RSSTë gjitha Entries tagged Me: "Hamasit"

The Arab Tomorrow

DAVID B. OTTAWAY

Tetor 6, 1981, was meant to be a day of celebration in Egypt. It marked the anniversary of Egypt’s grandest moment of victory in three Arab-Israeli conflicts, when the country’s underdog army thrust across the Suez Canal in the opening days ofthe 1973 Yom Kippur War and sent Israeli troops reeling in retreat. On a cool, cloudless morning, the Cairo stadium was packed with Egyptian families that had come to see the military strut its hardware.On the reviewing stand, President Anwar el-Sadat,the war’s architect, watched with satisfaction as men and machines paraded before him. I was nearby, a newly arrived foreign correspondent.Suddenly, one of the army trucks halted directly in front of the reviewing stand just as six Mirage jets roared overhead in an acrobatic performance, painting the sky with long trails of red, yellow, purple,and green smoke. Sadat stood up, apparently preparing to exchange salutes with yet another contingent of Egyptian troops. He made himself a perfect target for four Islamist assassins who jumped from the truck, stormed the podium, and riddled his body with bullets.As the killers continued for what seemed an eternity to spray the stand with their deadly fire, I considered for an instant whether to hit the ground and risk being trampled to death by panicked spectators or remain afoot and risk taking a stray bullet. Instinct told me to stay on my feet, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

Islamist Aktivizmi i grave në Palestinën e pushtuar

Intervistat nga Khaled Amayreh

Intervistë me Sameera Al-Halayka

Sameera Al-Halayka është një anëtar i zgjedhur i Këshillit Legjislativ palestinez. Ajo ishte

lindur në fshatin Shoyoukh afër Hebronit në 1964. Ajo ka një BA në Sheriatit (Islamik

jurisprudencë) nga Universiteti Hebron. Ajo ka punuar si gazetar nga 1996 te 2006 kur

ajo hyri Këshillit Legjislativ palestinez si një anëtar i zgjedhur në 2006 Zgjedhjet.

Ajo është e martuar dhe ka shtatë fëmijë.

Q: Ekziston një përshtypje e përgjithshme në disa vende perëndimore që gratë marrin

Trajtimi inferior brenda grupeve të rezistencës islamike, si Hamasin. A eshte e vertete?

Si janë gratë aktiviste trajtohen në Hamasit?
Të drejtat dhe detyrat e grave muslimane buron para së gjithash nga Sheriatit apo ligjit islamik.

Ata nuk janë akte vullnetare apo bamirëse apo gjeste që marrim nga Hamasi apo të gjithë

tjetër. Kështu, aq sa është angazhimi politik dhe aktivizmi është e shqetësuar, gratë në përgjithësi kanë

të njëjtat të drejta dhe detyrime si meshkujt. Pas te gjithave, gratë përbëjnë të paktën 50 për qind e

shoqëri. Në një kuptim, ato janë e gjithë shoqëria, sepse ata lindin, dhe për të rritur,

brezi i ri.

prandaj, Unë mund të them se statusi i grave në kuadër të Hamasit është në përputhje të plotë me të

Statusi në vetë Islam. Kjo do të thotë se ajo është një partner i plotë në të gjitha nivelet. Me të vërtetë, do të ishte

e padrejtë dhe e padrejtë për një islam (ose islamist në qoftë se ju preferoni) grua që të jetë partner në vuajtje

ndërsa ajo është përjashtuar nga procesi i vendim-marrjes. Kjo është arsyeja pse roli i gruas në

Hamasi ka qenë gjithmonë pioniere.

Q: A mendoni se shfaqja e aktivizmit politik të grave në kuadër të Hamasit është

një zhvillim i natyrshëm që është në përputhje me konceptet klasike islame

lidhur me statusin dhe rolin e gruas, apo është kjo thjesht një përgjigje e nevojshme për të

presionet e modernitetit dhe kërkesat e veprimit politik dhe e të vazhdueshme

pushtimi izraelit?

Nuk ka asnjë tekst në jurisprudencën islame as në statutin e Hamasit e cila pengon gratë nga

pjesëmarrja politike. Unë besoj se e kundërta është e vërtetë — ka ajete të shumta Kur'anore

dhe thëniet e Profetit Muhammed duke i bërë thirrje grave që të jenë aktivë në politikë dhe në publik

Çështjet që prekin muslimanët. Por është gjithashtu e vërtetë se për gratë, si ajo është për burrat, aktivizmi politik

nuk është i detyrueshëm, por vullnetare, dhe është i vendosur kryesisht në dritën e aftësive të secilit gruas,

kualifikimet dhe rrethanat individuale. Asnjë më pak, duke treguar shqetësim për publikun

çështje është i detyrueshëm mbi çdo dhe çdo njeriu musliman dhe gruaja. Profeti

Muhammed tha: "Ai që nuk tregojnë shqetësim për çështjet e muslimanëve nuk është musliman."

Për më tepër, gratë palestineze islamike duhet të marrin të gjithë faktorëve objektivë në terren në

parasysh kur të vendoset nëse do të bashkohet me politikën apo të përfshihen në aktivitete politike.


Profesion, Kolonializëm, Aparteid?

The Human Sciences Research Council

The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (domethënë, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, dhe
Gaz, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. At the same time, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, dhe, if so, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, këshillim, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. At the same time, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, për më tepër, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.

SHBA Hamasi blloqe politike e paqes në Lindjen e Mesme

Henry Siegman


bisedimeve dypalëshe Gabim gjatë këtyre të fundit 16 vite kanë treguar se një marrëveshje paqeje në Lindjen e Mesme nuk mund të arrihet nga vetë palët. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Për fat të keq, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Saktësi në luftën globale ndaj terrorit:

Sherifa Zuhur

Shtatë vjet pas shtator 11, 2001 (9/11) sulmet, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Europa e Mesme, and European nations, si në komplot kapur në shtator 2007 in Germany. Bruce shtetet Riedel: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Kalimi në mjetet e "pushtetit të butë,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Pse, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
këtë përpjekje.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; dhe (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Shtoni në këtë zemërim amerikan, fear, dhe ankthi në lidhje me ngjarjet vdekjeprurës i 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

Demokraci, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?

Vëllezërit Myslimanë EGYPT'S: Konfrontimit ose INTEGRIMIT?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (PDR) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 Zgjedhjet. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. At the same time, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

Islami dhe Demokracia

ITAC

Nëse dikush lexon shtypin apo dëgjon komentuesve mbi çështjet ndërkombëtare, ajo shpesh është thënë - dhe edhe më shpesh nënkuptohet, por nuk tha - se Islami nuk është në përputhje me demokracinë. Në vitet nëntëdhjetë, Samuel Huntington vendosur jashtë një stuhi intelektuale, kur ai botoi përplasjes së qytetërimeve dhe remaking e Rendit Botëror, në të cilën ai jep parashikimet e tij për botën - shkrim i madh. Në sferën politike, ai vë në dukje se ndërsa Turqia dhe Pakistani mund të ketë disa kërkesë të vogël për të "legjitimitetit demokratik" të gjitha të tjera "... vendet myslimane ishin shumicë dërrmuese jo-demokratike: monarkitë, Sistemet e një-partisë, regjimet ushtarake, diktaturat personale ose ndonjë kombinim i këtyre, zakonisht pushimi në një familje të kufizuar, fis, ose baza fisnore ". Premisa mbi të cilën argumenti i tij është themeluar është se ata nuk janë vetëm "nuk na pëlqen", ata janë kundër të vërtetë për vlerat tona themelore demokratike. Ai beson, si të tjerët, se ndërsa ideja e demokratizimit perëndimore është duke u rezistuar në pjesë të tjera të botës, konfrontimi është më i dukshëm në ato rajone ku Islami është feja dominante.
Argumenti ka bërë edhe nga ana tjetër, si dhe. Një dijetar fetar iranian, reflektuar në një krizë në fillim të shekullit të njëzetë kushtetuese në vendin e tij, deklaroi se Islami dhe demokracia nuk janë të pajtueshme për shkak se njerëzit nuk janë të barabartë dhe një trup legjislativ është i panevojshëm për shkak të natyrës gjithëpërfshirëse të ligjit fetar islam. Një pozitë e ngjashme është marrë kohët e fundit nga Ali Belhadj, një mësues algjerian të shkollës së mesme, predikues dhe (në këtë kontekst) Lideri i FIS, kur ai deklaroi se "demokracia nuk ishte një koncept islamik". Ndoshta deklarata më dramatike për këtë qëllim ishte ai i Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Lideri i kryengritësve suni në Irak të cilët, kur të përballen me perspektivën e zgjedhjeve, denoncuar demokracinë si një "parim i keq".
Por, sipas disa dijetarëve myslimanë, demokracia mbetet një ideal i rëndësishëm në Islam, me shtojcë që ajo është gjithmonë subjekt i ligjit fetar. Theksi në vendin madhe e Sheriatit është një element i pothuajse çdo komenti islame në qeverisje, moderuar apo ekstremist. Vetëm nëse sundimtari, që merr autoritetin e tij nga Perëndia, kufizon veprimet e tij në "mbikëqyrjen e administrimit të Sheriatit", është ai që do të bind. Nëse ai e bën të ndryshme nga kjo, ai është një jo-besimtar dhe e angazhuar muslimanët janë të rebelohen kundër tij. Këtu qëndron arsyetimi për pjesën më të madhe të dhunës që ka pllakosur botën myslimane në betejat e tilla si ai që mbizotëron në Algjeri gjatë viteve '90

Vazhdimësinë organizative në Vëllazëria myslimane Egjiptit

Eisenhart Tess Lee

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Vëllezër musliman, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (Ikhwan) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, megjithatë, Vëllazëria ka
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
regjim: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Në vend të kësaj, it explores

the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.

Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, teknologji, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become awestern expanding strategythat turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, kultura, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .

The Lives of Hasan al Banna & Syed Qutb.

Vëllazëria Muslimane (Ikhwan al Muslimeen) was founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) in the Egyptian town of al- Isma’iliyyah in 1928. The son of an Azharite scholar, who earned his livelihood by repairing watches, Hasan al-Banna showed from his early
school-days an inclination and great zeal for calling people to Islamic values and traditions. His strong sense of religiosity and spiritual awareness drove him to join the Hasafiyyah tariqah, one of many Sufi tariqahs that were widespread in Egypt at that time. Even though he was not formally associated with this tariqah after he founded the Ikhwan, ai, nevertheless, maintained a good relation with it, as indeed with other Islamic organizations and religious personalities, and persisted in reciting the litanies (awrad, pl. of wird) of this tariqah until his last days. Though Hasan al-Banna joined a modern-type school of education, he promised his father that he would continue to memorize the Qur’an, which he did, in fact later, at the age of twelve. While at school, he took part in the activities of some religious associations and clubs which were promoting it and calling for the observance of Islamic teachings .

Partive islamike : pse ata nuk mund të jetë demokratike

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, it has

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, demokraci, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

se, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

Islamist parties : Three kinds of movements

Tamara Cofman

Between 1991 dhe 2001, the world of political Islam became significantly more diverse. sot, the term “Islamist”—used to describe a political perspective centrally informed by a set of religious interpretations and commitments—can be applied to such a wide array of groups as to be almost meaningless. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.
Megjithatë, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. The religious discourse of the Islamists is now unavoidably central to Arab politics. Conventional policy discussions label Islamists either “moderate” or “radical,” generally categorizing them according to two rather loose and unhelpful criteria. The first is violence: Radicals use it and moderates do not. This begs the question of how to classify groups that do not themselves engage in violence but who condone, justify, or even actively support the violence of others. A second, only somewhat more restrictive criterion is whether the groups or individuals in question
accept the rules of the democratic electoral game. Popular sovereignty is no small concession for traditional Islamists, many of whom reject democratically elected governments as usurpers of God’s sovereignty.
Yet commitment to the procedural rules of democratic elections is not the same as commitment to democratic politics or governance.

LËVIZJET islamike dhe procesit demokratik në botën arabe: Eksplorimi i Zonat Gray

Nathan J. I nxirë nga dielli, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, lëvizjet islamike, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, Shtetet e Bashkuara, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, megjithatë, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordan, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politikë, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

Partive islamike , A janë ata të demokratëve? A ka rëndësi ?

Tarek Masoud

I shtyrë nga një ndjenjë se "islamistët po vijnë,"Gazetarët dhe krijuesit e politikave kanë qenë të angazhuar kohët e fundit në spekulime ethe mbi nëse partitë islamike të tilla si Vëllazërinë Myslimane të Egjiptit (MB) ose Hamasi Palestinës me të vërtetë besojnë në demokraci. Ndërsa unë të përpiqet të përshkruajë kufijtë e angazhimit islamik demokratike, Mendoj se duke i hedhur sytë në shpirtin islamik është një keqpërdorim i energjive. Islamikët nuk po vijnë. Për më tepër, si Adam Przeworski dhe të tjerët kanë argumentuar, angazhimet për demokracinë janë të lindur më shpesh i kufizimeve mjedisore sesa e besimit të vërtetë. Në vend të shqetësuese nëse islamistët janë demokratët e vërtetë,
qëllimi ynë duhet të jetë për të ndihmuar pasuroj institucioneve demokratike dhe liberale dhe aktorët në mënyrë që asnjë grup-islamike ose ndryshe, mund të shkatërrojnë ato.
Por çfarë është kjo lëvizje gjatë fides demokratike bona cilit ne merak? Islamizmi është një koncept i rrëshqitshëm. Për shembull, në qoftë se ne etiketë si islamike ato parti që bëjnë thirrje për zbatimin e sheriatit, ne duhet të përjashtojë Partisë për Drejtësi dhe Zhvillim të Turqisë (e cila është konsideruar gjerësisht islamike) dhe përfshijnë Partinë Demokratike Kombëtare në pushtet të Egjiptit (e cila në mënyrë aktive represses islamistët). Në vend të duke u bërë të zhytur në çështje përkufizuese, ne do të bëjmë më mirë të përqëndrohet në një grup të partive politike që janë rritur nga rrënjët njëjta historike, nxjerrin shumë prej qëllimeve dhe qëndrimeve të tyre nga i njëjti organ e ideve, dhe për të ruajtur lidhjet organizative me njëri-tjetrin, që është, ato parti që burojnë nga MB ndërkombëtare. Këto përfshijnë organizimin nënë egjiptian (themeluar në 1928), por edhe Hamasi, Fronti i Veprimit Islamik i Jordanisë, Lëvizja Algjerisë për një shoqëri paqësore, Partia Islamike e Irakut, Grupi islamik Libanit, dhe të tjerët.

ISLAMIC RULINGS ON WARFARE

H Youssef. Abul-Enein
Sherifa Zuhur

The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, histori,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.