RSSTout Entries Atenn Avèk: "Hassan al-Banna"

The future of Islam after 9/11

Mansoor Moaddel

There is no consensus among historians and Islamicists about the nature of theIslamic belief system and the experience of historical Islam, on which one couldbase a definitive judgment concerning Islam’s compatibility with modernity. Nonetheless,the availability of both historical and value survey data allow us to analyzethe future of Islam in light of the horrific event of 9/11. The key factor that woulddetermine the level of societal visibility necessary for predicting the future developmentof a culture is the nature and clarity of the ideological targets in relation towhich new cultural discourses are produced. Based on this premise, I shall try toilluminate the nature of such targets that are confronted by Muslim activists inIran, Peyi Lejip, and Jordan.

MB ale nan zòn riral

Hossam Tammam


Me a 2008 eleksyon nan Biwo Konsèy Frè Mizilman yo montre ke gwoup la te sibi yon gwo transfòmasyon. Frè Mizilman yo te konn fè yon gwoup iben nan manm yo ak nan fason jesyon yo. Koulye a, modèl kiltirèl li yo ak lwayote yo ap pran yon rad riral. Kòm yon rezilta, Frè Mizilman an ap pèdi klè nan direksyon ak metòd yon fwa te genyen.Pandan ane ki sot pase yo, Frè Mizilman yo te enfuze ak eleman riral yo. Itstone ap vin pi plis ak plis patriyakal, ak manm li yo ap montre siperyè yo kalite deferans ki asosye ak tradisyon peyi yo. Ou tande yo refere li a ofisyèl yo kòm la “tonton hajj “, “gwo hajj la “, “moun ki beni nou an”, “nonm beni nan sèk nou an”, “kouwòn lan sou tèt nou”, elatriye. Okazyonèlman, yo menm bo men ak tèt dirijan yo. Pa gen lontan, yon palmantè Frè Mizilman yo te bo men gid siprèm yo an piblik.Modèl konpòtman sa yo se nouvo nan Frè Mizilman yo., yon gwoup ki te parèt ak opere sitou nan yon kontèks iben. Nouvo fason lapawòl ak konpòtman, ke mwen pral refere yo kòm la “riralizasyon” nan Frè Mizilman yo, te afekte tout aspè nan operasyon entèn gwoup la. Nan dènye eleksyon li yo, Frè Mizilman yo te kenbe yon seri sekrè, te ofri piblik enfòmasyon kontradiktwa, epi jeneralman yo te sanble yo ap fonksyone ak ti konsiderasyon pou pwosedi etabli.. Enkyetid prensipal la nan Fratènite a, pandan tout dènye eleksyon yo, te sanble ak kenbe yon aura nan respè pou lidèchip la ak jwenn ran-ak- Fichye a ofri yon lwayote san dout bay otorite yo.Yon sistèm lwayote segondè te parèt andedan Frè Mizilman yo., nan prèske endepandans de tout konsiderasyon nan travay enstitisyonèl. Tout zòn jeyografik yo, tout gouvènay yo, yo konsidere kounye a kòm fyèd politik ki gen rapò ak yon lidè MuslimBrotherhood oswa yon lòt. Manm Frè Mizilman yo ta refere a yon sèten vil oswa gouvènora kòm tèritwa sèten moun., yon lòt karakteristik nan kominote riral yo, se tou rampant. Feyend fidelite se komen,ak manm yo di yon bagay an prive e yon lòt an piblik. Kòm se koutim nan nan peyi a, deferans pou otorite souvan makonnen ak rezistans nan chanjman. Kòm yon rezilta,ou ta wè manm pretann yo koute siperyè Frè Mizilman yo pandan y ap peye ti kras oswa pa gen atansyon a sa yo di.. Anpil nan nouvo lide yo te mete devan pa lidè MuslimBrotherhood yo te inyore, oswa omwen dilye epi answit jete.Lè yon manm Brotherhood vin ak yon nouvo lide, dirijan Frè Mizilman yo reyaji kòmsi manm sa a te pale nan lòd. Pwòp tèt ou- kritik yo ap deplizanpli malveye epi panse dominan nan Fratènite a ap vin tradisyonalis ak enkonstans. Frè Mizilman yo te aktif nan rekritman pwofesè ak pwofesè.. Men, pi fò nan nouvo rekrite yo se riral nan kilti yo ak konpreyansyon yo genyen sou lavi piblik. Malgre jeneyaloji yo, anpil nan akademisyen yo ki te rantre nan Brotherhood yo pawasyal nan konpreyansyon yo sou mond lan. Frè Mizilman yo gen prèske 3,000 pwofesè inivèsite nan ran li yo, epi kèk oswa nenpòt nan moun ki doue ak abitid nan panse kritik.Yo ka akademik., men yo pa vizyonè.Nan dènye eleksyon Frè Mizilman yo, senk manm nan Konsèy Shura gwoup la te genyen plas nan Biwo Pedagojik la. Pifò nan sa yo te swa nan zòn riral yo oswa moun ki te pwononse vi nan zòn riral yo. Kat te soti nan peyi a, ki gen ladan Saadeddin El-Husseini soti nan Sharqiya, Mohamed Hamed soti nan Mahala Al-Kobra, Saadeddin El-Katatni soti nan Minya.Sèlman youn te soti nan yon sant metwopoliten: Osama Nasr soti nan Alexandria.Pandan dekad ki sot pase a oswa konsa, pi fò nan fèk vini nan Biwo Konsèy la te soti nan peyi a: Mahmoud Hussein soti Assiut, Sabri Arafa El-Komi soti nan Daqahliya, akMohamed Mursi soti nan Sharqiya. Gouvènò riral yo, tankou Assiut, Minya, Daqahliya ak Sharqiya, yo kounye a nan kontwòl anpil nan Frè Mizilman yo, espesyalman pòs nan mitan yo, pandan ke Cairo ak Alexandria te wè estati yo piti piti erode. Leadership Brotherhood la ap ankouraje tandans nan, pou moun nan zòn riral yo gen mwens tandans defi dirijan yo.. Men depi fen ane 1980 yo bagay yo chanje. Akòz konfwontasyon ki dire lontan ak theregime, Frè Mizilman yo te jwenn li pi difisil pou rekrite sipòtè vil yo. Epitou, lackof inovasyon nan fason Fratènite Mizilman yo te fèmen anpil moun ki rete nan vil yo. Olye pou yo rantre nan Frè Mizilman yo, jèn yo ak mekontantman, osi byen ke moun k ap chèche delivrans espirityèl, te rantre nan aktyèl Salafi a oswa vin patizan nouvo kwaze ofwell nan peyi a- televanjelis pale. Lefèt ke Frè Mizilman yo te sitou abandone pwopagasyon relijye an favè politik ka akselere tandans sa a.Sa Frè Mizilman yo te ofri se yon bagay ke moun ki rete nan vil yo pa vrèman bezwen.Frè Mizilman yo ofri yon fanmi altènatif., yon klonaj kominote vilaj la ak sistèm sipò pèsonalize li yo. Sa a se yon bagay ki pi bon apèl pou nouvo arive soti nan peyi a, bay moun ki manke estabilite ak konfò nan yon kominote tradisyonèl yo. Atraksyon nan moun nan peyi yo nan Frè Mizilman yo pandan de deseni ki sot pase yo te koincide ak dezentegrasyon nan fanmi an pwolonje ak febli nan lyen kominal yo., oksidantizasyon lavi vil la te ka pouse anpil moun ki gen yon background riral pou yo chèche yon refij moral ak sosyal nan Fratènite Mizilman yo.Nan inivèsite yo., Frè Mizilman yo atire fèk vini nan vil yo olye ke moun ki abite nan vil orijinal yo. Li gen plis siksè nan rekritman nan mitan elèv nan Al-Azhar University pase nan lòt inivèsite, ak plis siksè nan gouvèna seksyon riral yo pase nan Cairo ak Alexandria.Swiv la 1952 Revolisyon, Lejip kòm yon antye sibi yon vag nan riralizasyon. Men eventhen, Frè Mizilman an konsantre rekritman li sou moun ki gen yon vi iben. Senkant ane de sa, Frè Mizilman yo te rekrite sitou pami pitit gason anplwaye gouvènman yo, pwofesè yo, e jeneralman klas blan-kolye a. Peyi Lejip la pa t akeyan pou Frè Mizilman yo oswa pèspektiv li yo. Kounye a, Frè Mizilman an te tèlman konvansyonèl ke li ap pran tè nan peyi a. Frè Mizilman yo ka fè kanpay efikas e menm genyen eleksyon nan anpil zòn nan peyi Lejip la.. Poutan, se kwayans mwen ke peyi a ap afekte Mizilman Brotherhood plis pase Mizilman Brotherhood ap afekte li. Nan tan Hassan El-Banna a., Lidè Frè Mizilman yo te sitou iben nan fason yo:Hassan El-Hodeibi, Oma El-Telmesani, Hassan Ashmawi, Moonir Dallah, Abdel-QaderHelmi ak Farid Abdel Khaleq. Menm nan peyi a, tèt manm Fratènite Mizilman yo te konnen pou vi iben yo: Mohamed Hamed Abul- Naser ak Abbas Al-Sisi, pa egzanp.Pa kontrè, nouvo kwaze nan lidè Frè Mizilman yo se riral nan fason li yo. Sa a ale menm pou lidè Frè Mizilman ki baze nan Cairo ki gen ladan Mohamed Mursi, Saad El-Katatni,Saad Al-Husseini ak Sabri Arafa El-Komi. Ak Frè Mizilman yo gid sipwèm,Mahdi Akef, se plis riral nan style lidèchip li pase predesesè li, Maamoun Al-Hodeibi.

Political Islam Gaining Ground

Michael A.. Long

characteristics of the democratic order. Their newly-discovered acceptance of elections andparliamentary processes results not least from a gradual democratisation of the formerlyauthoritarian regimes these groups had fought by terrorist means even in their home countries.The prime example of this development is Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, which started out as acharitable social movement and has now become the most powerful political opposition force inEgypt.Founded in the 1920s, the Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest Islamic organisation of the Arabworld today. Following the ideas of its founder Al-Banna, it intended to return to a state of ‘trueIslam’, i.e. to return to the way of life of the early Islamic congregation at the time of theProphet, and to establish a community of social justice. This vision was increasingly viewed as acounterweight to the Western social model that was marked by secularisation, moral decay, andgreed. During World War II, the Muslim Brotherhood even founded a secret military arm, whoseactivities, sepandan, were uncovered, leading to the execution of Mr Al-Banna by Egypt’s secretpolice

The Muslim Brotherhood in Belgium

Steve Merley,
Senior analis


The Global Muslim Brotherhood has been present in Europe since 1960 when SaidRamadan, the grandson of Hassan Al-Banna, founded a mosque in Munich.1 Since that time,Brotherhood organizations have been established in almost all of the EU countries, as well asnon-EU countries such as Russia and Turkey. Despite operating under other names, some ofthe organizations in the larger countries are recognized as part of the global MuslimBrotherhood. For example, the Union des Organizations Islamiques de France (UOIF) isgenerally regarded as part of the Muslim Brotherhood in France. The network is alsobecoming known in some of the smaller countries such as the Netherlands, where a recentNEFA Foundation report detailed the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in that country.2Neighboring Belgium has also become an important center for the Muslim Brotherhood inEurope. A 2002 report by the Intelligence Committee of the Belgian Parliament explainedhow the Brotherhood operates in Belgium:“The State Security Service has been following the activities of the InternationalMuslim Brotherhood in Belgium since 1982. The International MuslimBrotherhood has had a clandestine structure for nearly 20 years. The identityof the members is secret; they operate in the greatest discretion. They seek tospread their ideology within the Islamic community of Belgium and they aimin particular at the young people of the second and third generation ofimmigrants. In Belgium as in other European countries, they try to take controlof the religious, social, and sports associations and establish themselves asprivileged interlocutors of the national authorities in order to manage Islamicaffairs. The Muslim Brotherhood assumes that the national authorities will bepressed more and more to select Muslim leaders for such management and,in this context, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.

Frè Mizilman an Ewòp

Brigi t te Maréchal
Shumuliyyat al-Islam (Islam kòm anglobe tout aspè nan lavi) se premye a nan ven prensip mete deyò pa la
fondatè mouvman Fratènite Mizilman an, Hassan al-Banna, pou anseye disip li yo bon konpreyansyon
nan Islam. Menmsi prensip sa a, anjeneral yo tradui kòm "fason lavi konplè,” toujou rete entegral
ansèyman manm Fratènite a, tou de nan peyi Lejip ak nan Ewòp, li etranj ase
ni fè kòmantè sou nan referans savan yo, ni pa pi laj piblik la. Lè Federasyon Islamik la
Òganizasyon an Ewòp (FIOE, ki reprezante mouvman Fratènite Mizilman an nan nivo Ewopeyen an) te prezante Charter Mizilman Ewopeyen an bay laprès entènasyonal la nan mwa janvye 2008, pa gen okenn idantifye "dimansyon inivèsèl" sa a nan konpreyansyon yo genyen sou Islam malgre potansyèl tansyon yo oswa menm enkonpatibilite., tou de politik ak
legal, ke konsèp sa a ta ka genyen sou yon diskou sou entegrasyon ak sitwayènte. Ki sa Frè Mizilman yo tradisyonèlman di sou konsèp sa a ak ki jan yo jistifye apèl yo pou li? Ki konstitiyan li yo
ak dimansyon aplikasyon li? Èske gen nenpòt modifikasyon enpòtan nan konsèp la nan eseye kontèkstualize li nan yon Ewòp pliryèl?

Qutbism: An Ideology of Islamic-Fascism

DALE C. EIKMEIER

The recently published National Military Strategic Plan for the War onTerrorism (NMSP-WOT) is to be commended for identifying “ideology”as al Qaeda’s center of gravity.1 The identification of an ideology as thecenter of gravity rather than an individual or group is a significant shift froma“capture and kill” philosophy to a strategy focused on defeating the rootcause of Islamic terrorism. Accordingly, the plan’s principal focus is on attackingand countering an ideology that fuels Islamic terrorism. Unfortunately,the NMSP-WOT fails to identify the ideology or suggest ways tocounter it. The plan merely describes the ideology as “extremist.” This descriptioncontributes little to the public’s understanding of the threat or to thecapabilities of the strategist who ultimately must attack and defeat it. The intentof this article is to identify the ideology of the Islamic terrorists and recommendhow to successfully counter it.Sun Tzuwisely said, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundredbattles you will never be in peril.”2 Our success in theWar on Terrorismdepends on knowingwho the enemy is and understanding his ideology.While characterizing and labeling an enemymay serve such a purpose, it is only usefulif the labels are clearly defined and understood. Otherwise, overly broadcharacterizations obscure our ability to truly “know the enemy,” they diffuseefforts, and place potential allies and neutrals in the enemy’s camp. Unfortunately,theWar on Terrorism’s use of labels contributes a great deal to themisunderstandingsassociated with the latter. The fact is, five years after 9/11 theNMSP-WOT provides little specific guidance, other than labeling the enemyas extremist.3 This inability to focus on the specific threat and its supportingphilosophy reflects our own rigid adherence to political correctness and is beingexploited bymilitant Islamists portraying these overly broad descriptionsas a war against Islam.As David F. Forte states “Wemust not fail . . . to distinguishbetween the homicidal revolutionaries like bin Laden and mainstreamMuslim believers.

Political Islam in Egypt

Emad El-Din Shahin
The landscape of political Islam in Egypt has changed dramatically over the past decade and a half. Since the mid-1990s, the country’s mainstream Islamic movement, Frè Mizilman yo (MB, or Muslim Brothers), has undergone a significant transformation; an Islamist centrist party, Hizb al-Wasat, has emerged and for the past ten years has been struggling to acquire official recognition; and the country’s radical movements, especially the Jama`a
Islamiya, have reassessed some of their tactics.
The Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest grass-roots Islamist movement of the twentieth century (established in 1928) and perceives itself as “the mother of all centrist Islamist movements”. It is an activist movement with a comprehensive reform message, combining multi-dimensional spheres that give the movement reasonable space for manoeuvre, even when it is severely constrained by the Egyptian regime. The movement is a synthesised version of earlier reform movements (such as Salafi reformism and Islamic modernism) and can claim to be the heir of
‘reformist Islam’.1 It has adopted a gradualist bottom-up approach to change that seeks to resocialise society along Islamic lines: the individual, family, society, and then the state. The Brotherhood is also one of the most institutionalised movements in Egypt. Its structure has survived the lifetime of its founder, Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949), despite suffering repeated phases of brutal regime repression. All this has generated a particular political orientation that is characterised by caution, gradualism, slow adaptation, and fear of experimentation and failure.
In the movement’s view, failure will not simply reflect on the leadership of the group at a particular moment, but on the entire movement. It could even affect the fortunes of political Islam as an alternative to post-independence foreign-inspired secular models. Therefore, bpreserving the survival and structural coherence of the movement has always been a top priority.
It is an objective that for long has dominated the Brotherhood’s political calculations and levels b of interaction in the political process, and enabled the movement to exhibit a pragmatic attitude whenever the circumstances warrant it.
Nan dènye ane yo, the Muslim Brotherhood has revised its political strategies and policy orientations. To many observers, it seems as if it has made a clear and deliberate departure from its traditionally cautious approach. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Muslim Brothers rejected the idea of getting directly involved in the political process, participating in the parliament, or taking part in the syndicates. Their attention was mainly focused on rebuilding
the organisation’s structures and avoiding confrontations with the regime that might have provoked repression of the movement. By the mid-1980s, they gradually began to participate in parliamentary elections in alliance with other political parties like the Wafd Party in 1984 and the Labour Party in 1987. They also contested elections in syndicates and succeeded in gaining control over many of the latter during the 1990s. After 2000, the Muslim Brothers adopted an increasingly assertive strategy in their relationship with the regime and a pragmatic reform The landscape of political Islam in Egypt has changed dramatically over the past decade and ahalf. Since the mid-1990s, the country’s mainstream Islamic movement, the MuslimBrotherhood (MB, or Muslim Brothers), has undergone a significant transformation; an Islamistcentrist party, Hizb al-Wasat, has emerged and for the past ten years has been struggling toacquire official recognition; and the country’s radical movements, especially the Jama`aIslamiya, have reassessed some of their tactics.The Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest grass-roots Islamist movement of the twentieth century(established in 1928) and perceives itself as “the mother of all centrist Islamist movements”. Itis an activist movement with a comprehensive reform message, combining multi-dimensionalspheres that give the movement reasonable space for manoeuvre, even when it is severelyconstrained by the Egyptian regime. The movement is a synthesised version of earlier reformmovements (such as Salafi reformism and Islamic modernism) and can claim to be the heir of‘reformist Islam’.1 It has adopted a gradualist bottom-up approach to change that seeks to resocialisesociety along Islamic lines: the individual, family, society, and then the state. TheBrotherhood is also one of the most institutionalised movements in Egypt. Its structure hassurvived the lifetime of its founder, Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949), despite suffering repeatedphases of brutal regime repression. All this has generated a particular political orientation that ischaracterised by caution, gradualism, slow adaptation, and fear of experimentation and failure.In the movement’s view, failure will not simply reflect on the leadership of the group at aparticular moment, but on the entire movement. It could even affect the fortunes of politicalIslam as an alternative to post-independence foreign-inspired secular models. Therefore,preserving the survival and structural coherence of the movement has always been a top priority.It is an objective that for long has dominated the Brotherhood’s political calculations and levelsof interaction in the political process, and enabled the movement to exhibit a pragmatic attitudewhenever the circumstances warrant it.In recent years, the Muslim Brotherhood has revised its political strategies and policyorientations. To many observers, it seems as if it has made a clear and deliberate departure fromits traditionally cautious approach. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Muslim Brothersrejected the idea of getting directly involved in the political process, participating in theparliament, or taking part in the syndicates. Their attention was mainly focused on rebuildingthe organisation’s structures and avoiding confrontations with the regime that might haveprovoked repression of the movement. By the mid-1980s, they gradually began to participate inparliamentary elections in alliance with other political parties like the Wafd Party in 1984 andthe Labour Party in 1987. They also contested elections in syndicates and succeeded in gainingcontrol over many of the latter during the 1990s. After 2000, the Muslim Brothers adopted anincreasingly assertive strategy in their relationship with the regime and a pragmatic reform agenda .

The Muslim Brotherhood

Pwoblèm Frè Mizilman Ejipsyen an

Jeffrey Azarva

Samyèl Tadros

Nan mwa jen 20, 2007, Etazini. Biwo Entèlijans ak Rechèch Depatman Deta a te òganize yon reyinyon nan peyi Etazini. ofisyèl entèlijans yo peze pwospè nan angajman fòmèl ak Frè Mizilman peyi Lejip la,1li te ye nan arab kòm al-Ikhwan al-Mizilman. Sesyon an se te rezilta plizyè ane nan diskisyon sou angaje gwoup la ke anpil moun konsidere kòm sous la nan fondamantalis Sunni. Byenke administrasyon Bush la te etabli yon karantèn diplomatik nan Fratènite a apre Septanm. 11, 2001, manm nan peyi Etazini an. Chanm Reprezantan yo te fè plizyè reyinyon nan peyi Lejip nan prentan 2007 la—prèske twa mwa anvan reyinyon Depatman Deta a—ak MuhammadSaad al-Katatni., yon manm endepandan nan palman an moun peyi Lejip ak tèt la nan Brotherhoodaffiliatedbloc li yo. Nan mwa avril 5, 2007, Lidè Majorite Chanm Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) te kraze ak konvansyon ak rankontre Katatni nan bilding palman an moun peyi Lejip ak nan rezidans Etazini. anbasadè nan peyi Lejip Francis J. Ricciardone. Lè sa a, sou Me 27, 2007, yon kat manm U.S. delegasyon kongrè a ki te dirije pa Reprezantan David Price (D-N.C.) te rankontre Katatni nan Cairo.Apre vizit Hoyer a, Etazini. Anbasad nan Cairo te rejte kritik moun peyi Lejip yo ke reyinyon li yo te pretann yon ranvèse nan peyi Etazini. politik.2 Nan ​​mwa novanm 2007, Ricciardone tou te jwe sou themeetings lè li te deklare ke U.S. kontak ak manm Frètènite ki te nominalman endepandan yo pa t vle di “apòsman Ameriken pou opinyon palmantè yo oswa afilye politik yo.”3 Malgre rasirans sa a., reyinyon yo ak Katatni yo endike lidè opinyon yo, tou de anndan kou deyò peyi Etazini. gouvènman an, inevitab planèt la. Men, pandan y ap mouvman an, etabli pa Hassan al-Banna nan 1928, konstitye opozisyon ki pi òganize ak byen finanse nan peyi a jodi a—pwodwi tou de sèvis charitab li yo ak da'wa. (literalman “rele Bondye,” oswa preche) rezo ki opere andeyò kontwòl leta—nenpòt egzamen diskou li yo ak platfòm politik yo montre U.S. kontak yo dwe twò bonè. Malgre angajman li te deklare pou plirilis ak règ lalwa, Frètènite a ap kontinye angaje yo nan doub pale danjere lè li rive pwoblèm ki pi fondamantal nan demokrasi..