RSSAlle Einträge Tagged With: "HISBOLLAH"

Der arabische Morgen

DAVID B. Ottaway

Oktober 6, 1981, sollte ein Festtag werden in Ägypten. Es war der Jahrestag der großartigsten Moment des Sieges Ägyptens in drei arabisch-israelischen Konflikt, wenn das Land Underdog Armee Schub über den Suezkanal in den ersten Tagen Ofthe 1973 Jom-Kippur-Krieg und schickte israelischen Truppen auf dem Rückzug Kokons. An einem kühlen, wolkenlosen Morgen, Kairo Stadion wurde mit ägyptischen Familien, die kommen um zu sehen, das Militär seine Strebe hardware.On der Tribüne hatte verpackt, Präsident Anwar el-Sadat,Architekt des Krieges, beobachtete mit Genugtuung, wie Menschen und Maschinen vorgeführt vor ihm. Ich war in der Nähe, ein neu eingetroffen ausländischen correspondent.Suddenly, einer der Armeelastwagen gestoppt direkt vor der Tribüne ebenso sechs Mirage-Jets Overhead brüllte in einer akrobatischen Leistung, Gemälde den Himmel mit langen Wegen der roten, Gelb, lila,und grüner Rauch. Sadat stand, offenbar der Vorbereitung für den Austausch grüßt mit noch einem anderen Kontingent von ägyptischen Truppen. Er machte sich ein perfektes Ziel für vier islamistische Attentäter, die aus dem LKW gesprungen, stürmten das Podium, und voller seinen Körper mit bullets.As die Mörder zur Aufrechterhaltung der, wie es schien eine Ewigkeit zu sprühen Sie den Ständer mit ihren tödlichen Feuer, Ich überlegte einen Augenblick, ob auf den Boden und Risiko betroffen zum Tod durch Panik Zuschauer oder zertrampelt bleiben im Gange und Risikobereitschaft eine verirrte Kugel. Instinkt sagte mir, mich auf meine Füße bleiben, und meinen Sinn für journalistische Pflicht trieb mich zu gehen, ob Sadat wurde lebend oder tot wo.

Hizbollah Politisches Manifest 2009

Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, die Vereinigten Staaten wurde das Zentrum der Polarisierung und Hegemonie in der Welt; wie ein solches Projekt enorme Entwicklung auf den Ebenen der Herrschaft und Unterwerfung erlebt, dass in der Geschichte beispiellos, die Nutzung und auf den verschiedenen Ebenen des Wissens Vorteil der vielfältigen Leistungen unter, Kultur, Technologie, Wirtschaft sowie die militärische Ebene- , die sich durch eine wirtschaftspolitische System unterstützt, dass die Welt nur als Märkte betrachtet, die durch die amerikanische Sicht halten müssen.
Der gefährlichste Aspekt in der westlichen Hegemonie-amerikanischen eine präzise- ist, dass sie sich als Besitzer der Welt betrachten und deshalb, diese expandin Strategie zusammen mit dem wirtschaftlichen kapitalistischen Projekt hat sich zu einem “westliche Erweiterung Strategie” das stellte ein internationales System der unbegrenzten Gier zu sein. Savage Kapitalismus Kräfte- verkörpert vor allem in der internationalen Monopolnetze o fcompanies, die die Nationen und Kontinente durchqueren, Netzwerke von verschiedenen internationalen Einrichtungen vor allem der Finanz durch überlegene militärische Macht gesichert diejenigen mehr Widersprüche und Konflikte, von denen nicht weniger wichtig sind die Konflikte von Identitäten geführt haben, Kulturen, Zivilisationen, zusätzlich zu den Konflikten von Armut und Reichtum. Diese wilden Kapitalismus Kräfte haben sich in Mechanismen der Zwietracht säen und zu zerstören Identitäten sowie zur Einführung der gefährlichste Art von Kultur,
National, wirtschaftlicher sowie sozialer Diebstahl .

Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, it

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

Menschenrechte, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international

affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase

European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the

EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and

their political circumstances, country by country.

Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid

out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this

report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamist

parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, und

in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

Political Islam in the Middle East

Sind Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, in

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

Islamist Parties : why they can’t be democratic

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, es hat

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, democracy, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

Von Rebellenbewegung zu Politische Partei

Alastair Crooke

Die Ansicht von vielen im Westen gehalten, dass Transformation von einer bewaffneten Widerstandsbewegung politische Partei sollte linear, sollte durch einen Verzicht auf Gewalt vorangestellt werden, der Zivilgesellschaft und vermittelt durch moderate Politiker sollten hat für den Fall der Islamischen Widerstandsbewegung wenig Realität erleichtert werden (Hamas). Dies ist nicht zu vermuten, dass die Hamas Gegenstand eine politische Transformation nicht gewesen: es hat. Aber diese Transformation wurde trotz der westlichen Bemühungen erreicht und nicht durch diese Bemühungen erleichtert. Während verbleibenden einen Bewegungswiderstand, Hamas hat die Regierung der Palästinensischen Behörde worden und hat seine militärische Haltung geändert. Aber diese Transformation hat einen anderen Verlauf der in der traditionellen Konfliktlösungsmodelle skizziert ein genommen. Hamas und andere islamistische Gruppen sich weiterhin als Widerstandsbewegungen sehen, aber immer sehen sie die Aussicht, dass ihre Organisationen in politische Strömungen entwickeln können, die auf gewalt resistance.Standard Konfliktlösungsmodelle stützen sich stark auf die westliche Erfahrung in der Konfliktlösung fokussiert sind und oft die unterschiedlichen Ansätze in der islamischen Geschichte der Friedensschaffung ignorieren. Nicht überraschend, die Hamas Ansatz zu politischen Verhandlungen unterscheidet sich in der Art, dass der Westen. Ebenfalls, als islamistische Bewegung, dass die breitere Optik der Auswirkungen des Westens auf ihren Gesellschaften Aktien, Hamas hat Anforderungen an Authentizität und Legitimität in seinem eigenen Wahlkreis, der auf der Bedeutung tragen an der Aufrechterhaltung eine bewaffnete Fähigkeit. Diese Faktoren, gemeinsam mit der überwältigenden Wirkung des langfristigen Konflikts auf einer Psychologie-Community (ein Aspekt, der wenig Aufmerksamkeit in der westlichen Modellen erhält, die auf politische Analyse überwiegendes Gewicht zugelegt), schlägt vor, dass der Transformationsprozess für die Hamas aus der Umwandlung von Waffen Bewegungen sehr unterschiedlich in der traditionellen Analyse wurde. Außerdem, die rauen Landschaft des israelisch - palästinensischen Konflikt gibt die Hamas ihre besondere characteristics.Hamas erleben, ist in der Mitte einer wichtigen Transformation, aber die politischen Strömungen innerhalb Israel, und innerhalb der Region, macht das Ergebnis dieser Transformation unberechenbar. Viel wird über den Verlauf der westlichen Politik abhängen (seine „Global War on Terror“) und wie, dass die politischen Auswirkungen Erweckungsislamistische Gruppen wie die Hamas, Gruppen, die an Wahlen begangen werden, Reform und gute Regierungsführung.

Herausforderungen für die Demokratie in der arabischen und muslimischen Welt

Alon Ben-Meir

Präsident Bushs Vorstellungen, die Demokratisierung des Irak wird einen Dominoeffekt auf den Rest ofthe arabischen Welt, bringen Wohlstand und Frieden in der Region, und dass die Demokratie die panaceafor islamischen Terrorismus sind unbegründet sowie grob irreführend. Even a cursory review of the Arab political landscape indicates that the rise of democracy will not automatically translateinto the establishment of enduring liberal democracies or undermine terrorism in the region. Thesame conclusion may be generally made for the Muslim political landscape. Tatsächlich, given theopportunity to compete freely and fairly in elections, Islamic extremist organizations will mostlikely emerge triumphant. In the recent elections in Lebanon and Egypt, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively, won substantial gains, and in Palestine Hamas won thenational Parliamentary elections handedly. That they did so is both a vivid example of the today’spolitical realities and an indicator of future trends. And if current sentiments in the Arab statesoffer a guide, any government formed by elected Islamist political parties will be more antagonistic to the West than the authoritarian regimes still in power. Außerdem, there are noindications that democracy is a prerequisite to defeating terrorism or any empirical data tosupport the claim of linkage between existing authoritarian regimes and terrorism.

Terroristischen und extremistischen Bewegungen im Nahen Osten

Anthony H. Cordesman

Terrorismus und asymmetrische Kriegsführung sind kaum neue Features des Nahen Ostens militärischen Gleichgewichts, and Islamic
extremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differences
in the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civil
conflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civil
war in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-
Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led to a civil war in Jordan in September
1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocratic
revolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between their
Sunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.
There also, jedoch, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged by
regimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamic
movements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after his
peace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to the
PLO, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene of
coups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapse
of its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.
The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered
an Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal with
an uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elements
of the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.
Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed by
a civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamic
extremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicated
them. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.
Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National Guard
Training center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamic
extremists. Marokko, Libya, Tunesien, Jordan, Bahrain, Katar, Oman, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamist
movements become a serious national threat.
While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over two
million lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has also
been the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.a

Terrorismus und asymmetrische Kriegsführung sind kaum neue Features des Nahen Ostens militärischen Gleichgewichts, and Islamicextremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differencesin the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civilconflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civilwar in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led to a civil war in Jordan in September1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocraticrevolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between theirSunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.There also, jedoch, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged byregimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamicmovements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after hispeace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to thePLO, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene ofcoups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapseof its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggeredan Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal withan uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elementsof the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed bya civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamicextremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicatedthem. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National GuardTraining center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamicextremists. Marokko, Libya, Tunesien, Jordan, Bahrain, Katar, Oman, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamistmovements become a serious national threat.While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over twomillion lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has alsobeen the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.