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GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL ISLAM: THE SOCIAL BASES OF TURKEY’S WELFARE PARTY

Halduns Gulalps

Political Islam has gained heightened visibility in recent decades in Turkey. Large numbers of female students have begun to demonstrate their commitment by wearing the banned Islamic headdress on university campuses, and influential pro-Islamist TV
channels have proliferated. This paper focuses on the Welfare (Refah) Party as the foremost institutional representative of political Islam in Turkey.
The Welfare Party’s brief tenure in power as the leading coalition partner from mid-1996 to mid-1997 was the culmination of a decade of steady growth that was aided by other Islamist organizations and institutions. These organizations and institutions
included newspapers and publishing houses that attracted Islamist writers, numerous Islamic foundations, an Islamist labor-union confederation, and an Islamist businessmen’s association. These institutions worked in tandem with, and in support of, Welfare as the undisputed leader and representative of political Islam in Turkey, even though they had their own particularistic goals and ideals, which often diverged from Welfare’s political projects. Focusing on the Welfare Party, then, allows for an analysis of the wider social base upon which the Islamist political movement rose in Turkey. Since Welfare’s ouster from power and its eventual closure, the Islamist movement has been in disarray. This paper will, therefore, be confined to the Welfare Party period.
Welfare’s predecessor, the National Salvation Party, was active in the 1970s but was closed down by the military regime in 1980. Welfare was founded in 1983 and gained great popularity in the 1990s. Starting with a 4.4 percent vote in the municipal elections of 1984, the Welfare Party steadily increased its showing and multiplied its vote nearly five times in twelve years. It alarmed Turkey’s secular establishment first in the municipal elections of 1994, with 19 percent of all votes nationwide and the mayor’s seats in both Istanbul and Ankara, then in the general elections of 1995 when it won a plurality with 21.4 percent of the national vote. Nevertheless, the Welfare Party was only briefly able to lead a coalition government in partnership with the right-wing True Path Party of Tansu C¸ iller.

Islāmistu opozīcijas partijas un ES iesaistīšanās potenciāls

Tobijs Ārčers

Heidija Huuhtanena

Ņemot vērā islāmistu kustību pieaugošo nozīmi musulmaņu pasaulē un

veids, kā radikalizācija ir ietekmējusi globālos notikumus kopš gadsimta sākuma, to

ir svarīgi, lai ES izvērtētu savu politiku attiecībā uz dalībniekiem, kas var būt brīvi

saukta par "islāma pasauli". Īpaši svarīgi ir jautāt, vai un kā iesaistīties

ar dažādām islāmistu grupām.

Tas joprojām ir pretrunīgs pat ES ietvaros. Daži uzskata, ka islāmi to vērtē

guļ aiz islāmistu partijām ir vienkārši nesavienojami ar rietumu demokrātijas ideāliem un

cilvēktiesības, savukārt citi uzskata, ka iesaistīšanās ir reāla nepieciešamība pieaugošā pieauguma dēļ

islāmistu partiju vietējā nozīme un to pieaugošā iesaiste starptautiskajā

lietas. Vēl viena perspektīva ir tāda, ka musulmaņu pasaulē palielināsies demokratizācija

Eiropas drošība. Šo un citu argumentu derīgums par to, vai un kā

ES vajadzētu iesaistīties var pārbaudīt tikai, pētot dažādas islāmistu kustības un

viņu politiskie apstākļi, valsts pēc valsts.

Demokratizācija ir ES kopējās ārpolitikas pasākumu galvenā tēma, kā likts

pantā 11 Līgumam par Eiropas Savienību. Daudzi no štatiem, kas ņemti vērā šajā

ziņojumi nav demokrātiski, vai nav pilnībā demokrātiska. Lielākajā daļā šo valstu, islāmists

partijas un kustības veido būtisku opozīciju valdošajiem režīmiem, un

dažos veidos lielāko opozīcijas bloku. Eiropas demokrātijām jau sen ir bijis

tikt galā ar autoritāriem režīmiem, bet tā ir jauna parādība, kas jāspiež

demokrātiskām reformām valstīs, kurās varētu būt vislielākie ieguvēji, no

ES viedoklis, dažādas un dažkārt problemātiskas pieejas demokrātijai un tai

saistītās vērtības, mazākumtautību un sieviešu tiesības un tiesiskums. Šīs maksas ir

bieži vērsta pret islāmistu kustībām, tāpēc Eiropas politikas veidotājiem tas ir svarīgi

ir precīzs priekšstats par potenciālo partneru politiku un filozofiju.

Dažādu valstu pieredze liecina, ka jo vairāk brīvības ir islāmists

ballītes ir atļautas, jo mērenāki viņi ir savā rīcībā un idejās. Daudzos

gadījumos islāmistu partijas un grupas jau sen ir novirzījušās no sava sākotnējā mērķa

par islāma valsts nodibināšanu saskaņā ar islāma likumiem, un ir sākuši pieņemt pamata

demokrātiskie principi vēlēšanu konkurencei par varu, citu politisko esamību

konkurentiem, un politiskais plurālisms.

Islāmistu partijas : līdzdalība bez varas

Malika Zeghal

Pēdējo divu desmitgažu laikā, sociālās un politiskās kustības, kas savu ideoloģiju pamato ar atsaucēm uz islāmu, ir centušās kļūt par likumīgām politiskām partijām daudzās Tuvo Austrumu un Ziemeļāfrikas valstīs.. Dažām no šīm islāmistu kustībām ir atļauts likumīgi piedalīties vēlēšanu sacensībās. Viena no pazīstamākajām ir Turcijas Taisnīguma un attīstības partija (AKP), gadā ieguva parlamenta vairākumu 2002 un kopš tā laika ir vadījis valdību. Marokas Taisnīguma un attīstības partija (PJD) ir likumīga kopš vidus- 1990s un komandē ievērojamu vietu bloku parlamentā. Ēģiptē, musulmaņu brālība (MB) nekad nav bijis pilnvarots dibināt politisko partiju, taču, neskatoties uz valsts represijām, tā veiksmīgi startējusi kā nomināli neatkarīgie kandidāti gan valsts, gan pašvaldību vēlēšanās.
Kopš 90. gadu sākuma, šī tendence ir gājusi roku rokā ar oficiālu ierobežotas politiskās liberalizācijas politiku. Kopā, abas tendences ir izraisījušas debates par to, vai šīs kustības ir apņēmušās ievērot “demokrātiju”. Ir izveidojusies plaša literatūra, lai uzsvērtu paradoksus, kā arī iespējamos riskus un ieguvumus, iesaistot islāmistu partijas vēlēšanu procesā.. Galvenā paradigma, kas atrodama šajā rakstā, ir vērsta uz sekām, kas var rasties, ja islāmisti izmantos demokrātiskus instrumentus., un cenšas noteikt “patiesos” nodomus, ko islāmisti izpaudīs, ja viņi nonāks pie varas.

the 500 most influential muslims

Džons Esposito

Ibrahims Kaļins

The publication you have in your hands is the first of what we hope will be anannual series that provides a window into the movers and shakers of the Muslimworld. We have strived to highlight people who are influential as Muslims, thatis, people whose influence is derived from their practice of Islam or from the factthat they are Muslim. We think that this gives valuable insight into the differentways that Muslims impact the world, and also shows the diversity of how peopleare living as Muslims today.Influence is a tricky concept. Its meaning derives from the Latin word influensmeaning to flow-in, pointing to an old astrological idea that unseen forces (like themoon) affect humanity. The figures on this list have the ability to affect humanitytoo. In a variety of different ways each person on this list has influence over thelives of a large number of people on the earth. The 50 most influential figuresare profiled. Their influence comes from a variety of sources; however they areunified by the fact that they each affect huge swathes of humanity.We have then broken up the 500 leaders into 15 categories—Scholarly, Political,Administrative, Lineage, Preachers, Sievietes, Youth, Philanthropy, Development,Science and Technology, Arts and Culture, Mediji, Radicals, International IslamicNetworks, and Issues of the Day—to help you understand the different kinds ofways Islam and Muslims impact the world today.Two composite lists show how influence works in different ways: InternationalIslamic Networks shows people who are at the head of important transnationalnetworks of Muslims, and Issues of the Day highlights individuals whoseimportance is due to current issues affecting humanity.

Beyond Post-Islamism

Ihsan Yilmaz


With the increased international prominence of Turkey and its successful and internationallyrespected AK Party government, the Academia’s attention has focused on the Turkish Islamistexperience. Turkey had already been seen as an almost unique case as far Islam-state-secularismdemocracyrelations were concerned but the recent transformation of Turkish Islamism coupledwith the global turmoil in the post-9/11 world has made the Turkish case much more important.While Turkish Islamists’ recent transformation that has brought about their rise to the power hasbeen applauded at home and abroad, there are relatively very few studies that analyze theirtransformation by taking into account the unique experience of Turkish Islamism starting from the18th & 19th centuries’ Ottoman secularization, Young Ottomans of the 1860s and the Ottomanconstitutionalism and democracy. Turklāt, some dynamics that affected the change in theTurkish Islamists’ Islamic normative framework have not been analyzed in detail. Thus, this studyendeavors to analyze the main factors behind the newly emerged tolerant normative framework ofthe AK Party leaders who were formerly Islamists. After showing that there are good historicalreasons arising from the Ottoman experience of secularism and democracy and arguing based on abrief theoretical discussion of the plurality of Islamisms, it argues that the Turkish Islamism hasalways differed from the other Islamist experiences. Therefore, in this study, a detailed evaluationof the Turkish Islamist experience starting from the Young Ottomans is undertaken. Then, thispaper attempts to show that Islamic groups’ physical and discursive interaction has been a crucialfactor in the Turkish Islamism’s transformation. Main premise of this paper is that the Gülenmovement has been the most influential factor that has helped the AK Party leaders to develop amore tolerant normative framework and to eventually jettison their Islamism. It is of coursedifficult to establish casual relationship between two social phenomena but one can underscorecorrelations. As the main hypothesis is that the Gülen movement has been the most influentialfactor in the normative transformation of the former Islamists’ mental frameworks and theirreligio-political worldviews, this paper provides a comparative discourse analysis betweenFethullah Gülen’s and Islamists’ ideas on several issues that have been relevant for both Islamismand newly-emerged post-Islamism. To identify these relevant issues (secularism, pluralism,democracy, rule of law, nationalism, state, Islāmisms, religiosity, the other, borders and dialogue),the paper provides a brief theoretical discussion of Islamism and post-Islamism that will also helpthe reader to understand the fundamental differences between Islamism and the Gülenian thought.

ISLAMIC MODERNITIES: FETHULLAH GULEN and CONTEMPORARY ISLAM

FAHRI CAKI

The Nurju movement1, being the oldest moderate Islamist movement which is probably peculiar to Modern Turkey, was broken into several groups since Said Nursi, the founder of the movement, passed away in 1960. At the present time, there are more than ten nurcu groups with different agendas and strategies. Despite all their differences, today the Nurju groups seem to acknowledge each other’s identity and try to keep a certain level of solidarity. Theplace of the Fethullah Gulen group within the Nurju movement, tomēr, seems to be a bit shaky.Fethullah Gulen (b.1938) split himself, at least in appearance, from the overall Nurju movement in 1972 and succeeded in establishing his own group with a strong organizational structure in the 1980’s and the 90’s. Due to the development of its broad school network both in Turkey and abroad2, his group attracted attention. Those schools fascinated not only Islamist businessmen and middle classes but also a large number of secularist intellectuals and politicians. Although it originally emerged out of the overall Nurju movement, some believe that the number of the followers of the Fethullah Gulen group is much larger than that of the total of the rest of the nurju groups. Yet, there seems to be enough reason to think that there was a price to pay for this success: alienation from other Islamist groups as well as from the overall Nurju movement of which the Fethullah Gulen group3 itself is supposed to be a part.

Progresīvā islāma doma, pilsoniskā sabiedrība un Gulena kustība nacionālajā kontekstā

Greg Barton

Fethullah Gulen (born 1941), or Hodjaeffendi as he is known affectionately by hundreds of thousands of people in his native Turkey and abroad, is one of the most significant Islamic thinkers and activists to have emerged in the twentieth century. His optimistic and forward-looking thought, with its emphasis on self development of both heart and mind through education, of engaging proactively and positively with the modern world and of reaching out in dialogue and a spirit of cooperation between religious communities, social strata and nations can be read as a contemporary reformulation of the teachings of Jalaluddin Rumi, Yunus Emre, and other classic Sufi teachers (Michel, 2005a, 2005b; Saritoprak, 2003; 2005a; 2005b; Unal and Williams, 2005). More specifically, Gulen can be seen to be carrying on where Said Nursi (1876-1960), another great Anatolian Islamic intellectual, left off: chartinga way for Muslim activists in Turkey and beyond to effectively contribute to the development of modern society that avoids the pitfalls and compromises of party-political activism and replaces the narrowness of Islamist thought with a genuinely inclusive and humanitarian understanding of religion’s role in the modern world (Abu-Rabi, 1995; Markham and Ozdemir, 2005; Vahide, 2005, Yavuz, 2005a).