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The future of Islam after 9/11

Mansoor Moaddel

There is no consensus among historians and Islamicists about the nature of theIslamic belief system and the experience of historical Islam, on which one couldbase a definitive judgment concerning Islam’s compatibility with modernity. Usprkos tome,the availability of both historical and value survey data allow us to analyzethe future of Islam in light of the horrific event of 9/11. The key factor that woulddetermine the level of societal visibility necessary for predicting the future developmentof a culture is the nature and clarity of the ideological targets in relation towhich new cultural discourses are produced. Based on this premise, I shall try toilluminate the nature of such targets that are confronted by Muslim activists inIran, Egipat, and Jordan.

MB ide na selo

Hossam Tammam


Svibanj 2008 izbori u Uredu za usmjeravanje Muslimanskog bratstva pokazuju da je skupina prošla kroz veliku transformaciju. Muslimansko bratstvo je nekada bilo urbana grupa po svom članstvu i stilu upravljanja. Sada njezini kulturni obrasci i lojalnosti poprimaju ruralno ruho. Kao rezultat, Muslimansko bratstvo gubi jasnoću smjera i metoda koje je nekoć imalo. Tijekom proteklih nekoliko godina, Muslimansko bratstvo prožeto je ruralnim elementima. Itstone postaje sve više patrijarhalan, i njezini članovi iskazuju svojim nadređenima vrstu poštovanja koja je povezana sa seoskim tradicijama. Čujete ih kako svoje visoke dužnosnike nazivaju “amidža hadž “, “veliki hadž “, “naš blagoslovljeni”, “blagoslovljeni čovjek našeg kruga”, “kruna na naše glave”, itd. Povremeno, čak ljube ruke i glave najviših vođa. Nedavno, parlamentarac Muslimanskog bratstva poljubio je ruku vrhovnog vodiča u javnosti. Ovi obrasci ponašanja novi su za Muslimansko bratstvo, a group that emerged andoperated mostly in an urban context. The new ways of speech and behaviour, which I willrefer to as theruralisationof the Muslim Brotherhood, have affected every aspect of thegroup’s internal operations. In its recent elections, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained a tightlid of secrecy, offered the public contradictory information, and generally seemed to beoperating with little regard for established procedure.The Muslim Brotherhood Shura Council elections emphasised ritual over order. The mainconcern of the Brotherhood, throughout the recent elections, seemed to be with maintainingan aura of respect for the leadership and getting the rank-and- file to offer unquestioningloyalty to top officials.A system of secondary loyalties has emerged inside the Muslim Brotherhood, gotovo neovisno o svim aspektima institucionalnog rada. Čitava geografska područja, indeedentile gubernije, sada se promatraju kao politički feudi koji pripadaju jednom ili drugom vođi Muslimanskog bratstva. Članovi Muslimanskog bratstva govorili bi o određenoj gradskoj upravi kao o teritoriju određenih pojedinaca. Dvostrukost, još jedna odlika ruralnih zajednica, je također neobuzdano. Gluma odanost je uobičajena,s članovima koji govore jedno privatno, a drugo javno. Kao što je običaj na selu, poštivanje autoriteta često je povezano s otporom prema promjenama. Kao rezultat,vidjeli biste članove koji se pretvaraju da slušaju svoje nadređene iz Muslimanskog bratstva, a obraćaju malo ili nimalo pozornosti na ono što govore. Mnoge nove ideje koje su iznijeli čelnici Muslimanskog bratstva su ignorirane, ili barem razrijeđen pa odbačen.Kad član Bratstva dođe s novom idejom, vodstvo Muslimanskog bratstva reagira kao da je taj član govorio preko reda. sebe- kritika se sve više mršti, a dominantno razmišljanje unutar Bratstva postaje tradicionalističko i neupitno. Muslimansko bratstvo aktivno je regrutiralo učitelje i profesore. Ali većina novozaposlenih su ruralni po svojoj kulturi i shvaćanju javnog života. Unatoč njihovom znanstvenom pedigreu, mnogi akademici koji su se pridružili Bratstvu parohalni su u svom razumijevanju svijeta. Muslimansko bratstvo je gotovo 3,000 sveučilišnih profesora u svojim redovima, a malo je ili bilo tko od njih obdaren navikom kritičkog mišljenja. Oni mogu biti akademici, ali nisu nikakvi vizionari.Na nedavnim izborima Muslimanskog bratstva, pet članova Vijeća Shura grupe osvojilo je mjesta u Birou za usmjeravanje. Većina njih bili su ili iz ruralnih područja ili ljudi s izraženim ruralnim stilom života. Četvorica su bila sa sela, uključujući Saadeddina El-Huseinija iz Šarkije, Mohamed Hamed iz Mahale Al-Kobra, Saadeddin El-Katatni iz Minye. Samo je jedan bio iz gradskog središta: Osama Nasr iz Aleksandrije.Tijekom proteklih desetak godina, većina pridošlica u Biro za usmjeravanje bila je sa sela: Mahmoud Hussein iz Assiuta, Sabri Arafa El-Komi iz Daqahlije, i Mohammed Mursi iz Sharqije. Ruralne gubernije, kao što je Assiut, Minya, Daqahliya i Sharqiya, sada kontroliraju veći dio Muslimanskog bratstva, posebno mjesta srednjeg ranga, dok je status Kaira i Aleksandrije postupno erodirao. Vodstvo Bratstva potiče taj trend, jer ruralni ljudi manje su skloni izazivanju svojih vođa. Bilo je vremena kada se Muslimansko bratstvo obraćalo uglavnom urbanoj publici. Ali od kasnih 1980-ih stvari su se promijenile. Zbog dugotrajne konfrontacije s tamošnjim režimom, Muslimanskom bratstvu je bilo teže regrutirati urbane pristaše. Također, nedostatak inovacija na načine Muslimanskog bratstva odbio je mnoge stanovnike gradova. Umjesto da se pridruži Muslimanskom bratstvu, mladi i nezadovoljni, kao i oni koji traže duhovno spasenje, su se pridružili selefijskoj struji ili postali sljedbenici nove vrste ofwella u zemlji- govorni teleevanđelisti. Činjenica da je Muslimansko bratstvo uglavnom napustilo vjersku propagandu u korist politike možda je ubrzala ovaj trend. Ono što Muslimansko bratstvo ima za ponuditi je nešto što stanovnicima gradova zapravo nije potrebno. Muslimansko bratstvo nudi alternativnu obitelj, kloniranje seoske zajednice sa svojim personaliziranim sustavom podrške. To je nešto što se najviše sviđa pridošlicama sa sela, ljudima kojima nedostaju stabilnost i udobnost tradicionalne zajednice. Privlačnost ljudi sa sela Muslimanskom bratstvu tijekom posljednja dva desetljeća poklopila se s raspadom šire obitelji i slabljenjem zajedničkih veza. Štoviše, vesternizacija gradskog života možda je natjerala mnoge ljude ruralnog podrijetla da potraže moralno i društveno utočište u Muslimanskom bratstvu. Na sveučilištima, Muslimansko bratstvo privlači pridošlice u gradove, a ne izvorne stanovnike grada. Uspješniji je u zapošljavanju studenata na Sveučilištu Al-Azhar nego na drugim sveučilištima, i uspješniji u ruralnim gubernijama nego u Kairu i Aleksandriji.Slijedeći 1952 Revolucija, Egipat je kao cjelina prošao kroz val ruralizacije. Ali slučajno, Muslimansko bratstvo usmjerilo je svoje novačenje na ljude urbanog načina života. Prije pedeset godina, Muslimansko bratstvo regrutiralo je uglavnom među sinovima državnih službenika, učitelji, i općenito klasu bijelih ovratnika. Egipatsko selo nije bilo dobrodošlo Muslimanskom bratstvu ili njegovim pogledima. Sada, Muslimansko bratstvo postalo je toliko konvencionalno da se sve više širi na selu. Muslimansko bratstvo može voditi učinkovite kampanje, pa čak i pobijediti na izborima u mnogim područjima egipatskog sela. Još, ja vjerujem da selo više utječe na Muslimansko bratstvo nego što Muslimansko bratstvo utječe na njega. U vrijeme Hassana El-Banne, Vođe Muslimanskog bratstva uglavnom su bili urbani na svoj način:Hassan El-Hodeibi, Omar El-Telmesani, Hassan Ashmawi, Mounir Dallah, Abdel-Qader Helmi i Farid Abdel Khaleq. Čak i na selu, vrhunski članovi Muslimanskog bratstva bili su poznati po svom urbanom načinu života: Mohamed Hamed Abul- Nasser i Abbas Al-Sisi, na primjer.Nasuprot tome, nova vrsta vođa Muslimanskog bratstva ruralna je na svoj način. To vrijedi čak i za vođe Muslimanskog bratstva sa sjedištem u Kairu, uključujući Mohameda Mursija, Saad El-Katatni,Saad Al-Husseini i Sabri Arafa El-Komi. I Muslimansko bratstvo vrhovni vodič,Mahdi Akef, ruralniji je u svom stilu vođenja od svog prethodnika, Maamoun Al-Hodeibi.

Politički islam sve veći

Michael A. Dugo

karakteristike demokratskog poretka. Njihovo novootkriveno prihvaćanje izbora i parlamentarnih procesa rezultat je ne samo iz postupne demokratizacije nekadašnjih autoritarnih režima protiv kojih su se te skupine borile terorističkim sredstvima čak i u svojim matičnim zemljama. Glavni primjer ovog razvoja je egipatsko Muslimansko bratstvo, koji je započeo kao dobrotvorni društveni pokret, a sada je postao najmoćnija politička oporbena snaga u Egiptu. Osnovan 1920-ih, Muslimansko bratstvo je danas najstarija islamska organizacija u arapskom svijetu. Slijedeći ideje svog osnivača Al-Banna, namjeravao se vratiti u stanje 'pravog islama', tj. vratiti se načinu života ranog islamskog džemata u vrijeme Poslanika, i uspostaviti zajednicu socijalne pravde. Ova vizija se sve više smatrala protutežom zapadnom društvenom modelu koji je bio obilježen sekularizacijom, moralno propadanje, ipohlepa. Za vrijeme Drugog svjetskog rata, Muslimansko bratstvo je čak osnovalo tajni vojni ogranak, čije aktivnosti, međutim, bili otkriveni, što je dovelo do pogubljenja gospodina Al-Banne od strane egipatske tajne policije

Muslimansko bratstvo u Belgiji

Steve Merley,
Viši analitičar


Globalno muslimansko bratstvo prisutno je u Europi od 1960 kada je rekao ramazan, unuk Hassana Al-Banne, osnovao džamiju u Münchenu.1 Od tog vremena,Bratstva su osnovana u gotovo svim zemljama EU, kao i zemlje koje nisu članice EU poput Rusije i Turske. Unatoč tome što djeluje pod drugim imenima, neke od organizacija u većim zemljama priznate su kao dio globalnog Muslimanskog bratstva. Na primjer, Savez islamskih organizacija Francuske (UOIF) općenito se smatra dijelom Muslimanskog bratstva u Francuskoj. Mreža također postaje poznata u nekim manjim zemljama poput Nizozemske, gdje je nedavno izvješće Zaklade NEFA detaljno opisalo aktivnosti Muslimanskog bratstva u toj zemlji.2 Susjedna Belgija također je postala važno središte za Muslimansko bratstvo u Europi. A 2002 izvješće Odbora za obavještajne poslove belgijskog parlamenta objasnilo je kako Bratstvo djeluje u Belgiji:“Služba državne sigurnosti od tada prati aktivnosti Međunarodnog muslimanskog bratstva u Belgiji 1982. Međunarodno Muslimansko bratstvo ima tajnu strukturu već skoro 20 godine. Identitet članova je tajan; djeluju u najvećoj diskreciji. They seek tospread their ideology within the Islamic community of Belgium and they aimin particular at the young people of the second and third generation ofimmigrants. In Belgium as in other European countries, they try to take controlof the religious, social, and sports associations and establish themselves asprivileged interlocutors of the national authorities in order to manage Islamicaffairs. The Muslim Brotherhood assumes that the national authorities will bepressed more and more to select Muslim leaders for such management and,in this context, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe

Brigi t te Maréchal
Shumuliyyat al-islam (Islam as encompassing every aspect of life) je prvi od dvadeset principa koje je postavio
utemeljitelj pokreta Muslimanska braća, Hassan al-Banna, da pouči svoje sljedbenike ispravnom razumijevanju
islama. Iako ovaj princip, obično se prevodi kao „sveobuhvatan način života,” i dalje ostaje integralan
učenjima članova Bratstva, kako u Egiptu tako i u Europi, dovoljno je čudno
niti komentiran u znanstvenim referencama niti u široj javnosti. Kada je Federacija islamskih
Organizacije u Europi (FIOE, predstavljajući pokret Muslimansko bratstvo na europskoj razini) u siječnju je međunarodnom tisku predstavio Europsku muslimansku povelju 2008, nitko nije istaknuo ovu "univerzalnu dimenziju" svog razumijevanja islama unatoč potencijalnim napetostima ili čak nekompatibilnostima, kako politički tako i
pravni, da bi ovaj koncept mogao imati na diskurs o integraciji i građanstvu. Što Muslimanska braća tradicionalno kažu o ovom konceptu i kako opravdavaju svoj poziv na njega? Koji su njegovi sastojci
i opseg njegove primjene? Postoje li značajne modifikacije koncepta u pokušaju da se kontekstualizira unutar pluralističke Europe?

Qutbizam: An Ideology of Islamic-Fascism

DALE C. EIKMEIER

The recently published National Military Strategic Plan for the War onTerrorism (NMSP-WOT) is to be commended for identifying “ideology”as al Qaeda’s center of gravity.1 The identification of an ideology as thecenter of gravity rather than an individual or group is a significant shift froma“capture and kill” philosophy to a strategy focused on defeating the rootcause of Islamic terrorism. Accordingly, the plan’s principal focus is on attackingand countering an ideology that fuels Islamic terrorism. Unfortunately,the NMSP-WOT fails to identify the ideology or suggest ways tocounter it. The plan merely describes the ideology as “extremist.” This descriptioncontributes little to the public’s understanding of the threat or to thecapabilities of the strategist who ultimately must attack and defeat it. The intentof this article is to identify the ideology of the Islamic terrorists and recommendhow to successfully counter it.Sun Tzuwisely said, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundredbattles you will never be in peril.”2 Our success in theWar on Terrorismdepends on knowingwho the enemy is and understanding his ideology.While characterizing and labeling an enemymay serve such a purpose, it is only usefulif the labels are clearly defined and understood. Otherwise, overly broadcharacterizations obscure our ability to truly “know the enemy,” they diffuseefforts, and place potential allies and neutrals in the enemy’s camp. Unfortunately,theWar on Terrorism’s use of labels contributes a great deal to themisunderstandingsassociated with the latter. The fact is, five years after 9/11 theNMSP-WOT provides little specific guidance, other than labeling the enemyas extremist.3 This inability to focus on the specific threat and its supportingphilosophy reflects our own rigid adherence to political correctness and is beingexploited bymilitant Islamists portraying these overly broad descriptionsas a war against Islam.As David F. Forte states “Wemust not fail . . . to distinguishbetween the homicidal revolutionaries like bin Laden and mainstreamMuslim believers.

Political Islam in Egypt

Emad el-din šahin
The landscape of political Islam in Egypt has changed dramatically over the past decade and a half. Since the mid-1990s, the country’s mainstream Islamic movement, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB, or Muslim Brothers), has undergone a significant transformation; an Islamist centrist party, Hizb al-Wasat, has emerged and for the past ten years has been struggling to acquire official recognition; and the country’s radical movements, especially the Jama`a
Islamiya, have reassessed some of their tactics.
The Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest grass-roots Islamist movement of the twentieth century (established in 1928) and perceives itself as “the mother of all centrist Islamist movements”. It is an activist movement with a comprehensive reform message, combining multi-dimensional spheres that give the movement reasonable space for manoeuvre, even when it is severely constrained by the Egyptian regime. The movement is a synthesised version of earlier reform movements (such as Salafi reformism and Islamic modernism) and can claim to be the heir of
‘reformist Islam’.1 It has adopted a gradualist bottom-up approach to change that seeks to resocialise society along Islamic lines: the individual, family, society, and then the state. The Brotherhood is also one of the most institutionalised movements in Egypt. Its structure has survived the lifetime of its founder, Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949), despite suffering repeated phases of brutal regime repression. All this has generated a particular political orientation that is characterised by caution, gradualism, slow adaptation, and fear of experimentation and failure.
In the movement’s view, failure will not simply reflect on the leadership of the group at a particular moment, but on the entire movement. It could even affect the fortunes of political Islam as an alternative to post-independence foreign-inspired secular models. Therefore, bpreserving the survival and structural coherence of the movement has always been a top priority.
It is an objective that for long has dominated the Brotherhood’s political calculations and levels b of interaction in the political process, and enabled the movement to exhibit a pragmatic attitude whenever the circumstances warrant it.
Posljednjih godina, the Muslim Brotherhood has revised its political strategies and policy orientations. To many observers, it seems as if it has made a clear and deliberate departure from its traditionally cautious approach. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Muslim Brothers rejected the idea of getting directly involved in the political process, participating in the parliament, or taking part in the syndicates. Their attention was mainly focused on rebuilding
the organisation’s structures and avoiding confrontations with the regime that might have provoked repression of the movement. By the mid-1980s, they gradually began to participate in parliamentary elections in alliance with other political parties like the Wafd Party in 1984 and the Labour Party in 1987. They also contested elections in syndicates and succeeded in gaining control over many of the latter during the 1990s. After 2000, the Muslim Brothers adopted an increasingly assertive strategy in their relationship with the regime and a pragmatic reform The landscape of political Islam in Egypt has changed dramatically over the past decade and ahalf. Since the mid-1990s, the country’s mainstream Islamic movement, the MuslimBrotherhood (MB, or Muslim Brothers), has undergone a significant transformation; an Islamistcentrist party, Hizb al-Wasat, has emerged and for the past ten years has been struggling toacquire official recognition; and the country’s radical movements, especially the Jama`aIslamiya, have reassessed some of their tactics.The Muslim Brotherhood is the oldest grass-roots Islamist movement of the twentieth century(established in 1928) and perceives itself as “the mother of all centrist Islamist movements”. Itis an activist movement with a comprehensive reform message, combining multi-dimensionalspheres that give the movement reasonable space for manoeuvre, even when it is severelyconstrained by the Egyptian regime. The movement is a synthesised version of earlier reformmovements (such as Salafi reformism and Islamic modernism) and can claim to be the heir of‘reformist Islam’.1 It has adopted a gradualist bottom-up approach to change that seeks to resocialisesociety along Islamic lines: the individual, family, society, and then the state. TheBrotherhood is also one of the most institutionalised movements in Egypt. Its structure hassurvived the lifetime of its founder, Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949), despite suffering repeatedphases of brutal regime repression. All this has generated a particular political orientation that ischaracterised by caution, gradualism, slow adaptation, and fear of experimentation and failure.In the movement’s view, failure will not simply reflect on the leadership of the group at aparticular moment, but on the entire movement. It could even affect the fortunes of politicalIslam as an alternative to post-independence foreign-inspired secular models. Therefore,preserving the survival and structural coherence of the movement has always been a top priority.It is an objective that for long has dominated the Brotherhood’s political calculations and levelsof interaction in the political process, and enabled the movement to exhibit a pragmatic attitudewhenever the circumstances warrant it.In recent years, the Muslim Brotherhood has revised its political strategies and policyorientations. To many observers, it seems as if it has made a clear and deliberate departure fromits traditionally cautious approach. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Muslim Brothersrejected the idea of getting directly involved in the political process, participating in theparliament, or taking part in the syndicates. Their attention was mainly focused on rebuildingthe organisation’s structures and avoiding confrontations with the regime that might haveprovoked repression of the movement. By the mid-1980s, they gradually began to participate inparliamentary elections in alliance with other political parties like the Wafd Party in 1984 andthe Labour Party in 1987. They also contested elections in syndicates and succeeded in gainingcontrol over many of the latter during the 1990s. After 2000, the Muslim Brothers adopted anincreasingly assertive strategy in their relationship with the regime and a pragmatic reform agenda .

The Muslim Brotherhood

The Problem of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Jeffrey Azarva

Samuel Tadros

On June 20, 2007, sad. Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research convened ameeting ofU.S. intelligence officials to weigh the prospect of formal engagement with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,1known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin. The session was the result of several years of discussion aboutengaging the group considered by many to be the fountainhead of Sunni fundamentalism.Although the Bush administration established a diplomatic quarantine of the Brotherhood afterSeptember 11, 2001, members of the U.S. House of Representatives held several meetings in Egyptin the spring of 2007—almost three months before the State Department meeting—with MuhammadSaad al-Katatni, an independent member of the Egyptian parliament and the head of its Brotherhoodaffiliatedbloc. On April 5, 2007, House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) broke with conventionand met with Katatni at the Egyptian parliament building and at the residence ofU.S. ambassador to Egypt Francis J. Ricciardone. Then, on May 27, 2007, a four-member U.S. congressionaldelegation led by Representative David Price (D-N.C.) met with Katatni in Cairo.Following Hoyer’s visit, sad. Embassy in Cairo dismissed Egyptian criticism that his meetingspresaged a reversal of U.S. policy.2 In November 2007, Ricciardone also played down themeetings when he claimed that U.S. contacts with nominally independent Brotherhood members did“not imply American endorsement of the views of the individual parliamentarians or their politicalaffiliates.”3 Despite this reassurance, the meetings with Katatni are indicative of opinion leaders, bothinside and outside the U.S. government, warming inevitable. Yet while the movement, established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, constitutes the most organizedand well-funded opposition in the country today—the byproduct of both its charitable services and da’wa (literally“call to God,” or preaching) network that operate outside state control—any examination of its rhetoricand political platforms shows U.S. outreach to be premature. Despite its professed commitment to pluralismand the rule of law, the Brotherhood continues to engage in dangerous doublespeak when it comes to the mostfundamental issues of democracy.