RSSУсе запісы з тэгамі: "Фетхуллах Гюлен"


Haldun Gulalp

Political Islam has gained heightened visibility in recent decades in Turkey. Large numbers of female students have begun to demonstrate their commitment by wearing the banned Islamic headdress on university campuses, and influential pro-Islamist TV
channels have proliferated. This paper focuses on the Welfare (Refah) Party as the foremost institutional representative of political Islam in Turkey.
The Welfare Party’s brief tenure in power as the leading coalition partner from mid-1996 to mid-1997 was the culmination of a decade of steady growth that was aided by other Islamist organizations and institutions. These organizations and institutions
included newspapers and publishing houses that attracted Islamist writers, numerous Islamic foundations, an Islamist labor-union confederation, and an Islamist businessmen’s association. These institutions worked in tandem with, and in support of, Welfare as the undisputed leader and representative of political Islam in Turkey, even though they had their own particularistic goals and ideals, which often diverged from Welfare’s political projects. Focusing on the Welfare Party, then, allows for an analysis of the wider social base upon which the Islamist political movement rose in Turkey. Since Welfare’s ouster from power and its eventual closure, the Islamist movement has been in disarray. This paper will, Таму, be confined to the Welfare Party period.
Welfare’s predecessor, the National Salvation Party, was active in the 1970s but was closed down by the military regime in 1980. Welfare was founded in 1983 and gained great popularity in the 1990s. Starting with a 4.4 percent vote in the municipal elections of 1984, the Welfare Party steadily increased its showing and multiplied its vote nearly five times in twelve years. It alarmed Turkey’s secular establishment first in the municipal elections of 1994, з 19 percent of all votes nationwide and the mayor’s seats in both Istanbul and Ankara, then in the general elections of 1995 when it won a plurality with 21.4 percent of the national vote. Тым не менш, the Welfare Party was only briefly able to lead a coalition government in partnership with the right-wing True Path Party of Tansu C¸ iller.

Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement

Тобі Арчер

Хайдзі Huuhtanen

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, it

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

правы чалавека, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international

affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase

European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the

EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and

their political circumstances, country by country.

Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid

out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this

report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamist

parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, і

in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

Islamist Parties : participation without power

Malika Zeghal

Over the last two decades, social and political movements grounding their ideologies in references to Islam have sought to become legal political parties in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Some of these Islamist movements have been authorized to take part lawfully in electoral competition. Among the best known is Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won a parliamentary majority in 2002 and has led the government ever since. Morocco’s own Party of Justice and Development (ПСР) has been legal since the mid- 1990s and commands a significant bloc of seats in Parliament. У Егіпце, Браты-мусульмане (мегабайт) has never been authorized to form a political party, but in spite of state repression it has successfully run candidates as nominal independents in both national and local elections.
Since the early 1990s, this trend has gone hand-in-hand with official policies of limited political liberalization. Together, the two trends have occasioned a debate about whether these movements are committed to “democracy.” A vast literature has sprung up to underline the paradoxes as well as the possible risks and benefits of including Islamist parties in the electoral process. The main paradigm found in this body of writing focuses on the consequences that might ensue when Islamists use democratic instruments, and seeks to divine the “true” intentions that Islamists will manifest if they come to power.

the 500 most influential muslims

Джон Эспазіта

Ібрагім Калін

The publication you have in your hands is the first of what we hope will be anannual series that provides a window into the movers and shakers of the Muslimworld. We have strived to highlight people who are influential as Muslims, thatis, people whose influence is derived from their practice of Islam or from the factthat they are Muslim. We think that this gives valuable insight into the differentways that Muslims impact the world, and also shows the diversity of how peopleare living as Muslims today.Influence is a tricky concept. Its meaning derives from the Latin word influensmeaning to flow-in, pointing to an old astrological idea that unseen forces (like themoon) affect humanity. The figures on this list have the ability to affect humanitytoo. In a variety of different ways each person on this list has influence over thelives of a large number of people on the earth. The 50 most influential figuresare profiled. Their influence comes from a variety of sources; however they areunified by the fact that they each affect huge swathes of humanity.We have then broken up the 500 leaders into 15 categories—Scholarly, Political,Administrative, Lineage, Preachers, жанчыны, Youth, Philanthropy, Development,Science and Technology, Arts and Culture, сродкі масавай інфармацыі, Radicals, International IslamicNetworks, and Issues of the Day—to help you understand the different kinds ofways Islam and Muslims impact the world today.Two composite lists show how influence works in different ways: InternationalIslamic Networks shows people who are at the head of important transnationalnetworks of Muslims, and Issues of the Day highlights individuals whoseimportance is due to current issues affecting humanity.

Акрамя постісламізму

Ихсан Йылмаз

З ростам міжнароднай вядомасці Турцыі і яе паспяховага і паважанага на міжнародным узроўні ўрада Партыі АК, увага акадэмікаў была сканцэнтравана на вопыце турэцкага ісламізму. Турцыя ўжо разглядалася як амаль унікальны выпадак у адносінах да ісламска-дзяржаўна-секулярыстычнай дэмакратыі, але нядаўняя трансфармацыя турэцкага ісламізму ў спалучэнні з глабальнай калатнечаю ў свеце пасля 11 верасня зрабіла турэцкую справу значна важнейшай. "нядаўнія пераўтварэнні, якія прывялі да іх уздыму да ўлады, былі апладзіраваны ў краіне і за мяжой, даследаванняў, якія аналізуюць іх трансфармацыю з улікам унікальнага вопыту турэцкага ісламізму, пачынаючы з 18-га, адносна вельмі мала & 19Асманская секулярызацыя стагоддзяў, Маладыя асманы 1860-х гадоў і асманская канстытуцыяналізм і дэмакратыя. Прычым, некаторыя дынамікі, якія паўплывалі на змены ў ісламскіх нарматыўных рамках турэцкіх ісламістаў, не былі падрабязна прааналізаваны. Такім чынам, гэта даследаванне імкнецца прааналізаваць асноўныя фактары нядаўна ўзніклай талерантнай нарматыўнай базы лідэраў партыі АК, якія раней былі ісламістамі. Паказаўшы, што ёсць важкія гістарычныя прычыны, якія вынікаюць з асманскага досведу секулярызму і дэмакратыі, і паспрачаўшыся на аснове кароткага тэарэтычнага абмеркавання мноства ісламізма, ён сцвярджае, што турэцкі ісламізм заўсёды адрозніваўся ад іншага досведу ісламізму. Таму, у гэтым даследаванні, праводзіцца падрабязная ацэнка турэцкага ісламісцкага досведу, пачынаючы з маладых асманаў. Тады, гэты артыкул спрабуе паказаць, што фізічнае і дыскурсіўнае ўзаемадзеянне ісламскіх груп стала важным фактарам пераўтварэння турэцкага ісламізму. Асноўная перадумова гэтага артыкула заключаецца ў тым, што рух Гюлена быў найбольш уплывовым фактарам, які дапамог лідэрам партыі АК распрацаваць больш талерантную нарматыўную базу і ў рэшце рэшт адмовіцца ад свайго ісламізму. Вядома, складана ўсталяваць выпадковыя сувязі паміж двума сацыяльнымі з'явамі, але можна падкрэсліць карэляцыю. Паколькі асноўная гіпотэза заключаецца ў тым, што рух Гюлена быў найбольш уплывовым фактарам нарматыўнай трансфармацыі ментальных рам былых ісламістаў і іх рэлігійна-палітычнага светапогляду, гэты артыкул забяспечвае параўнальны аналіз дыскурсу паміж ідэямі Фетхулаха Гюлена і ісламістаў па некалькіх пытаннях, якія былі актуальныя як для ісламізму, так і для новага постісламізму.. Каб вызначыць гэтыя адпаведныя праблемы (секулярызм, плюралізм,дэмакратыя, вяршэнства закона, нацыяналізм, дзяржавы, ісламізм, рэлігійнасць, другі, межы і дыялог),артыкул дае кароткае тэарэтычнае абмеркаванне ісламізму і постісламізму, якое таксама дапаможа чытачу зразумець асноўныя адрозненні паміж ісламізмам і думкай Гюлена.


Фергюсон Caki

The Nurju movement1, being the oldest moderate Islamist movement which is probably peculiar to Modern Turkey, was broken into several groups since Said Nursi, the founder of the movement, passed away in 1960. At the present time, there are more than ten nurcu groups with different agendas and strategies. Despite all their differences, today the Nurju groups seem to acknowledge each other’s identity and try to keep a certain level of solidarity. Theplace of the Fethullah Gulen group within the Nurju movement, Аднак, seems to be a bit shaky.Fethullah Gulen (b.1938) split himself, at least in appearance, from the overall Nurju movement in 1972 and succeeded in establishing his own group with a strong organizational structure in the 1980’s and the 90’s. Due to the development of its broad school network both in Turkey and abroad2, his group attracted attention. Those schools fascinated not only Islamist businessmen and middle classes but also a large number of secularist intellectuals and politicians. Although it originally emerged out of the overall Nurju movement, some believe that the number of the followers of the Fethullah Gulen group is much larger than that of the total of the rest of the nurju groups. Усё ж, there seems to be enough reason to think that there was a price to pay for this success: alienation from other Islamist groups as well as from the overall Nurju movement of which the Fethullah Gulen group3 itself is supposed to be a part.

Прагрэсіўная ісламская думка, грамадзянская супольнасць і рух Гюлена ў нацыянальным кантэксце

Greg Barton

Фетхуллах Гюлен (born 1941), or Hodjaeffendi as he is known affectionately by hundreds of thousands of people in his native Turkey and abroad, is one of the most significant Islamic thinkers and activists to have emerged in the twentieth century. His optimistic and forward-looking thought, with its emphasis on self development of both heart and mind through education, of engaging proactively and positively with the modern world and of reaching out in dialogue and a spirit of cooperation between religious communities, social strata and nations can be read as a contemporary reformulation of the teachings of Jalaluddin Rumi, Yunus Emre, and other classic Sufi teachers (Michel, 2005a, 2005b; Saritoprak, 2003; 2005a; 2005b; Unal and Williams, 2005). More specifically, Gulen can be seen to be carrying on where Said Nursi (1876-1960), another great Anatolian Islamic intellectual, left off: chartinga way for Muslim activists in Turkey and beyond to effectively contribute to the development of modern society that avoids the pitfalls and compromises of party-political activism and replaces the narrowness of Islamist thought with a genuinely inclusive and humanitarian understanding of religion’s role in the modern world (Abu-Rabi, 1995; Markham and Ozdemir, 2005; Vahide, 2005, Yavuz, 2005a).