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Den arabiske morgendagen

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

oktober 6, 1981, var ment som en feiringsdag i Egypt. Det markerte jubileet for Egyptens største seiersøyeblikk i tre arabisk-israelske konflikter, da landets underdoghær kastet seg over Suez-kanalen de første dagene av 1973 Yom Kippur-krigen og sendte israelske tropper som trakk seg tilbake. På en kul, skyfri morgen, Kairo stadion var fullpakket med egyptiske familier som hadde kommet for å se militæret spenne maskinvaren. På vurderingsstanden, President Anwar el-Sadat,krigens arkitekt, så med tilfredshet mens menn og maskiner gikk foran ham. Jeg var i nærheten, en nylig ankom utenlandsk korrespondent. Plutselig, en av hærens lastebiler stoppet rett foran anmelderstanden akkurat da seks Mirage-jetfly brølte overhead i en akrobatisk forestilling, maler himmelen med lange stier av rødt, gul, lilla,og grønn røyk. Sadat reiste seg, tilsynelatende forbereder seg på å utveksle honnør med enda en kontingent av egyptiske tropper. Han gjorde seg selv til et perfekt mål for fire islamistiske leiemordere som hoppet fra lastebilen, stormet pallen, og drepte kroppen hans med kuler. Da morderne fortsatte i det som virket en evighet, å sprøyte stativet med sin dødelige ild, Jeg vurderte et øyeblikk om jeg skulle treffe bakken og risikere å bli tråkket i hjel av paniske tilskuere eller være på foten og risikere å ta en villfarende kule. Instinkt ba meg holde meg på beina, og min følelse av journalistisk plikt fikk meg til å finne ut om Sadat var i live eller død.

Islamsk reformasjon

Adnan Khan

Den italienske statsministeren, Silvio Berlusconi skrøt etter hendelsene i 9/11:
“... vi må være klar over sivilisasjonens overlegenhet, et system som har garantert

velvære, respekt for menneskerettighetene og – i motsetning til islamske land – respekt

for religiøse og politiske rettigheter, et system som har sine verdier forståelse av mangfold

og toleranse ... Vesten vil erobre folk, som om den erobret kommunismen, selv om det

betyr en konfrontasjon med en annen sivilisasjon, den islamske, satt fast der den var

1,400 år siden ... ”1

Og i en 2007 rapporterer RAND-instituttet erklært:
“Kampen som pågår i store deler av den muslimske verden er egentlig en krig av

ideer. Resultatet av det vil avgjøre den muslimske verdens fremtidige retning. ”

Bygger moderat muslimske nettverk, RAND-instituttet

Konseptet ‘islah’ (reform) er et begrep ukjent for muslimer. Det eksisterte aldri i hele

historien til den islamske sivilisasjonen; det ble aldri diskutert eller engang vurdert. Et kort blikk på klassisk

Islamsk litteratur viser oss at når klassiske forskere la grunnlaget for usul, og kodifisert

deres islamske avgjørelser (fiqh) de så bare på forståelsen av de islamske reglene for å kunne

bruke dem. En lignende situasjon oppstod da reglene ble lagt for hadithen, tafseer og

arabisk språk. Lærde, tenkere og intellektuelle gjennom islamsk historie brukte mye tid

forstå Allahs åpenbaring - Koranen og anvende ayaat på realitetene og myntet

rektorer og disipliner for å lette forståelsen. Derfor ble Koranen fortsatt grunnlaget for

studier og alle fagene som utviklet seg, var alltid basert på Koranen. De som ble

slått av gresk filosofi som muslimske filosofer og noen fra Mut’azilah

ble ansett å ha forlatt islams fold da Koranen sluttet å være deres grunnlag for studier. Dermed for

enhver muslim som prøver å utlede regler eller forstå hvilken holdning som skal tas mot en bestemt

utstede Koranen er grunnlaget for denne studien.

Det første forsøket på å reformere islam fant sted på begynnelsen av 1800-tallet. Ved begynnelsen av

århundre hadde Ummah vært i en lang periode med tilbakegang der den globale maktbalansen skiftet

fra Khilafah til Storbritannia. Monteringsproblemer slukte Khilafah mens Vest-Europa var i

midt i den industrielle revolusjonen. Ummah mistet sin uberørte forståelse av islam, og

i et forsøk på å snu tilbakegangen som oppslukte Uthmanis (Osmannere) noen muslimer ble sendt til

Vest, og som et resultat ble slått av det de så. Rifa’a Rafi ’al-Tahtawi fra Egypt (1801-1873),

da han kom tilbake fra Paris, skrev en biografisk bok kalt Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (De

Utvinning av gull, eller en oversikt over Paris, 1834), roser deres renslighet, kjærlighet til arbeid, og over

all sosial moral. Han erklærte at vi må etterligne det som blir gjort i Paris, taler for endringer i

det islamske samfunnet fra å liberalisere kvinner til styresystemene. Denne tanken, og andre liker det,

markerte begynnelsen på den gjenoppfunnende trenden i islam.

NØJAKTIGHET I DEN GLOBALE KRIGEN PÅ FREM:

Sherifa zuhur

Syv år etter september 11, 2001 (9/11) angrep, mange eksperter mener at al-Qa’ida har fått styrke igjen og at kopier eller tilknyttede selskaper er dødeligere enn før. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 hevdet at al-Qa’ida er farligere nå enn før 9/11.1 Al-Qaidas emulatorer fortsetter å true vestlige, Midtøsten, og europeiske nasjoner, som i plottet foliert i september 2007 i Tyskland. Uttaler Bruce Riedel: Takk i stor grad til Washingtons iver etter å gå inn i Irak i stedet for å jakte på al Qaidas ledere, organisasjonen har nå en solid operasjonsbase i Badlands i Pakistan og en effektiv franchise i det vestlige Irak. Dens rekkevidde har spredt seg over hele den muslimske verden og i Europa . . . Osama bin Laden har satt i gang en vellykket propagandakampanje. . . . Hans ideer tiltrekker seg nå flere følgere enn noen gang.
Det er sant at ulike salafi-jihadist-organisasjoner fremdeles dukker opp i hele den islamske verden. Hvorfor har svar på den islamistiske terrorismen som vi kaller global jihad ikke har vist seg å være ekstremt effektive?
Å gå til verktøyene til “myk kraft,”Hva med effekten av vestlig innsats for å styrke muslimer i den globale krigen mot terror (GWOT)? Hvorfor har USA vunnet så få "hjerter og sinn" i den bredere islamske verden? Hvorfor spiller amerikanske strategiske meldinger om dette problemet så dårlig i regionen? Hvorfor, til tross for bred muslimsk misbilligelse av ekstremisme som vist i undersøkelser og offisielle ytringer fra viktige muslimske ledere, har støtten til bin Ladin faktisk økt i Jordan og i Pakistan?
Denne monografien vil ikke revidere opprinnelsen til islamistisk vold. Det er i stedet opptatt av en type konseptuell feil som feilaktig konstruerer GWOT og som fraråder muslimer å støtte den. De klarer ikke å identifisere seg med de foreslåtte transformative mottiltakene fordi de oppdager noen av sine kjernetro og institusjoner som mål i
dette arbeidet.
Flere dypt problematiske trender forvirrer de amerikanske konseptualiseringene av GWOT og de strategiske budskapene som er laget for å kjempe den krigen. Disse utvikler seg fra (1) postkoloniale politiske tilnærminger til muslimer og muslimske majoritetsnasjoner som varierer sterkt og derfor gir motstridende og forvirrende inntrykk og effekter; og (2) gjenværende generalisert uvitenhet om og fordommer overfor islam og subregionale kulturer. Legg til dette amerikanske sinne, frykt, og angst for de dødelige hendelsene i 9/11, og visse elementer som, til tross for oppfordringer fra kjøligere hoder, hold muslimer og deres religion ansvarlig for deres gjerningsmennes ugjerninger, eller som synes det er nyttig å gjøre det av politiske årsaker.

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 valg. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. Samtidig, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. Regimet kunne godt ha satset på at en beskjeden økning i de muslimske brødrenes parlamentariske representasjon kunne brukes til å vekke frykt for en islamistisk maktovertakelse og dermed tjene som en grunn til å stoppe reformen.. I så fall, strategien er i stor risiko for tilbakeslag.

Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Tess Lee Eisenhart

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, brorskapet (brorskap) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, derimot, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
valget av de åttiåtte brødrene til folkeforsamlingen i 2005 – den største
opposisjonell blokk i moderne egyptisk historie - og de påfølgende arrestasjonene av nesten
1,000 Brødre.2 Valgets fremmarsj til mainstream-politikk gir rikelig med fôr
for lærde å teste teorier og komme med spådommer om fremtiden til egypteren
regime: vil det tilfalle den islamistiske opposisjonen eller forbli et fyrtårn for sekularisme i
arabisk verden?
Denne oppgaven viker unna med slike brede spekulasjoner. I stedet, den utforsker

i hvilken grad det muslimske brorskapet har tilpasset seg som organisasjon tidligere
tiår.

MELLOM I GÅR OG I DAG

HASAN AL-BANNA

Den første islamske staten
På grunnlaget for denne dydige koranens sosiale orden oppsto den første islamske staten, har urokkelig tro på den, bruker det omhyggelig, og sprer det over hele verden, slik den første Khilafah pleide å si: 'Hvis jeg skulle miste en kamels ledelse, Jeg ville finne det i Allahs bok.'. Han kjempet mot de som nektet å betale zakah, angående dem som frafalne fordi de hadde styrtet en av grunnpilarene i denne orden, ordtak: 'Ved Allah, hvis de nektet meg en ledning som de ville overlate til Allahs apostel (PBUH), Jeg ville kjempet mot dem så snart jeg har en sverdet i hånden min!’ For enhet, i alle dens betydninger og manifestasjoner, gjennomsyret denne nye kommende nasjonen.
Fullstendig sosial enhet oppsto ved å gjøre koranordenen og dens språk universell, mens den er fullstendig politisk enhet var under skyggen av Amir Al-Mumineen og under standarden til Khilafah i hovedstaden.
Det faktum at den islamske ideologien var en desentralisering av de væpnede styrkene, statskassene, og provinsguvernører viste seg ikke å være noen hindring for dette, siden alle handlet i henhold til en enkelt trosbekjennelse og en enhetlig og omfattende kontroll. Koranens prinsipper fordrev og la den overtroiske avgudsdyrkelsen som var utbredt på den arabiske halvøy og Persia. De forviste skyldig jødedom og begrenset den til en smal provins, sette en stopper for dens religiøse og politiske autoritet. De kjempet med kristendommen slik at dens innflytelse var sterkt redusert på de asiatiske og afrikanske kontinentene, bare begrenset til Europa under bysantinernes vakthold Imperium i Konstantinopel. Dermed ble den islamske staten sentrum for åndelig og politisk dominans innenfor de to største kontinentene. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Constantinople from the east and besieging it until the siege grew wearisome. Then it came at it from the west,
plunging into Spain, with its victorious soldiers reaching the heart of France and penetrating as far as northern and southern Italy. It established an imposing state in Western Europe, radiant with science and knowledge.
Afterwards, it ended the conquest of Constantinople itself and the confined Christianity within the restricted area of Central Europe. Islamic fleets ventured into the depths of the Mediterranean and Red seas, both became Islamic lakes. And so the armed forces of the Islamic state assumed supremacy of the seas both in the East and West, enjoying absolute mastery over land and sea. These Islamic nations had already combined and incorporated many things from other civilisations, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. De Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.

The Lives of Hasan al Banna & Syed Qutb.

Det muslimske brorskapet (Ikhwan al Muslimeen) was founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) in the Egyptian town of al- Isma’iliyyah in 1928. The son of an Azharite scholar, who earned his livelihood by repairing watches, Hasan al-Banna showed from his early
school-days an inclination and great zeal for calling people to Islamic values and traditions. His strong sense of religiosity and spiritual awareness drove him to join the Hasafiyyah tariqah, one of many Sufi tariqahs that were widespread in Egypt at that time. Even though he was not formally associated with this tariqah after he founded the Ikhwan, he, nevertheless, maintained a good relation with it, as indeed with other Islamic organizations and religious personalities, and persisted in reciting the litanies (awrad, pl. of wird) of this tariqah until his last days. Though Hasan al-Banna joined a modern-type school of education, he promised his father that he would continue to memorize the Qur’an, which he did, in fact later, at the age of twelve. While at school, he took part in the activities of some religious associations and clubs which were promoting it and calling for the observance of Islamic teachings .

In the Shadow of an Arab Caesar: Sayyid Qutb and the Radicalization of Modern Islamic Fundamentalism

Research

“We are the umma of the believers, living within a jahili society. As a community of believers we should see ourselves in a state of war with the state and the society. The territory we dwell in is the House of War.”1 These were the words of Sayyid Qutb in an Egyptian military court in April, 1966 before he and two of his companions were sentenced to death by hanging. The offense; conspiring against the government and plotting its overthrow, the evidence used by the state prosecutors in the trial, besides ‘confessions,’ a book, Qutb’s final piece of literature, Ma‘alim fi al-Turuq, Signposts.2 This study does not set out to be a thorough analysis of the political and religious ideology of Sayyid Qutb. Rather it is an attempt to identify the political and social climate in Egypt as the primary motivation which led to the development of Qutb’s radical interpretations of Islam. Notions of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism dominated the political discourse of Qutb’s Egypt and hearts and minds were enraptured by promises of its populist leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser. This chapter in Arab history from the early 1950’s until the late 1960’s is etched in historical memory as the era of pan-Arabism. derimot, it was also a vital period in the evolution of fundamentalist Islam into its more radical form which first expressed itself in the 1970’s and is until today at the base of radical fundamentalist Islamic thought worldwide. This piece will
demonstrate the principal role played by Sayyid Qutb in this transformation and reveal that radical interpretations of Islam were given impetus to develop in Egypt during this period due to the nature of Nasser’s regime

EGYPT: SECURITY, POLITISK, AND ISLAMIST CHALLENGES

Sherifa zuhur

This monograph addresses three issues in contemporary Egypt: failures of governance and political development, the continued strength of Islamism, and counter terrorism. It is easier to tackle their contours in Egypt if they are considered separately. They are not, derimot, separate or independent; continuing to treat them as mutually exclusive conditions will lead to further crisis down the road.
The Egyptian government forged a truce with its most troublesome Islamist militants in 1999. derimot, violence emerged again from new sources of Islamist militancy from 2003 into 2006. All of the previously held conclusions about the role of state strength
versus movements that led to the truce are now void as it appears that “al-Qa’idism” may continue to
plague the country or, indeed, the region as a whole.
In consequence, an important process of political liberalization was slowed, and in 3 til 4 år, if not earlier, Egypt’s political security and stability will be at risk. Widespread economic and political discontent might push that date forward. I tillegg, continuing popular support for moderate Islamism could lead to a situation where the current peace could erode if a
comprehensive peace settlement to the Palestinian- Arab-Israeli conflict is achieved, and if various other
factors were to come into play.

THE METAMORPHOSIS OF THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERS

Mona El-Ghobashy

Jihane al-Halafawi’s small apartment above a barbershop in Alexandria is exceedingly

orderly, a cool oasis on a sweltering summer afternoon. Plant leaves brush up against
curtains undulating with the breeze from the nearby Mediterranean. As she walks into
the living room with a tray full of cakes and tea, al-Halafawi is the picture of a kindly
Egyptian mother, a genuine smile gracing her youthful face. But when this fifty-yearold
mother of six and grandmother announced her candidacy for Egypt’s parliamentary
elections in fall 2000, the state geared up amassive security force outside polling stations;
leftists shrugged her off as a “front” for her husband; and state feminists dedicated to the
electoral empowerment of women were silent.When Halafawi outperformed her rulingparty
rival in the first round, despite rigging, the Interior Ministry promptly stepped in
and canceled the results on the pretext of respecting an earlier court ruling postponing
the elections.
Alexandria’s al-Raml district went without parliamentary representation for two years

s al-Halafawi and her legal team battled the state in the courts. Endelig, in June 2002,
a Supreme Administrative Court ruling compelled the Interior Ministry to hold the
by-elections.On election day, security forces blockaded roads leading to polling stations,
arrested al-Halafawi’s legal team and 101 of her supporters, roughed up journalists, og
stepped aside as public-sector workers bused in from outside the district voted for her

rival. Unusually, the six o’clock news was interrupted that evening to announce the
sweeping victory of the two ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) candidates in the
Raml by-elections.1
Al-Halafawi’s experience is one dramatic piece of a larger story, the story of the

group of which she is a part: the Society of Muslim Brothers (Jamaat al-Ikhwan al-
Muslimun).2 Over the past quarter-century, the Society of Muslim Brothers (Ikhwan)
has morphed from a highly secretive, hierarchical, antidemocratic organization led by
anointed elders into a modern, multivocal political association steered by educated,

savvy professionals not unlike activists of the same age in rival Egyptian political
parties. Seventy-seven years ago, the Muslim Brothers were founded in the provincial
city of Ismailiyya by the charismatic disciplinarian and shrewd organizer Hasan al-
Banna (1906–49).

The History of the Muslim Brotherhood

Michelle Paison

We in the West !nd it incomprehensible that theological ideas still in”ame the minds of men, stirring up messianic passions that can leave societies in ruin. We had assumed that this was no longer possible,that human beings had learned to separate religious questions from political ones, that political theology died in 16h-century Europe. We were wrong.1Islam is no longer exclusively a religion, but an ideology that provides a total framework for all aspects of political, social, economic, and cultural life in the Muslim world. Although Islam has continuously demonstrated the theme of resurgence throughout its history in response to the internal and external forces that challenge Muslim faith and society, the assertion of Islamism has strongly reemerged. Discontent is evident through the gradual movement towards Islamist ideology, whether or not the idea ofIslam strongly resonates among the populous. Individuals, despondentfrom the suppression of alternatives from oppressive regimes, look towards change. Organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, provide clear examples of the greater trend developing throughout the region ofthe Middle East and North Africa. #e political power and social in”uenceheld by the Brotherhood capitalizes on the Arab Republic of Egypt’s failureto support its peoples. Subsequently the dissatis!ed population turns to a movement that has the ability to provide the necessary services for survival;Islamism. #is increasing development is pushing moderate, mainstream Islam into the realm of radicalism through means of desperation.Part of the emergence of neorevivalism, the Muslim Brotherhood,established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, saw the Islamic community at a critical crossroads and insisted that Muslims would !nd strength in the totalself-su$ciency of Islam.

The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood

Amr Al-Chobaki


The Muslim Brotherhood managed to maintain its organizational existence since its establishment in 1928, by the late Hasan Al-Banna. Throughout eight decades, it has managed to exist as a religious movement as well as a political and social organization. This, on one hand, helped it to be sufficiently strong to be distinguished from other political powers, but also made it weak and feeble in some other ways.

The Muslim Brotherhood as a movement is similar to other Egyptian political movements, as it was established at the time of the royal regime and a semi-liberal era. It clashed with the government during the time of President `Abd Al-Nasser, adapted to the regime of President Sadat, and tended to fluctuate in its relationship with President Mubarak, however, the relationship was based on partial elimination, just like the state during the age of President `Abd Al-Nasser. Moreover, it has been outlawed for most of its history; since 1954 until the present time (i.e. more than half a century).

The Muslim Brotherhood has continued to be both a witness and a party in the political and cultural dispute in Egypt and the Arab countries, throughout different historical periods; Egypt in the time of the royal regime and in the time of the republic with its three stages. This dispute was about issues of identity and cultural belonging, the relationship between the religion – on one hand – and politics, the East and the West on the other hand, as well as the coming and the inherited. The Muslim Brotherhood had a flexible political and intellectual reference that gave it a comprehensive conception of Islam.

Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Dr. Israel Elad Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last twoyears has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up fordissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to takeinitiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The EgyptianMuslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a politicalorganization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities and new risks.Western governments, including the government of the United States, are consideringthe MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advancedemocracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Couldthe Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice andDevelopment Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), twoIslamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules ofliberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with,respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handledthe ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the pasttwo years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to newcircumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has itreacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign? How has itnavigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forceson the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? Towhat extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt toward liberaldemocracy?

Will Politics Tame Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood?

NEIL MacFARQUHAR


CAIRO, Dec. 7 – When stumping through the port city of Alexandria, whose crumbling mansions and rickety tram lines evoke long-faded glory, Sobhe Saleh of the Muslim Brotherhood vowed he had a different vision for Egypt’s future.

“If Islam were applied, no one would be hungry,” he roared recently to a crowd of fully veiled women ululating with joy. “Islam is a religion of construction. Islam is a religion of investment. Islam is a religion of development.”

Religion, in fact, should profoundly alter both Egypt’s domestic and foreign policy, said Mr. Saleh, a 52-year-old lawyer with a clipped helmet of steel-gray hair.

“If Islam were applied, the television would not show us prostitution and people lacking all decency!” he declared. “If Islam were applied, Iraq could not have been invaded, Israel could not occupy Jerusalem, and aggression could not have been used to humiliate Muslims everywhere!”

A long-expected day of reckoning is at hand in Egyptian politics now that the Brotherhood, an illegal organization with a violent past, is entering the corridors of power for the first time in significant numbers.

The outcome of the freest election in more than 50 years could determine whether political Islam will turn Egypt into a repressive, anti-American theocracy or if Islamic parties across the Arab world will themselves be transformed by participating in mainstream politics.

No sudden earthquake is expected. But initial results from the final round of voting on Wednesday showed that the Brotherhood had gained at least 12 more seats to bring its total to 88, with seven races from all three rounds still unsettled, according to a spokesman. That is five times the 17 seats the group won in 2000.

Democratization and Islamic Politics:

YOKOTA Takayuki�

The aim of this article is to explore the often contradictory correlation between democratizationand Islamic politics in Egypt, focusing on a new Islamic political party, the Wasat Party (Ḥizbal-Wasaṭ).Theoretically, democratization and Islamic politics are not incompatible if Islamic politicalorganizations can and do operate within a legal and democratic framework. On the other hand,this requires democratic tolerance by governments for Islamic politics, as long as they continueto act within a legal framework. In the Middle East, however, Islamic political parties are oftensuspected of having undemocratic agendas, and governments have often used this suspicion as ajustification to curb democratization. This is also the case with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood(Jam‘īya al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) under the Ḥusnī Mubārak regime. Although the Brotherhood is amainstream Islamic movement in Egypt, operating publicly and enjoying considerable popularity,successive governments have never changed its illegal status for more than half a century. Someof the Brotherhood members decided to form the Wasat Party as its legal political organ in order tobreak this stalemate.There have been some studies on the Wasat Party. Stacher [2002] analyzes the “Platformof the Egyptian Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Miṣrī 1998] and explains the basic principlesof the Wasat Party as follows: democracy, sharī‘a (Islamic law), rights of women, and Muslim-Christian relations. Baker [2003] regards the Wasat Party as one of the new Islamist groups thathave appeared in contemporary Egypt, and analyzes its ideology accordingly. Wickham [2004]discusses the moderation of Islamic movements in Egypt and the attempt to form the WasatParty from the perspective of comparative politics. Norton [2005] examines the ideology andactivities of the Wasat Party in connection with the Brotherhood’s political activities. As theseearlier studies are mainly concerned with the Wasat Party during the 1990s and the early 2000s,I will examine the ideology and activities of the Wasat Party till the rise of the democratizationmovement in Egypt in around 2005. I will do so on the basis of the Wasat Party’s documents, suchas the “Platform of the New Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Jadīd 2004]1), and my interviews withits members.

ISLAMISM IN SOUTHERN EGYPT

James Toth

For years, religious violence and terrorism in Middle Eastern countries such as Egypthave splashed across the headlines and surged across the screen, announcing yet anotherround of senseless death and destruction. While Arabists and Islamicists attemptto pick their way carefully through the ideological and intellectual minefields to makesense of what is happening, the wider public generally disregards their insights andinstead sticks to what it knows best: deeply ingrained prejudices and biases. Egyptian,Arab, Muslim—all are painted in a very unfavorable light. Even in Egypt, manybystanders show the same sorry prejudices. In the end, people simply blame the brutalityon inexplicable backward religious ideas and then move on.Yet comprehending terrorism and violence in places such as Egypt by recourse toan unnuanced religious fundamentalism is generally acknowledged not only to begthe question of why these events actually happen, but also to lead to misunderstandingsand misperceptions, and perhaps even to exacerbating existing tensions.1 Mostscholars agree that such seemingly “irrational” social behavior instead needs to beplaced in its appropriate context to be properly understood, and hence made rational.Analyzing these actions, then, involves situating this violence and destruction in theireconomic, political, and ideological milieu as these have developed historically, forthis so-called Islamic terrorism does not merely arise, ex nihilo, out of a timeless void.What follows, then, is one case study of one portion of the Islamic movement as itemerged principally in southern Egypt and as it was revealed through anthropologicalfieldwork conducted in one of this region’s major cities. This account takes a completelydifferent direction from that of stigmatizing this movement as a sordid collectionof terrorist organizations hell bent on the senseless destruction of Egypt and itsIslamic civilization.2 Because this view is somewhat at odds with the perceptions oflocal spectators, Egyptians in Cairo, and non–Egyptians inside and outside the country,I go to some length not only to discuss the movement itself but also to shed lighton why it might have received such negative publicity.