RSSAlle reacties Tagged With: "Hassan al-Banna"

De Arabische Morgen

DAVID B. Ottaway

oktober 6, 1981, was bedoeld als een feestdag in Egypte. Het was de verjaardag van de mooiste moment van de Egyptische overwinning in drie Arabisch-Israëlische conflict, toen het land de underdog leger stuwkracht over het Suezkanaal in de opening dagen Ofthe 1973 Yom Kippoer-oorlog en stuurde de Israëlische troepen afgehaspeld in retraite. Op een koele, wolkenloze ochtend, het Cairo stadion zat vol met Egyptische gezinnen die waren gekomen om te zien de militaire strut haar hardware.On het toetsen stand, President Anwar el-Sadat,architect van de oorlog, keek met voldoening als mannen en machines voor hem paradeerden. Ik was in de buurt, een pas gearriveerde buitenlandse correspondent.Suddenly, een van het leger vrachtwagens gestopt direct voor de herziening stand net zoals zes Mirage jets overhead brulde in een acrobatische voorstelling, het schilderen van de hemel met lange paden van rood, geel, Purper,en groene rook. Sadat stond op, blijkbaar bereidt zich voor om te wisselen salutes met nog een contingent van de Egyptische troepen. Hij maakte zich een perfect doelwit voor vier islamitische moordenaars die uit de vrachtwagen gesprongen, bestormden het podium, en bezaaid zijn lichaam met bullets.As de moordenaars bleef voor wat leek een eeuwigheid om de stand te spuiten met hun dodelijke brand, Ik overwoog een ogenblik of op de grond en het risico getroffen te worden vertrapt tot de dood door paniek toeschouwers of blijven te voet en het nemen van risico een verdwaalde kogel. Instinct vertelde me om te verblijven op mijn voeten, en mijn gevoel voor journalistieke plicht dreef me om te gaan erachter te komen of Sadat was levend of dood.

Islamitische reformatie

Adnan Khan

De Italiaanse premier, Berlusconi schepte na de gebeurtenissen van 9/11:
“... we moeten zich bewust zijn van de superioriteit van onze beschaving, een systeem dat is gegarandeerd

welzijn, eerbiediging van de mensenrechten en – in tegenstelling met de islamitische landen – respecteren

voor religieuze en politieke rechten, een systeem dat de waarden begrip diversiteit heeft

en tolerantie ... Het Westen zal volkeren veroveren, alsof het veroverde het communisme, zelfs als het

: een confrontatie met een andere beschaving, de islamitische één, geplakt waar het was

1,400 jaren geleden ...”1

En in een 2007 verslag van de RAND instituut verklaard:
“De strijd aan de gang in een groot deel van de islamitische wereld is in wezen een oorlog van

ideeën. De uitkomst zal de toekomstige richting van de moslimwereld te bepalen.”

Het bouwen van gematigde moslim Networks, RAND Institute

Het begrip ‘Islah’ (hervorming) is een concept onbekend moslims. Het bestond nooit in de hele

geschiedenis van de islamitische beschaving; het was nooit besproken of zelfs overwogen. Een vluchtige blik op klassieke

De islamitische literatuur toont ons dat wanneer de klassieke geleerden legde de fundamenten van usul, en gecodificeerd

hun islamitische uitspraken (fiqh) ze waren alleen op zoek naar het begrip van de islamitische regels om

toe te passen. Een soortgelijke situatie deed zich voor toen de regels vastgesteld voor de hadith werden gelegd, tafseer en de

Arabische taal. geleerden, denkers en intellectuelen de hele islamitische geschiedenis veel tijd doorgebracht

het begrijpen van Allah's openbaring - de Koran en het aanbrengen van de ayaat op de realiteit en bedacht

opdrachtgevers en disciplines om het begrip te vergemakkelijken. Vandaar de koran bleef basis van

studie en alle disciplines die geëvolueerd zijn altijd gebaseerd op de Koran. Degenen die werd

geslagen door de Griekse filosofie, zoals de islamitische filosofen en een aantal van onder de Mut'azilah

werden beschouwd als de plooi van de islam te hebben verlaten als de Koran beëindiging van hun basis van de studie. dus voor

elke moslim een ​​poging om regels af te leiden of te begrijpen welke houding moeten worden genomen op een bepaald

uitgifte van de Koran is de basis van deze studie.

De eerste poging tot hervorming van de islam vond plaats aan het begin van de 19e eeuw. Tegen het einde van de

eeuw de Ummah had in een lange periode van verval waar de mondiale machtsverhoudingen verschoven

van de Khilafah naar Groot-Brittannië. Toenemende problemen overspoelde de Khilafah, terwijl West-Europa in

het midden van de industriële revolutie. De Ummah kwam naar haar oorspronkelijke begrip van de islam te verliezen, en

in een poging om de daling engulfing de Ottomaanse te keren (Ottomanen) sommige moslims werden gestuurd naar de

Westen, en als gevolg daarvan werd geslagen door wat ze zagen. Rifa'a Rafi’al-Tahtawi Egypte (1801-1873),

bij zijn terugkeer uit Parijs, schreef een biografische boek genaamd Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (De

Winning van Gold, of een Overzicht van Parijs, 1834), prees hun netheid, werklust, en hoger

alle sociale moraal. Hij verklaarde dat we moeten nabootsen wat er gedaan wordt in Parijs, pleiten voor veranderingen in

de islamitische samenleving van de liberalisering van de vrouwen om de systemen van de heersende. deze gedachte, en anderen het leuk,

markeerde het begin van het opnieuw uitvinden van trend in de islam.

Precisie bij de wereldwijde oorlog tegen terreur:

Sherifa Zuhur

Zeven jaar na de in september 11, 2001 (9/11) aanvallen, veel deskundigen geloven dat al-Qaeda heeft herwonnen kracht en dat zijn copycats of filialen zijn dodelijker dan voorheen. De National Intelligence Estimate van 2007 beweerd dat Al-Qaeda is nu gevaarlijker dan voorheen 9/11.1 Al-Qaeda's emulators blijven bedreigen westerse, Midden Oosten, en Europese landen, zoals in de plot verijdeld in september 2007 in Duitsland. Bruce Riedel staten: Grotendeels dankzij gretigheid van Washington in Irak te gaan in plaats van de jacht op de leiders van al-Qaeda, de organisatie heeft nu een solide basis van de operaties in de Badlands van Pakistan en een effectieve franchise in West-Irak. Zijn bereik heeft verspreid in heel de islamitische wereld en in Europa . . . Osama bin Laden heeft een succesvolle propagandacampagne gemonteerd. . . . Zijn ideeën nu trekken meer volgers dan ooit.
Het is waar dat verschillende salafi-jihadistische organisaties nog steeds in opkomst in de hele islamitische wereld. Waarom hebben zwaar middelen reacties op het islamistisch terrorisme dat we roepen de wereldwijde jihad niet bewezen zeer effectief?
Verhuizen naar de instrumenten van “soft power,”Hoe zit het met de effectiviteit van de westerse inspanningen om moslims in de Global War on Terror versterken (GWOT)? Waarom heeft de Verenigde Staten won zo weinig “hearts and minds” in de bredere islamitische wereld? Waarom Amerikaanse strategische berichten over deze kwestie te spelen zo slecht in de regio? Waarom, ondanks brede islamitische afkeuring van extremisme, zoals weergegeven in enquêtes en officiële uitlatingen van de belangrijkste islamitische leiders, is de steun voor bin Ladin zelfs toegenomen in Jordanië en in Pakistan?
Deze monografie zal niet de oorsprong van islamitisch geweld te herzien. Het is in plaats daarvan betrekking op een soort conceptuele storing die de GWOT en die moslims weerhoudt steunen verkeerd construeert. Ze zijn niet in staat zich te identificeren met de voorgestelde transformerende tegenmaatregelen, omdat ze een deel van hun core overtuigingen en instellingen als doelwit bij onderscheiden
dit streven.
Verscheidene diep problematische trends verwarren de Amerikaanse conceptualisaties van de GWOT en de strategische boodschappen gemaakt om te vechten dat War. Deze evolueren van (1) postkoloniale politieke benaderingen van moslims en islamitische meerderheid landen die sterk verschillen en daarom produceren tegenstrijdige en verwarrende indrukken en effecten; en (2) resterende algemene onwetendheid en vooroordelen tegenover de islam en subregionale culturen. Voeg daarbij de Amerikaanse woede, angst, en angst voor de dodelijke gebeurtenissen van 9/11, en bepaalde elementen, ondanks het aandringen van het hoofd koel, houden moslims en hun religie verantwoordelijk voor de wandaden van hun geloofsgenoten, of die vinden het handig om dit te doen om politieke redenen.

Egyptische Moslimbroeders: CONFRONTATIE of integratie?

Onderzoek

De Vereniging van het succes Moslimbroeders in het november-december 2005 verkiezingen voor de Volksvergadering zond schokgolven door middel van politieke systeem van Egypte. In antwoord, het regime met harde hand op de beweging, lastiggevallen andere potentiële rivalen en zijn vliegvlug hervormingsproces omgekeerd. Dit is gevaarlijk kortzichtig. Er is reden om bezorgd te zijn over het politieke programma van de Moslimbroeders, en ze te danken aan de mensen echte opheldering over een aantal van zijn aspecten. Maar de regerende Nationale Democratische
Party's (NDP) weigering om zijn greep los te maken risico's verergeren spanningen in een tijd van zowel de politieke onzekerheid rond de presidentiële successie en ernstige sociaal-economische onrust. Hoewel dit zal waarschijnlijk een langdurige, geleidelijk proces, de regeling moet voorbereidende stappen te nemen om de deelname van de Moslimbroeders in het politieke leven te normaliseren. De Moslimbroeders, wier sociale activiteiten zijn reeds lang getolereerd, maar waarvan de rol in de formele politiek strikt beperkt, won een ongekende 20 procent van de parlementszetels in de 2005 verkiezingen. Zij deden dat ondanks concurreren voor slechts een derde van de beschikbare zitplaatsen en ondanks aanzienlijke hindernissen, inbegrip van de politie repressie en verkiezingsfraude. Dit succes bevestigt hun positie als een uiterst, overzichtelijk en diepgewortelde politieke kracht. Tegelijkertijd, Hij benadrukte dat er zwakke punten van zowel de legale oppositie en de regerende partij. Het regime zou goed hebben ingezet, dat een bescheiden toename van de parlementaire vertegenwoordiging van de Moslimbroeders kunnen worden gebruikt om stoke vrees voor een islamistische overname en daarbij dienen als een reden om kraam hervorming. Als, de strategie is op zware risico van terugslag.

Organisatorische Continuïteit in de Egyptische Moslimbroederschap

Tess Lee Eisenhart

Als oudste en meest vooraanstaande oppositiebeweging van Egypte, de Vereniging van

Moslimbroeders, al-Ikhwan al-Moeslimien, al lang een uitdaging bleef opeenvolgende seculaire
regimes door het aanbieden van een integrale visie op een islamitische staat en uitgebreid sociaal
Welzijnsdiensten. Sinds de oprichting in 1928, de Broederschap (Ichwaan) heeft bloeide in een
parallel sector religieuze en sociale diensten, algemeen vermijden directe confrontatie met
regerende regimes.1 Meer recent in de afgelopen twee decennia, echter, de Broederschap heeft
dabbled met partijdigheid in de formele politieke domein. Dit experiment culmineerde in
de verkiezing van de achtentachtig Brothers aan de Volksvergadering in 2005-de grootste
oppositionele blok in de moderne Egyptische geschiedenis en de daarop volgende arrestaties van bijna
1,000 Brothers.2 De electorale vooruitgang in de reguliere politiek biedt voldoende voeder
voor wetenschappers om te testen theorieën en voorspellingen over de toekomst van de Egyptische
regime: het zal vallen aan de islamistische oppositie en blijft een baken van secularisme in de
Arabische wereld?
Dit proefschrift schuwt het maken van dergelijke brede speculaties. In plaats daarvan, verkent

de mate waarin de Moslimbroederschap is ingericht als organisatie in het verleden
decennium.

TUSSEN GISTEREN EN VANDAAG

HASAN AL-BANNA

The First Islamic State
On the foundation of this virtuous Qur’anic social order the first Islamic state arose, having unshakeable faith in het, meticulously applying it, and spreading it throughout the world, so that the first Khilafah used to say: ‘If I should lose a camel’s lead, I would find it in Allah’s Book.’. He fought those who refused to pay zakah, regarding them as apostates because they had overthrown one of the pillars of this order, saying: ‘By Allah, if they refused me a lead which they would hand over to the Apostle of Allah (vzmh), I would fight them as soon as I have a sword in my hand!’ For unity, in all its meanings and manifestations, pervaded this new forthcoming nation.
Complete social unity arose from making the Qur’anic order and it’s language universal, while complete political unity was under the shadow of the Amir Al-Mumineen and beneath the standard of the Khilafah in the capital.
The fact that the Islamic ideology was one of decentralisation of the armed forces, the state treasuries, en provincial governors proved to be no obstacle to this, since all acted according to a single creed and a unified and comprehensive control. The Qur’anic principles dispelled and laid to rest the superstitious idolatry prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. They banished guileful Judaism and confined it to a narrow province, putting an end to its religious and political authority. They struggled with Christianity such that its influence was greatly diminished in the Asian and African continents, confined only to Europe under the guard of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Thus the Islamic state became the centre of spiritual and political dominance within the two largest continents. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Constantinople from the east and besieging it until the siege grew wearisome. Then it came at it from the west,
plunging into Spain, with its victorious soldiers reaching the heart of France and penetrating as far as northern and southern Italy. It established an imposing state in Western Europe, radiant with science and knowledge.
Afterwards, it ended the conquest of Constantinople itself and the confined Christianity within the restricted area of Central Europe. Islamic fleets ventured into the depths of the Mediterranean and Red seas, both became Islamic lakes. And so the armed forces of the Islamic state assumed supremacy of the seas both in the East and West, enjoying absolute mastery over land and sea. These Islamic nations had already combined and incorporated many things from other civilisations, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. De Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.

Het leven van Hasan al Banna & Syed Qutb.

De Moslim Broederschap (Ikhwan al Muslimeen) was founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) in the Egyptian town of al- Isma’iliyyah in 1928. The son of an Azharite scholar, who earned his livelihood by repairing watches, Hasan al-Banna showed from his early
school-days an inclination and great zeal for calling people to Islamic values and traditions. His strong sense of religiosity and spiritual awareness drove him to join the Hasafiyyah tariqah, one of many Sufi tariqahs that were widespread in Egypt at that time. Even though he was not formally associated with this tariqah after he founded the Ikhwan, he, nevertheless, maintained a good relation with it, as indeed with other Islamic organizations and religious personalities, and persisted in reciting the litanies (awrad, pl. of wird) of this tariqah until his last days. Though Hasan al-Banna joined a modern-type school of education, he promised his father that he would continue to memorize the Qur’an, which he did, in fact later, at the age of twelve. While at school, he took part in the activities of some religious associations and clubs which were promoting it and calling for the observance of Islamic teachings .

In de schaduw van een Arabische Caesar: Sayyid Qutb en de radicalisering van het moderne islamitisch fundamentalisme

Onderzoek

“We are the umma of the believers, living within a jahili society. As a community of believers we should see ourselves in a state of war with the state and the society. The territory we dwell in is the House of War.”1 These were the words of Sayyid Qutb in an Egyptian military court in April, 1966 before he and two of his companions were sentenced to death by hanging. The offense; conspiring against the government and plotting its overthrow, the evidence used by the state prosecutors in the trial, besides ‘confessions,’ a book, Qutb’s final piece of literature, Ma‘alim fi al-Turuq, Signposts.2 This study does not set out to be a thorough analysis of the political and religious ideology of Sayyid Qutb. Rather it is an attempt to identify the political and social climate in Egypt as the primary motivation which led to the development of Qutb’s radical interpretations of Islam. Notions of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism dominated the political discourse of Qutb’s Egypt and hearts and minds were enraptured by promises of its populist leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser. This chapter in Arab history from the early 1950’s until the late 1960’s is etched in historical memory as the era of pan-Arabism. Evenwel, it was also a vital period in the evolution of fundamentalist Islam into its more radical form which first expressed itself in the 1970’s and is until today at the base of radical fundamentalist Islamic thought worldwide. This piece will
demonstrate the principal role played by Sayyid Qutb in this transformation and reveal that radical interpretations of Islam were given impetus to develop in Egypt during this period due to the nature of Nasser’s regime

EGYPTE: VEILIGHEID, POLITIEKE, EN ISLAMISTISCHE UITDAGINGEN

Sherifa Zuhur

This monograph addresses three issues in contemporary Egypt: failures of governance and political development, the continued strength of Islamism, and counter terrorism. It is easier to tackle their contours in Egypt if they are considered separately. They are not, echter, separate or independent; continuing to treat them as mutually exclusive conditions will lead to further crisis down the road.
The Egyptian government forged a truce with its most troublesome Islamist militants in 1999. Evenwel, violence emerged again from new sources of Islamist militancy from 2003 into 2006. All of the previously held conclusions about the role of state strength
versus movements that led to the truce are now void as it appears that “al-Qa’idism” may continue to
plague the country or, indeed, the region as a whole.
In consequence, an important process of political liberalization was slowed, and in 3 naar 4 jaar, if not earlier, Egypt’s political security and stability will be at risk. Widespread economic and political discontent might push that date forward. In aanvulling, continuing popular support for moderate Islamism could lead to a situation where the current peace could erode if a
comprehensive peace settlement to the Palestinian- Arab-Israeli conflict is achieved, and if various other
factors were to come into play.

DE METAMORFOSE VAN DE EGYPTISCHE MOSLIMBROEDERS

Mona El-Ghobashy

Jihane al-Halafawi’s small apartment above a barbershop in Alexandria is exceedingly

orderly, a cool oasis on a sweltering summer afternoon. Plant leaves brush up against
curtains undulating with the breeze from the nearby Mediterranean. As she walks into
the living room with a tray full of cakes and tea, al-Halafawi is the picture of a kindly
Egyptian mother, a genuine smile gracing her youthful face. But when this fifty-yearold
mother of six and grandmother announced her candidacy for Egypt’s parliamentary
elections in fall 2000, the state geared up amassive security force outside polling stations;
leftists shrugged her off as a “front” for her husband; and state feminists dedicated to the
electoral empowerment of women were silent.When Halafawi outperformed her rulingparty
rival in the first round, despite rigging, the Interior Ministry promptly stepped in
and canceled the results on the pretext of respecting an earlier court ruling postponing
the elections.
Alexandria’s al-Raml district went without parliamentary representation for two years

s al-Halafawi and her legal team battled the state in the courts. Tot slot, in June 2002,
a Supreme Administrative Court ruling compelled the Interior Ministry to hold the
by-elections.On election day, security forces blockaded roads leading to polling stations,
arrested al-Halafawi’s legal team and 101 of her supporters, roughed up journalists, en
stepped aside as public-sector workers bused in from outside the district voted for her

rival. Unusually, the six o’clock news was interrupted that evening to announce the
sweeping victory of the two ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) candidates in the
Raml by-elections.1
Al-Halafawi’s experience is one dramatic piece of a larger story, the story of the

group of which she is a part: the Society of Muslim Brothers (Jamaat al-Ikhwan al-
Muslimun).2 Over the past quarter-century, the Society of Muslim Brothers (Ikhwan)
has morphed from a highly secretive, hierarchical, antidemocratic organization led by
anointed elders into a modern, multivocal political association steered by educated,

savvy professionals not unlike activists of the same age in rival Egyptian political
parties. Seventy-seven years ago, the Muslim Brothers were founded in the provincial
city of Ismailiyya by the charismatic disciplinarian and shrewd organizer Hasan al-
Banna (1906–49).

The History of the Muslim Brotherhood

Michelle Paison

We in the West !nd it incomprehensible that theological ideas still in”ame the minds of men, stirring up messianic passions that can leave societies in ruin. We had assumed that this was no longer possible,that human beings had learned to separate religious questions from political ones, that political theology died in 16h-century Europe. We were wrong.1Islam is no longer exclusively a religion, but an ideology that provides a total framework for all aspects of political, social, economic, and cultural life in the Muslim world. Although Islam has continuously demonstrated the theme of resurgence throughout its history in response to the internal and external forces that challenge Muslim faith and society, the assertion of Islamism has strongly reemerged. Discontent is evident through the gradual movement towards Islamist ideology, whether or not the idea ofIslam strongly resonates among the populous. Individuals, despondentfrom the suppression of alternatives from oppressive regimes, look towards change. Organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, provide clear examples of the greater trend developing throughout the region ofthe Middle East and North Africa. #e political power and social in”uenceheld by the Brotherhood capitalizes on the Arab Republic of Egypt’s failureto support its peoples. Subsequently the dissatis!ed population turns to a movement that has the ability to provide the necessary services for survival;Islamism. #is increasing development is pushing moderate, mainstream Islam into the realm of radicalism through means of desperation.Part of the emergence of neorevivalism, the Muslim Brotherhood,established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, saw the Islamic community at a critical crossroads and insisted that Muslims would !nd strength in the totalself-su$ciency of Islam.

The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood

Amr Al-Chobaki


The Muslim Brotherhood managed to maintain its organizational existence since its establishment in 1928, by the late Hasan Al-Banna. Throughout eight decades, it has managed to exist as a religious movement as well as a political and social organization. This, on one hand, helped it to be sufficiently strong to be distinguished from other political powers, but also made it weak and feeble in some other ways.

The Muslim Brotherhood as a movement is similar to other Egyptian political movements, as it was established at the time of the royal regime and a semi-liberal era. It clashed with the government during the time of President `Abd Al-Nasser, adapted to the regime of President Sadat, and tended to fluctuate in its relationship with President Mubarak, however, the relationship was based on partial elimination, just like the state during the age of President `Abd Al-Nasser. Moreover, it has been outlawed for most of its history; since 1954 until the present time (i.e. more than half a century).

The Muslim Brotherhood has continued to be both a witness and a party in the political and cultural dispute in Egypt and the Arab countries, throughout different historical periods; Egypt in the time of the royal regime and in the time of the republic with its three stages. This dispute was about issues of identity and cultural belonging, the relationship between the religion – on one hand – and politics, the East and the West on the other hand, as well as the coming and the inherited. The Muslim Brotherhood had a flexible political and intellectual reference that gave it a comprehensive conception of Islam.

Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Dr. Israel Elad Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last twoyears has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up fordissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to takeinitiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The EgyptianMuslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a politicalorganization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities and new risks.Western governments, including the government of the United States, are consideringthe MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advancedemocracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Couldthe Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice andDevelopment Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), twoIslamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules ofliberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with,respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handledthe ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the pasttwo years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to newcircumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has itreacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign? How has itnavigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forceson the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? Towhat extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt toward liberaldemocracy?

Will Politics Tame Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood?

NEIL MacFARQUHAR


CAIRO, Dec. 7 – When stumping through the port city of Alexandria, whose crumbling mansions and rickety tram lines evoke long-faded glory, Sobhe Saleh of the Muslim Brotherhood vowed he had a different vision for Egypt’s future.

“If Islam were applied, no one would be hungry,” he roared recently to a crowd of fully veiled women ululating with joy. “Islam is a religion of construction. Islam is a religion of investment. Islam is a religion of development.”

Religion, in fact, should profoundly alter both Egypt’s domestic and foreign policy, said Mr. Saleh, a 52-year-old lawyer with a clipped helmet of steel-gray hair.

“If Islam were applied, the television would not show us prostitution and people lacking all decency!” he declared. “If Islam were applied, Iraq could not have been invaded, Israel could not occupy Jerusalem, and aggression could not have been used to humiliate Muslims everywhere!”

A long-expected day of reckoning is at hand in Egyptian politics now that the Brotherhood, an illegal organization with a violent past, is entering the corridors of power for the first time in significant numbers.

The outcome of the freest election in more than 50 years could determine whether political Islam will turn Egypt into a repressive, anti-American theocracy or if Islamic parties across the Arab world will themselves be transformed by participating in mainstream politics.

No sudden earthquake is expected. But initial results from the final round of voting on Wednesday showed that the Brotherhood had gained at least 12 more seats to bring its total to 88, with seven races from all three rounds still unsettled, according to a spokesman. That is five times the 17 seats the group won in 2000.

Democratization and Islamic Politics:

YOKOTA Takayuki�

The aim of this article is to explore the often contradictory correlation between democratizationand Islamic politics in Egypt, focusing on a new Islamic political party, the Wasat Party (Ḥizbal-Wasaṭ).Theoretically, democratization and Islamic politics are not incompatible if Islamic politicalorganizations can and do operate within a legal and democratic framework. On the other hand,this requires democratic tolerance by governments for Islamic politics, as long as they continueto act within a legal framework. In the Middle East, however, Islamic political parties are oftensuspected of having undemocratic agendas, and governments have often used this suspicion as ajustification to curb democratization. This is also the case with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood(Jam‘īya al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) under the Ḥusnī Mubārak regime. Although the Brotherhood is amainstream Islamic movement in Egypt, operating publicly and enjoying considerable popularity,successive governments have never changed its illegal status for more than half a century. Someof the Brotherhood members decided to form the Wasat Party as its legal political organ in order tobreak this stalemate.There have been some studies on the Wasat Party. Stacher [2002] analyzes the “Platformof the Egyptian Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Miṣrī 1998] and explains the basic principlesof the Wasat Party as follows: democracy, sharī‘a (Islamic law), rights of women, and Muslim-Christian relations. Baker [2003] regards the Wasat Party as one of the new Islamist groups thathave appeared in contemporary Egypt, and analyzes its ideology accordingly. Wickham [2004]discusses the moderation of Islamic movements in Egypt and the attempt to form the WasatParty from the perspective of comparative politics. Norton [2005] examines the ideology andactivities of the Wasat Party in connection with the Brotherhood’s political activities. As theseearlier studies are mainly concerned with the Wasat Party during the 1990s and the early 2000s,I will examine the ideology and activities of the Wasat Party till the rise of the democratizationmovement in Egypt in around 2005. I will do so on the basis of the Wasat Party’s documents, suchas the “Platform of the New Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Jadīd 2004]1), and my interviews withits members.

ISLAMISM IN SOUTHERN EGYPT

James Toth

For years, religious violence and terrorism in Middle Eastern countries such as Egypthave splashed across the headlines and surged across the screen, announcing yet anotherround of senseless death and destruction. While Arabists and Islamicists attemptto pick their way carefully through the ideological and intellectual minefields to makesense of what is happening, the wider public generally disregards their insights andinstead sticks to what it knows best: deeply ingrained prejudices and biases. Egyptian,Arab, Muslim—all are painted in a very unfavorable light. Even in Egypt, manybystanders show the same sorry prejudices. In the end, people simply blame the brutalityon inexplicable backward religious ideas and then move on.Yet comprehending terrorism and violence in places such as Egypt by recourse toan unnuanced religious fundamentalism is generally acknowledged not only to begthe question of why these events actually happen, but also to lead to misunderstandingsand misperceptions, and perhaps even to exacerbating existing tensions.1 Mostscholars agree that such seemingly “irrational” social behavior instead needs to beplaced in its appropriate context to be properly understood, and hence made rational.Analyzing these actions, then, involves situating this violence and destruction in theireconomic, political, and ideological milieu as these have developed historically, forthis so-called Islamic terrorism does not merely arise, ex nihilo, out of a timeless void.What follows, then, is one case study of one portion of the Islamic movement as itemerged principally in southern Egypt and as it was revealed through anthropologicalfieldwork conducted in one of this region’s major cities. This account takes a completelydifferent direction from that of stigmatizing this movement as a sordid collectionof terrorist organizations hell bent on the senseless destruction of Egypt and itsIslamic civilization.2 Because this view is somewhat at odds with the perceptions oflocal spectators, Egyptians in Cairo, and non–Egyptians inside and outside the country,I go to some length not only to discuss the movement itself but also to shed lighton why it might have received such negative publicity.