています

イスラム主義政党の国内的重要性と国際への関与の高まり

事務. もう一つの見方は、イスラム世界の民主化が進むだろうということです

ヨーロッパの安全保障. かどうか、そしてどのように

EUが関与すべきであるのは、さまざまなイスラム主義運動を研究することによってのみテストすることができ、

彼らの政治的状況, 国ごと.

民主化は、EUの一般的な外交政策行動の中心的なテーマです, 敷設されたように

記事に出て 11 欧州連合条約. これで考慮される州の多く

レポートは民主的ではありません, または完全に民主的ではない. これらの国のほとんどで, イスラム教徒

政党と運動は、一般的な政権に対する重大な反対を構成します, と

いくつかでは、彼らは最大の野党ブロックを形成します. ヨーロッパの民主主義は長い間しなければならなかった

権威主義的な統治体制に対処する, でも押すのは新しい現象です

最も可能性の高い受益者がいる可能性のある州の民主的改革のために, から

EUの見解, 民主主義とその

関連する値, マイノリティや女性の権利、法の支配など. これらの料金は

しばしばイスラム主義運動に反対する, したがって、ヨーロッパの政策立案者にとって重要なのは

潜在的なパートナーの方針と哲学を正確に把握する.

さまざまな国からの経験は、より自由なイスラム主義者を示唆する傾向があります

パーティーは許可されています, 彼らの行動や考えがより穏健である. 多くの中

イスラム教徒の政党やグループが当初の目的から遠ざかっていた事例

イスラム法に準拠したイスラム国家の樹立, ベーシックを受け入れるようになりました

権力をめぐる選挙競争の民主主義の原則, 他の政治の存在

競合他社, と政治的多元論.

イスラム国 : 起源に戻る

HusainさんHaqqani

ヒレルフラドキン

How should we understand the emergence and the nature of Islamist parties? Can they reasonably be expected not just to participate in democratic politics but even to respect the norms of liberal democracy? These questions lie at the heart of the issues that we have been asked to address.
In our view, any response that is historically and thus practically relevant must begin with the following observation: Until very recently, even the idea of an Islamist party (let alone a democratic Islamist party) would have seemed, from the perspective of Islamism itself, a paradox if not a contradiction in terms. Islamism’s original conception of a healthy Islamic political life made no room for—indeed rejected—any role for parties of any sort. Islamist groups described themselves as the vanguard of Islamic revival, claiming that they represented the essence of Islam and reflected the aspiration of the global umma (community of believers) for an Islamic polity. Pluralism, which is a precondition for the operation of political parties, was rejected by most Islamist political
thinkers as a foreign idea.
As should be more or less obvious, the novelty not only of actually existing Islamist parties but of the very idea of such parties makes it exceptionally difficult to assess their democratic bona fides. But this difficulty merely adds another level of complication to a problem that stems from the very origins of Islamism and its conception of the true meaning of Islam and of Islam’s relationship to political life

シリア野党

ジョシュアランディス

ジョーペース


数十年, 米国. 政策シリアはひたすらシリア大統領に焦点を当てている, ハーフィズアルアサド, から 1970 に 2000, 息子バシャールが続く. Because they perceived the Syrian opposition to be too weak and anti-American, 米国. officials preferred to work with the Asad regime. Washington thus had no relations with the Syrian opposition until its invasion of Iraq in 2003. その時でさえ, the Bush administration reached out only to Washington-based opponents of the Syrian regime. They were looking for a Syrian counterpart to Ahmad Chalabi, the pro-U.S. Iraqi opposition leader who helped build the case for invading Iraq.
Washington was not interested in engaging Islamists, whom it considered the only opposition with a demonstrated popular base in Syria. As for the secular opposition in Syria, 米国. embassy officials in Damascus considered them to “have a weak back bench,” without a popular constituency or connection to Syrian youth.2 Moreover, contact between opposition members and embassy officials could be dangerous for opponents of the regime and leave them open to accusations of treason. For these reasons, the difficult terrain of opposition figures within Syria remained terra incognita.

アラブ世界の市民社会と民主化

サードのエディンイブラヒム
イスラムが答えであっても, アラブのイスラム教徒が問題

5月 2008, アラブ諸国は多くの火災を経験しました, というより, 武力紛争—に

レバノン, イラク, パレスチナ, イエメン, とソマリア. これらの紛争で,

戦争当事者は動員のための手段としてイスラム教を使用しました

とサポートを蓄積. まとめて, イスラム教徒は

イスラム教徒に対する戦争.

一部のイスラム教徒が「イスラム教が解決策である」というスローガンを掲げた後,」

それ

「彼らのイスラム教が問題だ」と明らかになった。彼らのうちのいくつかはすぐに武器を手に入れました,

関係なく国家とその支配体制に反対してそれを提起したより

その政権がイスラムの名の下で支配していたかどうか.

我々は持っています

オサマビンラディンの信者の間で近年これを見て

一方でアルカイダ組織, と当局

サウジアラビア王国, もう一方の. また、

モロッコでのこの現象の爆発的な例, その王はイスラムの名の下で支配し、

そのタイトルは「忠実な王子。’ したがって、各イスラム教派閥は他のイスラム教徒を殺す

イスラームの名前.
メディアの内容を一目見ると、

イスラム教とそれに関連するシンボルは、これらのイスラム教徒の手に渡る単なるツールに.

これらのイスラムを利用する派閥の顕著な例は:
ムスリム同胞団, エジプトのイスラム聖戦, ジャミアット・アル・イスラミヤ, エジプトで

ハマスとイスラムのジハード運動, パレスチナのヒズボラで, ファタハ・イスラム,

とJamiat al-Islammiyya, レバノンでは、フーティザヤディ反乱軍とイスラム改革グループ

(改善), イエメンイスラム法廷, ソマリアのイスラム戦線 ,

エジプトブロゴスフィア: 新しいフェミニズムの家

ローラPitel

Has there been a time in your life when you experienced, felt or even heard about a story at the heart of which lay the oppression of a woman because she, a female, lives in a male society?1These were the first words of an email sent in 2006 to Egypt‟s female bloggers, calling upon them to speak out about the problems faced by women in their society. The authors of the invitation were a group of five female Egyptian bloggers who, weeks earlier, had begun We are all Laila – a blogging initiative set-up in order to shed light on the frustrations of being a woman in a patriarchal society. On 9th September, over 70 bloggers contributed to We are all Laila day, successfully creating a storm both in the world of blogging and beyond.The group formed at a time of enormous growth in Egypt‟s online sphere. The popularity of blogs – websites usually run by an individual, made public for anyone to read – took off in the three years up to 2007: pre-2005 there were around 40 Egyptian blogs,2 によって 2005 there were about 400,3 and by September 2006 that number is estimated to have been 1800.4 This parallels the growth in the global blogosphere5 which was home to 70 million blogs by April 2007.

政治的イスラム教の台頭

マイケルA. ロング

characteristics of the democratic order. Their newly-discovered acceptance of elections andparliamentary processes results not least from a gradual democratisation of the formerlyauthoritarian regimes these groups had fought by terrorist means even in their home countries.The prime example of this development is Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, which started out as acharitable social movement and has now become the most powerful political opposition force inEgypt.Founded in the 1920s, the Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest Islamic organisation of the Arabworld today. Following the ideas of its founder Al-Banna, it intended to return to a state of ‘trueIslam’, つまり、. to return to the way of life of the early Islamic congregation at the time of theProphet, and to establish a community of social justice. This vision was increasingly viewed as acounterweight to the Western social model that was marked by secularisation, moral decay, andgreed. During World War II, the Muslim Brotherhood even founded a secret military arm, whoseactivities, しかし、, were uncovered, leading to the execution of Mr Al-Banna by Egypt’s secretpolice

兄弟の影で

Omaymaアブドルラティフ

9月中 2007, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt released its fi rst politicalparty platform draft. Among the heavily criticized clauses was one that deniedwomen (and Copts) the right to be head of state. “Duties and responsibilities assumed by the head of state, such as army commanding, are in contradictionwith the socially acceptable roles for women,” the draft stated. In previousBrotherhood documents there was no specifi c mention of the position of headof state; むしろ, they declared that women were allowed to occupy all postsexcept for al-imama al-kubra, the position of caliph, which is the equivalentof a head of state in modern times. Many were surprised that despite severalprogressive moves the Brotherhood had made in previous years to empowerwomen, it ruled out women’s right to the country’s top position.Although the platform was only a fi rst draft, the Muslim Brotherhood’s banon women in Egypt’s top offi ce revived old, but serious, questions regardingthe Islamist movement’s stand on the place and role of the “Sisters” inside themovement. The Brotherhood earlier had taken an advanced position concerningwomen, as refl ected in its naming of women candidates for parliamentaryand municipal elections in 2000, 2005, と 2007, as well as the growingnumbers of women involved in Brotherhood political activities, such as streetprotests and elections. Although the platform recognizes women as key politicalactors, it was considered a retreat from the movement’s advanced positionin some earlier electoral platforms.

エジプトのムスリム同胞団のドラフト党綱領

ネイサンjは. ブラウン
アムルHamzawy

夏の終わりに 2007, エジプトの支配階級エリートからの大きな期待の中で 反対運動, ムスリム同胞団は、党綱領の最初の草案を知識人とアナリストのグループに配布しました. このプラットフォームは、既存の政党や設立されようとしている政党の文書として機能するものではありませんでした。: ブラザーフッドはエジプトとエジプトの統治者に法的な承認がないままであり、彼らが制定した法律により、ブラザーフッドが設立した党の法的承認の見通しは遠いように思われます. しかし、ブラザーフッドの指導部は、許可された場合にどのようなパーティーを見つけるかを明確に示したいと考えていました。.

草案の回覧に伴い, この運動は、プラットフォームの主要なアイデアについての議論や論争への扉を開きました。, 同胞団の政治的役割のありそうなコース, そして、国内の他の政治勢力との関係の将来。1この論文では, ブラザーフッドに関する4つの質問に答えようとしています

パーティープラットフォーム:

1. プラットフォームによって生成された特定の論争と分裂は何ですか?


2. プラットフォームが非常に分裂的であることが証明された理由と方法?


3. それが引き起こした分裂と不吉な政治環境を考えると,

この時点でプラットフォームがドラフトされたのはなぜですか?


4. これらの論争はどのように解決される可能性がありますか?


また、ブラザーフッドの経験についてのいくつかの観察を提供します

党の綱領を起草し、その目標が部分的にしか行われていないことを示す

会った. 最終的に, 通常の政治としてのムスリム同胞団の統合

俳優は運動の言葉だけでなく行為にも依存します

同胞団の政治的役割にますます敵対しているように見える政権の.

正義への呼びかけ

イブラヒムエルHoudaiby

It was over 12 years ago that I watched CNN to follow the trial of O J Simpson. Although being thousands of miles away, I was still able to see what was going on inside the court room, listen to
persecutor and defence arguments, and read transcripts of that in newspapers. I even remember arguing with family members and friends in Egypt on whether or not he was guilty.

Regardless of the verdict, I sincerely believe that this trial had all foundations and necessary guarantees and requirements of a fair trial. Most importantly: it was held publicly so that people all over the world could follow its procedures.

今日, 12 years later, opposition leaders belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood are standing before asecretmilitary tribunal in Egypt. Sixteen sessions have been held so far, while all journalists, reporters, domestic or international human rights observers have
been denied access. Defendants belonging to the country’s largest opposition group, and the region’s largest Islamist movement with moderate orientation and peaceful approach, are standing before this tribunal despite civilian courts acquitting them four times of all charges brought by the notorious State Security Prosecutor, describing them asfabricated, groundless, and politically motivated.They are standing before the tribunal despite a court’s ruling that found the President’s decision to transfer them to a military tribunalunconstitutional,” as they are civilian opposition leaders who should be tried by civilian courts. The decision to transfer them to military tribunals disrespecting civilian courts’ verdicts was condemned by international human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.
また, the case was brought to military tribunal even before charges were prepared. After the third acquittal of the detainees by civilian courts, the regime had no legal excuse to extend their detention, and therefore had to commence trial sessions within a couple of days so that it could keep them behind bars. The regime never attempted to justify that, and the judge (a military officer who has no option but to follow the orders of his seniors; the President and the Minister of Defence) only adjourned the session till charges were prepared in a clear violation of due legal processes.

Forty defendants, including the group’s Deputy Chairman Khayrat El Shater, are facing false accusations of money laundering and financing a ‘banned organisation’. The only witness in the case is the State Security officer who presided over investigations. In his testimony, 彼
failed to present any substantial evidence to support his claims.

He made some fatal mistakes that should undermine his testimony altogether. This included not knowing the names and professions of some of the defendants, refusing to respond to most of the defence questions and providing contradictory answers for the other questions. He failed to provide a single piece of evidence that would support the charges.
But all this took place behind closed doors. The only people granted access to the court room were the detaineesfamilies. The justification was rather silly; the sessions were being held in a military base which required a special permit to enter. This does not explain why families are allowed to enter without a permit, nor does it explain why civilian opposition leaders are being tried in a military base!! Strict procedures were imposed in order to guarantee that no account of what happens inside the court room would not reach the outside world except through families and lawyers who could be easily discredited.
The motives for all this are patently clear. Mubarak’s regime is suffering eroding popularity due to its political, social and economic failures both domestically and internationally at a time when there is a pressing need to speed up the devilish inheritance plan by which
Jamal Mubarak is expected to take over the presidency from his 80-years-old father despite the strong popular opposition. With mounting public discontent and unprecedented wave of strikes, most recent are raging protests by around 30,000 cotton factory workers protesting unimaginable living conditions resulting from a $27 per month salary, it was necessary that the regime attempts to silence its strong opposition groups by resorting to extralegal measures,and the list is endless.
アイマン我々の精神, a young articulate politician and a potential opponent for Jamal Mubarak in any upcoming elections was sentenced to 5 years in prison, MP Talaat El Sadat, nephew of late President Sadat and an outspoken parliamentarian was sentenced to one year in prison by a military tribunal, hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood activists have been detained and kept behind bars with no accusations, and now 40 influential leaders and members of the group are facing an unknown fate in military tribunal which lacks all basic guarantees of a fair trial. In the past few weeks, four independent newspaper editors were sentenced to prison term after being found guilty of ‘defaming ruling figures’.
Twelve years ago, American courts set O J Simson free, and yet later on had to pay restitution as he was foundliablefor the deaths by a civil suit. The underpinning idea was clear: you need to be certain to take away a person’s freedom, but maybe less certain to
take away some of his money. Today in Egypt, there is an oppressive regime imposing draconian measures against its people and depriving many of their freedom despite the ruling of court of justice, while the vast majority of Western governments, writers and civil society organisations remain silent. Only very few have spoken out and acted against this assault on human rights and democracy. It is high time for those interested in bringing justice and freedom to Egypt to manifest this interest through actions as well as words.

エジプトにおける反対意見と改革: 民主化への挑戦

Ayat M. アブル- Futouh

Over the last two years, Egypt has witnessed large demonstrations led by newdemocratic civil society movements, including Kefaya (Arabic for “enough”), the JudgesClub of Egypt, journalist advocacy groups, civil society coalitions, and other human rightsactivists.These groups have championed a number of causes including an independentjudiciary, contested presidential elections, presidential term limits, and the annulment ofemergency law. While most of these demands have yet to be met, some gains, asexemplified by the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections, have been made.However, it remains to be seen whether or not this surge of democratic fervor willsucceed in pressuring President Hosni Mubarak’s regime to take meaningful steps towardopening the system and allowing for broader democratic participation. Egypt’s rulers havenot been seriously challenged by a domestic opposition for over five decades. Behind afortress of restrictive laws, the regime has managed to undermine nascent political partiesand keep them weak, fragmented, and unable to develop any constituency among thepeople. Civil society is likewise shackled by laws that have constrained their formation andactivities.Since the late 1970s, following Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel, the Egyptiangovernment has received unwavering financial and moral support from Westerndemocracies—particularly the United States. Egypt is seen as a staunch ally in the region, apartner in managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Arab-Israeli relations, と, after the9/11 attacks, a valuable source of intelligence in the war on terror. The regime has usedthis support to maintain its suffocating grip on political activity.Then, starting in 2004, it seemed a new day had dawned for Egyptian reformers.Calls by the United States for Arab governments to democratize resonated strongly withincivil society, rapidly escalating domestic demands for radical political reforms. PresidentBush has often cited Egypt as an example of a developing democracy in the region. But theEgyptian regime is a hybrid of deeply rooted authoritarian elements and pluralistic andliberal aspects. There are strong state security forces, but also an outspoken oppositionpress and an active, albeit constrained, civil society. In short, Egypt is the perfect model of a“semi-authoritarian” state, rather than a “transitional democracy.”President Mubarak’s government continues to proclaim its commitment to liberaldemocracy, pointing to a vast array of formal democratic institutions. The reality, しかし、,is that these institutions are highly deficient. The ruling elite maintains an absolutemonopoly over political power. President Hosni Mubarak was elected last September for afifth six-year term in office. In order for democratic reforms to advance in Egypt,substantial institutional and legal changes must be made.