Todas las entradas con etiquetas con: "Hamas"
El mañana árabe
david b. OTTAWAY
Octubre 6, 1981, estaba destinado a ser un día de celebración en Egipto. Marcó el aniversario del momento más grandioso de la victoria de Egipto en tres conflictos árabe-israelíes., cuando el ejército desvalido del país atravesó el Canal de Suez en los primeros días del 1973 Guerra de Yom Kippur y envió a las tropas israelíes tambaleándose en retirada. en un fresco, mañana sin nubes, El estadio de El Cairo estaba repleto de familias egipcias que habían venido a ver a los militares pavonearse con su hardware. En el estrado de revisión, Presidente Anwar el-Sadat,el arquitecto de la guerra, observó con satisfacción cómo hombres y máquinas desfilaban ante él. yo estaba cerca, un corresponsal extranjero recién llegado. De repente, uno de los camiones del ejército se detuvo justo frente a la plataforma de revisión justo cuando seis jets Mirage rugían sobre su cabeza en una actuación acrobática, pintando el cielo con largas estelas de rojo, amarillo, violeta,y humo verde. sadat se puso de pie, aparentemente preparándose para intercambiar saludos con otro contingente de tropas egipcias. Se convirtió en blanco perfecto para cuatro sicarios islamistas que saltaron del camión, subió al podio, y acribillaron su cuerpo a balazos. Mientras los asesinos continuaban durante lo que pareció una eternidad rociando el stand con su fuego mortal, Consideré por un instante si golpear el suelo y arriesgarme a ser pisoteado hasta la muerte por espectadores aterrorizados o permanecer en pie y arriesgarme a recibir una bala perdida.. El instinto me dijo que me quedara de pie, y mi sentido del deber periodístico me impulsó a ir a averiguar si Sadat estaba vivo o muerto.
| Sep 26, 2010 | Comentarios 0
EL ACTIVISMO DE LAS MUJERES ISLAMISTAS EN LA PALESTINA OCUPADA
Entrevistas de Khaled Amayreh
Entrevista con Sameera Al-Halayka
Sameera Al-Halayka es miembro electo del Consejo Legislativo Palestino. Ella estaba
nacido en el pueblo de Shoyoukh cerca de Hebron en 1964. Ella tiene un BA en Sharia (Islámica
Jurisprudencia) de la Universidad de Hebrón. Trabajó como periodista de 1996 a 2006 cuando
ingresó al Consejo Legislativo Palestino como miembro electo en el 2006 elecciones.
Está casada y tiene siete hijos..
q: Existe la impresión general en algunos países occidentales de que las mujeres reciben
trato inferior dentro de los grupos de resistencia islámica, como Hamás. Es esto cierto?
¿Cómo son tratadas las mujeres activistas en Hamas??
Los derechos y deberes de las mujeres musulmanas emanan ante todo de la sharia o ley islámica.
No son actos o gestos voluntarios o caritativos que recibimos de Hamas o de cualquier persona.
más. Por lo tanto, en lo que respecta a la participación política y el activismo, las mujeres generalmente tienen
los mismos derechos y deberes que los hombres. Después de todo, las mujeres se maquillan al menos 50 por ciento de
sociedad. En cierto sentido, son toda la sociedad porque dan a luz, y subir,
La nueva generación.
Por lo tanto, Puedo decir que el estatus de la mujer dentro de Hamas está en plena conformidad con su
estado en el Islam mismo. Esto significa que ella es una socia de pleno derecho en todos los niveles.. En efecto, podría ser
injusto e injusto para un islámico (o islamista si lo prefieres) mujer para ser compañera en el sufrimiento
mientras que ella está excluida del proceso de toma de decisiones. Por eso el papel de la mujer en
Hamás siempre ha sido pionero.
q: ¿Cree que el surgimiento del activismo político de las mujeres dentro de Hamas es
un desarrollo natural que es compatible con los conceptos islámicos clásicos
sobre la condición y el papel de la mujer, o es simplemente una respuesta necesaria a
presiones de la modernidad y exigencias de la acción política y de la continuidad
ocupación israelí?
No hay texto en la jurisprudencia islámica ni en la carta de Hamás que impida a las mujeres
participacion politica. Yo creo que lo contrario es cierto — hay numerosos versos coránicos
y dichos del profeta Mahoma instando a las mujeres a ser activas en la política y en la vida pública.
problemas que afectan a los musulmanes. Pero también es cierto que para las mujeres, como lo es para los hombres, activismo politico
no es obligatorio sino voluntario, y se decide en gran medida a la luz de las habilidades de cada mujer,
calificaciones y circunstancias individuales. Sin embargo, mostrando preocupación por el público
asuntos es obligatorio para todos y cada uno de los hombres y mujeres musulmanes. El profeta
Mahoma dijo: “Quien no muestra preocupación por los asuntos de los musulmanes no es musulmán”.
Es más, Las mujeres islamistas palestinas tienen que tener en cuenta todos los factores objetivos sobre el terreno.
cuenta a la hora de decidir si unirse a la política o involucrarse en el activismo político.
| Sep 19, 2010 | Comentarios 0
Ocupación, Colonialismo, Apartheid?
The Human Sciences Research Council
The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (a saber,, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, y
Gas, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. Al mismo tiempo, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, y, si es así, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, consulta, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. Al mismo tiempo, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.
| Sep 07, 2010 | Comentarios 0
La política estadounidense de Hamas bloquea la paz en Medio Oriente
Henry Siegman
Conversaciones bilaterales fallidas en estos últimos 16 años han demostrado que un acuerdo de paz en Oriente Medio nunca puede ser alcanzado por las propias partes. Los gobiernos israelíes creen que pueden desafiar la condena internacional de su proyecto colonial ilegal en Cisjordania porque pueden contar con Estados Unidos para oponerse a las sanciones internacionales.. Conversaciones bilaterales que no se enmarcan en los parámetros formulados por EE.UU. (sobre la base de las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad, los acuerdos de oslo, la Iniciativa de Paz Árabe, la “hoja de ruta” y otros acuerdos previos entre israelíes y palestinos) no puede tener éxito. El gobierno de Israel cree que el Congreso de los Estados Unidos no permitirá que un presidente estadounidense emita tales parámetros y exija su aceptación.. Qué esperanza hay para las conversaciones bilaterales que se reanudan en Washington DC en septiembre 2 depende completamente de que el presidente Obama demuestre que esa creencia es incorrecta, y sobre si las “propuestas puente” que ha prometido, si las conversaciones llegan a un punto muerto, son un eufemismo para la sumisión de los parámetros americanos. Tal iniciativa estadounidense debe ofrecer a Israel garantías férreas de su seguridad dentro de sus fronteras anteriores a 1967., pero al mismo tiempo debe dejar en claro que estas garantías no están disponibles si Israel insiste en negar a los palestinos un estado viable y soberano en Cisjordania y Gaza.. Este documento se centra en el otro gran obstáculo para un acuerdo de estatus permanente: la ausencia de un interlocutor palestino efectivo. Abordar las quejas legítimas de Hamas, y como se señaló en un informe reciente de CENTCOM, Hamas tiene quejas legítimas: podría conducir a su regreso a un gobierno de coalición palestino que proporcionaría a Israel un socio de paz creíble.. Si ese alcance falla debido al rechazo de Hamás, la capacidad de la organización para impedir un acuerdo razonable negociado por otros partidos políticos palestinos se habrá visto significativamente obstaculizada. Si la administración Obama no lidera una iniciativa internacional para definir los parámetros de un acuerdo israelí-palestino y promover activamente la reconciliación política palestina, Europa debe hacerlo, y espero que Estados Unidos siga. Desafortunadamente, no existe una bala de plata que pueda garantizar el objetivo de “dos estados que vivan uno al lado del otro en paz y seguridad”.
Pero el rumbo actual del presidente Obama lo impide absolutamente..
| Sep 07, 2010 | Comentarios 0
PRECISIÓN EN LA GUERRA GLOBAL CONTRA EL TERROR:
Sherifa Zuhur
Siete años después de septiembre 11, 2001 (9/11) ataques, muchos expertos creen que al-Qaeda ha recuperado fuerza y que sus imitadores o afiliados son más letales que antes. La estimación de inteligencia nacional de 2007 afirmó que al-Qaeda es más peligrosa ahora que antes 9/11.1 Los emuladores de Al-Qaeda continúan amenazando a Occidente, Medio este, y naciones europeas, como en la trama frustrada en septiembre 2007 en Alemania. Bruce Riedel afirma: En gran parte gracias al afán de Washington de entrar en Irak en lugar de perseguir a los líderes de Al Qaeda., la organización ahora tiene una sólida base de operaciones en las tierras baldías de Pakistán y una franquicia efectiva en el oeste de Irak. Su alcance se ha extendido por todo el mundo musulmán y en Europa . . . Osama bin Laden ha montado una exitosa campaña de propaganda. . . . Sus ideas atraen ahora más seguidores que nunca.
Es cierto que siguen surgiendo diversas organizaciones salafistas-yihadistas en todo el mundo islámico. ¿Por qué las respuestas con muchos recursos al terrorismo islamista que llamamos yihad global no han demostrado ser extremadamente efectivas??
Pasando a las herramientas de “soft power”,¿Qué pasa con la eficacia de los esfuerzos occidentales para reforzar a los musulmanes en la Guerra Global contra el Terror? (GWOT)? ¿Por qué Estados Unidos ha ganado tan pocos “corazones y mentes” en el mundo islámico más amplio?? ¿Por qué los mensajes estratégicos estadounidenses sobre este tema juegan tan mal en la región?? Por qué, a pesar de la amplia desaprobación musulmana del extremismo, como se muestra en encuestas y declaraciones oficiales de líderes musulmanes clave, ¿Ha aumentado el apoyo a Bin Laden en Jordania y Pakistán??
Esta monografía no repasará los orígenes de la violencia islamista. En cambio, se refiere a un tipo de falla conceptual que construye erróneamente la GWOT y que desalienta a los musulmanes a apoyarla.. No pueden identificarse con las contramedidas transformadoras propuestas porque perciben algunas de sus creencias e instituciones centrales como objetivos en
este esfuerzo.
Varias tendencias profundamente problemáticas confunden las conceptualizaciones estadounidenses de la GWOT y los mensajes estratégicos elaborados para pelear esa guerra.. Estos evolucionan de (1) enfoques políticos poscoloniales hacia los musulmanes y las naciones de mayoría musulmana que varían mucho y, por lo tanto, producen impresiones y efectos contradictorios y confusos; y (2) ignorancia generalizada residual y prejuicio hacia el Islam y las culturas subregionales. Agregue a esta ira estadounidense, miedo, y la ansiedad por los eventos mortales de 9/11, y ciertos elementos que, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.
| Sep 06, 2010 | Comentarios 0
Democracia, Elecciones y los Hermanos Musulmanes Egipcios
Israel Elad-Altman
The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?
| Sep 05, 2010 | Comentarios 0
LOS HERMANOS MUSULMANES DE EGIPTO: CONFRONTACIÓN O INTEGRACIÓN?
Research
The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (nombra y destituye a los gobernadores) la negativa a aflojar el control corre el riesgo de exacerbar las tensiones en un momento de incertidumbre política en torno a la sucesión presidencial y de graves disturbios socioeconómicos. Aunque es probable que esto sea un período prolongado, proceso gradual, el régimen debe tomar medidas preliminares para normalizar la participación de los Hermanos Musulmanes en la vida política. los hermanos musulmanes, cuyas actividades sociales han sido toleradas durante mucho tiempo pero cuyo papel en la política formal está estrictamente limitado, ganó un sin precedentes 20 por ciento de los escaños parlamentarios en el 2005 elecciones. Lo hicieron a pesar de competir por solo un tercio de los asientos disponibles y a pesar de los obstáculos considerables., incluyendo la represión policial y el fraude electoral. Este éxito confirmó su posición como una fuerza política extremadamente bien organizada y profundamente arraigada.. Al mismo tiempo, subrayó las debilidades tanto de la oposición legal como del partido gobernante. El régimen bien podría haber apostado a que un modesto aumento en la representación parlamentaria de los Hermanos Musulmanes podría usarse para avivar los temores de una toma de poder islamista y, por lo tanto, servir como una razón para detener la reforma.. Si es así, la estrategia corre un gran riesgo de fracasar.
| Sep 05, 2010 | Comentarios 0
Islam y Democracia
ITAC
If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s
| Sep 04, 2010 | Comentarios 0
Continuidad organizacional en la Hermandad Musulmana de Egipto
Tess Eisenhart Lee
As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of
Hermanos Musulmanes, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Desde su fundación en 1928, the Brotherhood (Ikhwan) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, sin embargo,, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
regime: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores
the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.
| Sep 01, 2010 | Comentarios 0
Manifiesto político de Hizbollah 2009
Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become a “western expanding strategy” that turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .
| ago 27, 2010 | Comentarios 0
Las vidas de Hasan al Banna & Syed Qutb.
La Hermandad Musulmana (Ikhwan al Muslimeen) was founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) in the Egyptian town of al- Isma’iliyyah in 1928. The son of an Azharite scholar, who earned his livelihood by repairing watches, Hasan al-Banna showed from his early
school-days an inclination and great zeal for calling people to Islamic values and traditions. His strong sense of religiosity and spiritual awareness drove him to join the Hasafiyyah tariqah, one of many Sufi tariqahs that were widespread in Egypt at that time. Even though he was not formally associated with this tariqah after he founded the Ikhwan, he, nevertheless, maintained a good relation with it, as indeed with other Islamic organizations and religious personalities, and persisted in reciting the litanies (awrad, pl. of wird) of this tariqah until his last days. Though Hasan al-Banna joined a modern-type school of education, he promised his father that he would continue to memorize the Qur’an, which he did, in fact later, at the age of twelve. While at school, he took part in the activities of some religious associations and clubs which were promoting it and calling for the observance of Islamic teachings .
| ago 20, 2010 | Comentarios 0
Partes islamistas : ¿Por qué no pueden ser democráticos?
Bassam Tibi
Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many
Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take
an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, it has
become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on
clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam
and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate
consequences.
Intelligent discussion of Islamism, la democracia, and Islam requires
clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into
confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after
thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and
democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious
reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what
I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-
Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment
of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.
In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds
this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is
that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty
because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.
Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment
upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of
all practical wisdom.
| ago 20, 2010 | Comentarios 0
partidos islamistas : Tres clases de movimientos
Tamara Cofman
Between 1991 y 2001, the world of political Islam became significantly more diverse. Este Dia, the term “Islamist”—used to describe a political perspective centrally informed by a set of religious interpretations and commitments—can be applied to such a wide array of groups as to be almost meaningless. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.
Nonetheless, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. The religious discourse of the Islamists is now unavoidably central to Arab politics. Conventional policy discussions label Islamists either “moderate” or “radical,” generally categorizing them according to two rather loose and unhelpful criteria. The first is violence: Radicals use it and moderates do not. This begs the question of how to classify groups that do not themselves engage in violence but who condone, justify, or even actively support the violence of others. A second, only somewhat more restrictive criterion is whether the groups or individuals in question
accept the rules of the democratic electoral game. Popular sovereignty is no small concession for traditional Islamists, many of whom reject democratically elected governments as usurpers of God’s sovereignty.
Yet commitment to the procedural rules of democratic elections is not the same as commitment to democratic politics or governance.
| ago 18, 2010 | Comentarios 0
LOS MOVIMIENTOS ISLAMISTAS Y EL PROCESO DEMOCRÁTICO EN EL MUNDO ÁRABE: Explorando las zonas grises
Nathan J. Marrón, , Amr Hamzawy,
Marina Ottaway
During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Los movimientos islamistas, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, sin embargo,, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordania, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Política, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.
| ago 18, 2010 | Comentarios 0
Partes islamistas , SON DEMÓCRATAS? ¿Importa ?
Tarek Masoud
Driven by a sense that “the Islamists are coming,” journalists and policy makers have been engaged of late in fevered speculation over whether Islamist parties such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or Palestine’s Hamas really believe in democracy. While I attempt to outline the boundaries of the Islamist democratic commitment, I think that peering into the Islamist soul is a misuse of energies. The Islamists are not coming. Es más, as Adam Przeworski and others have argued, commitments to democracy are more often born of environmental constraints than of true belief. Instead of worrying whether Islamists are real democrats,
our goal should be to help fortify democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group—Islamist or otherwise—can subvert them.
But what is this movement over whose democratic bona fides we worry? Islamism is a slippery concept. Por ejemplo, if we label as Islamist those parties that call for the application of shari‘a, we must exclude Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (which is widely considered Islamist) and include Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (which actively represses Islamists). Instead of becoming mired in definitional issues, we would do better to focus on a set of political parties that have grown from the same historical roots, derive many of their goals and positions from the same body of ideas, and maintain organizational ties to one another—that is, those parties that spring from the international MB. These include the Egyptian mother organization (founded in 1928), but also Hamas, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, Algeria’s Movement for a Peaceful Society, the Iraqi Islamic Party, Lebanon’s Islamic Group, and others.
| ago 17, 2010 | Comentarios 0
NORMAS ISLÁMICAS SOBRE LA GUERRA
H Youssef. Aboul-Enein
Sherifa Zuhur
The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.
| ago 13, 2010 | Comentarios 0
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