RSSรายการทั้งหมดที่ติดแท็กด้วย: "Hamas"

พรุ่งนี้อาหรับ

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

เดือนตุลาคม 6, 1981, มีความหมายถึงวันแห่งการเฉลิมฉลองในอียิปต์. มันครบรอบในช่วงเวลายิ่งใหญ่ของอียิปต์ชัยชนะในสามความขัดแย้งอาหรับอิสราเอล, เมื่อแรงผลักดันกองทัพของประเทศฝ่ายแพ้ข้ามคลองสุเอซในวันเปิด ofthe 1973 ยม Kippur War และส่งทหารอิสราเอล reeling ในอย่างไม่เป็นทางการ. เมื่อวันที่เย็น, เช้ากระจ่าง, the Cairo stadium was packed with Egyptian families that had come to see the military strut its hardware.On the reviewing stand, President Anwar el-Sadat,the war’s architect, watched with satisfaction as men and machines paraded before him. I was nearby, a newly arrived foreign correspondent.Suddenly, หนึ่งในกองทัพรถบรรทุกหยุดอยู่ตรงด้านหน้าของขาตั้งตรวจสอบเช่นเดียวกับหก Mirage jets roared ค่าใช้จ่ายในการปฏิบัติเกี่ยวกับการแสดงผาดโผน, ภาพสีฟ้ากับเส้นทางยาวสีแดง, สีเหลือง, สีม่วง,และควันสีเขียว. Sadat ยืนขึ้น, ดูเหมือนเตรียมที่จะ salutes แลกเปลี่ยนกับพวกอื่นที่เกิดขึ้นของกองกำลังอียิปต์. เขาทำให้ตัวเองเป้าหมายที่สมบูรณ์แบบสำหรับสี่สังหารมุสลิมที่เพิ่มขึ้นจากรถบรรทุก, stormed แท่น, และพรุนร่างกายของเขาด้วย bullets.As killers อย่างต่อเนื่องสำหรับสิ่งที่ประจักษ์นิรันดร์สเปรย์ยืนด้วยไฟร้ายแรงของพวกเขา, สำหรับผมถือว่าได้ทันทีว่าจะตีพื้นดินและความเสี่ยงที่จะถูก trampled ไปสู่ความตายโดย panicked ชมหรือยังคงเดินเท้าเปล่าและความเสี่ยงการ bullet เร่ร่อน. สัญชาตญาณบอกฉันที่จะอยู่บนเท้าของฉัน, และความรู้สึกเกี่ยวกับการหนังสือพิมพ์ impelled หน้าที่ฉันจะไปหาว่า Sadat มีชีวิตอยู่หรือตาย.

การเคลื่อนไหวสตรีมุสลิมในครอบครองปาเลสไตน์

Interviews by Khaled Amayreh

สัมภาษณ์ Sameera Al - Halayka

Sameera Al-Halayka is an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. She was

born in the village of Shoyoukh near Hebron in 1964. She has a BA in Sharia (ศาสนาอิสลาม

Jurisprudence) from Hebron University. She worked as a journalist from 1996 ไปยัง 2006 when

she entered the Palestinian Legislative Council as an elected member in the 2006 การเลือกตั้ง.

She is married and has seven children.

Q: There is a general impression in some western countries that women receive

inferior treatment within Islamic resistance groups, such as Hamas. Is this true?

How are women activists treated in Hamas?
Rights and duties of Muslim women emanate first and foremost from Islamic Sharia or law.

They are not voluntary or charitable acts or gestures we receive from Hamas or anyone

else. ดังนั้น, as far as political involvement and activism is concerned, women generally have

the same rights and duties as men. After all, women make up at least 50 per cent of

สังคม. In a certain sense, they are the entire society because they give birth to, and raise,

the new generation.

จึง, I can say that the status of women within Hamas is in full conformity with her

status in Islam itself. This means that she is a full partner at all levels. จริง, it would be

unfair and unjust for an Islamic (or Islamist if you prefer) woman to be partner in suffering

while she is excluded from the decision-making process. This is why the woman’s role in

Hamas has always been pioneering.

Q: Do you feel that the emergence of women’s political activism within Hamas is

a natural development that is compatible with classical Islamic concepts

regarding the status and role of women, or is it merely a necessary response to

pressures of modernity and requirements of political action and of the continued

Israeli occupation?

There is no text in Islamic jurisprudence nor in Hamas’ charter which impedes women from

political participation. I believe the opposite is truethere are numerous Quranic verses

and sayings of the Prophet Muhammed urging women to be active in politics and public

issues affecting Muslims. But it is also true that for women, as it is for men, political activism

is not compulsory but voluntary, and is largely decided in light of each woman’s abilities,

qualifications and individual circumstances. None the less, showing concern for public

matters is mandatory upon each and every Muslim man and woman. The Prophet

Muhammed said: “He who doesn’t show concern for the affairs of Muslims is not a Muslim.”

ยิ่งไปกว่านั้น, Palestinian Islamist women have to take all objective factors on the ground into

account when deciding whether to join politics or get involved in political activism.


อาชีพ, ลัทธิล่าอาณานิคม, นโยบายแยกคนต่างผิว?

The Human Sciences Research Council

The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (คือ, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, และ
ก๊าซ, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. At the same time, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, และ, ถ้าเช่นนั้น, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, consultation, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. At the same time, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, ยิ่งไปกว่านั้น, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.

สหรัฐอเมริกา Hamas นโยบายบล็อกสันติภาพตะวันออกกลาง

Siegman เฮนรี่


การเจรจาระดับทวิภาคีล้มเหลวมากกว่าที่ผ่านมาเหล่านี้ 16 ปีแสดงให้เห็นว่าตาม Middle East สันติภาพไม่สามารถเข้าถึงได้โดยบุคคลที่ตัวเอง. รัฐบาลอิสราเอลเชื่อว่าพวกเขาสามารถต่อต้านการลงโทษของโครงการระหว่างประเทศอาณานิคมของพวกเขาที่ผิดกฎหมายในเวสต์แบงก์เพราะพวกเขาสามารถนับบนสหรัฐเพื่อต่อต้านการลงโทษระหว่างประเทศ. พูดถึงระดับทวิภาคีที่ไม่ได้ใช้เฟรมโดย US - กำหนดค่าพารามิเตอร์ (ตามมติคณะมนตรีความมั่นคง, ข้อตกลงออสโล, Arab Peace Initiative, "แผนที่ถนน"และอื่น ๆ ข้อตกลงก่อนหน้านี้อิสราเอลปาเลสไตน์) ไม่สามารถประสบความสำเร็จ. รัฐบาลอิสราเอลเชื่อว่าสภาคองเกรสของสหรัฐฯจะไม่อนุญาตให้ประธานาธิบดีอเมริกันออกค่าพารามิเตอร์ดังกล่าวและความต้องการการยอมรับของพวกเขา. อะไรหวังว่าคงมีการพูดถึงระดับทวิภาคีที่ดำเนินการต่อในวอชิงตันดีซีเมื่อวันที่ 2 ขึ้นอยู่กับประธานโอบามาพิสูจน์ความเชื่อว่าจะไม่ถูกต้อง, และว่า"ข้อเสนอการแก้"เขามีสัญญา, ควรพูดถึงทางตัน, เป็นคำรื่นหูของการส่งพารามิเตอร์อเมริกัน. ดังกล่าวจะต้องเสนอข้อเสนอของสหรัฐฯรับรองเกราะเหล็กเพื่อความปลอดภัยของอิสราเอลภายในเขตก่อน 1967 ของ, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: กรณีที่ไม่มีคู่สนทนาปาเลสไตน์ที่มีประสิทธิภาพ. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, และหวังว่าอเมริกาจะปฏิบัติตาม. อับ, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

รีซิชั่นในสงครามระดับโลกที่มีต่อความหวาดกลัว:

Zuhur Sherifa

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; และ (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

ประชาธิปไตย, การเลือกตั้งและประชาชาติมุสลิมอียิปต์

Israel Elad-Altman

อเมริกันนำปฏิรูปตะวันออกกลางและแคมเปญประชาธิปไตยของสองปีได้ช่วยให้รูปร่างความเป็นจริงทางการเมืองใหม่ในอียิปต์. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?

อียิปต์พี่น้องมุสลิม: การเผชิญหน้าหรือการรวม?

วิจัย

สังคมของความสำเร็จของชาวมุสลิมบราเธอร์สในเดือนพฤศจิกายนถึงธันวาคม 2005 การเลือกตั้งสมัชชาประชาชนส่งคลื่นกระแทกผ่านระบบการเมืองของอียิปต์. ในการตอบสนอง, ระบอบการปกครองแตกลงในการเคลื่อนไหว, คุกคามคู่แข่งที่มีศักยภาพอื่น ๆ และย้อนกลับกระบวนการปฏิรูป fledging. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 การเลือกตั้ง. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. At the same time, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

ศาสนาอิสลามและประชาธิปไตย

ITAC

ถ้าคนอ่านกดหรือฟังการแสดงความเห็นในกิจการระหว่างประเทศ, ได้มีการกล่าวมักจะ -- และโดยนัยได้มากขึ้น แต่มักจะไม่กล่าวว่า -- ว่าศาสนาอิสลามเข้ากันไม่ได้กับระบอบประชาธิปไตย. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

ความต่อเนื่องขององค์กรในประชาชาติมุสลิมอียิปต์

Lee Eisenhart Tess

ในฐานะที่เป็นอียิปต์เคลื่อนไหวฝ่ายค้านที่เก่าแก่ที่สุดและโดดเด่นที่สุด, the Society of

พี่น้องมุสลิม, อัลอิควานอัล Muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. นับตั้งแต่ก่อตั้งใน 1928, the Brotherhood (Ikhwan) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, อย่างไรก็ตาม, มีพี่น้อง
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
ระบบการปกครอง: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. แทน, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

Hizbollah ของแถลงการณ์ทางการเมือง 2009

หลังสงครามโลกครั้งที่สอง, สหรัฐอเมริกากลายเป็นศูนย์กลางของโพลาไรซ์และมีอำนาจในโลก; เป็นโครงการดังกล่าวเป็นสักขีพยานในการพัฒนาอย่างมากในระดับของการปกครองและการปราบปรามที่เป็นประวัติการณ์ในประวัติศาสตร์, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become awestern expanding strategythat turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .

ชีวิตของบ้านนา al Hasan & Syed Qutb.

ภราดรภาพมุสลิม (Ikhwan อัล Muslimeen) ก่อตั้งขึ้นโดยฮาซันอัลบันนา (1906-1949) ในเมืองอียิปต์ของอัล- Isma'iliyyah ใน 1928. ลูกชายของนักวิชาการ Azharite, ที่ได้รับการทำมาหากินของเขาโดยการซ่อมนาฬิกา, Hasan al-Banna showed from his early
school-days an inclination and great zeal for calling people to Islamic values and traditions. His strong sense of religiosity and spiritual awareness drove him to join the Hasafiyyah tariqah, one of many Sufi tariqahs that were widespread in Egypt at that time. Even though he was not formally associated with this tariqah after he founded the Ikhwan, he, nevertheless, maintained a good relation with it, as indeed with other Islamic organizations and religious personalities, and persisted in reciting the litanies (awrad, pl. of wird) of this tariqah until his last days. Though Hasan al-Banna joined a modern-type school of education, he promised his father that he would continue to memorize the Qur’an, which he did, in fact later, at the age of twelve. While at school, he took part in the activities of some religious associations and clubs which were promoting it and calling for the observance of Islamic teachings .

ภาคี Islamist : ทำไมพวกเขาไม่สามารถเป็นประชาธิปไตย

Bassam Tibi

สังเกตการอุทธรณ์การเจริญเติบโตของศาสนาอิสลามและความแข็งแรงบนพื้นดิน, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. ในการรักษาด้วยความปรารถนานี้, it has

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, ประชาธิปไตย, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

ฝ่ายอิสลาม : สามชนิดของการเคลื่อนไหว

Cofman Tamara

ระหว่าง 1991 และ 2001, โลกของการเมืองศาสนาอิสลามกลายเป็นความหลากหลายมากขึ้นอย่างมีนัยสำคัญ. ในวันนี้, คำว่า“อิสลาม” เชิงลบที่จะอธิบายมุมมองทางการเมืองแจ้งส่วนกลางโดยชุดของการตีความศาสนาและผูกพันสามารถนำไปใช้เช่นความหลากหลายของกลุ่มให้เป็นความหมายเกือบ. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.
กระนั้น, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. The religious discourse of the Islamists is now unavoidably central to Arab politics. Conventional policy discussions label Islamists either “moderate” or “radical,” generally categorizing them according to two rather loose and unhelpful criteria. The first is violence: Radicals use it and moderates do not. This begs the question of how to classify groups that do not themselves engage in violence but who condone, justify, or even actively support the violence of others. A second, only somewhat more restrictive criterion is whether the groups or individuals in question
accept the rules of the democratic electoral game. Popular sovereignty is no small concession for traditional Islamists, many of whom reject democratically elected governments as usurpers of God’s sovereignty.
Yet commitment to the procedural rules of democratic elections is not the same as commitment to democratic politics or governance.

การเคลื่อนไหวของมุสลิมและกระบวนการประชาธิปไตยในโลกอาหรับ: การสำรวจเขตพื้นที่สีเทา

J Nathan. สีน้ำตาล, Hamzawy Amr,

Ottaway Marina

ในช่วงทศวรรษที่ผ่านมา, การเคลื่อนไหวของมุสลิมมีการจัดตั้งตัวเองเป็นผู้เล่นทางการเมืองที่สำคัญในตะวันออกกลาง. ด้วยความร่วมมือกับรัฐบาล, Islamist เคลื่อนไหว, ปานกลางรวมทั้งอนุมูลอิสระ, จะกำหนดวิธีการทางการเมืองของภูมิภาคเปิดตัวขึ้นในอนาคตอันใกล้. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, อย่างไรก็ตาม, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, ประเทศจอร์แดน, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. การเมือง, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

ภาคี Islamist , พวกเขาอยู่พรรคประชาธิปัตย์? ไม่ได้เรื่อง ?

Masoud Tarek

ขับเคลื่อนโดยความรู้สึกว่า” อิสลามจะมา,” นักข่าวและผู้กำหนดนโยบายได้รับการว่าจ้างของสายในการเก็งกำไรไข้มากกว่าว่าฝ่ายอิสลามเช่นอียิปต์ภราดรภาพมุสลิม (MB) หรือปาเลสไตน์ฮามาจริงๆเชื่อมั่นในการปกครองระบอบประชาธิปไตย. While I attempt to outline the boundaries of the Islamist democratic commitment, I think that peering into the Islamist soul is a misuse of energies. The Islamists are not coming. ยิ่งไปกว่านั้น, as Adam Przeworski and others have argued, commitments to democracy are more often born of environmental constraints than of true belief. Instead of worrying whether Islamists are real democrats,
our goal should be to help fortify democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group—Islamist or otherwise—can subvert them.
But what is this movement over whose democratic bona fides we worry? Islamism is a slippery concept. เช่น, if we label as Islamist those parties that call for the application of shari‘a, we must exclude Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (which is widely considered Islamist) and include Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (which actively represses Islamists). Instead of becoming mired in definitional issues, we would do better to focus on a set of political parties that have grown from the same historical roots, derive many of their goals and positions from the same body of ideas, and maintain organizational ties to one another—that is, those parties that spring from the international MB. These include the Egyptian mother organization (founded in 1928), but also Hamas, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, Algeria’s Movement for a Peaceful Society, the Iraqi Islamic Party, Lebanon’s Islamic Group, and others.

คำวินิจฉัยของอิสลามสงคราม

Youssef H. Aboul - Enein
Zuhur Sherifa

สหรัฐอเมริกาไม่มีข้อสงสัยจะมีส่วนร่วมในตะวันออกกลางนานหลายสิบปี. เพื่อให้แน่ใจว่า, ยุติข้อพิพาทระหว่างอิสราเอลและปาเลสไตน์หรือบรรเทาความยากจนสามารถช่วยที่จะกั้นกระแสน้ำรุนแรงอิสลามและความรู้สึกต่อต้านอเมริกัน. แต่ในระดับอุดมการณ์, เราจะต้องเผชิญหน้ากับความหมายที่เฉพาะเจาะจงของกฎหมายอิสลาม, ประวัติศาสตร์,และคัมภีร์ที่เป็นอันตรายต่อทั้งในสหรัฐอเมริกาและพันธมิตร. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.