Totes les entrades etiquetades amb: "Hamas"
The Arab Tomorrow
DAVID B. OTTAWAY
Octubre 6, 1981, was meant to be a day of celebration in Egypt. It marked the anniversary of Egypt’s grandest moment of victory in three Arab-Israeli conflicts, when the country’s underdog army thrust across the Suez Canal in the opening days ofthe 1973 Yom Kippur War and sent Israeli troops reeling in retreat. On a cool, cloudless morning, the Cairo stadium was packed with Egyptian families that had come to see the military strut its hardware.On the reviewing stand, President Anwar el-Sadat,the war’s architect, watched with satisfaction as men and machines paraded before him. I was nearby, a newly arrived foreign correspondent.Suddenly, un dels camions de l'exèrcit es va aturar directament davant de l'estand de revisió just quan sis avions Mirage rugien per sobre en una actuació acrobàtica., pintant el cel amb llargs estels de vermell, groc, porpra,i fum verd. Sadat es va aixecar, aparentment es prepara per intercanviar salutacions amb un altre contingent de tropes egípcies. Es va convertir en un objectiu perfecte per a quatre assassins islamistes que van saltar del camió, va assaltar el podi, i va cridar el seu cos amb bales. Mentre els assassins van continuar durant el que va semblar una eternitat ruixant el suport amb el seu foc mortal., Vaig pensar per un instant si topar a terra i arriscar-me a ser trepitjat fins a la mort per espectadors en pànic o romandre a peu i arriscar-me a agafar una bala perduda.. L'instint em va dir que em mantingués de peu, i el meu sentit del deure periodístic em va impulsar a anar a saber si Sadat era viu o mort.
| setembre 26, 2010 | Comentaris 0
ISLAMIST WOMEN’S ACTIVISM IN OCCUPIED PALESTINE
Interviews by Khaled Amayreh
Interview with Sameera Al-Halayka
Sameera Al-Halayka is an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. She was
born in the village of Shoyoukh near Hebron in 1964. She has a BA in Sharia (islàmic
Jurisprudence) from Hebron University. She worked as a journalist from 1996 per 2006 when
va ingressar al Consell Legislatiu Palestí com a membre electe del 2006 eleccions.
Està casada i té set fills.
Q: Hi ha una impressió general en alguns països occidentals que reben les dones
tracte inferior dins dels grups de resistència islàmica, com Hamàs. És cert això??
Com es tracten les dones activistes a Hamàs?
Els drets i els deures de les dones musulmanes emanen, en primer lloc, de la xaria o llei islàmica.
No són actes o gestos voluntaris o benèfics que rebem de Hamàs o de ningú
altra cosa. Així, pel que fa a la implicació política i l'activisme, les dones en general tenen
els mateixos drets i deures que els homes. Després de tot, les dones com a mínim constitueixen 50 per cent de
societat. En cert sentit, són tota la societat perquè pareixen, i pujar,
la nova generació.
Per tant, I can say that the status of women within Hamas is in full conformity with her
status in Islam itself. This means that she is a full partner at all levels. Indeed, it would be
unfair and unjust for an Islamic (or Islamist if you prefer) woman to be partner in suffering
while she is excluded from the decision-making process. This is why the woman’s role in
Hamas has always been pioneering.
Q: Do you feel that the emergence of women’s political activism within Hamas is
a natural development that is compatible with classical Islamic concepts
regarding the status and role of women, or is it merely a necessary response to
pressures of modernity and requirements of political action and of the continued
Israeli occupation?
No hi ha cap text a la jurisprudència islàmica ni a la carta de Hamàs que impedeixi a les dones
participació política. Crec que és cert el contrari — hi ha nombrosos versos alcorànics
i les dites del profeta Mahoma que demanaven les dones a ser actives en la política i en el públic
problemes que afecten els musulmans. Però també és cert que per a les dones, com és per als homes, activisme polític
no és obligatori sinó voluntari, i es decideix en gran mesura en funció de les capacitats de cada dona,
qualificacions i circumstàncies individuals. No obstant això, mostrant preocupació pel públic
els assumptes són obligatoris per a tots i cadascun dels musulmans. El Profeta
va dir Muhammed: "Qui no mostra preocupació pels afers dels musulmans no és musulmà".
A més, Les dones islamistes palestines han de tenir en compte tots els factors objectius sobre el terreny
account when deciding whether to join politics or get involved in political activism.
| setembre 19, 2010 | Comentaris 0
ocupació, colonialisme, segregació racial?
Consell de Recerca en Ciències Humanes
El Consell de Recerca en Ciències Humanes de Sud-àfrica va encarregar aquest estudi per provar la hipòtesi plantejada pel professor John Dugard en l'informe que va presentar al Consell de Drets Humans de l'ONU al gener. 2007, en la seva qualitat de relator especial de l'ONU sobre la situació dels drets humans als territoris palestins ocupats per Israel (és a dir, Cisjordània, inclosa Jerusalem Est, i
Gaza, d'ara endavant OPT). El professor Dugard va plantejar la pregunta: Israel està clarament en ocupació militar dels TPO. Al mateix temps, elements de l'ocupació constitueixen formes de colonialisme i d'apartheid, que són contraris al dret internacional. Quines són les conseqüències legals d'un règim d'ocupació prolongada amb trets de colonialisme i apartheid per al poble ocupat?, la potència ocupant i tercers estats?
Per tenir en compte aquestes conseqüències, aquest estudi es va proposar examinar legalment les premisses de la pregunta del professor Dugard: Israel és l'ocupant dels TPO, i, si és així, elements de la seva ocupació d'aquests territoris equivalen a colonialisme o apartheid? Sud-àfrica té un interès evident en aquestes preguntes donada la seva amarga història d'apartheid, que va comportar la negació de l'autodeterminació
a la seva població majoritària i, durant la seva ocupació de Namíbia, l'extensió de l'apartheid a aquell territori que Sud-àfrica pretenia efectivament colonitzar. Aquestes pràctiques il·legals no s'han de reproduir en cap altre lloc: els altres pobles no han de patir com han patit les poblacions de Sud-àfrica i Namíbia.
Per explorar aquestes qüestions, es va reunir un equip internacional d'estudiosos. L'objectiu d'aquest projecte era examinar la situació des de la perspectiva no partidista del dret internacional, en lloc de participar en el discurs polític i la retòrica. Aquest estudi és el resultat d'un procés col·laboratiu d'investigació intensiva de quinze mesos, consulta, escriptura i revisió. Conclou i, és d'esperar, argumenta de manera persuasiva i demostra clarament que Israel, des 1967, ha estat el poder ocupant bel·ligerant als TPO, i que la seva ocupació d'aquests territoris s'ha convertit en una empresa colonial que implementa un sistema d'apartheid. L'ocupació bel·ligerant en si mateixa no és una situació il·legal: s'accepta com a possible conseqüència d'un conflicte armat. Al mateix temps, sota el dret dels conflictes armats (també conegut com a dret internacional humanitari), l'ocupació pretén ser només un estat de coses temporal. El dret internacional prohibeix l'annexió unilateral o l'adquisició permanent de territori com a conseqüència de l'amenaça o l'ús de la força.: en cas que això passi, cap Estat pot reconèixer o donar suport a la situació il·lícita resultant. En contrast amb l'ocupació, tant el colonialisme com l'apartheid són sempre il·legals i, de fet, es consideren infraccions especialment greus del dret internacional perquè són fonamentalment contraris als valors fonamentals de l'ordenament jurídic internacional.. El colonialisme viola el principi d'autodeterminació,
que la Cort Internacional de Justícia (ICJ) ha afirmat com "un dels principis essencials del dret internacional contemporani". Tots els estats tenen el deure de respectar i promoure l'autodeterminació. L'apartheid és un cas agreujat de discriminació racial, que es constitueix d'acord amb la Convenció internacional per a la repressió i el càstig del crim d'apartheid (1973,
d'ara endavant "Convenció de l'apartheid") per "actes inhumans comesos amb el propòsit d'establir i mantenir el domini d'un grup racial de persones sobre qualsevol altre grup racial de persones i oprimir-los sistemàticament".. La pràctica de l'apartheid, a més, és un crim internacional.
El professor Dugard en el seu informe al Consell de Drets Humans de l'ONU a 2007 va suggerir que es demanés a la CIJ una opinió consultiva sobre les conseqüències legals de la conducta d'Israel. Aquest dictamen consultiu, sens dubte, complementaria l'opinió que va emetre la CIJ 2004 sobre les conseqüències jurídiques de la construcció d'un mur als territoris palestins ocupats (d'ara endavant "l'opinió consultiva del Mur"). Aquest curs d'acció legal no esgota les opcions obertes a la comunitat internacional, ni tampoc els deures de tercers estats i organitzacions internacionals quan s'avaluen que un altre Estat es dedica a les pràctiques del colonialisme o l'apartheid..
| setembre 07, 2010 | Comentaris 0
US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace
Henry Siegman
Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Malauradament, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.
| setembre 07, 2010 | Comentaris 0
PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:
sherifa Zuhur
Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (quota)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; i (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.
| setembre 06, 2010 | Comentaris 0
democràcia, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
Israel Elad-Altman
The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?
| setembre 05, 2010 | Comentaris 0
EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?
Research
The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. En resposta, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 eleccions. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. Al mateix temps, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.
| setembre 05, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Islam and Democracy
ITAC
If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s
| setembre 04, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood
Tess Llegeix Eisenhart
As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of
Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Des de la seva fundació a 1928, the Brotherhood (germà) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, malgrat això, la Germandat té
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
regime: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. En canvi, it explores
the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.
| setembre 01, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009
Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become a “western expanding strategy” that turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .
| agost 27, 2010 | Comentaris 0
The Lives of Hasan al Banna & Syed Qutb.
The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al Muslimeen) was founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) in the Egyptian town of al- Isma’iliyyah in 1928. The son of an Azharite scholar, who earned his livelihood by repairing watches, Hasan al-Banna showed from his early
school-days an inclination and great zeal for calling people to Islamic values and traditions. His strong sense of religiosity and spiritual awareness drove him to join the Hasafiyyah tariqah, one of many Sufi tariqahs that were widespread in Egypt at that time. Even though he was not formally associated with this tariqah after he founded the Ikhwan, he, nevertheless, maintained a good relation with it, as indeed with other Islamic organizations and religious personalities, and persisted in reciting the litanies (awrad, pl. of wird) of this tariqah until his last days. Though Hasan al-Banna joined a modern-type school of education, he promised his father that he would continue to memorize the Qur’an, which he did, in fact later, at the age of twelve. While at school, he took part in the activities of some religious associations and clubs which were promoting it and calling for the observance of Islamic teachings .
| agost 20, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Partits islamistes : why they can’t be democratic
Bassam Tibi
Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many
Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take
an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, it has
become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on
clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam
and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate
consequences.
Intelligent discussion of Islamism, democràcia, and Islam requires
clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into
confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after
thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and
democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious
reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what
I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-
Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment
of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.
In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds
this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is
that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty
because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.
Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment
upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of
all practical wisdom.
| agost 20, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Islamist parties : Three kinds of movements
Tamara Cofman
Between 1991 i 2001, the world of political Islam became significantly more diverse. avui, the term “Islamist”—used to describe a political perspective centrally informed by a set of religious interpretations and commitments—can be applied to such a wide array of groups as to be almost meaningless. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.
No obstant això, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. The religious discourse of the Islamists is now unavoidably central to Arab politics. Conventional policy discussions label Islamists either “moderate” or “radical,” generally categorizing them according to two rather loose and unhelpful criteria. The first is violence: Radicals use it and moderates do not. This begs the question of how to classify groups that do not themselves engage in violence but who condone, justify, or even actively support the violence of others. A second, only somewhat more restrictive criterion is whether the groups or individuals in question
accept the rules of the democratic electoral game. Popular sovereignty is no small concession for traditional Islamists, many of whom reject democratically elected governments as usurpers of God’s sovereignty.
Yet commitment to the procedural rules of democratic elections is not the same as commitment to democratic politics or governance.
| agost 18, 2010 | Comentaris 0
ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones
Nathan J. marró, Amr Hamzawy,
Marina Ottaway
During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Com a resultat, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, malgrat això, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, que tindrà el major impacte en la futura evolució política de l'Orient Mitjà. Els grandiosos objectius dels radicals de restablir un califat que uneixi tot el món àrab, o fins i tot d'imposar als països àrabs individuals lleis i costums socials inspirats en una interpretació fonamentalista de l'islam estan simplement massa allunyats de la realitat actual per ser realitzats.. Això no vol dir que els grups terroristes no siguin perillosos —podrien causar grans pèrdues de vides fins i tot en la recerca d'objectius impossibles—, sinó que és poc probable que canviïn la cara de l'Orient Mitjà.. Les organitzacions islamistes principals són generalment una qüestió diferent. Ja han tingut un impacte poderós en els costums socials de molts països, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordània, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. política, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.
| agost 18, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Partits islamistes , ARE THEY DEMOCRATS? DOES it matter ?
Tarek Masoud
Driven by a sense that “the Islamists are coming,” journalists and policy makers have been engaged of late in fevered speculation over whether Islamist parties such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or Palestine’s Hamas really believe in democracy. While I attempt to outline the boundaries of the Islamist democratic commitment, I think that peering into the Islamist soul is a misuse of energies. The Islamists are not coming. A més, as Adam Przeworski and others have argued, commitments to democracy are more often born of environmental constraints than of true belief. Instead of worrying whether Islamists are real democrats,
our goal should be to help fortify democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group—Islamist or otherwise—can subvert them.
But what is this movement over whose democratic bona fides we worry? Islamism is a slippery concept. Per exemple, if we label as Islamist those parties that call for the application of shari‘a, we must exclude Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (which is widely considered Islamist) and include Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (which actively represses Islamists). Instead of becoming mired in definitional issues, we would do better to focus on a set of political parties that have grown from the same historical roots, derive many of their goals and positions from the same body of ideas, i mantenir llaços organitzatius entre ells, és a dir, aquells partits que sorgeixen del MB internacional. Aquests inclouen l'organització mare egípcia (fundada a 1928), però també Hamàs, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, Moviment d'Algèria per una societat pacífica, el Partit Islàmic iraquià, Grup Islàmic del Líban, i altres.
| agost 17, 2010 | Comentaris 0
ISLAMIC RULINGS ON WARFARE
Youssef H. Aboul-Enein
sherifa Zuhur
The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.
| agost 13, 2010 | Comentaris 0
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