RSSLahat ng Entries Na Naka-tag Sa: "Hamas"

Ang Arabo Bukas

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Oktubre 6, 1981, ay sinadya upang maging isang araw ng pagdiriwang sa Egypt. Minarkahan nito ang anibersaryo ng pinakadakilang sandali ng tagumpay ng Egypt sa tatlong salungatan ng Arab-Israeli, nang ang underdog na hukbo ng bansa ay tumawid sa Suez Canal sa mga pagbubukas ng araw ng 1973 Yom Kippur War at nagpadala ng mga tropang Israeli sa pag-urong. Sa isang cool, walang ulap na umaga, ang istadyum ng Cairo ay puno ng mga pamilyang Ehipsiyo na dumating upang makita ang militar na strut ang hardware nito. Sa reviewing stand, Pangulong Anwar el-Sadat,arkitekto ng digmaan, nanonood nang may kasiyahan habang nagpaparada ang mga lalaki at makina sa kanyang harapan. Nasa malapit ako, isang bagong dating na foreign correspondent.Bigla, isa sa mga trak ng hukbo ay direktang huminto sa harap ng reviewing stand habang anim na Mirage jet ang umuungal sa itaas sa isang akrobatikong pagtatanghal, pagpinta sa langit na may mahabang landas na pula, dilaw, lila,at berdeng usok. Tumayo si Sadat, tila naghahanda na makipagpalitan ng mga pagpupugay sa isa pang pangkat ng mga tropang Egyptian. Ginawa niyang perpektong target ang kanyang sarili para sa apat na Islamist assassin na tumalon mula sa trak, bumangga sa podium, at nilagyan ng mga bala ang kanyang katawan. Habang ang mga pumatay ay nagpatuloy para sa tila isang walang hanggan upang iwiwisik ang stand ng kanilang nakamamatay na apoy, Nag-isip ako saglit kung tatama sa lupa at nanganganib na matapakan hanggang mamatay ng mga natarantang manonood o mananatiling lakad at nanganganib na matamaan ng ligaw na bala. Instinct told me to stay on my feet, at ang aking pakiramdam ng tungkulin sa pamamahayag ay nagtulak sa akin na alamin kung si Sadat ay buhay o patay na.

AKTIBISMO NG MGA KABABAIHAN ISLAM SA SINAKOP NA PALESTIN

Mga panayam ni Khaled Amayreh

Panayam kay Sameera Al-Halayka

Si Sameera Al-Halayka ay isang nahalal na miyembro ng Palestinian Legislative Council. Siya ay

ipinanganak sa nayon ng Shoyoukh malapit sa Hebron noong 1964. Mayroon siyang BA sa Sharia (Islamic

Jurisprudence) mula sa Hebron University. Nagtrabaho siya bilang isang mamamahayag mula sa 1996 sa 2006 kailan

pumasok siya sa Palestinian Legislative Council bilang nahalal na miyembro sa 2006 halalan.

Siya ay may asawa at may pitong anak.

Q: Mayroong pangkalahatang impresyon sa ilang kanluraning bansa na natatanggap ng mga kababaihan

mababang pagtrato sa loob ng mga grupo ng paglaban sa Islam, tulad ng Hamas. Totoo ba ito?

Paano ginagamot ang mga babaeng aktibista sa Hamas?
Ang mga karapatan at tungkulin ng mga babaeng Muslim ay nagmumula sa Islamic Sharia o batas.

Ang mga ito ay hindi boluntaryo o kawanggawa o mga kilos na natatanggap namin mula sa Hamas o sinuman

iba pa. Sa gayon, hanggang sa pakikilahok sa pulitika at aktibismo ay nababahala, karaniwang mayroon ang mga kababaihan

ang parehong mga karapatan at tungkulin ng mga lalaki. Kung tutuusin, ang mga kababaihan ay bumubuo ng hindi bababa sa 50 porsyento ng

lipunan. Sa isang tiyak na kahulugan, sila ang buong lipunan dahil pinanganak nila, at itaas,

ang bagong henerasyon.

Samakatuwid, Masasabi kong ang katayuan ng mga kababaihan sa loob ng Hamas ay ganap na umaayon sa kanya

katayuan sa Islam mismo. Nangangahulugan ito na siya ay ganap na kasosyo sa lahat ng antas. Sa totoo lang, ito ay magiging

hindi patas at hindi makatarungan para sa isang Islam (o Islamist kung gusto mo) babaeng magiging katuwang sa paghihirap

while she is excluded from the decision-making process. This is why the woman’s role in

Hamas has always been pioneering.

Q: Do you feel that the emergence of women’s political activism within Hamas is

a natural development that is compatible with classical Islamic concepts

regarding the status and role of women, or is it merely a necessary response to

pressures of modernity and requirements of political action and of the continued

Israeli occupation?

There is no text in Islamic jurisprudence nor in Hamas’ charter which impedes women from

political participation. I believe the opposite is truethere are numerous Quranic verses

and sayings of the Prophet Muhammed urging women to be active in politics and public

issues affecting Muslims. But it is also true that for women, as it is for men, aktibismo sa pulitika

ay hindi sapilitan ngunit boluntaryo, at higit na napagpasyahan ayon sa kakayahan ng bawat babae,

mga kwalipikasyon at indibidwal na kalagayan. None the less, nagpapakita ng pagmamalasakit sa publiko

ang mga bagay ay ipinag-uutos sa bawat at bawat Muslim na lalaki at babae. Ang Propeta

sabi ni Muhammad: "Siya na hindi nagpapakita ng pagmamalasakit sa mga gawain ng mga Muslim ay hindi isang Muslim."

At saka, Ang mga Palestinian Islamist na kababaihan ay kailangang kunin ang lahat ng layunin na mga kadahilanan sa lupa

account kapag nagpapasya kung sasali sa pulitika o makisali sa aktibismo sa pulitika.


Trabaho, Kolonyalismo, Apartheid?

The Human Sciences Research Council

The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (ibig sabihin, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, at
Gaza, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. At the same time, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, at, kung gayon, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, consultation, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. At the same time, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, saka, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.

Hinaharang ng patakaran ng US Hamas ang kapayapaan sa Gitnang Silangan

Henry Siegman


Nabigo ang bilateral talks nitong nakaraan 16 taon ay nagpakita na ang isang kasunduang pangkapayapaan sa Gitnang Silangan ay hindi kailanman makakamit ng mga partido mismo. Naniniwala ang mga gobyerno ng Israel na maaari nilang labanan ang internasyonal na pagkondena sa kanilang iligal na kolonyal na proyekto sa West Bank dahil maaasahan nila ang US na tutulan ang mga internasyonal na parusa. Bilateral talks na hindi naka-frame sa pamamagitan ng US-formulated parameters (batay sa mga resolusyon ng Security Council, ang mga kasunduan ng Oslo, ang Arab Peace Initiative, ang "mapa ng daan" at iba pang mga nakaraang kasunduan ng Israeli-Palestinian) hindi magtagumpay. Naniniwala ang gobyerno ng Israel na hindi papahintulutan ng US Congress ang isang Amerikanong presidente na mag-isyu ng mga naturang parameter at hingin ang kanilang pagtanggap. Ano ang pag-asa para sa bilateral talks na magpapatuloy sa Washington DC sa Setyembre 2 ganap na nakasalalay kay Pangulong Obama na nagpapatunay na mali ang paniniwalang iyon, at kung ang mga "bridging proposal" ba ay ipinangako niya, kung ang mga pag-uusap ay umabot sa isang hindi pagkakasundo, ay isang euphemism para sa pagsusumite ng mga parameter ng Amerikano. Ang ganitong inisyatiba ng US ay dapat mag-alok ng Israel ng mga katiyakan para sa seguridad nito sa loob ng mga hangganan nito bago ang 1967, ngunit sa parehong oras ay dapat linawin ang mga katiyakang ito ay hindi magagamit kung ang Israel ay igiit na ipagkait sa mga Palestinian ang isang mabubuhay at soberanong estado sa West Bank at Gaza. Nakatuon ang papel na ito sa iba pang malaking balakid sa isang permanenteng kasunduan sa katayuan: ang kawalan ng isang epektibong Palestinian interlocutor. Pagtugon sa mga lehitimong hinaing ng Hamas - at tulad ng nabanggit sa isang kamakailang ulat ng CENTCOM, Ang Hamas ay may mga lehitimong hinaing - maaaring humantong sa pagbabalik nito sa isang Palestinian coalition government na magbibigay sa Israel ng isang mapagkakatiwalaang partner sa kapayapaan. Kung nabigo ang outreach na iyon dahil sa pagtanggi ng Hamas, ang kakayahan ng organisasyon na pigilan ang isang makatwirang kasunduan na napag-usapan ng iba pang mga partidong pampulitika ng Palestinian ay lubhang nahadlangan. Kung ang administrasyong Obama ay hindi mamumuno sa isang internasyonal na inisyatiba upang tukuyin ang mga parameter ng isang Israeli-Palestinian na kasunduan at aktibong isulong ang Palestinian political reconciliation, Dapat gawin ito ng Europa, at sana sumunod ang America. Sa kasamaang palad, walang pilak na bala na magagarantiyahan ang layunin ng "dalawang estado na magkatabi sa kapayapaan at seguridad."
Ngunit ang kasalukuyang kurso ni Pangulong Obama ay ganap na humahadlang dito.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; at (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

Demokrasya, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 halalan. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. At the same time, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

Islam at Demokrasya

ITAC

Kung may magbasa ng press o nakikinig sa mga komentarista sa mga pang-internasyonal na gawain, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

Tess Lee Eisenhart

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (Kapatiran) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, gayunpaman, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
rehimen: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become awestern expanding strategythat turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .

The Lives of Hasan al Banna & Syed Qutb.

Ang Kapatiran ng Muslim (Ikhwan al Muslimeen) was founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) in the Egyptian town of al- Isma’iliyyah in 1928. The son of an Azharite scholar, who earned his livelihood by repairing watches, Hasan al-Banna showed from his early
school-days an inclination and great zeal for calling people to Islamic values and traditions. His strong sense of religiosity and spiritual awareness drove him to join the Hasafiyyah tariqah, one of many Sufi tariqahs that were widespread in Egypt at that time. Even though he was not formally associated with this tariqah after he founded the Ikhwan, he, nevertheless, maintained a good relation with it, as indeed with other Islamic organizations and religious personalities, and persisted in reciting the litanies (awrad, pl. of wird) of this tariqah until his last days. Though Hasan al-Banna joined a modern-type school of education, he promised his father that he would continue to memorize the Qur’an, which he did, in fact later, at the age of twelve. While at school, he took part in the activities of some religious associations and clubs which were promoting it and calling for the observance of Islamic teachings .

Mga Partido ng Islamista : why they can’t be democratic

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, marami

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, it has

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, demokrasya, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

Islamist parties : Three kinds of movements

Tamara Cofman

Sa pagitan ng 1991 at 2001, the world of political Islam became significantly more diverse. Today, the term “Islamist”—used to describe a political perspective centrally informed by a set of religious interpretations and commitments—can be applied to such a wide array of groups as to be almost meaningless. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.
Nonetheless, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. Ang diskurso ng relihiyon ng mga Islamista ay hindi maiiwasang sentro ng politika sa Arab. Ang mga maginoo na talakayan sa patakaran ay tatak sa mga Islamista alinman sa "katamtaman" o "radikal,"Sa pangkalahatan ay ikinategorya ang mga ito ayon sa dalawang medyo maluwag at hindi nakakatulong na pamantayan. Ang una ay karahasan: Ginagamit ito ng mga radical at hindi ginagamit ng mga moderate. Nagtatanong ito kung paano uuriin ang mga pangkat na hindi sa kanilang sarili nagsasagawa ng karahasan ngunit kinukunsinti, bigyan ng katwiran, o kahit na aktibong sumusuporta sa karahasan ng iba. Isang segundo, medyo mas mahigpit na pamantayan lamang kung ang mga pangkat o indibidwal na pinag-uusapan
tanggapin ang mga patakaran ng demokratikong larong elektoral. Ang popular na soberanya ay hindi maliit na konsesyon para sa tradisyunal na Islamists, marami sa kanino ang tumatanggi sa mga gobyernong nahalal sa demokratikong bilang usurpers ng soberanya ng Diyos.
Gayunpaman ang paninindigan sa mga panuntunang pamaraan ng demokratikong halalan ay hindi katulad ng pangako sa demokratikong politika o pamamahala.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Si Nathan J. Kayumanggi, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, gayunpaman, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordan, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Pulitika, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

Mga Partido ng Islamista , ARE THEY DEMOCRATS? DOES it matter ?

Tarek Masoud

Driven by a sense that “the Islamists are coming,” journalists and policy makers have been engaged of late in fevered speculation over whether Islamist parties such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or Palestine’s Hamas really believe in democracy. While I attempt to outline the boundaries of the Islamist democratic commitment, I think that peering into the Islamist soul is a misuse of energies. The Islamists are not coming. At saka, as Adam Przeworski and others have argued, commitments to democracy are more often born of environmental constraints than of true belief. Instead of worrying whether Islamists are real democrats,
our goal should be to help fortify democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group—Islamist or otherwise—can subvert them.
But what is this movement over whose democratic bona fides we worry? Islamism is a slippery concept. Halimbawa, if we label as Islamist those parties that call for the application of shari‘a, we must exclude Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (which is widely considered Islamist) and include Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (which actively represses Islamists). Instead of becoming mired in definitional issues, we would do better to focus on a set of political parties that have grown from the same historical roots, derive many of their goals and positions from the same body of ideas, and maintain organizational ties to one another—that is, those parties that spring from the international MB. These include the Egyptian mother organization (founded in 1928), but also Hamas, Islamic Action Front ng Jordan, Algeria’s Movement for a Peaceful Society, the Iraqi Islamic Party, Lebanon’s Islamic Group, and others.

ISLAMIC RULINGS ON WARFARE

Youssef H. Aboul-Enein
Sherifa zuhur

The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.