所有条目标记为: "哈马斯"
阿拉伯明天
大卫·B. OTTAWAY
十月 6, 1981, 本来是在埃及庆祝的一天. 它标志着埃及在三项阿以冲突中取得最伟大胜利的周年纪念日, 在开国之日，该国的失败者军队冲过苏伊士运河 1973 赎罪日战争，使以色列军队退缩. 酷, 万里无云的早晨, 开罗体育馆里挤满了埃及家庭，他们前来参观是为了看准军事力量。, 总统安瓦尔·萨达特,战争的建筑师, 人和机器在他面前游行时满意地看着. 我在附近, 刚到的外国记者, 六架幻影喷气式飞机在杂技表演中高高呼啸，其中一辆军车直接停在了检阅台前, 用长长的红色画天空, 黄色, 紫色,和绿色的烟雾. 萨达特站了起来, 显然准备与另一支埃及军队交换礼炮. 他使自己成为四名从卡车上跳下来的伊斯兰刺客的理想目标。, 冲上领奖台, 随着子弹的杀手不断地向他们的致命之火喷洒架子, 我考虑了一下是跌倒在地，冒着被惊恐的观众踩死的危险，还是保持脚步并冒着流弹的风险. 本能告诉我要站稳脚跟, 我的新闻责任感促使我去寻找萨达特是活着还是死了.
伊斯兰妇女在被占巴勒斯坦的行动
Khaled Amayreh的采访
Sameera Al-Halayka 访谈
Sameera Al-Halayka is an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. 她
出生在希伯伦附近的肖尤赫村 1964. 她拥有伊斯兰教法学士学位 (伊斯兰
法理) 来自希伯伦大学. 她曾是一名记者 1996 至 2006 什么时候
she entered the Palestinian Legislative Council as an elected member in the 2006 选举.
她已婚并育有七个孩子.
问: 在一些西方国家，女性接受的普遍印象
伊斯兰抵抗组织内的低劣待遇, 比如哈马斯. 这是真的?
哈马斯如何对待女性活动家?
穆斯林妇女的权利和义务首先来自伊斯兰教法或法律.
它们不是我们从哈马斯或任何人那里收到的自愿或慈善行为或姿态
别的. 因此, 就政治参与和行动而言, 女性一般都有
与男性相同的权利和义务. 毕竟, 女性至少弥补 50 的百分比
社会. 在某种意义上, 他们是整个社会，因为他们生, 并提高,
新一代.
所以, 我可以说，哈马斯内部的妇女地位完全符合她的要求
在伊斯兰教本身的地位. 这意味着她是各个级别的全面合作伙伴. 的确, 这将是
对伊斯兰教徒来说是不公平和不公正的 (或伊斯兰主义者，如果你愿意) 女人成为痛苦的伙伴
而她被排除在决策过程之外. 这就是为什么女人扮演的角色
哈马斯一直在开拓.
问: 您是否觉得哈马斯内部出现女性政治激进主义是
符合古典伊斯兰概念的自然发展
关于妇女的地位和作用, 还是仅仅是对
现代性的压力和政治行动的要求以及持续的
以色列占领?
伊斯兰法学和哈马斯宪章中没有任何文字禁止女性
政治参与. 我相信事实正好相反 — 有许多古兰经经文
和先知穆罕默德的格言敦促妇女积极参与政治和公共事务
影响穆斯林的问题. 但对于女性来说，这也是事实, 就像男人一样, 政治活动
不是强制性的，而是自愿的, 并且很大程度上取决于每个女人的能力,
资格和个人情况. 尽管如此, 关心公众
每个穆斯林男人和女人都必须遵守. 先知
穆罕默德说: “不关心穆斯林事务的人不是穆斯林。”
而且, 巴勒斯坦伊斯兰主义妇女必须将实地的所有客观因素纳入
决定是否加入政治或参与政治活动时的帐户.
职业, 殖民主义, 种族隔离?
人类科学研究委员会
南非人文科学研究委员会委托进行这项研究，以检验 John Dugard 教授在 1 月份提交给联合国人权理事会的报告中提出的假设 2007, 以联合国以色列占领的巴勒斯坦领土人权状况特别报告员的身份 (即, 西岸, 包括东耶路撒冷, 和
加沙, 以后选择). Dugard教授提出了这个问题: 以色列显然是对被占领土的军事占领. 同时, 占领的因素构成殖民主义和种族隔离的形式, 违反国际法的. 具有殖民主义和种族隔离特征的长期占领政权对被占领人民的法律后果是什么, 占领国和第三国?
为了考虑这些后果, 这项研究旨在合法地检查杜加德教授问题的前提: 以色列是 OPT 的占领者吗, 和, 如果是这样, 它对这些领土的占领是否构成殖民主义或种族隔离? 鉴于其痛苦的种族隔离历史，南非对这些问题有着明显的兴趣, 这意味着否认自决
对其大多数人口和, 在占领纳米比亚期间, 将种族隔离扩大到南非有效地寻求殖民的领土. 这些非法做法绝不能在其他地方复制: 其他民族绝不能像南非和纳米比亚人民那样遭受苦难.
探索这些问题, 组建了一个国际学者团队. 该项目的目的是从国际法的无党派角度审视局势, 而不是参与政治话语和修辞. 这项研究是为期 15 个月的深入研究协作过程的结果, 咨询, 写作和审查. 它总结和, 这是值得期待的, 有说服力地论证并清楚地表明，以色列, 自从 1967, 一直是 OPT 的交战占领国, 并且它对这些领土的占领已成为实施种族隔离制度的殖民企业. 交战占领本身并不是非法情况: 它被认为是武装冲突的可能后果. 同时, 根据武装冲突法 (也称为国际人道法), 占领只是一种暂时的状态. 国际法禁止以武力威胁或使用武力的方式单方面吞并或永久获取领土: 如果发生这种情况, 任何国家不得承认或支持由此产生的非法情况. 相对于职业, 殖民主义和种族隔离总是非法的，并且确实被认为是特别严重的违反国际法的行为，因为它们从根本上违背了国际法律秩序的核心价值观. 殖民主义违反自决原则,
其中国际法院 (国际法院) 被确认为“当代国际法的基本原则之一”. 所有国家都有义务尊重和促进自决. 种族隔离是种族歧视的严重案例, 根据《禁止并惩治种族隔离罪行国际公约》构成 (1973,
此后的“种族隔离公约”) “为了建立和维持一个种族群体对任何其他种族群体的统治并有系统地压迫他们而实施的不人道行为”. 种族隔离的做法, 而且, 是国际犯罪.
Dugard 教授在其向联合国人权理事会提交的报告中 2007 建议应就以色列行为的法律后果征求国际法院的咨询意见. 这一咨询意见无疑将补充国际法院在 2004 关于在被占巴勒斯坦领土修建隔离墙的法律后果 (此后的“墙咨询意见”). 这一法律行动过程并未穷尽国际社会可以选择的选项, 第三国和国际组织在被评估为另一国从事殖民主义或种族隔离做法时的义务.
美国哈马斯政策阻碍中东和平
亨利·西格曼
过去的双边会谈失败 16 多年的经验表明，中东和平协议永远不可能靠各方自己达成. 以色列政府相信他们可以无视国际社会对其在约旦河西岸的非法殖民项目的谴责，因为他们可以指望美国反对国际制裁. 不受美国制定的参数框架的双边会谈 (根据安全理事会决议, 奥斯陆协定, 阿拉伯和平倡议, “路线图”和其他以前的巴以协议) 不能成功. 以色列政府认为，美国国会不会允许美国总统发布此类参数并要求其接受. 9月在华盛顿特区恢复双边会谈有什么希望 2 完全取决于奥巴马总统证明这种信念是错误的, 以及他承诺的“过渡建议”是否, 如果谈判陷入僵局, 是提交美式参数的委婉说法. 这样的美国倡议必须为以色列在其 1967 年前边界内的安全提供铁定的保证, 但同时必须明确指出，如果以色列坚持不让巴勒斯坦人在约旦河西岸和加沙建立一个可行的主权国家，这些保证是不可用的. 本文重点讨论永久地位协议的另一个主要障碍: 缺乏有效的巴勒斯坦对话者. 解决哈马斯的正当不满——正如中央司令部最近的一份报告所指出的那样, 哈马斯有正当的不满——可能导致其重返巴勒斯坦联合政府，为以色列提供可靠的和平伙伴. 如果由于哈马斯的拒绝主义而导致外展失败, 该组织阻止其他巴勒斯坦政党谈判达成的合理协议的能力将受到严重阻碍. 如果奥巴马政府不领导一项国际倡议，以定义巴以协议的内容，并积极促进巴勒斯坦政治和解, 欧洲必须这样做, 希望美国能效法. 不幸, 没有银弹可以保证“两国在和平与安全中并存”的目标。
但是，奥巴马总统目前的做法绝对不能.
全球反恐战争中的精准:
Sherifa Zuhur
九月之后的七年 11, 2001 (9/11) 攻击, 许多专家认为，基地组织已经恢复了力量，其模仿者或分支机构比以前更具杀伤力. 国家情报估计 2007 断言基地组织现在比以前更危险 9/11.1 基地组织的模仿者继续威胁西方, 中东, 和欧洲国家, 就像在九月被挫败的情节一样 2007 在德国. 布鲁斯·里德尔说: 很大程度上要归功于华盛顿急于进入伊拉克而不是追捕基地组织的领导人, 该组织现在在巴基斯坦的荒地拥有坚实的业务基础，并在伊拉克西部拥有有效的特许经营权. 它的影响力遍及整个穆斯林世界和欧洲 . . . 奥萨马·本·拉登开展了一场成功的宣传活动. . . . 他的想法现在吸引了比以往更多的追随者.
确实，各种萨拉菲圣战组织仍在整个伊斯兰世界中出现. 为什么对我们称之为全球圣战的伊斯兰恐怖主义的大量资源反应没有证明非常有效?
转向“软实力”工具,” 西方在全球反恐战争中支持穆斯林的努力效果如何？ (长城汽车)? 为什么美国在更广泛的伊斯兰世界中赢得如此少的“民心”? 为什么美国在这个问题上的战略信息在该地区发挥如此糟糕? 为什么, 尽管穆斯林普遍反对极端主义，正如主要穆斯林领导人的调查和官方言论所示, 约旦和巴基斯坦对本拉登的支持实际上有所增加?
本专着不会重新审视伊斯兰暴力的起源. 相反，它关注的是一种错误地构建 GWOT 并阻止穆斯林支持它的概念上的失败. 他们无法认同提议的变革性对策，因为他们将自己的一些核心信念和制度视为目标
这种努力.
几个严重成问题的趋势混淆了美国对 GWOT 的概念化以及为打这场战争而制定的战略信息. 这些演变自 (1) 对穆斯林和穆斯林占多数的国家的后殖民政治方法差异很大，因此产生了相互矛盾和令人困惑的印象和效果; 和 (2) 对伊斯兰教和次区域文化的普遍无知和偏见. 增加美国人的愤怒, 恐惧, 和对致命事件的焦虑 9/11, 和某些元素, 尽管有冷静的头脑的敦促, 让穆斯林和他们的宗教为他们的同教者的罪行负责, 或出于政治原因认为这样做有用的人.
民主, 选举和埃及穆斯林兄弟会
Israel Elad-Altman
The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (兆字节), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?
埃及的穆斯林兄弟: 对抗或整合?
Research
The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 选举. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. 同时, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.
伊斯兰教与民主
ITAC
If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s
埃及穆斯林兄弟会的组织连续性
苔丝·李·艾森哈特
As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of
Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (兄弟会) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, 然而, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
regime: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores
the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.
真主党的政治宣言 2009
Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become a “western expanding strategy” that turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .
哈桑·阿尔班纳的生平 & 赛区.
穆斯林兄弟会 (Ikhwan al Muslimeen) was founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) in the Egyptian town of al- Isma’iliyyah in 1928. The son of an Azharite scholar, who earned his livelihood by repairing watches, Hasan al-Banna showed from his early
school-days an inclination and great zeal for calling people to Islamic values and traditions. His strong sense of religiosity and spiritual awareness drove him to join the Hasafiyyah tariqah, one of many Sufi tariqahs that were widespread in Egypt at that time. Even though he was not formally associated with this tariqah after he founded the Ikhwan, he, nevertheless, maintained a good relation with it, as indeed with other Islamic organizations and religious personalities, and persisted in reciting the litanies (awrad, pl. of wird) of this tariqah until his last days. Though Hasan al-Banna joined a modern-type school of education, he promised his father that he would continue to memorize the Qur’an, which he did, in fact later, at the age of twelve. While at school, he took part in the activities of some religious associations and clubs which were promoting it and calling for the observance of Islamic teachings .
伊斯兰政党 : 为什么他们不能民主
Bassam Tibi
Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many
Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take
an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, 它有
become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on
clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam
and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate
consequences.
Intelligent discussion of Islamism, 民主, and Islam requires
clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into
confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after
thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and
democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious
reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what
I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-
Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment
of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.
In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds
this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is
that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty
because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.
Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment
upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of
all practical wisdom.
伊斯兰政党 : 三种动作
塔玛拉·科夫曼（Tamara Cofman）
Between 1991 和 2001, the world of political Islam became significantly more diverse. Today, the term “Islamist”—used to describe a political perspective centrally informed by a set of religious interpretations and commitments—can be applied to such a wide array of groups as to be almost meaningless. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.
尽管如此, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. The religious discourse of the Islamists is now unavoidably central to Arab politics. Conventional policy discussions label Islamists either “moderate” or “radical,” generally categorizing them according to two rather loose and unhelpful criteria. The first is violence: Radicals use it and moderates do not. This begs the question of how to classify groups that do not themselves engage in violence but who condone, justify, or even actively support the violence of others. A second, only somewhat more restrictive criterion is whether the groups or individuals in question
accept the rules of the democratic electoral game. Popular sovereignty is no small concession for traditional Islamists, many of whom reject democratically elected governments as usurpers of God’s sovereignty.
Yet commitment to the procedural rules of democratic elections is not the same as commitment to democratic politics or governance.
伊斯兰运动和阿拉伯世界的民主进程: 探索灰色地带
内森J. 棕色, 阿姆·哈姆扎维（Amr Hamzawy）,
玛丽娜·奥特韦（Marina Ottaway）
在过去的十年中, 伊斯兰运动已成为中东地区的主要政治参与者. 与政府一起, 伊斯兰运动, 温和的和激进的, 将决定该地区的政治在可预见的未来如何展开. 他们不仅展示了制作具有广泛大众吸引力的信息的能力，而且, 最重要的是, 创建具有真正社会基础的组织并制定连贯的政治战略. 其他方,
总的来说, 所有帐户都失败了.
西方公众和, 尤其是, 美国, 在发生戏剧性事件后才意识到伊斯兰运动的重要性, 例如伊朗革命和埃及总统安瓦尔·萨达特被暗杀. 自 9 月的恐怖袭击以来，注意力更加持久 11, 2001. 因此, 伊斯兰运动被广泛认为是危险和敌对的. 虽然这种描述对于伊斯兰极端组织的组织来说是准确的, 这很危险，因为他们愿意在追求目标时不分青红皂白地使用暴力, 这不是对许多放弃或避免暴力的群体的准确描述. 因为恐怖组织构成了直接
威胁, 然而, 所有国家的政策制定者都对暴力组织给予了不成比例的关注.
它是主流的伊斯兰组织, 不是激进的, 这将对中东未来的政治演变产生最大的影响. 激进分子重建统一整个阿拉伯世界的哈里发的宏伟目标, 甚至将受伊斯兰教原教旨主义解释启发的法律和社会习俗强加于个别阿拉伯国家，这与今天的现实相去甚远，无法实现. 这并不意味着恐怖组织没有危险——即使在追求不可能的目标时，它们也可能造成巨大的生命损失——但它们不太可能改变中东的面貌. 主流伊斯兰组织通常是另一回事. 他们已经对许多国家的社会习俗产生了强大的影响, 制止和扭转世俗主义趋势，改变许多阿拉伯人的着装和行为方式. 以及他们直接的政治目标, 通过参与本国的正常政治而成为强大的力量, 不是不可能的. 它已经在摩洛哥等国家实现, 约旦, 甚至埃及, 仍然禁止所有伊斯兰政治组织，但现在议会中有八十八名穆斯林兄弟. 政治, 不是暴力, 是什么赋予了主流伊斯兰主义者影响力.
伊斯兰政党 , 他们是民主党人吗? 有关系吗 ?
塔雷克·马苏德（Tarek Masoud）
受“伊斯兰主义者来袭”的感觉驱使,” 记者和政策制定者最近一直在激烈猜测埃及穆斯林兄弟会等伊斯兰政党是否 (兆字节) 或者巴勒斯坦的哈马斯真的相信民主. 虽然我试图勾勒出伊斯兰民主承诺的界限, 我认为凝视伊斯兰灵魂是对能量的滥用. 伊斯兰主义者不来. 而且, 正如 Adam Przeworski 和其他人所争论的那样, 对民主的承诺更多地源于环境限制而不是真正的信仰. 而不是担心伊斯兰主义者是否是真正的民主主义者,
我们的目标应该是帮助加强民主和自由的机构和行动者，这样任何团体——无论是伊斯兰主义者还是其他人——都无法颠覆它们.
但是我们担心这场运动的民主善意是什么？? 伊斯兰主义是一个狡猾的概念. 例如, 如果我们将那些要求应用伊斯兰教法的政党称为伊斯兰主义者, 我们必须排除土耳其的正义与发展党 (这被广泛认为是伊斯兰主义者) 包括埃及执政的民族民主党 (积极镇压伊斯兰主义者). 而不是陷入定义问题, 我们会更好地专注于从相同的历史根源发展起来的一组政党, 他们的许多目标和立场来自同一个思想体系, 并保持彼此之间的组织联系——也就是说, 那些来自国际 MB 的政党. 其中包括埃及母亲组织 (成立于 1928), 还有哈马斯, 约旦的伊斯兰行动阵线, 阿尔及利亚和平社会运动, 伊拉克伊斯兰党, 黎巴嫩伊斯兰组织, 和别的.
伊斯兰战争规则
优素福H. 艾布尔·埃宁
Sherifa Zuhur
The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.
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