が付けられているすべてのエントリー: "人権"
イスラム教の構造における運動の原理
ディーアール. して、Muhammad Iqbalさん
イスラム野党とEUの婚約の可能性
トビーアーチャー
ハイディHuuhtanen
イスラム国 : 起源に戻る
HusainさんHaqqani
ヒレルフラドキン
シリア野党
ジョシュアランディス
ジョーペース
アラブ世界の市民社会と民主化
エジプトブロゴスフィア: 新しいフェミニズムの家
ローラPitel
Has there been a time in your life when you experienced, felt or even heard about a story at the heart of which lay the oppression of a woman because she, a female, lives in a male society?1These were the first words of an email sent in 2006 to Egypt‟s female bloggers, calling upon them to speak out about the problems faced by women in their society. The authors of the invitation were a group of five female Egyptian bloggers who, weeks earlier, had begun We are all Laila – a blogging initiative set-up in order to shed light on the frustrations of being a woman in a patriarchal society. On 9th September, over 70 bloggers contributed to We are all Laila day, successfully creating a storm both in the world of blogging and beyond.The group formed at a time of enormous growth in Egypt‟s online sphere. The popularity of blogs – websites usually run by an individual, made public for anyone to read – took off in the three years up to 2007: pre-2005 there were around 40 Egyptian blogs,2 によって 2005 there were about 400,3 and by September 2006 that number is estimated to have been 1800.4 This parallels the growth in the global blogosphere5 which was home to 70 million blogs by April 2007.
政治的イスラム教の台頭
マイケルA. ロング
characteristics of the democratic order. Their newly-discovered acceptance of elections andparliamentary processes results not least from a gradual democratisation of the formerlyauthoritarian regimes these groups had fought by terrorist means even in their home countries.The prime example of this development is Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, which started out as acharitable social movement and has now become the most powerful political opposition force inEgypt.Founded in the 1920s, the Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest Islamic organisation of the Arabworld today. Following the ideas of its founder Al-Banna, it intended to return to a state of ‘trueIslam’, つまり、. to return to the way of life of the early Islamic congregation at the time of theProphet, and to establish a community of social justice. This vision was increasingly viewed as acounterweight to the Western social model that was marked by secularisation, moral decay, andgreed. During World War II, the Muslim Brotherhood even founded a secret military arm, whoseactivities, しかし、, were uncovered, leading to the execution of Mr Al-Banna by Egypt’s secretpolice
兄弟の影で
Omaymaアブドルラティフ
9月中 2007, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt released its fi rst politicalparty platform draft. Among the heavily criticized clauses was one that deniedwomen (and Copts) the right to be head of state. “Duties and responsibilities assumed by the head of state, such as army commanding, are in contradictionwith the socially acceptable roles for women,” the draft stated. In previousBrotherhood documents there was no specifi c mention of the position of headof state; むしろ, they declared that women were allowed to occupy all postsexcept for al-imama al-kubra, the position of caliph, which is the equivalentof a head of state in modern times. Many were surprised that despite severalprogressive moves the Brotherhood had made in previous years to empowerwomen, it ruled out women’s right to the country’s top position.Although the platform was only a fi rst draft, the Muslim Brotherhood’s banon women in Egypt’s top offi ce revived old, but serious, questions regardingthe Islamist movement’s stand on the place and role of the “Sisters” inside themovement. The Brotherhood earlier had taken an advanced position concerningwomen, as refl ected in its naming of women candidates for parliamentaryand municipal elections in 2000, 2005, と 2007, as well as the growingnumbers of women involved in Brotherhood political activities, such as streetprotests and elections. Although the platform recognizes women as key politicalactors, it was considered a retreat from the movement’s advanced positionin some earlier electoral platforms.
エジプトのムスリム同胞団のドラフト党綱領
夏の終わりに 2007, エジプトの支配階級エリートからの大きな期待の中で 反対運動, ムスリム同胞団は、党綱領の最初の草案を知識人とアナリストのグループに配布しました. このプラットフォームは、既存の政党や設立されようとしている政党の文書として機能するものではありませんでした。: ブラザーフッドはエジプトとエジプトの統治者に法的な承認がないままであり、彼らが制定した法律により、ブラザーフッドが設立した党の法的承認の見通しは遠いように思われます. しかし、ブラザーフッドの指導部は、許可された場合にどのようなパーティーを見つけるかを明確に示したいと考えていました。.
草案の回覧に伴い, この運動は、プラットフォームの主要なアイデアについての議論や論争への扉を開きました。, 同胞団の政治的役割のありそうなコース, そして、国内の他の政治勢力との関係の将来。1この論文では, ブラザーフッドに関する4つの質問に答えようとしています
パーティープラットフォーム:
1. プラットフォームによって生成された特定の論争と分裂は何ですか?
2. プラットフォームが非常に分裂的であることが証明された理由と方法?
3. それが引き起こした分裂と不吉な政治環境を考えると,
この時点でプラットフォームがドラフトされたのはなぜですか?
4. これらの論争はどのように解決される可能性がありますか?
また、ブラザーフッドの経験についてのいくつかの観察を提供します
党の綱領を起草し、その目標が部分的にしか行われていないことを示す
会った. 最終的に, 通常の政治としてのムスリム同胞団の統合
俳優は運動の言葉だけでなく行為にも依存します
同胞団の政治的役割にますます敵対しているように見える政権の.
正義への呼びかけ
イブラヒムエルHoudaiby
エジプトにおける反対意見と改革: 民主化への挑戦
Ayat M. アブル- Futouh
Over the last two years, Egypt has witnessed large demonstrations led by newdemocratic civil society movements, including Kefaya (Arabic for “enough”), the JudgesClub of Egypt, journalist advocacy groups, civil society coalitions, and other human rightsactivists.These groups have championed a number of causes including an independentjudiciary, contested presidential elections, presidential term limits, and the annulment ofemergency law. While most of these demands have yet to be met, some gains, asexemplified by the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections, have been made.However, it remains to be seen whether or not this surge of democratic fervor willsucceed in pressuring President Hosni Mubarak’s regime to take meaningful steps towardopening the system and allowing for broader democratic participation. Egypt’s rulers havenot been seriously challenged by a domestic opposition for over five decades. Behind afortress of restrictive laws, the regime has managed to undermine nascent political partiesand keep them weak, fragmented, and unable to develop any constituency among thepeople. Civil society is likewise shackled by laws that have constrained their formation andactivities.Since the late 1970s, following Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel, the Egyptiangovernment has received unwavering financial and moral support from Westerndemocracies—particularly the United States. Egypt is seen as a staunch ally in the region, apartner in managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Arab-Israeli relations, と, after the9/11 attacks, a valuable source of intelligence in the war on terror. The regime has usedthis support to maintain its suffocating grip on political activity.Then, starting in 2004, it seemed a new day had dawned for Egyptian reformers.Calls by the United States for Arab governments to democratize resonated strongly withincivil society, rapidly escalating domestic demands for radical political reforms. PresidentBush has often cited Egypt as an example of a developing democracy in the region. But theEgyptian regime is a hybrid of deeply rooted authoritarian elements and pluralistic andliberal aspects. There are strong state security forces, but also an outspoken oppositionpress and an active, albeit constrained, civil society. In short, Egypt is the perfect model of a“semi-authoritarian” state, rather than a “transitional democracy.”President Mubarak’s government continues to proclaim its commitment to liberaldemocracy, pointing to a vast array of formal democratic institutions. The reality, しかし、,is that these institutions are highly deficient. The ruling elite maintains an absolutemonopoly over political power. President Hosni Mubarak was elected last September for afifth six-year term in office. In order for democratic reforms to advance in Egypt,substantial institutional and legal changes must be made.