RSSが付けられているすべてのエントリー: "ハッサンアルバンナ"

アラブ明日

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

10月 6, 1981, エジプトでのお祝いの日になることを意図していた. これは、3回のアラブ-イスラエル紛争におけるエジプトの最も壮大な勝利の瞬間の記念日でした。, 国の弱者軍がスエズ運河を横切って開通したとき 1973 第四次中東戦争とイスラエル軍の撤退. クールに, 雲ひとつない朝, カイロスタジアムは、軍の支柱を見に来たエジプトの家族でいっぱいでした。, アンワルエルサダト大統領,戦争の建築家, 男性と機械が彼の前をパレードするのを満足して見守っていた. 私は近くにいました, 新しく到着した外国特派員突然。, アクロバティックなパフォーマンスで6機のミラージュジェットが頭上を吠えたのと同じように、軍用トラックの1台がレビュースタンドの真正面で停止しました。, 赤の長い道で空を描く, 黄, 紫の,と緑の煙. サダトは立ち上がった, どうやらエジプト軍のさらに別の部隊と敬礼を交換する準備をしている. 彼はトラックから飛び降りた4人のイスラム教徒の暗殺者の完璧な標的になりました, 表彰台を襲った, 殺人者たちが永遠のように思われることを続けて、スタンドに致命的な火を吹きかけたので、彼の体を弾丸でいっぱいにしました。, 私は一瞬、地面にぶつかってパニックに陥った観客に踏みにじられて死ぬ危険を冒すのか、それとも足を踏み入れたままで迷走する危険を冒すのかを考えました。. 本能は私に私の足にとどまるように言った, ジャーナリズムの義務感から、サダトが生きているのか死んでいるのかを調べに行くようになりました。.

イスラム改革

して、Adnan Khanさん

イタリアの首相, シルヴィオ・ベルルスコーニは、 9/11:
「…私​​たちは自分たちの文明の優位性を認識しなければなりません, 保証しているシステム

幸福, 人権の尊重と – イスラム国とは対照的 – 尊敬する

宗教的および政治的権利のために, 多様性を理解する価値観を持つシステム

そして寛容…西洋は人々を征服する, 共産主義を征服したように, たとえそれが

別の文明との対立を意味する, イスラムのもの, その場で立ち往生

1,400 何年も前に…」1

そして、 2007 RAND研究所が宣言した報告:
「イスラム世界の大部分で進行中の闘争は、本質的には戦争です。

アイデア. その結果は、イスラム世界の将来の方向性を決定するでしょう。」

穏健なイスラム教徒ネットワークの構築, ランド研究所

「イスラ」の概念 (改革) イスラム教徒には知られていない概念です. それはずっと存在しなかった

イスラム文明の歴史; それは決して議論されず、考慮さえされませんでした. クラシックの概要

イスラム文学は、古典学者がウスルの基礎を築いたとき、, 成文化された

彼らのイスラム教の裁定 (フィク) 彼らは、イスラム教の規則を理解することだけに目を向けていました。

それらを適用する. ハディースの規則が定められたとき、同様の状況が発生しました, タフシールと

アラビア語. 学者, イスラムの歴史を通じて思想家や知識人は多くの時間を費やしました

アッラーの啓示 – クルアーンを理解し、現実にアヤートを適用し、造語

理解を容易にするための原則と分野. したがって、クルアーンは依然として

研究と進化したすべての分野は常にクルアーンに基づいていました. になった人たち

イスラム教徒の哲学者やムアジラの中からの何人かなどのギリシア哲学に打たれた

クルアーンが彼らの研究の基礎ではなくなったため、彼らはイスラム教から離れたと考えられていた. したがって、

規則を推測しようとしたり、特定の事柄に対してどのような立場を取るべきかを理解しようとするムスリム

クルアーンを発行することは、この研究の基礎です.

イスラム教を改革する最初の試みは、19 世紀の変わり目に行われました。. の順番で

20 世紀、ウンマは長期にわたる衰退期にあり、世界的な力のバランスが変化した

キラファからイギリスへ. 西ヨーロッパが侵攻している間、山積みの問題がキラファを飲み込んだ

産業革命の真っ只中. ウンマはイスラームに対する純粋な理解を失うようになった, と

ウスマニ家を飲み込む衰退を逆転させようとして (オスマン帝国) 何人かのイスラム教徒が派遣された

ウェスト, その結果、彼らが見たものに心を奪われた. エジプトのリファア ラフィ アル タハタウィ (1801-1873),

彼がパリから戻ったとき, Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz という伝記の本を書きました (The

金の抽出, またはパリの概要, 1834), 彼らの清潔さを称賛する, 仕事への愛, 以上

すべての社会道徳. 彼は、パリで行われていることを真似しなければならないと宣言した, ~への変更を提唱する

女性の自由化から支配システムへのイスラム社会. この思い, そして他の人はそれが好き,

イスラームにおける再発明の傾向の始まりを示した.

精度のTHE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

9月から7年 11, 2001 (9/11) 攻撃, 多くの専門家は、アルカイダが力を取り戻し、その模倣者または関連会社が以前よりも致命的であると信じています. の国家諜報活動の見積もり 2007 アルカーイダは以前よりも危険であると主張した 9/11.1 アルカーイダのエミュレーターは引き続き西洋を脅かしている, 中東, およびヨーロッパ諸国, 9月に失敗したプロットのように 2007 ドイツ語に. ブルース・リーデルは述べています: アルカイダの指導者を追い詰めるのではなく、イラクに行きたがっているワシントンの熱意に主に感謝します, 組織は現在、パキスタンのバッドランズに強固な事業基盤を持ち、イラク西部に効果的なフランチャイズを持っています。. その範囲はイスラム世界全体とヨーロッパに広がっています . . . オサマビンラーディンは成功した宣伝キャンペーンを開始しました. . . . 彼のアイデアは今まで以上に多くのフォロワーを引き付けています.
さまざまなサラフィージハード主義組織がイスラム世界全体でまだ出現しているのは事実です. 私たちがグローバルなジハードと呼んでいるイスラム教徒のテロに対する多大なリソースのある対応が、非常に効果的であることが証明されていないのはなぜですか?
「ソフトパワー」のツールへの移行,」対テロ戦争でイスラム教徒を強化するための西側の取り組みの有効性についてはどうでしょうか。 (GWOT)? なぜ米国はより広いイスラム世界でこれほど少ない「心と精神」を獲得したのか? この問題に関するアメリカの戦略的メッセージがこの地域でそれほどひどく再生されるのはなぜですか? なぜ, 主要なイスラム教徒の指導者による調査と公式の発言に示されているように、イスラム教徒による過激主義の広範な不承認にもかかわらず, ビンラーディンへの支持は実際にヨルダンとパキスタンで増加しました?
このモノグラフは、イスラム教徒の暴力の起源を再考することはありません. 代わりに、それはGWOTを誤って構築し、イスラム教徒がそれを支持することを思いとどまらせる一種の概念的失敗に関係している。. 彼らは、彼らの核となる信念や制度のいくつかをターゲットとして認識しているため、提案された変革的対抗策を特定することができません。
この努力.
いくつかの深刻な問題のある傾向は、GWOTのアメリカの概念化と、その戦争と戦うために作成された戦略的メッセージを混乱させます. これらはから進化します (1) 大きく異なり、したがって対立し混乱する印象と影響を生み出すイスラム教徒とイスラム教徒の大多数の国への植民地後の政治的アプローチ; と (2) イスラム教と小地域の文化に対する残りの一般化された無知と偏見. このアメリカ人の怒りに加えて, 恐れ, との致命的なイベントについての不安 9/11, と特定の要素, クーラーヘッドの促しにもかかわらず, イスラム教徒とその宗教に彼らの共宗教主義者の悪行の責任を負わせる, または政治的な理由でそうすることが有用だと思う人.

エジプトのイスラム教徒の兄弟: 対決または統合?

研究

11月から12月のムスリム同胞団の成功 2005 人民議会の選挙は、エジプトの政治システムを通じて衝撃波を送りました. に応じて, 政権は運動を取り締まった, 他の潜在的なライバルに嫌がらせをし、その駆け出しの改革プロセスを逆転させた. これは危険な近視眼的です. ムスリム同胞団の政治計画について懸念する理由があります, そして彼らはその側面のいくつかについて人々に本物の説明をする義務があります. しかし、与党の国民民主主義者
パーティーの (NDP) 握力を緩めることを拒否することは、大統領の継承を取り巻く政治的不確実性と深刻な社会経済的不安の両方の時に緊張を悪化させるリスクがある. これはおそらく長期化するでしょうが, 段階的なプロセス, 政権は、ムスリム同胞団の政治生活への参加を正常化するための準備措置を講じる必要があります. ムスリム同胞団, その社会的活動は長い間容認されてきたが、正式な政治におけるその役割は厳しく制限されている, 前例のない勝利 20 の議会の議席のパーセント 2005 選挙. 彼らは利用可能な座席の3分の1だけを争い、かなりの障害にもかかわらずそうしました, 警察の弾圧と不正選挙を含む. この成功は、非常によく組織され、深く根付いた政治勢力としての彼らの立場を確認しました. 同時に, それは、法的な野党と与党の両方の弱点を強調した. 政権は、ムスリム同胞団の議会代表の適度な増加がイスラム教徒の乗っ取りの恐れをかき立て、それによって改革を停滞させる理由として役立つ可能性があることを賭けていたかもしれません. もしそうなら, 戦略は逆火のリスクが高い.

エジプトのムスリム同胞団の組織継続

テスリーEisenhart

エジプトで最も古く、最も顕著な野党運動として, 学会

ムスリム兄弟, アルイクワンアルムスリム, 長い間、世俗的
イスラム国家と広範な社会の包括的なビジョンを提供することによって体制
福祉サービス. 創業以来 1928, 兄弟愛 (兄弟) で繁栄しました
並行する宗教および社会サービス部門, 一般的に直接の対立を避ける
支配体制。1最近では過去20年間, しかし、, 同胞団は
正式な政治領域における党派主義に手を出して. この実験は最高潮に達しました
2005年の人民議会への88人の兄弟の選挙
現代エジプトの歴史における反対勢力のブロックとそれに続くほぼすべての逮捕
1,000 Brothers.2主流の政治への選挙の進展は十分な食料を提供します
学者が理論を検証し、エジプトの将来について予測するため
政権: それはイスラム教徒の反対勢力に落ちるか、世俗主義の標識のまま
アラブ世界?
この論文は、そのような幅広い推測を行うことから遠ざかっています. 代わりに, 探検する

ムスリム同胞団が過去に組織として適応させてきた範囲
十年.

昨日と今日の間

HASAN AL-BANNA

The First Islamic State
On the foundation of this virtuous Qur’anic social order the first Islamic state arose, having unshakeable faith in それ, meticulously applying it, and spreading it throughout the world, so that the first Khilafah used to say: ‘If I should lose a camel’s lead, I would find it in Allah’s Book.’. He fought those who refused to pay zakah, regarding them as apostates because they had overthrown one of the pillars of this order, saying: ‘By Allah, if they refused me a lead which they would hand over to the Apostle of Allah (PBUH), I would fight them as soon as I have a sword in my hand!’ For unity, in all its meanings and manifestations, pervaded this new forthcoming nation.
Complete social unity arose from making the Qur’anic order and it’s language universal, while complete political unity was under the shadow of the Amir Al-Mumineen and beneath the standard of the Khilafah in the capital.
The fact that the Islamic ideology was one of decentralisation of the armed forces, the state treasuries, と provincial governors proved to be no obstacle to this, since all acted according to a single creed and a unified and comprehensive control. The Qur’anic principles dispelled and laid to rest the superstitious idolatry prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. They banished guileful Judaism and confined it to a narrow province, putting an end to its religious and political authority. They struggled with Christianity such that its influence was greatly diminished in the Asian and African continents, confined only to Europe under the guard of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Thus the Islamic state became the centre of spiritual and political dominance within the two largest continents. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Constantinople from the east and besieging it until the siege grew wearisome. Then it came at it from the west,
plunging into Spain, with its victorious soldiers reaching the heart of France and penetrating as far as northern and southern Italy. It established an imposing state in Western Europe, radiant with science and knowledge.
その後, it ended the conquest of Constantinople itself and the confined Christianity within the restricted area of Central Europe. Islamic fleets ventured into the depths of the Mediterranean and Red seas, both became Islamic lakes. And so the armed forces of the Islamic state assumed supremacy of the seas both in the East and West, enjoying absolute mastery over land and sea. These Islamic nations had already combined and incorporated many things from other civilisations, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. The Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.

ハサンアルバンナの生活 & Syed Qutb.

ムスリム同胞団 (Ikhwan al Muslimeen) Hasanal-Bannaによって設立されました (1906-1949) アルのエジプトの町で- Isma’iliyyah in 1928. アズハライト学者の息子, 時計を修理して生計を立てた人, ハサンアルバンナは彼の初期から示した
学生時代、人々にイスラムの価値観と伝統を呼びかける傾向と熱意. 彼の強い信心深さと精神的な意識が彼をハサフィヤタリーカに参加させました, 当時エジプトで広まった多くのスーフィーのタリーカの1つ. イフワーンを設立した後、彼はこのタリーカと正式に関係していませんでしたが, 彼, それにもかかわらず, それとの良好な関係を維持しました, 確かに他のイスラム組織や宗教的人格と同じように, 連祷を暗唱し続けた (awrad, pl. 多くの場合) 彼の最後の日までこのタリーカの. ハサンアルバンナは現代型の教育学校に入学しましたが, 彼は父親にコーランを暗記し続けると約束しました, 彼はそれをしました, 実際後で, 12歳で. 在学中, 彼はそれを促進し、イスラム教の教えの遵守を要求しているいくつかの宗教団体やクラブの活動に参加しました .

アラブシーザーの影で: サイイド・クトゥブと現代イスラム原理主義の急進化

研究

“We are the umma of the believers, living within a jahili society. As a community of believers we should see ourselves in a state of war with the state and the society. The territory we dwell in is the House of War.”1 These were the words of Sayyid Qutb in an Egyptian military court in April, 1966 before he and two of his companions were sentenced to death by hanging. The offense; conspiring against the government and plotting its overthrow, the evidence used by the state prosecutors in the trial, besides ‘confessions,’ a book, Qutb’s final piece of literature, Ma‘alim fi al-Turuq, Signposts.2 This study does not set out to be a thorough analysis of the political and religious ideology of Sayyid Qutb. Rather it is an attempt to identify the political and social climate in Egypt as the primary motivation which led to the development of Qutb’s radical interpretations of Islam. Notions of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism dominated the political discourse of Qutb’s Egypt and hearts and minds were enraptured by promises of its populist leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser. This chapter in Arab history from the early 1950’s until the late 1960’s is etched in historical memory as the era of pan-Arabism. しかし、, it was also a vital period in the evolution of fundamentalist Islam into its more radical form which first expressed itself in the 1970’s and is until today at the base of radical fundamentalist Islamic thought worldwide. This piece will
demonstrate the principal role played by Sayyid Qutb in this transformation and reveal that radical interpretations of Islam were given impetus to develop in Egypt during this period due to the nature of Nasser’s regime

エジプト: 安全, 政治的, とイスラム主義の課題

Sherifa Zuhur

This monograph addresses three issues in contemporary Egypt: failures of governance and political development, the continued strength of Islamism, and counter terrorism. It is easier to tackle their contours in Egypt if they are considered separately. They are not, しかし、, separate or independent; continuing to treat them as mutually exclusive conditions will lead to further crisis down the road.
The Egyptian government forged a truce with its most troublesome Islamist militants in 1999. しかし、, violence emerged again from new sources of Islamist militancy from 2003 into 2006. All of the previously held conclusions about the role of state strength
versus movements that led to the truce are now void as it appears that “al-Qa’idism” may continue to
plague the country or, 確かに, the region as a whole.
In consequence, an important process of political liberalization was slowed, とで 3 に 4 年, if not earlier, Egypt’s political security and stability will be at risk. Widespread economic and political discontent might push that date forward. 加えて, continuing popular support for moderate Islamism could lead to a situation where the current peace could erode if a
comprehensive peace settlement to the Palestinian- Arab-Israeli conflict is achieved, and if various other
factors were to come into play.

エジプトのイスラム教徒の兄弟の変態

モナエルGhobashy

Jihane al-Halafawi’s small apartment above a barbershop in Alexandria is exceedingly

orderly, a cool oasis on a sweltering summer afternoon. Plant leaves brush up against
curtains undulating with the breeze from the nearby Mediterranean. As she walks into
the living room with a tray full of cakes and tea, al-Halafawi is the picture of a kindly
Egyptian mother, a genuine smile gracing her youthful face. But when this fifty-yearold
mother of six and grandmother announced her candidacy for Egypt’s parliamentary
elections in fall 2000, the state geared up amassive security force outside polling stations;
leftists shrugged her off as a “front” for her husband; and state feminists dedicated to the
electoral empowerment of women were silent.When Halafawi outperformed her rulingparty
rival in the first round, despite rigging, the Interior Ministry promptly stepped in
and canceled the results on the pretext of respecting an earlier court ruling postponing
the elections.
Alexandria’s al-Raml district went without parliamentary representation for two years

s al-Halafawi and her legal team battled the state in the courts. ついに, in June 2002,
a Supreme Administrative Court ruling compelled the Interior Ministry to hold the
by-elections.On election day, security forces blockaded roads leading to polling stations,
arrested al-Halafawi’s legal team and 101 of her supporters, roughed up journalists, と
stepped aside as public-sector workers bused in from outside the district voted for her

rival. Unusually, the six o’clock news was interrupted that evening to announce the
sweeping victory of the two ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) candidates in the
Raml by-elections.1
Al-Halafawi’s experience is one dramatic piece of a larger story, the story of the

group of which she is a part: the Society of Muslim Brothers (Jamaat al-Ikhwan al-
Muslimun).2 Over the past quarter-century, the Society of Muslim Brothers (Ikhwan)
has morphed from a highly secretive, hierarchical, antidemocratic organization led by
anointed elders into a modern, multivocal political association steered by educated,

savvy professionals not unlike activists of the same age in rival Egyptian political
parties. Seventy-seven years ago, the Muslim Brothers were founded in the provincial
city of Ismailiyya by the charismatic disciplinarian and shrewd organizer Hasan al-
Banna (1906–49).

The History of the Muslim Brotherhood

Michelle Paison

We in the West !nd it incomprehensible that theological ideas still in”ame the minds of men, stirring up messianic passions that can leave societies in ruin. We had assumed that this was no longer possible,that human beings had learned to separate religious questions from political ones, that political theology died in 16h-century Europe. We were wrong.1Islam is no longer exclusively a religion, but an ideology that provides a total framework for all aspects of political, social, economic, and cultural life in the Muslim world. Although Islam has continuously demonstrated the theme of resurgence throughout its history in response to the internal and external forces that challenge Muslim faith and society, the assertion of Islamism has strongly reemerged. Discontent is evident through the gradual movement towards Islamist ideology, whether or not the idea ofIslam strongly resonates among the populous. Individuals, despondentfrom the suppression of alternatives from oppressive regimes, look towards change. Organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, provide clear examples of the greater trend developing throughout the region ofthe Middle East and North Africa. #e political power and social in”uenceheld by the Brotherhood capitalizes on the Arab Republic of Egypt’s failureto support its peoples. Subsequently the dissatis!ed population turns to a movement that has the ability to provide the necessary services for survival;Islamism. #is increasing development is pushing moderate, mainstream Islam into the realm of radicalism through means of desperation.Part of the emergence of neorevivalism, the Muslim Brotherhood,established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, saw the Islamic community at a critical crossroads and insisted that Muslims would !nd strength in the totalself-su$ciency of Islam.

The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood

Amr Al-Chobaki


The Muslim Brotherhood managed to maintain its organizational existence since its establishment in 1928, by the late Hasan Al-Banna. Throughout eight decades, it has managed to exist as a religious movement as well as a political and social organization. This, on one hand, helped it to be sufficiently strong to be distinguished from other political powers, but also made it weak and feeble in some other ways.

The Muslim Brotherhood as a movement is similar to other Egyptian political movements, as it was established at the time of the royal regime and a semi-liberal era. It clashed with the government during the time of President `Abd Al-Nasser, adapted to the regime of President Sadat, and tended to fluctuate in its relationship with President Mubarak, however, the relationship was based on partial elimination, just like the state during the age of President `Abd Al-Nasser. Moreover, it has been outlawed for most of its history; since 1954 until the present time (i.e. more than half a century).

The Muslim Brotherhood has continued to be both a witness and a party in the political and cultural dispute in Egypt and the Arab countries, throughout different historical periods; Egypt in the time of the royal regime and in the time of the republic with its three stages. This dispute was about issues of identity and cultural belonging, the relationship between the religion – on one hand – and politics, the East and the West on the other hand, as well as the coming and the inherited. The Muslim Brotherhood had a flexible political and intellectual reference that gave it a comprehensive conception of Islam.

Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Dr. Israel Elad Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last twoyears has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up fordissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to takeinitiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The EgyptianMuslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a politicalorganization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities and new risks.Western governments, including the government of the United States, are consideringthe MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advancedemocracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Couldthe Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice andDevelopment Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), twoIslamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules ofliberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with,respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handledthe ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the pasttwo years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to newcircumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has itreacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign? How has itnavigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forceson the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? Towhat extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt toward liberaldemocracy?

Will Politics Tame Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood?

NEIL MacFARQUHAR


CAIRO, Dec. 7 – When stumping through the port city of Alexandria, whose crumbling mansions and rickety tram lines evoke long-faded glory, Sobhe Saleh of the Muslim Brotherhood vowed he had a different vision for Egypt’s future.

“If Islam were applied, no one would be hungry,” he roared recently to a crowd of fully veiled women ululating with joy. “Islam is a religion of construction. Islam is a religion of investment. Islam is a religion of development.”

Religion, in fact, should profoundly alter both Egypt’s domestic and foreign policy, said Mr. Saleh, a 52-year-old lawyer with a clipped helmet of steel-gray hair.

“If Islam were applied, the television would not show us prostitution and people lacking all decency!” he declared. “If Islam were applied, Iraq could not have been invaded, Israel could not occupy Jerusalem, and aggression could not have been used to humiliate Muslims everywhere!”

A long-expected day of reckoning is at hand in Egyptian politics now that the Brotherhood, an illegal organization with a violent past, is entering the corridors of power for the first time in significant numbers.

The outcome of the freest election in more than 50 years could determine whether political Islam will turn Egypt into a repressive, anti-American theocracy or if Islamic parties across the Arab world will themselves be transformed by participating in mainstream politics.

No sudden earthquake is expected. But initial results from the final round of voting on Wednesday showed that the Brotherhood had gained at least 12 more seats to bring its total to 88, with seven races from all three rounds still unsettled, according to a spokesman. That is five times the 17 seats the group won in 2000.

Democratization and Islamic Politics:

YOKOTA Takayuki�

The aim of this article is to explore the often contradictory correlation between democratizationand Islamic politics in Egypt, focusing on a new Islamic political party, the Wasat Party (Ḥizbal-Wasaṭ).Theoretically, democratization and Islamic politics are not incompatible if Islamic politicalorganizations can and do operate within a legal and democratic framework. On the other hand,this requires democratic tolerance by governments for Islamic politics, as long as they continueto act within a legal framework. In the Middle East, however, Islamic political parties are oftensuspected of having undemocratic agendas, and governments have often used this suspicion as ajustification to curb democratization. This is also the case with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood(Jam‘īya al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) under the Ḥusnī Mubārak regime. Although the Brotherhood is amainstream Islamic movement in Egypt, operating publicly and enjoying considerable popularity,successive governments have never changed its illegal status for more than half a century. Someof the Brotherhood members decided to form the Wasat Party as its legal political organ in order tobreak this stalemate.There have been some studies on the Wasat Party. Stacher [2002] analyzes the “Platformof the Egyptian Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Miṣrī 1998] and explains the basic principlesof the Wasat Party as follows: democracy, sharī‘a (Islamic law), rights of women, and Muslim-Christian relations. Baker [2003] regards the Wasat Party as one of the new Islamist groups thathave appeared in contemporary Egypt, and analyzes its ideology accordingly. Wickham [2004]discusses the moderation of Islamic movements in Egypt and the attempt to form the WasatParty from the perspective of comparative politics. Norton [2005] examines the ideology andactivities of the Wasat Party in connection with the Brotherhood’s political activities. As theseearlier studies are mainly concerned with the Wasat Party during the 1990s and the early 2000s,I will examine the ideology and activities of the Wasat Party till the rise of the democratizationmovement in Egypt in around 2005. I will do so on the basis of the Wasat Party’s documents, suchas the “Platform of the New Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Jadīd 2004]1), and my interviews withits members.

ISLAMISM IN SOUTHERN EGYPT

James Toth

For years, religious violence and terrorism in Middle Eastern countries such as Egypthave splashed across the headlines and surged across the screen, announcing yet anotherround of senseless death and destruction. While Arabists and Islamicists attemptto pick their way carefully through the ideological and intellectual minefields to makesense of what is happening, the wider public generally disregards their insights andinstead sticks to what it knows best: deeply ingrained prejudices and biases. Egyptian,Arab, Muslim—all are painted in a very unfavorable light. Even in Egypt, manybystanders show the same sorry prejudices. In the end, people simply blame the brutalityon inexplicable backward religious ideas and then move on.Yet comprehending terrorism and violence in places such as Egypt by recourse toan unnuanced religious fundamentalism is generally acknowledged not only to begthe question of why these events actually happen, but also to lead to misunderstandingsand misperceptions, and perhaps even to exacerbating existing tensions.1 Mostscholars agree that such seemingly “irrational” social behavior instead needs to beplaced in its appropriate context to be properly understood, and hence made rational.Analyzing these actions, then, involves situating this violence and destruction in theireconomic, political, and ideological milieu as these have developed historically, forthis so-called Islamic terrorism does not merely arise, ex nihilo, out of a timeless void.What follows, then, is one case study of one portion of the Islamic movement as itemerged principally in southern Egypt and as it was revealed through anthropologicalfieldwork conducted in one of this region’s major cities. This account takes a completelydifferent direction from that of stigmatizing this movement as a sordid collectionof terrorist organizations hell bent on the senseless destruction of Egypt and itsIslamic civilization.2 Because this view is somewhat at odds with the perceptions oflocal spectators, Egyptians in Cairo, and non–Egyptians inside and outside the country,I go to some length not only to discuss the movement itself but also to shed lighton why it might have received such negative publicity.