RSSTous les articles taggés avec: "droits de l'homme"

Le principe du mouvement dans la structure de l'islam

Dr. Muhammad Iqbal

En tant que mouvement culturel, l'islam rejette l'ancienne vision statique de l'univers, et atteint une vue dynamique. En tant que système émotionnel d'unification, il reconnaît la valeur de l'individu en tant que tel, et rejette la relation du sang comme base de l'unité humaine. La relation de sang est l'enracinement de la terre. La recherche d'un fondement purement psychologique de l'unité humaine ne devient possible qu'avec la perception que toute vie humaine est d'origine spirituelle1. Une telle perception est créatrice de nouvelles loyautés sans aucun cérémonial pour les maintenir en vie., et permet à l'homme de s'émanciper de la terre. Le christianisme qui était apparu à l'origine comme un ordre monastique a été essayé par Constantin comme un système d'unification2.. Un historien moderne de la civilisation a ainsi dépeint l'état du monde civilisé à l'époque où l'Islam est apparu sur la scène de l'Histoire.: Il semblait alors que la grande civilisation qu'il avait fallu quatre mille ans pour construire était sur le point de se désintégrer., et que l'humanité était susceptible de retourner à cette condition de barbarie où chaque tribu et secte était contre la suivante., et la loi et l'ordre étaient inconnus . . . Le
les anciennes sanctions tribales avaient perdu leur pouvoir. Ainsi, les anciennes méthodes impériales ne fonctionneraient plus. Les nouvelles sanctions créées par
Le christianisme travaillait à la division et à la destruction au lieu de l'unité et de l'ordre. C'était une époque pleine de tragédie. Civilisation, comme un arbre gigantesque dont le feuillage avait dominé le monde et dont les branches avaient porté les fruits d'or de l'art, de la science et de la littérature, se tenait en chancelant, son tronc n'est plus vivant de la sève qui coule de la dévotion et de la révérence, mais pourri jusqu'à la moelle, déchiré par les tempêtes de la guerre, et maintenus ensemble uniquement par les cordes des anciennes coutumes et lois, qui peut casser à tout moment. Y avait-il une culture émotionnelle qui pourrait être introduite, rassembler à nouveau l'humanité dans l'unité et sauver la civilisation? Cette culture doit être quelque chose d'un nouveau type, car les anciennes sanctions et cérémonies étaient mortes, et en édifier d'autres du même genre serait l'œuvre
des siècles. » L'auteur poursuit en nous disant que le monde avait besoin d'une nouvelle culture pour remplacer la culture du trône., et les systèmes d'unification qui étaient basés sur les relations du sang.
C'est étonnant, il ajoute, qu'une telle culture aurait surgi d'Arabie juste au moment où elle était le plus nécessaire. Il y a, cependant, rien d'étonnant dans le phénomène. La vie du monde voit intuitivement ses propres besoins, et aux moments critiques définit sa propre direction. C'est quoi, dans la langue de la religion, nous appelons la révélation prophétique. Il est tout à fait naturel que l'islam ait traversé la conscience d'un peuple simple épargné par aucune des cultures anciennes., et occupant une position géographique où trois continents se rejoignent. La nouvelle culture trouve le fondement de l'unité du monde dans le principe de Tauhâd., en tant que politique, n'est qu'un moyen pratique de faire de ce principe un facteur vivant dans la vie intellectuelle et affective de l'humanité. Cela exige la loyauté envers Dieu, pas aux trônes. Et puisque Dieu est la base spirituelle ultime de toute vie, la fidélité à Dieu équivaut virtuellement à la fidélité de l'homme à sa propre nature idéale. La base spirituelle ultime de toute vie, tel que conçu par l'Islam, est éternel et se révèle dans la variété et le changement. Une société fondée sur une telle conception de la Réalité doit concilier, dans sa vie, les catégories de permanence et de changement. Il doit posséder des principes éternels pour régler sa vie collective, car l'éternel nous donne un pied dans le monde en perpétuel changement.

Les partis d'opposition islamistes et le potentiel d'engagement de l'UE

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Face à l'importance croissante des mouvements islamistes dans le monde musulman et

la façon dont la radicalisation a influencé les événements mondiaux depuis le début du siècle, il

est important pour l'UE d'évaluer ses politiques envers les acteurs dans ce qui peut être vaguement

appelé le « monde islamique ». Il est particulièrement important de se demander si et comment s'engager

avec les différents groupes islamistes.

Cela reste controversé même au sein de l'UE. Certains pensent que les valeurs islamiques qui

derrière les partis islamistes sont tout simplement incompatibles avec les idéaux occidentaux de démocratie et

droits de l'homme, tandis que d'autres voient l'engagement comme une nécessité réaliste en raison de la croissance

l'importance nationale des partis islamistes et leur implication croissante dans les

affaires. Une autre perspective est que la démocratisation dans le monde musulman augmenterait

Sécurité européenne. La validité de ces arguments et d'autres sur la question de savoir si et comment la

L'UE devrait s'engager ne peut être testée qu'en étudiant les différents mouvements islamistes et

leur situation politique, pays par pays.

La démocratisation est un thème central des actions de politique étrangère commune de l'UE, comme prévu

dans l'article 11 du traité sur l'Union européenne. De nombreux États considérés dans ce

le rapport n'est pas démocratique, ou pas entièrement démocratique. Dans la plupart de ces pays, islamiste

les partis et mouvements constituent une opposition significative aux régimes en place, et

dans certains, ils forment le plus grand bloc d'opposition. Les démocraties européennes ont longtemps dû

faire face à des régimes autoritaires, mais c'est un phénomène nouveau d'appuyer

pour une réforme démocratique dans les États où les bénéficiaires les plus probables pourraient avoir, du

Le point de vue de l'UE, approches différentes et parfois problématiques de la démocratie et de ses

valeurs liées, tels que les droits des minorités et des femmes et l’état de droit. Ces frais sont

souvent portées contre les mouvements islamistes, il est donc important que les décideurs politiques européens

avoir une image précise des politiques et des philosophies des partenaires potentiels.

Les expériences de différents pays tendent à suggérer que plus les islamistes sont libres

les fêtes sont autorisées, plus ils sont modérés dans leurs actions et leurs idées. Dans de nombreux

cas, les partis et groupes islamistes se sont éloignés depuis longtemps de leur objectif initial

d'établir un État islamique régi par la loi islamique, et en sont venus à accepter les bases

principes démocratiques de la compétition électorale pour le pouvoir, l'existence d'autres politiques

concurrents, et pluralisme politique.

Les partis islamistes : retour aux origines

Husain Haqqani

Hillel Fradkin

How should we understand the emergence and the nature of Islamist parties? Can they reasonably be expected not just to participate in democratic politics but even to respect the norms of liberal democracy? These questions lie at the heart of the issues that we have been asked to address.
In our view, any response that is historically and thus practically relevant must begin with the following observation: Until very recently, even the idea of an Islamist party (let alone a democratic Islamist party) would have seemed, from the perspective of Islamism itself, a paradox if not a contradiction in terms. Islamism’s original conception of a healthy Islamic political life made no room for—indeed rejected—any role for parties of any sort. Islamist groups described themselves as the vanguard of Islamic revival, claiming that they represented the essence of Islam and reflected the aspiration of the global umma (community of believers) for an Islamic polity. Pluralism, which is a precondition for the operation of political parties, was rejected by most Islamist political
thinkers as a foreign idea.
As should be more or less obvious, the novelty not only of actually existing Islamist parties but of the very idea of such parties makes it exceptionally difficult to assess their democratic bona fides. But this difficulty merely adds another level of complication to a problem that stems from the very origins of Islamism and its conception of the true meaning of Islam and of Islam’s relationship to political life

L'opposition syrienne

Joshua Landis

Joe Pace


Pendant des décennies,, États-Unis. politique vers la Syrie a été porté avec détermination le président de la Syrie, Hafiz al-Asad, à partir de 1970 à 2000, suivi de son fils Bashar. Because they perceived the Syrian opposition to be too weak and anti-American, États-Unis. officials preferred to work with the Asad regime. Washington thus had no relations with the Syrian opposition until its invasion of Iraq in 2003. Même à ce moment là, the Bush administration reached out only to Washington-based opponents of the Syrian regime. They were looking for a Syrian counterpart to Ahmad Chalabi, the pro-U.S. Iraqi opposition leader who helped build the case for invading Iraq.
Washington was not interested in engaging Islamists, whom it considered the only opposition with a demonstrated popular base in Syria. As for the secular opposition in Syria, États-Unis. embassy officials in Damascus considered them to “have a weak back bench,” without a popular constituency or connection to Syrian youth.2 Moreover, contact between opposition members and embassy officials could be dangerous for opponents of the regime and leave them open to accusations of treason. For these reasons, the difficult terrain of opposition figures within Syria remained terra incognita.

la société civile et la démocratisation dans le monde arabe

Saad Eddin Ibrahim
Même si l'islam est la réponse, Les musulmans arabes sont le problème

En mai 2008, la nation arabe a connu plusieurs incendies, ou plutôt, conflits armés—dans

Liban, Irak, Palestine, Yémen, et la Somalie. Dans ces conflits,

les belligérants ont utilisé l'islam comme instrument de mobilisation

et accumuler du soutien. Collectivement, Les musulmans sont

faire la guerre aux musulmans.

Après que certains musulmans aient lancé le slogan « L'islam est la solution,"

il

est devenu évident que "leur islam est le problème". A peine certains d'entre eux ont-ils acquis des armes,

qu'ils l'ont élevé contre l'État et son régime au pouvoir, indépendamment de

si ce régime gouvernait au nom de l'islam ou non.

Nous avons

vu cela ces dernières années entre les partisans d'Oussama ben Laden

et l'organisation Al-Qaïda d'une part, et les autorités de

le Royaume d'Arabie Saoudite, de l'autre. Nous avons également vu un

exemple explosif de ce phénomène au Maroc, dont le roi règne au nom de l'Islam et

dont le titre est le « Prince des fidèles ».’ Ainsi, chaque faction musulmane tue d'autres musulmans dans le

nom de l'islam.
Un rapide coup d'œil au contenu des médias confirme à quel point le

terme Islam et ses symboles associés sont devenus de simples outils entre les mains de ces musulmans.

Des exemples éminents de ces factions exploitant l'Islam sont:
Les Frères musulmans, Jihad islamique égyptien, et Jamiat al-Islamiyya, en Egypte

Hamas et le mouvement du Jihad islamique, en Palestine Hezbollah, Fatah al Islam,

et Jamiat al-Islammiyya, au Liban Les rebelles Houthi Zayadi et le Groupement réformateur islamique

(Correction), au Yémen Les tribunaux islamiques, en Somalie Le Front Islamique ,

La blogosphère égyptienne: Accueil d'un nouveau féminisme

Laura Pitel

Has there been a time in your life when you experienced, felt or even heard about a story at the heart of which lay the oppression of a woman because she, a female, lives in a male society?1These were the first words of an email sent in 2006 to Egypt‟s female bloggers, calling upon them to speak out about the problems faced by women in their society. The authors of the invitation were a group of five female Egyptian bloggers who, weeks earlier, had begun We are all Laila – a blogging initiative set-up in order to shed light on the frustrations of being a woman in a patriarchal society. On 9th September, over 70 bloggers contributed to We are all Laila day, successfully creating a storm both in the world of blogging and beyond.The group formed at a time of enormous growth in Egypt‟s online sphere. The popularity of blogs – websites usually run by an individual, made public for anyone to read – took off in the three years up to 2007: pre-2005 there were around 40 Egyptian blogs,2 par 2005 there were about 400,3 and by September 2006 that number is estimated to have been 1800.4 This parallels the growth in the global blogosphere5 which was home to 70 million blogs by April 2007.

L'islam politique gagne du terrain

Michael A. Long

caractéristiques de l'ordre démocratique. Leur acceptation nouvellement découverte des élections et des processus parlementaires résulte notamment d'une démocratisation progressive des régimes anciennement autoritaires que ces groupes avaient combattus par des moyens terroristes, même dans leur pays d'origine., qui a commencé comme un mouvement social caritatif et est maintenant devenu la force d'opposition politique la plus puissante en Égypte. Fondée dans les années 1920, les Frères musulmans sont la plus ancienne organisation islamique du monde arabe aujourd'hui. Suivant les idées de son fondateur Al-Banna, it intended to return to a state of ‘trueIslam’, Je. to return to the way of life of the early Islamic congregation at the time of theProphet, and to establish a community of social justice. This vision was increasingly viewed as acounterweight to the Western social model that was marked by secularisation, moral decay, andgreed. During World War II, the Muslim Brotherhood even founded a secret military arm, whoseactivities, cependant, were uncovered, leading to the execution of Mr Al-Banna by Egypt’s secretpolice

A l'ombre des frères

Omayma Abdel-Latif

En septembre 2007, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt released its fi rst politicalparty platform draft. Among the heavily criticized clauses was one that deniedwomen (and Copts) the right to be head of state. “Duties and responsibilities assumed by the head of state, such as army commanding, are in contradictionwith the socially acceptable roles for women,” the draft stated. In previousBrotherhood documents there was no specifi c mention of the position of headof state; rather, they declared that women were allowed to occupy all postsexcept for al-imama al-kubra, the position of caliph, which is the equivalentof a head of state in modern times. Many were surprised that despite severalprogressive moves the Brotherhood had made in previous years to empowerwomen, it ruled out women’s right to the country’s top position.Although the platform was only a fi rst draft, the Muslim Brotherhood’s banon women in Egypt’s top offi ce revived old, but serious, questions regardingthe Islamist movement’s stand on the place and role of the “Sisters” inside themovement. The Brotherhood earlier had taken an advanced position concerningwomen, as refl ected in its naming of women candidates for parliamentaryand municipal elections in 2000, 2005, et 2007, as well as the growingnumbers of women involved in Brotherhood political activities, such as streetprotests and elections. Although the platform recognizes women as key politicalactors, it was considered a retreat from the movement’s advanced positionin some earlier electoral platforms.

Le programme du Parti Projet de la Fraternité musulmane égyptienne

Nathan J. Brun
Amr Hamzawy

In the late summer 2007, amid great anticipation from Egypt’s ruling elite and opposition movements, the Muslim Brotherhood distributed the first draft of a party platform to a group of intellectuals and analysts. The platform was not to serve as a document for an existing political party or even one about to be founded: the Brotherhood remains without legal recognition in Egypt and Egypt’s rulers and the laws they have enacted make the prospect of legal recognition for a Brotherhood-founded party seem distant. But the Brotherhood’s leadership clearly wished to signal what sort of party they would found if allowed to do so.

With the circulation of the draft document, the movement opened its doors to discussion and even contentious debate about the main ideas of the platform, the likely course of the Brotherhood’s political role, and the future of its relationship with other political forces in the country.1 In this paper, we seek to answer four questions concerning the Brotherhood’s

party platform:

1. What are the specific controversies and divisions generated by the platform?


2. Why and how has the platform proved so divisive?


3. Given the divisions it caused as well as the inauspicious political environment,

why was a platform drafted at this time?


4. How will these controversies likely be resolved?


We also offer some observations about the Brotherhood’s experience with

drafting a party platform and demonstrate how its goals have only been partly

met. Ultimately, the integration of the Muslim Brotherhood as a normal political

actor will depend not only on the movement’s words but also on the deeds

of a regime that seems increasingly hostile to the Brotherhood’s political role.

Un appel à la justice

Ibrahim El Houdaiby

It was over 12 years ago that I watched CNN to follow the trial of O J Simpson. Although being thousands of miles away, I was still able to see what was going on inside the court room, listen to
persecutor and defence arguments, and read transcripts of that in newspapers. I even remember arguing with family members and friends in Egypt on whether or not he was guilty.

Regardless of the verdict, I sincerely believe that this trial had all foundations and necessary guarantees and requirements of a fair trial. Most importantly: it was held publicly so that people all over the world could follow its procedures.

Aujourd'hui, 12 years later, opposition leaders belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood are standing before asecretmilitary tribunal in Egypt. Sixteen sessions have been held so far, while all journalists, reporters, domestic or international human rights observers have
been denied access. Defendants belonging to the country’s largest opposition group, and the region’s largest Islamist movement with moderate orientation and peaceful approach, are standing before this tribunal despite civilian courts acquitting them four times of all charges brought by the notorious State Security Prosecutor, describing them asfabricated, groundless, and politically motivated.They are standing before the tribunal despite a court’s ruling that found the President’s decision to transfer them to a military tribunalunconstitutional,” as they are civilian opposition leaders who should be tried by civilian courts. The decision to transfer them to military tribunals disrespecting civilian courts’ verdicts was condemned by international human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.
En outre, the case was brought to military tribunal even before charges were prepared. After the third acquittal of the detainees by civilian courts, the regime had no legal excuse to extend their detention, and therefore had to commence trial sessions within a couple of days so that it could keep them behind bars. The regime never attempted to justify that, and the judge (a military officer who has no option but to follow the orders of his seniors; the President and the Minister of Defence) only adjourned the session till charges were prepared in a clear violation of due legal processes.

Forty defendants, including the group’s Deputy Chairman Khayrat El Shater, are facing false accusations of money laundering and financing a ‘banned organisation’. The only witness in the case is the State Security officer who presided over investigations. In his testimony, il
failed to present any substantial evidence to support his claims.

He made some fatal mistakes that should undermine his testimony altogether. This included not knowing the names and professions of some of the defendants, refusing to respond to most of the defence questions and providing contradictory answers for the other questions. He failed to provide a single piece of evidence that would support the charges.
But all this took place behind closed doors. The only people granted access to the court room were the detaineesfamilies. The justification was rather silly; the sessions were being held in a military base which required a special permit to enter. This does not explain why families are allowed to enter without a permit, nor does it explain why civilian opposition leaders are being tried in a military base!! Strict procedures were imposed in order to guarantee that no account of what happens inside the court room would not reach the outside world except through families and lawyers who could be easily discredited.
The motives for all this are patently clear. Mubarak’s regime is suffering eroding popularity due to its political, social and economic failures both domestically and internationally at a time when there is a pressing need to speed up the devilish inheritance plan by which
Jamal Mubarak is expected to take over the presidency from his 80-years-old father despite the strong popular opposition. With mounting public discontent and unprecedented wave of strikes, most recent are raging protests by around 30,000 cotton factory workers protesting unimaginable living conditions resulting from a $27 per month salary, it was necessary that the regime attempts to silence its strong opposition groups by resorting to extralegal measures,and the list is endless.
Ayman Nour, a young articulate politician and a potential opponent for Jamal Mubarak in any upcoming elections was sentenced to 5 years in prison, MP Talaat El Sadat, nephew of late President Sadat and an outspoken parliamentarian was sentenced to one year in prison by a military tribunal, hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood activists have been detained and kept behind bars with no accusations, and now 40 influential leaders and members of the group are facing an unknown fate in military tribunal which lacks all basic guarantees of a fair trial. In the past few weeks, four independent newspaper editors were sentenced to prison term after being found guilty of ‘defaming ruling figures’.
Twelve years ago, American courts set O J Simson free, and yet later on had to pay restitution as he was foundliablefor the deaths by a civil suit. The underpinning idea was clear: you need to be certain to take away a person’s freedom, but maybe less certain to
take away some of his money. Today in Egypt, there is an oppressive regime imposing draconian measures against its people and depriving many of their freedom despite the ruling of court of justice, while the vast majority of Western governments, writers and civil society organisations remain silent. Only very few have spoken out and acted against this assault on human rights and democracy. It is high time for those interested in bringing justice and freedom to Egypt to manifest this interest through actions as well as words.

Dissidence et de la Réforme en Egypte: Les défis de la démocratisation

Ayat M. Abul-Futouh

Over the last two years, Egypt has witnessed large demonstrations led by newdemocratic civil society movements, including Kefaya (Arabic for “enough”), the JudgesClub of Egypt, journalist advocacy groups, civil society coalitions, and other human rightsactivists.These groups have championed a number of causes including an independentjudiciary, contested presidential elections, presidential term limits, and the annulment ofemergency law. While most of these demands have yet to be met, some gains, asexemplified by the 2005 presidential and parliamentary elections, have been made.However, it remains to be seen whether or not this surge of democratic fervor willsucceed in pressuring President Hosni Mubarak’s regime to take meaningful steps towardopening the system and allowing for broader democratic participation. Egypt’s rulers havenot been seriously challenged by a domestic opposition for over five decades. Behind afortress of restrictive laws, the regime has managed to undermine nascent political partiesand keep them weak, fragmented, and unable to develop any constituency among thepeople. Civil society is likewise shackled by laws that have constrained their formation andactivities.Since the late 1970s, following Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel, the Egyptiangovernment has received unwavering financial and moral support from Westerndemocracies—particularly the United States. Egypt is seen as a staunch ally in the region, apartner in managing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Arab-Israeli relations, et, after the9/11 attacks, a valuable source of intelligence in the war on terror. The regime has usedthis support to maintain its suffocating grip on political activity.Then, starting in 2004, it seemed a new day had dawned for Egyptian reformers.Calls by the United States for Arab governments to democratize resonated strongly withincivil society, rapidly escalating domestic demands for radical political reforms. PresidentBush has often cited Egypt as an example of a developing democracy in the region. But theEgyptian regime is a hybrid of deeply rooted authoritarian elements and pluralistic andliberal aspects. There are strong state security forces, but also an outspoken oppositionpress and an active, albeit constrained, civil society. Bref, Egypt is the perfect model of a“semi-authoritarian” state, rather than a “transitional democracy.”President Mubarak’s government continues to proclaim its commitment to liberaldemocracy, pointing to a vast array of formal democratic institutions. The reality, cependant,is that these institutions are highly deficient. The ruling elite maintains an absolutemonopoly over political power. President Hosni Mubarak was elected last September for afifth six-year term in office. In order for democratic reforms to advance in Egypt,substantial institutional and legal changes must be made.