همه نوشته های با برچسب: "حماس"
عرب فردا
دیوید بی. خارج از کشور
اکتبر 6, 1981, قرار بود روز جشن در مصر باشد. این سالگرد بزرگ ترین لحظه پیروزی مصر در سه درگیری اعراب و اسرائیل بود, زمانی که ارتش مستضعف این کشور در روزهای افتتاحیه کانال سوئز را عبور داد 1973 جنگ یوم کیپور و فرستادن سربازان اسرائیلی در حال عقب نشینی. در خنک, صبح بی ابر, استادیوم قاهره مملو از خانواده‌های مصری بود که برای دیدن تجهیزات نظامی ارتش آمده بودند. در جایگاه بازبینی, رئیس جمهور انور السادات,معمار جنگ, با رضایت به تماشای رژه مردان و ماشین آلات مقابل او نشست. من همین نزدیکی بودم, یک خبرنگار خارجی تازه وارد. ناگهان, یکی از کامیون‌های ارتش درست در مقابل جایگاه بازبینی متوقف شد، درست زمانی که شش جت میراژ در یک نمایش آکروباتیک از بالای سرشان غرش می‌کردند., رنگ آمیزی آسمان با مسیرهای طولانی قرمز, رنگ زرد, رنگ بنفش,و دود سبز. سادات برخاست, ظاهراً برای تبادل سلام با گروه دیگری از نیروهای مصری آماده می شود. او خود را به یک هدف عالی برای چهار قاتل اسلام گرا تبدیل کرد که از کامیون پریدند, به تریبون یورش بردند, و بدن او را با گلوله پر کرد. در حالی که قاتلان برای چیزی که به نظر می رسید برای ابدیت ادامه می دادند تا جایگاه را با آتش مرگبار خود بپاشند., من برای یک لحظه فکر کردم که آیا باید به زمین بخورم و خطر زیر پا گذاشتن توسط تماشاگران وحشت زده را به جان بخرم یا در راه بمانم و خطر گلوله سرگردان را بگیرم.. غریزه به من گفت که روی پاهایم بمان, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.
| سپتامبر 26, 2010 | نظرات 0
فعالیت زنان اسلامگرا در فلسطین اشغالی
مصاحبه های خالد آمیره
مصاحبه با سمیرا الحلیکا
سمیرا الحلیکا یکی از اعضای منتخب شورای قانونگذاری فلسطین است. او بود
در روستای شویخ در حومه الخلیل متولد شد 1964. او لیسانس شریعت دارد (اسلامی
فقه) از دانشگاه هبرون. او به عنوان روزنامه نگار از 1996 به 2006 چه زمانی
او به عنوان یک عضو منتخب در شورای قانونگذاری فلسطین وارد شد 2006 انتخابات.
او متاهل است و هفت فرزند دارد.
س: در برخی از کشورهای غربی تصور کلی وجود دارد که زنان از آن برخوردار هستند
رفتار حقارت در گروه های مقاومت اسلامی, مانند حماس. آیا این درست است?
رفتار با فعالان زن در حماس چگونه است؟?
حقوق و تکالیف زنان مسلمان قبل از هر چیز از شریعت یا قوانین اسلامی سرچشمه می گیرد.
آنها اعمال یا حرکات داوطلبانه یا خیریه ای نیستند که ما از حماس یا کسی دریافت می کنیم
دیگر. بدین ترتیب, تا آنجا که به دخالت و کنشگری سیاسی مربوط می شود, زنان به طور کلی دارند
همان حقوق و وظایفی که مردان دارند. گذشته از همه اینها, زنان حداقل آرایش می کنند 50 درصد از
جامعه. به یک معنا, آنها کل جامعه هستند زیرا آنها به دنیا می آیند, و بالا بردن,
نسل جدید.
از این رو, می توانم بگویم که وضعیت زنان در حماس کاملاً با او مطابقت دارد
جایگاه در خود اسلام. این بدان معنی است که او یک شریک کامل در تمام سطوح است. در واقع, خواهد بود
برای یک اسلامی ناعادلانه و ناعادلانه است (یا اسلام گرا در صورت تمایل) زن شریک رنج باشد
در حالی که او از فرآیند تصمیم گیری کنار گذاشته شده است. به همین دلیل است که نقش زن در
حماس همیشه پیشگام بوده است.
س: آیا احساس می کنید که ظهور فعالیت سیاسی زنان در داخل حماس است؟
توسعه طبیعی که با مفاهیم کلاسیک اسلامی سازگار است
در مورد جایگاه و نقش زنان, یا صرفاً پاسخی ضروری به آن است
فشارهای مدرنیته و الزامات کنش سیاسی و تداوم آن
اشغال اسرائیل?
هیچ نصی در فقه اسلامی و منشور حماس وجود ندارد که زنان را از این امر بازدارد
مشارکت سیاسی. من معتقدم برعکس است — آیات قرآن فراوان است
و سخنان حضرت محمد (ص) که زنان را به حضور فعال در عرصه سیاسی و عمومی تشویق می کند
مسائلی که مسلمانان را تحت تأثیر قرار می دهد. اما این در مورد زنان نیز صادق است, همانطور که برای مردان است, فعالیت سیاسی
اجباری نیست بلکه اختیاری است, و تا حد زیادی با توجه به توانایی های هر زن تصمیم گیری می شود,
شرایط و شرایط فردی. با این حال کمتر, نشان دادن نگرانی برای عموم
امور بر هر زن و مرد مسلمان واجب است. پیامبر
محمد گفت: «کسی که به امور مسلمین توجهی نداشته باشد، مسلمان نیست».
علاوه بر این, زنان اسلام گرا فلسطینی باید همه عوامل عینی را در میدان وارد کنند
هنگام تصمیم گیری در مورد پیوستن به سیاست یا درگیر شدن در فعالیت های سیاسی حساب کنید.
| سپتامبر 19, 2010 | نظرات 0
اشتغال, استعمار, آپارتاید?
The Human Sciences Research Council
The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (برای مثال, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, و
غزه, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. همزمان, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, و, if so, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, مشاوره, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. همزمان, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.
| سپتامبر 07, 2010 | نظرات 0
US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace
هنری Siegman
Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.
| سپتامبر 07, 2010 | نظرات 0
PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:
Sherifa Zuhur
Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (سهمیه)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; و (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.
| سپتامبر 06, 2010 | نظرات 0
دموکراسی, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
Israel Elad-Altman
The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?
| سپتامبر 05, 2010 | نظرات 0
EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?
Research
The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 انتخابات. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. همزمان, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.
| سپتامبر 05, 2010 | نظرات 0
Islam and Democracy
ITAC
If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s
| سپتامبر 04, 2010 | نظرات 0
Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood
تس لی آیزنهارت
As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of
Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (برادر) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, با این حال, the Brotherhood has
با تحزب در قلمرو رسمی سیاسی. این آزمایش به اوج خود رسید
انتخاب هشتاد و هشت برادران به مجلس خلق در سال 2005 - بزرگترین
بلوک اپوزیسیون در تاریخ مدرن مصر - و دستگیری های بعدی تقریباً
1,000 برادران. 2 پیشروی انتخاباتی در جریان اصلی سیاست خوراک فراوانی را فراهم می کند
برای دانشمندان تا نظریه ها را آزمایش کنند و در مورد آینده مصری ها پیش بینی کنند
رژیم: آیا به دست اپوزیسیون اسلامگرا خواهد افتاد یا چراغ راه سکولاریسم در جهان باقی خواهد ماند
جهان عرب?
این تز از طرح چنین حدس و گمان های گسترده ای خودداری می کند. بجای, آن را بررسی می کند
میزان سازگاری اخوان المسلمین به عنوان یک سازمان در گذشته
دهه.
| سپتامبر 01, 2010 | نظرات 0
Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009
Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become a “western expanding strategy” that turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .
| اوت 27, 2010 | نظرات 0
The Lives of Hasan al Banna & Syed Qutb.
The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al Muslimeen) was founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) in the Egyptian town of al- Isma’iliyyah in 1928. The son of an Azharite scholar, who earned his livelihood by repairing watches, Hasan al-Banna showed from his early
school-days an inclination and great zeal for calling people to Islamic values and traditions. His strong sense of religiosity and spiritual awareness drove him to join the Hasafiyyah tariqah, one of many Sufi tariqahs that were widespread in Egypt at that time. Even though he was not formally associated with this tariqah after he founded the Ikhwan, he, nevertheless, maintained a good relation with it, as indeed with other Islamic organizations and religious personalities, and persisted in reciting the litanies (awrad, pl. of wird) of this tariqah until his last days. Though Hasan al-Banna joined a modern-type school of education, he promised his father that he would continue to memorize the Qur’an, which he did, in fact later, at the age of twelve. While at school, he took part in the activities of some religious associations and clubs which were promoting it and calling for the observance of Islamic teachings .
| اوت 20, 2010 | نظرات 0
Islamist Parties : why they can’t be democratic
Bassam Tibi
Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many
Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take
an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, it has
become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on
clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam
and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate
consequences.
بحث هوشمندانه اسلام گرایی, democracy, و اسلام اقتضا می کند
تعاریف واضح و دقیق. بدون آنها, تجزیه و تحلیل به سقوط خواهد کرد
سردرگمی و سیاست گذاری آسیب خواهد دید. دیدگاه خودم, تشکیل شده است
سی سال مطالعه و تأمل در این مورد, این است که اسلام و
دموکراسی واقعاً سازگار هستند, مشروط بر اینکه برخی ضروریات دینی
اصلاحات انجام می شود. تمایل به انجام چنین اصلاحاتی چیست
من اسلام سیاسی را فاقد آن می دانم. علاقه مندی خودم به عنوان یک عرب-
تئوریسین و مجری دموکراسی مسلمان - برای ارتقای تشکیلات است
دموکراسی سکولار در محدوده تمدن اسلامی.
به منظور کمک به رفع سردرگمی که اغلب در اطراف وجود دارد
این موضوع, من چندین نکته اساسی را که باید در نظر داشته باشید بیان می کنم. اولی این است
که, تا حالا, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty
because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.
Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment
upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of
all practical wisdom.
| اوت 20, 2010 | نظرات 0
Islamist parties : Three kinds of movements
تامارا Cofman
Between 1991 و 2001, the world of political Islam became significantly more diverse. Today, the term “Islamist”—used to describe a political perspective centrally informed by a set of religious interpretations and commitments—can be applied to such a wide array of groups as to be almost meaningless. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.
Nonetheless, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. The religious discourse of the Islamists is now unavoidably central to Arab politics. Conventional policy discussions label Islamists either “moderate” or “radical,” generally categorizing them according to two rather loose and unhelpful criteria. The first is violence: Radicals use it and moderates do not. This begs the question of how to classify groups that do not themselves engage in violence but who condone, justify, or even actively support the violence of others. A second, only somewhat more restrictive criterion is whether the groups or individuals in question
accept the rules of the democratic electoral game. Popular sovereignty is no small concession for traditional Islamists, many of whom reject democratically elected governments as usurpers of God’s sovereignty.
Yet commitment to the procedural rules of democratic elections is not the same as commitment to democratic politics or governance.
| اوت 18, 2010 | نظرات 0
ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones
ناتان J. رنگ قهوه ای, عمرو حمزوی,
مارینا اوتاوای Marina Ottaway
During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, با این حال, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, اردن, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. سیاست, not violence, چیزی است که به جریان اصلی اسلام گرایان نفوذ می کند.
| اوت 18, 2010 | نظرات 0
Islamist Parties , ARE THEY DEMOCRATS? DOES it matter ?
طارق مسعود
Driven by a sense that “the Islamists are coming,” journalists and policy makers have been engaged of late in fevered speculation over whether Islamist parties such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or Palestine’s Hamas really believe in democracy. While I attempt to outline the boundaries of the Islamist democratic commitment, I think that peering into the Islamist soul is a misuse of energies. The Islamists are not coming. علاوه بر این, as Adam Przeworski and others have argued, commitments to democracy are more often born of environmental constraints than of true belief. Instead of worrying whether Islamists are real democrats,
our goal should be to help fortify democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group—Islamist or otherwise—can subvert them.
But what is this movement over whose democratic bona fides we worry? Islamism is a slippery concept. For example, if we label as Islamist those parties that call for the application of shari‘a, we must exclude Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (which is widely considered Islamist) and include Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (which actively represses Islamists). Instead of becoming mired in definitional issues, we would do better to focus on a set of political parties that have grown from the same historical roots, derive many of their goals and positions from the same body of ideas, and maintain organizational ties to one another—that is, those parties that spring from the international MB. These include the Egyptian mother organization (founded in 1928), but also Hamas, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, Algeria’s Movement for a Peaceful Society, the Iraqi Islamic Party, Lebanon’s Islamic Group, and others.
| اوت 17, 2010 | نظرات 0
ISLAMIC RULINGS ON WARFARE
یوسف H. ابو-Enein
Sherifa Zuhur
The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.
| اوت 13, 2010 | نظرات 0
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