RSS所有条目标记为: "自由"

伊斯兰教中的妇女

阿米拉(Amira Burghul)

尽管许多哲学家和历史学家达成了重大共识,即

伊斯兰教的原则和教义使妇女的地位发生了根本性的变化

与当时东西方国家的普遍情况相比, 尽管

大量思想家和立法者一致认为,在当时的妇女

预言家 (PBUH) 被授予人为法律未授予的权利和法律特权,直到

最近, 西方人和西方人的宣传活动

一直指责伊斯兰教对女性不公平, 对他们施加限制, 和

边缘化他们在社会中的角色.

整个地区普遍存在的气氛和条件使这种情况变得更糟

穆斯林世界, 无知和贫穷导致对宗教的理解有限

以及阻碍正义和文明生活方式的家庭和人际关系, 特别

男女之间. 被授予机会的一小群人

受过教育和能力也落入了相信实现正义的陷阱

对女性而言,利用她们的能力取决于拒绝宗教和虔诚,

接受西方生活方式, 一方面是由于他们对伊斯兰教的肤浅研究

以及生活消遣对他人的影响.

这两个群体中只有极少数人设法逃脱并摆脱了

他们披着无知和传统的外衣. 这些人深入研究了他们的遗产

和细节, 并以开放的心态看待西方经验的结果. 他们有

区分过去和现在的小麦和谷壳, 并处理了

科学客观地处理出现的问题. 他们驳斥了错误的

以雄辩的论据对伊斯兰教提出指控, 并承认了隐瞒的缺陷.

他们还重新审视了无误者的说法和习俗,以便

区分什么是确定的和神圣的,什么是改变的和扭曲的.

这个群体的负责任的行为确立了新的方向和新的交易方式

伊斯兰社会中的妇女问题. 他们显然还没有解决所有问题

并找到了许多立法空白和缺陷的最终解决方案, 但他们已经奠定了

穆斯林妇女新模式出现的基础, 谁既强大又

致力于其社会的合法和有效基础.

随着伊朗伊斯兰革命的胜利和领导人的祝福, 哪一个是

妇女参与及其有效政治和社会活动的主要宗教权威

参与, 对伊斯兰教妇女进行激烈辩论的范围已显着扩大.

The model of Muslim women in Iran has spread to Islamic resistance movements in Lebanon,

Palestine other Arab countries and even the Western world, and as a result, propaganda

campaigns against Islam have abated to some extent.

The emergence of Salafi Islamic movements such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and similar

Salafi movements in Saudi Arabia and North Africa, and their fanatical way of treating women,

have provoked nervous onlookers fearing an Islamic resurgence into launching new propaganda

campaigns accusing Islam of inspiring terrorism and being backwards and unjust towards

women.

圣战伊斯兰主义的极权主义及其对欧洲和伊斯兰教的挑战

胫骨低音

在阅读由自称政治伊斯兰教专家发表的大量文献的大部分文本时, 很容易忽略一个新运动已经出现的事实. 更远, 该文献未能以令人满意的方式解释驱动它的意识形态是基于对伊斯兰教的特定解释这一事实, 因此它是一种政治化的宗教信仰,
不是世俗的. 唯一一本书将政治伊斯兰视为极权主义的一种形式,是保罗·伯曼(Paul Berman)的那本书, 恐怖主义与自由主义 (2003). 作者是, 然而, 不是专家, cannot read Islamic sources, and therefore relies on the selective use of one or two secondary sources, thus failing to grasp the phenomenon.
造成这种缺陷的原因之一是,大多数试图向我们通报“圣战威胁”的人——伯曼是该奖学金的典型代表——不仅缺乏阅读政治理论家提供的资料的语言技能。伊斯兰教, 但也缺乏对运动文化层面的了解. 这种新的极权主义运动在很多方面都是新鲜事物
在政治史上,因为它源于两个平行且相关的现象: 第一的, 导致政治被概念化为一种文化系统的政治文化化 (Clifford Geertz 开创的观点); 其次是神圣的回归, 或世界的“重新魔法”, 作为对全球化导致的密集世俗化的反应.
基于宗教的政治意识形态分析, 因此,它可以作为一种政治宗教产生吸引力, 涉及对宗教在世界政治中所起的作用的社会科学理解, 尤其是在冷战的两极体系让位于多极世界之后. 在汉娜阿伦特研究所进行的一项将极权主义应用于政治宗教研究的项目中, 我提出了作为宗教替代品的世俗意识形态之间的区别, 和基于真正宗教信仰的宗教意识形态, 宗教原教旨主义就是这种情况 (看注释
24). 另一个关于“政治宗教”的项目, 在巴塞尔大学进行, 更清楚地表明,一旦宗教信仰披上了政治外衣,就需要新的政治方法。借鉴政治伊斯兰教的权威来源, 这篇文章表明,受伊斯兰意识形态启发的各种各样的组织将被概念化为政治宗教和政治运动. 政治伊斯兰教的独特之处在于它基于跨国宗教 (看注释 26).

自由民主与政治伊斯兰: 寻找共同点.

穆斯塔法·本亨达

本文旨在建立民主和伊斯兰政治理论之间的对话。1 它们之间的相互作用令人费解: 例如, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
regime, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. 例如, 穆斯林学者和活动家经常赞同对统治者负责的原则, 这是民主的一个决定性特征. 相反, 他们经常拒绝政教分离的原则, 这通常被认为是民主的一部分 (至少, 当今美国所熟知的民主). 鉴于对民主原则的这种混合评估, 确定伊斯兰政治模式背后的民主概念似乎很有趣. 换句话说, 我们应该尝试找出什么是“神民主”中的民主. 为此, 在规范性政治思想的伊斯兰传统的令人印象深刻的多样性和多元化中, 我们主要关注可追溯到 Abu ‘Ala Maududi 和埃及知识分子 Sayyed Qutb 的广泛思想潮流。8 这种特殊的思想趋势很有趣,因为在穆斯林世界, 它是对源自西方的价值观传播的一些最具挑战性的反对意见的基础. 基于宗教价值观, 这一趋势阐述了一种替代自由民主的政治模式. 广义上讲, 这种伊斯兰政治模式中包含的民主概念是程序性的. 有一些不同, 这一概念受到一些宪政主义者和政治学家所倡导的民主理论的启发。 10 它是单薄且极简主义的, 到某一点. 例如, 它不依赖于任何人民主权的概念,也不需要将宗教与政治分开. 本文的第一个目的是阐述这种极简主义的概念. 我们对它进行了详细的重述,以便将这个概念与它的道德 (自由主义的) 基础, 从这里考虑的特定伊斯兰观点来看,这是有争议的. 的确, 民主进程通常源于个人自治原则, 这些伊斯兰理论并不认可这一点。 11 这里, 我们表明,这样的原则对于证明民主进程的正当性并不是必要的.

伊斯兰改革

阿德南汗

意大利总理, 西尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼(Silvio Berlusconi)在事件发生后吹嘘 9/11:
“……我们必须意识到我们文明的优越性, 一个保证了的系统

福祉, 尊重人权和 – 与伊斯兰国家相反 – 尊重

为了宗教和政治权利, 一个有其价值观的系统 对多样性的理解

和宽容……西方将征服人民, 就像它征服了共产主义, 即使它

意味着与另一个文明的对抗, 伊斯兰的, 卡在原来的地方

1,400 几年前……”1

并且在一个 2007 报告兰德研究所宣布:
“穆斯林世界大部分地区正在进行的斗争本质上是一场

想法. 其结果将决定穆斯林世界的未来方向。”

建立温和的穆斯林网络, 兰德研究所

“伊斯拉”的概念 (改革) 是穆斯林不知道的概念. 它从未存在于整个

伊斯兰文明史; 它从未被辩论甚至考虑过. 对古典的粗略一瞥

伊斯兰文学告诉我们,当古典学者奠定了usul的基础时, 并编纂

他们的伊斯兰裁决 (菲格) 他们只是在寻求对伊斯兰规则的理解,以便

应用它们. 当为圣训制定规则时,也发生了类似的情况, 塔夫西尔和

阿拉伯语. 学者, 伊斯兰历史上的思想家和知识分子花了很多时间

理解真主的启示——古兰经,并将 ayaat 应用于现实并创造

校长和学科,以促进理解. 因此,古兰经仍然是

研究和发展的所有学科始终以古兰经为基础. 那些成为

被希腊哲学迷住了,例如穆斯林哲学家和一些来自 Mut'azilah

由于古兰经不再是他们学习的基础,他们被认为已经离开了伊斯兰教的圈子. 因此对于

任何试图推断规则或理解应该对特定的立场采取什么立场的穆斯林

发行古兰经是本研究的基础.

改革伊斯兰教的第一次尝试发生在 19 世纪之交. 轮到

世纪以来,Ummah 经历了一段漫长的衰落期,全球力量平衡发生了变化

从 Khilafah 到英国. 越来越多的问题席卷了希拉法,而西欧则在

工业革命中. 乌玛开始失去她对伊斯兰教的原始理解, 和

试图扭转席卷乌斯马尼人的衰落 (奥斯曼人) 一些穆斯林被送往

西, 结果被他们所看到的迷住了. 埃及的 Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi (1801-1873),

从巴黎回来时, 写了一本名为 Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz 的传记 (这

黄金的提取, 或巴黎概览, 1834), 赞美他们的清洁, 热爱工作, 以上

一切社会道德. 他宣称我们必须模仿巴黎正在做的事情, 提倡改变

伊斯兰社会从女性自由化到统治体系. 这个想法, 和其他人喜欢它,

标志着伊斯兰教重塑趋势的开始.

全球反恐战争中的精准:

Sherifa Zuhur

九月之后的七年 11, 2001 (9/11) 攻击, 许多专家认为,基地组织已经恢复了力量,其模仿者或分支机构比以前更具杀伤力. 国家情报估计 2007 断言基地组织现在比以前更危险 9/11.1 基地组织的模仿者继续威胁西方, 中东, 和欧洲国家, 就像在九月被挫败的情节一样 2007 在德国. 布鲁斯·里德尔说: 很大程度上要归功于华盛顿急于进入伊拉克而不是追捕基地组织的领导人, 该组织现在在巴基斯坦的荒地拥有坚实的业务基础,并在伊拉克西部拥有有效的特许经营权. 它的影响力遍及整个穆斯林世界和欧洲 . . . 奥萨马·本·拉登开展了一场成功的宣传活动. . . . 他的想法现在吸引了比以往更多的追随者.
确实,各种萨拉菲圣战组织仍在整个伊斯兰世界中出现. 为什么对我们称之为全球圣战的伊斯兰恐怖主义的大量资源反应没有证明非常有效?
转向“软实力”工具,” 西方在全球反恐战争中支持穆斯林的努力效果如何? (长城汽车)? 为什么美国在更广泛的伊斯兰世界中赢得如此少的“民心”? 为什么美国在这个问题上的战略信息在该地区发挥如此糟糕? 为什么, 尽管穆斯林普遍反对极端主义,正如主要穆斯林领导人的调查和官方言论所示, 约旦和巴基斯坦对本拉登的支持实际上有所增加?
本专着不会重新审视伊斯兰暴力的起源. 相反,它关注的是一种错误地构建 GWOT 并阻止穆斯林支持它的概念上的失败. 他们无法认同提议的变革性对策,因为他们将自己的一些核心信念和制度视为目标
这种努力.
几个严重成问题的趋势混淆了美国对 GWOT 的概念化以及为打这场战争而制定的战略信息. 这些演变自 (1) 对穆斯林和穆斯林占多数的国家的后殖民政治方法差异很大,因此产生了相互矛盾和令人困惑的印象和效果; 和 (2) 对伊斯兰教和次区域文化的普遍无知和偏见. 增加美国人的愤怒, 恐惧, 和对致命事件的焦虑 9/11, 和某些元素, 尽管有冷静的头脑的敦促, 让穆斯林和他们的宗教为他们的同教者的罪行负责, 或出于政治原因认为这样做有用的人.

昨天和今天之间

HASAN AL-BANNA

The First Islamic State
On the foundation of this virtuous Qur’anic social order the first Islamic state arose, having unshakeable faith in 它, meticulously applying it, and spreading it throughout the world, so that the first Khilafah used to say: ‘If I should lose a camel’s lead, I would find it in Allah’s Book.’. He fought those who refused to pay zakah, regarding them as apostates because they had overthrown one of the pillars of this order, saying: ‘By Allah, if they refused me a lead which they would hand over to the Apostle of Allah (PBUH), I would fight them as soon as I have a sword in my hand!’ For unity, in all its meanings and manifestations, pervaded this new forthcoming nation.
Complete social unity arose from making the Qur’anic order and it’s language universal, while complete political unity was under the shadow of the Amir Al-Mumineen and beneath the standard of the Khilafah in the capital.
The fact that the Islamic ideology was one of decentralisation of the armed forces, the state treasuries, 和 provincial governors proved to be no obstacle to this, since all acted according to a single creed and a unified and comprehensive control. The Qur’anic principles dispelled and laid to rest the superstitious idolatry prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. They banished guileful Judaism and confined it to a narrow province, putting an end to its religious and political authority. They struggled with Christianity such that its influence was greatly diminished in the Asian and African continents, confined only to Europe under the guard of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Thus the Islamic state became the centre of spiritual and political dominance within the two largest continents. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Constantinople from the east and besieging it until the siege grew wearisome. Then it came at it from the west,
plunging into Spain, with its victorious soldiers reaching the heart of France and penetrating as far as northern and southern Italy. It established an imposing state in Western Europe, radiant with science and knowledge.
然后, it ended the conquest of Constantinople itself and the confined Christianity within the restricted area of Central Europe. Islamic fleets ventured into the depths of the Mediterranean and Red seas, both became Islamic lakes. And so the armed forces of the Islamic state assumed supremacy of the seas both in the East and West, enjoying absolute mastery over land and sea. These Islamic nations had already combined and incorporated many things from other civilisations, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. 这 Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.

伊斯兰政治思想中的民主

Azzam S. 塔米米

Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, 在 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, 在 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.

伊斯兰政治文化, 民主, 和人权

丹尼尔(Daniele). 价钱

有人认为伊斯兰教助长了威权主义, 矛盾的

西方社会的价值观, 并显着影响重要的政治结果

在穆斯林国家. 最后, 学者, 评论员, 和政府

官员们经常指出“伊斯兰原教旨主义”是下一个

对自由民主国家的意识形态威胁. 这种观点, 然而, 主要是基于

关于文本分析, 伊斯兰政治理论, 和特别研究

个别国家, 不考虑其他因素. 这是我的争论

伊斯兰教的文本和传统, 像其他宗教一样,

可用于支持各种政治制度和政策. 国家

具体的和描述性的研究并不能帮助我们找到有帮助的模式

我们解释伊斯兰教与政治之间的不同关系

穆斯林世界的国家. 因此, 一种新的研究方法

伊斯兰教与政治之间的联系被要求.
我建议, 通过严格评估伊斯兰教之间的关系,

民主, 和跨国一级的人权, 太多了

强调伊斯兰教作为一种政治力量的力量. 我先来

使用比较案例研究, 关注与相互作用相关的因素

伊斯兰团体和政权之间, 经济影响, 种族分裂,

和社会发展, 解释影响的差异

八个国家的伊斯兰教政治.

伊斯兰政治文化, 民主, 和人权

丹尼尔(Daniele). 价钱

有人认为伊斯兰教助长了威权主义, 矛盾的

西方社会的价值观, 并显着影响重要的政治结果
在穆斯林国家. 最后, 学者, 评论员, 和政府
官员们经常指出“伊斯兰原教旨主义”是下一个
对自由民主国家的意识形态威胁. 这种观点, 然而, 主要是基于
关于文本分析, 伊斯兰政治理论, 和特别研究
个别国家, 不考虑其他因素. 这是我的争论
伊斯兰教的文本和传统, 像其他宗教一样,
可用于支持各种政治制度和政策. 国家
具体的和描述性的研究并不能帮助我们找到有帮助的模式
我们解释伊斯兰教与政治之间的不同关系
穆斯林世界的国家. 因此, 一种新的研究方法
伊斯兰教与政治之间的联系被要求.
我建议, 通过严格评估伊斯兰教之间的关系,
民主, 和跨国一级的人权, 太多了
强调伊斯兰教作为一种政治力量的力量. 我先来
使用比较案例研究, 关注与相互作用相关的因素
伊斯兰团体和政权之间, 经济影响, 种族分裂,

和社会发展, 解释影响的差异

八个国家的伊斯兰教政治.

中东的政治伊斯兰教

是努森

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, 在

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

回顾一些用来解释中东伊斯兰复兴的主要理论

(数字 1). 简单来说, 报告表明,伊斯兰教不必与民主和

有一种趋势是忽视许多中东国家已经

参与了对伊斯兰运动的残酷镇压, 导致他们, 有人争辩, 占用

反对国家的武器, 更罕见的是, 外国. 使用政治暴力是

广泛分布于中东, 但既不不合逻辑也不非理性. 在很多情况下甚至

以使用暴力而闻名的伊斯兰团体已转变为和平的政治组织

政党成功参加市政和全国选举. 尽管如此, 伊斯兰主义者

尽管有许多理论试图

说明它的增长和受欢迎的吸引力. 一般来说, 大多数理论认为伊斯兰主义是

对相对剥夺的反应, 尤其是社会不平等和政治压迫. 选择

理论在宗教本身和宗教的范围内寻求伊斯兰复兴的答案

强大的, 宗教象征的唤起潜力.

结论主张超越“悲观与厄运”的方法,即

将伊斯兰主义描绘成一种非法的政治表达和对西方的潜在威胁 (“老的

伊斯兰主义”), 以及对当前伊斯兰主义民主化的更细致入微的理解

现在正在整个中东发生的运动 (“新伊斯兰主义”). 这个

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

社会中较贫穷的阶层,但也属于中产阶级.

伊斯兰政党 : 为什么他们不能民主

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, 它有

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, 民主, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

伊斯兰政党 : 回到原点

侯赛因·哈卡尼

希勒尔·弗雷德金

How should we understand the emergence and the nature of Islamist parties? Can they reasonably be expected not just to participate in democratic politics but even to respect the norms of liberal democracy? These questions lie at the heart of the issues that we have been asked to address.
In our view, any response that is historically and thus practically relevant must begin with the following observation: Until very recently, even the idea of an Islamist party (let alone a democratic Islamist party) would have seemed, from the perspective of Islamism itself, a paradox if not a contradiction in terms. Islamism’s original conception of a healthy Islamic political life made no room for—indeed rejected—any role for parties of any sort. Islamist groups described themselves as the vanguard of Islamic revival, claiming that they represented the essence of Islam and reflected the aspiration of the global umma (community of believers) for an Islamic polity. Pluralism, which is a precondition for the operation of political parties, was rejected by most Islamist political
thinkers as a foreign idea.
As should be more or less obvious, the novelty not only of actually existing Islamist parties but of the very idea of such parties makes it exceptionally difficult to assess their democratic bona fides. But this difficulty merely adds another level of complication to a problem that stems from the very origins of Islamism and its conception of the true meaning of Islam and of Islam’s relationship to political life

伊斯兰政党 : 三种动作

塔玛拉·科夫曼(Tamara Cofman)

Between 1991 和 2001, the world of political Islam became significantly more diverse. Today, the term “Islamist”—used to describe a political perspective centrally informed by a set of religious interpretations and commitments—can be applied to such a wide array of groups as to be almost meaningless. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.
尽管如此, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. The religious discourse of the Islamists is now unavoidably central to Arab politics. Conventional policy discussions label Islamists either “moderate” or “radical,” generally categorizing them according to two rather loose and unhelpful criteria. The first is violence: Radicals use it and moderates do not. This begs the question of how to classify groups that do not themselves engage in violence but who condone, justify, or even actively support the violence of others. A second, only somewhat more restrictive criterion is whether the groups or individuals in question
accept the rules of the democratic electoral game. Popular sovereignty is no small concession for traditional Islamists, many of whom reject democratically elected governments as usurpers of God’s sovereignty.
Yet commitment to the procedural rules of democratic elections is not the same as commitment to democratic politics or governance.

政治伊斯兰教: 准备好订婚?

埃马德·埃尔丁·沙欣

The voluminous literature on reform and democratization in the Middle East region reveals a number of facts: a main obstacle to reform is the incumbent regimes that have been trying to resist and circumvent genuine democratic transformations; political reform cannot be credible without integrating moderate Islamists in the process; and external actors (mainly the US and the EU) have not yet formulated a coherent approach to reform that could simultaneously achieve stability and democracy in the region. This paper explores the possibilities and implications of a European engagement with moderate Islamists on democracy promotion in the region. It argues that the EU approach to political reform in the Middle East region needs to be enhanced and linked to realities on the ground. Political reform cannot be effective without the integration of non-violent Islamic groups in a gradual, multifaceted process. It should be highlighted that the process of engagement is a risky one for both the EU and the Islamists, yet both stand to gain from a systematic dialogue on democracy. To reduce the risks, the engagement with political Islam should come within a broader EU strategy for democracy promotion in the region. 实际上, what the Islamists would expect from Europe is to maintain a
consistent and assertive stand on political reforms that would allow for a genuine representation of the popular will through peaceful means.
In this regard, a number of questions seem pertinent. Does the EU really need to engage political Islam in democratic reforms? Is political Islam ready for engagement and will it be willing to engage? How can an engagement policy be formulated on the basis of plausible implementation with minimal risks to the interests of the parties involved?

这是政策, 愚蠢的

约翰·L. Esposito

US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. 衬套. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. 然而, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, 恐怖主义, and peace in the Middle East.

Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. 因此, 例如, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.

In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?


埃及的穆斯林兄弟会

威廉·托马森

Is Islam a religion of violence? Is the widely applied stereotype that all Muslims are violently opposed to “infidel” Western cultures accurate? Today’s world is confronted with two opposing faces of Islam; one being a peaceful, adaptive, modernized Islam, and the other strictly fundamentalist and against all things un-Islamic or that may corrupt Islamic culture. Both specimens, though seemingly opposed, mingle and inter-relate, and are the roots of the confusion over modern Islam’s true identity. Islam’s vastness makes it difficult to analyze, but one can focus on a particular Islamic region and learn much about Islam as a whole. 的确, one may do this with Egypt, particularly the relationship between the Fundamentalist society known as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and population. The two opposing faces of Islam are presented in Egypt in a manageable portion, offering a smaller model of the general multi-national struggle of today’s Islam. In an effort to exemplify the role of Islamic Fundamentalists, and their relationship with Islamic society as a whole in the current debate over what Islam is, this essay will offer a history of the Society of Muslim Brothers, a description of how the organization originated, functioned, and was organized, and a summary of the Brother’s activities and influences on Egyptian culture. Certainly, by doing so, one may gain a deeper understanding of how Islamic Fundamentalists interpret Islam