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El mañana árabe

david b. OTTAWAY

Octubre 6, 1981, estaba destinado a ser un día de celebración en Egipto. Marcó el aniversario del momento más grandioso de la victoria de Egipto en tres conflictos árabe-israelíes., cuando el ejército desvalido del país atravesó el Canal de Suez en los primeros días del 1973 Guerra de Yom Kippur y envió a las tropas israelíes tambaleándose en retirada. en un fresco, mañana sin nubes, El estadio de El Cairo estaba repleto de familias egipcias que habían venido a ver a los militares pavonearse con su hardware. En el estrado de revisión, Presidente Anwar el-Sadat,el arquitecto de la guerra, observó con satisfacción cómo hombres y máquinas desfilaban ante él. yo estaba cerca, un corresponsal extranjero recién llegado. De repente, uno de los camiones del ejército se detuvo justo frente a la plataforma de revisión justo cuando seis jets Mirage rugían sobre su cabeza en una actuación acrobática, pintando el cielo con largas estelas de rojo, amarillo, violeta,y humo verde. sadat se puso de pie, aparentemente preparándose para intercambiar saludos con otro contingente de tropas egipcias. Se convirtió en blanco perfecto para cuatro sicarios islamistas que saltaron del camión, subió al podio, y acribillaron su cuerpo a balazos. Mientras los asesinos continuaban durante lo que pareció una eternidad rociando el stand con su fuego mortal, Consideré por un instante si golpear el suelo y arriesgarme a ser pisoteado hasta la muerte por espectadores aterrorizados o permanecer en pie y arriesgarme a recibir una bala perdida.. El instinto me dijo que me quedara de pie, y mi sentido del deber periodístico me impulsó a ir a averiguar si Sadat estaba vivo o muerto.

Manifiesto político de Hizbollah 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become awestern expanding strategythat turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .

Los partidos de oposición islamistas y el potencial para el compromiso de la UE

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

A la luz de la creciente importancia de los movimientos islamistas en el mundo musulmán y

la forma en que la radicalización ha influido en los acontecimientos mundiales desde el cambio de siglo, eso

Es importante que la UE evalúe sus políticas hacia los actores dentro de lo que puede

llamado el "mundo islámico". Es particularmente importante preguntarse si y cómo involucrar

con los diversos grupos islamistas.

Esto sigue siendo controvertido incluso dentro de la UE.. Algunos sienten que los valores islámicos que

se encuentran detrás de los partidos islamistas son simplemente incompatibles con los ideales occidentales de democracia y

derechos humanos, mientras que otros ven el compromiso como una necesidad realista debido a la creciente

importancia doméstica de los partidos islamistas y su creciente participación en

asuntos. Otra perspectiva es que la democratización en el mundo musulmán aumentaría

seguridad europea. La validez de estos y otros argumentos sobre si y cómo el

La UE debe comprometerse solo puede probarse estudiando los diferentes movimientos islamistas y

sus circunstancias politicas, país por país.

La democratización es un tema central de las acciones de política exterior común de la UE, como se puso

en el artículo 11 del Tratado de la Unión Europea. Muchos de los estados considerados en este

informe no son democráticos, o no totalmente democrático. En la mayoría de estos países, islamista

partidos y movimientos constituyen una oposición significativa a los regímenes imperantes, y

en algunos forman el mayor bloque de oposición. Las democracias europeas han tenido que

hacer frente a los regímenes de gobierno que son autoritarios, pero es un fenómeno nuevo para presionar

para la reforma democrática en estados donde los beneficiarios más probables podrían haber, desde el

El punto de vista de la UE, enfoques diferentes y a veces problemáticos de la democracia y su

valores relacionados, como los derechos de las minorías y de las mujeres y el estado de derecho. Estos cargos son

a menudo contra los movimientos islamistas, por lo que es importante que los responsables políticos europeos

tener una imagen precisa de las políticas y filosofías de los socios potenciales.

Las experiencias de diferentes países tienden a sugerir que cuanto más libertad islamista

se permiten fiestas, cuanto más moderados son en sus acciones e ideas. En muchos

casos Hace tiempo que los partidos y grupos islamistas se han alejado de su objetivo original

de establecer un estado islámico regido por la ley islámica, y han llegado a aceptar lo básico

principios democráticos de la competencia electoral por el poder, la existencia de otras políticas

competidores, y pluralismo político.

Islam político en el Medio Oriente

Si Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, en

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(nombra y destituye a los gobernadores 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

Partes islamistas : ¿Por qué no pueden ser democráticos?

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, it has

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, la democracia, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

De movimiento rebelde a partido político

Alastair Crooke

The view held by many in the West that transformation from an armed resistance movement to political party should be linear, should be preceded by a renunciation of violence, should be facilitated by civil society and brokered by moderate politicians has little reality for the case of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). This is not to suggest that Hamas has not been subject to a political transformation: it has. But that transformation has been achieved in spite of Western efforts and not facilitated by those efforts. While remaining a resistance movement, Hamas has become the government of the Palestinian Authority and has modified its military posture. But this transformation has taken a different course from the one outlined in traditional conflict resolution models. Hamas and other Islamist groups continue to see themselves as resistance movements, but increasingly they see the prospect that their organizations may evolve into political currents that are focused on non-violent resistance.Standard conflict resolution models rely heavily on Western experience in conflict resolution and often ignore the differences of approach in the Islamic history of peace-making. Not surprisingly, the Hamas approach to political negotiation is different in style to that of the West. Also, as an Islamist movement that shares the wider optic of the impact of the West on their societies, Hamas has requirements of authenticity and legitimacy within its own constituency that bear on the importance attached to maintaining an armed capability. These factors, together with the overwhelming effect of long term conflict on a community’s psychology (an aspect that receives little attention in Western models that put preponderant weight on political analysis), suggests that the transformation process for Hamas has been very different from the transformation of arms movements in traditional analysis. In addition, the harsh landscape of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict gives the Hamas experience its special characteristics.Hamas is in the midst of an important transformation, but the political currents within Israel, and within the region, make the outcome of this transformation unpredictable. Much will depend on the course of Western policy (its “Global War on Terror”) and how that policy effects revivalist Islamist groups such as Hamas, groups that are committed to elections, reform and good-governance.

Desafíos de la Democracia en el mundo árabe y musulmán

Alon Ben-Meir

nociones Presidente Bush de que la democratización de Irak tendrá un efecto dominó en el resto del mundo árabe deLa, llevar la prosperidad y la paz a la región, y que la democracia es el terrorismo islámico panaceafor carecen de fundamento, así como groseramente engañosa. Even a cursory review of the Arab political landscape indicates that the rise of democracy will not automatically translateinto the establishment of enduring liberal democracies or undermine terrorism in the region. Thesame conclusion may be generally made for the Muslim political landscape. De hecho, given theopportunity to compete freely and fairly in elections, Islamic extremist organizations will mostlikely emerge triumphant. In the recent elections in Lebanon and Egypt, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively, won substantial gains, and in Palestine Hamas won thenational Parliamentary elections handedly. That they did so is both a vivid example of the today’spolitical realities and an indicator of future trends. And if current sentiments in the Arab statesoffer a guide, any government formed by elected Islamist political parties will be more antagonistic to the West than the authoritarian regimes still in power. In addition, there are noindications that democracy is a prerequisite to defeating terrorism or any empirical data tosupport the claim of linkage between existing authoritarian regimes and terrorism.

Terroristas y los movimientos extremistas en el Medio Oriente

Anthony H. Cordesman

El terrorismo y la guerra asimétrica son apenas las nuevas características del equilibrio militar de Oriente Medio, and Islamic
extremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differences
in the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civil
conflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civil
war in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-
Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (OLP) led to a civil war in Jordan in September
1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocratic
revolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between their
Sunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.
There also, sin embargo,, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged by
regimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamic
movements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after his
peace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to the
OLP, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene of
coups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapse
of its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.
The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered
an Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal with
an uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elements
of the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.
Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed by
a civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamic
extremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicated
them. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.
Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National Guard
Training center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamic
extremists. Marruecos, Libya, Túnez, Jordania, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamist
movements become a serious national threat.
While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over two
million lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has also
been the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.a

El terrorismo y la guerra asimétrica son apenas las nuevas características del equilibrio militar de Oriente Medio, and Islamicextremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differencesin the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civilconflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civilwar in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (OLP) led to a civil war in Jordan in September1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocraticrevolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between theirSunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.There also, sin embargo,, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged byregimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamicmovements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after hispeace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to thePLO, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene ofcoups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapseof its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggeredan Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal withan uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elementsof the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed bya civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamicextremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicatedthem. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National GuardTraining center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamicextremists. Marruecos, Libya, Túnez, Jordania, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamistmovements become a serious national threat.While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over twomillion lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has alsobeen the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.