RSSAlle Entries Tagged Met: "Fethullah Gülen"

Globalisering en politieke Islam: DIE SOSIALE BASES van Turkye se welsyn PARTY

Haldun Gulalp

Politieke Islam opgedoen het verhoogde sigbaarheid in die afgelope dekades in Turkye. Groot getalle vroulike studente het hul toewyding begin demonstreer deur die verbode Islamitiese hooftooisel op universiteitskampusse te dra, en invloedryke pro-Islamitiese TV
kanale het haarden. Hierdie artikel fokus op die Welsyn (Welsyn) Party as die voorste institusionele verteenwoordiger van politieke Islam in Turkye.
Die Welsynsparty se kort ampstermyn aan bewind as die voorste koalisievennoot vanaf middel 1996 tot middel 1997 was die hoogtepunt van 'n dekade van bestendige groei wat deur ander Islamitiese organisasies en instellings bygestaan ​​is.. Hierdie organisasies en instansies
ingesluit koerante en uitgewers wat aangetrokke Islamitiese skrywers, talle Islamitiese fondamente, 'n Islamitiese arbeid Union Confederation, en 'n Islamitiese sakemannevereniging. Hierdie instellings het in tandem met, en ter ondersteuning van, Welsyn as die leier en verteenwoordiger van politieke Islam in Turkye, al het hulle hul eie partikularistiese doelwitte en ideale gehad, wat dikwels van Welsyn se politieke projekte afgewyk het. Fokus op die Welsyn Party, dan, maak voorsiening vir 'n ontleding van die breër sosiale basis waarop die Islamitiese politieke beweging in Turkye opgestaan ​​het. Sedert Welsyn se verdrijving van krag en sy uiteindelike sluiting, die Islamitiese beweging was in wanorde. Hierdie vraestel sal, dus, tot die Welsynsparty-tydperk beperk word.
Welsyn se voorganger, die Nasionale Salvation Party, was aktief in die 1970's, maar is deur die militêre regime in 1980. Welsyn is gestig in 1983 en het in die 1990's groot gewildheid verwerf. Begin met 'n 4.4 persent stem in die munisipale verkiesings van 1984, die Welsynsparty het sy vertoning geleidelik verhoog en sy stem byna vyf keer in twaalf jaar vermenigvuldig. Dit het Turkye se sekulêre establishment eers in die munisipale verkiesings van 1994, met 19 persent van alle stemme landwyd en die burgemeester se setels in beide Istanbul en Ankara, dan in die algemene verkiesing van 1995 toe dit 'n pluraliteit gewen het met 21.4 persent van die nasionale stemme. Nogtans, die Welsynsparty kon slegs kortstondig 'n koalisieregering lei in vennootskap met die regse True Path Party van Tansu C¸ iller.

Islamistiese opposisiepartye en die potensiaal vir EU -betrokkenheid

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

In die lig van die toenemende belangrikheid van Islamistiese bewegings in die Moslemwêreld en

die manier waarop radikalisering wêreldwye gebeure sedert die eeuwisseling beïnvloed het, Dit

is dit belangrik dat die EU sy beleid ten opsigte van akteurs evalueer binne wat losweg kan wees

die 'Islamitiese wêreld' genoem. Dit is veral belangrik om te vra of en hoe om betrokke te raak

met die verskillende Islamistiese groepe.

Dit bly omstrede, selfs binne die EU. Sommige voel dat die Islamitiese waardes dat

agter Islamistiese partye lê, is eenvoudig nie verenigbaar met westerse ideale van demokrasie en

menseregte, terwyl ander betrokkenheid as 'n realistiese noodsaaklikheid beskou as gevolg van die groeiende

huislike belangrikheid van Islamistiese partye en hul toenemende betrokkenheid by die internasionale

sake. 'N Ander perspektief is dat demokratisering in die Moslemwêreld toeneem

Europese veiligheid. Die geldigheid van hierdie en ander argumente oor of en hoe die

EU moet betrokke kan slegs getoets word deur die bestudering van die verskillende Islamistiese bewegings en

hul politieke omstandighede, land vir land.

Demokratisering is 'n sentrale tema van die EU se algemene optrede in die buiteland, soos gelê

uiteengesit in artikel 11 van die Verdrag oor die Europese Unie. Baie van die state het hierin besin

verslag is nie demokraties nie, of nie heeltemal demokraties nie. In die meeste van hierdie lande, Islamiste

partye en bewegings vorm 'n beduidende opposisie teen die heersende regimes, en

in sommige vorm hulle die grootste opposisieblok. Europese demokrasieë moes lankal

hanteer regerende regimes wat outoritêr is, maar dit is 'n nuwe verskynsel om te druk

vir demokratiese hervorming in state waar die mees waarskynlike begunstigdes kan hê, van die

EU se standpunt, verskillende en soms problematiese benaderings tot demokrasie en sy

verwante waardes, soos minderheids- en vroueregte en die oppergesag van die reg. Hierdie aanklagte is

dikwels teen Islamitiese bewegings gelê, daarom is dit belangrik vir Europese beleidmakers om

'n akkurate beeld te hê van die beleide en filosofieë van potensiële vennote.

Ervarings van verskillende lande is geneig om te suggereer dat hoe meer vryheid Islamitiese

partytjies word toegelaat, hoe meer gematig is hulle in hul optrede en idees. In baie

gevalle islamistiese partye en groepe het lankal weggedraai van hul oorspronklike doel

van die stigting van 'n Islamitiese staat onder die Islamitiese wet, en het basiese beginsels aanvaar

demokratiese beginsels van verkiesingskompetisie om mag, die bestaan ​​van ander politieke

mededingers, en politieke pluralisme.

Islamitiese partye : deelname sonder krag

Malika Zeghal

Oor die afgelope twee dekades, sosiale en politieke bewegings wat hul ideologieë begrond in verwysings na Islam, het probeer om wettige politieke partye in baie lande van die Midde-Ooste en Noord-Afrika te word. Sommige van hierdie Islamitiese bewegings is gemagtig om wettiglik aan verkiesingskompetisie deel te neem. Onder die bekendstes is Turkye se Justisie en Ontwikkelingsparty (Die Oseaan), wat 'n parlementêre meerderheid in 2002 en het sedertdien die regering gelei. Marokko se eie Party van Geregtigheid en Ontwikkeling (PJD) is sedert die middel wettig- 1990s en beveel 'n beduidende blok setels in die Parlement. In Egipte, die Moslem-broederskap (MB) is nog nooit gemagtig om 'n politieke party te stig nie, maar ten spyte van staatsonderdrukking het dit suksesvol kandidate as nominale onafhanklikes in beide nasionale en plaaslike verkiesings gevoer.
Sedert die vroeë 1990's, hierdie tendens het hand aan hand gegaan met amptelike beleide van beperkte politieke liberalisering. Saam, die twee tendense het gelei tot 'n debat oor die vraag of hierdie bewegings verbind is tot "demokrasie." 'n Groot literatuur het ontstaan ​​​​om die paradokse te onderstreep, sowel as die moontlike risiko's en voordele van die insluiting van Islamitiese partye in die verkiesingsproses. Die hoofparadigma wat in hierdie skrywe gevind word, fokus op die gevolge wat kan inhou wanneer Islamiete demokratiese instrumente gebruik, en poog om die “ware” bedoelings wat Islamiete sal manifesteer as hulle aan bewind kom, te verkondig.

die 500 mees invloedryke Moslems

John Esposito

Ibrahim Kalin

Die publikasie wat jy in jou hande het, is die eerste van wat ons hoop jaarlikse reeks sal wees wat 'n venster bied in die beweegaars en skud van die Moslemwêreld. Ons het daarna gestreef om mense te beïnvloed wat invloedryk is as Moslems, dit is, mense wie se invloed afkomstig is van hul beoefening van Islam of uit die feit dat hulle Moslem is. Ons dink dat dit waardevolle insig gee in die verskillende maniere waarop Moslems die wêreld beïnvloed, and also shows the diversity of how peopleare living as Muslims today.Influence is a tricky concept. Its meaning derives from the Latin word influensmeaning to flow-in, wys op 'n ou astrologiese idee wat ongesiene kragte het (like themoon) beïnvloed die mensdom. The figures on this list have the ability to affect humanitytoo. In a variety of different ways each person on this list has influence over thelives of a large number of people on the earth. Die 50 most influential figuresare profiled. Hul invloed kom van 'n verskeidenheid bronne; however they areunified by the fact that they each affect huge swathes of humanity.We have then broken up the 500 leiers in 15 kategorieë-wetenskaplike, Politiese,administratiewe, geslag, predikers, Vroue, jeug, filantropie, Ontwikkeling,Wetenskap en tegnologie, Kuns en Kultuur, Media, radikale, International IslamicNetworks, and Issues of the Day—to help you understand the different kinds ofways Islam and Muslims impact the world today.Two composite lists show how influence works in different ways: InternationalIslamic Networks shows people who are at the head of important transnationalnetworks of Muslims, and Issues of the Day highlights individuals whoseimportance is due to current issues affecting humanity.

Beyond Post-Islam

Ihsan Yilmaz


With the increased international prominence of Turkey and its successful and internationallyrespected AK Party government, the Academia’s attention has focused on the Turkish Islamistexperience. Turkey had already been seen as an almost unique case as far Islam-state-secularismdemocracyrelations were concerned but the recent transformation of Turkish Islamism coupledwith the global turmoil in the post-9/11 world has made the Turkish case much more important.While Turkish Islamists’ recent transformation that has brought about their rise to the power hasbeen applauded at home and abroad, there are relatively very few studies that analyze theirtransformation by taking into account the unique experience of Turkish Islamism starting from the18th & 19th centuries’ Ottoman secularization, Young Ottomans of the 1860s and the Ottomanconstitutionalism and democracy. Verder, some dynamics that affected the change in theTurkish Islamists’ Islamic normative framework have not been analyzed in detail. Dus, this studyendeavors to analyze the main factors behind the newly emerged tolerant normative framework ofthe AK Party leaders who were formerly Islamists. After showing that there are good historicalreasons arising from the Ottoman experience of secularism and democracy and arguing based on abrief theoretical discussion of the plurality of Islamisms, it argues that the Turkish Islamism hasalways differed from the other Islamist experiences. Daarom, in this study, a detailed evaluationof the Turkish Islamist experience starting from the Young Ottomans is undertaken. Toe, thispaper attempts to show that Islamic groups’ physical and discursive interaction has been a crucialfactor in the Turkish Islamism’s transformation. Main premise of this paper is that the Gülenmovement has been the most influential factor that has helped the AK Party leaders to develop amore tolerant normative framework and to eventually jettison their Islamism. It is of coursedifficult to establish casual relationship between two social phenomena but one can underscorecorrelations. As the main hypothesis is that the Gülen movement has been the most influentialfactor in the normative transformation of the former Islamists’ mental frameworks and theirreligio-political worldviews, this paper provides a comparative discourse analysis betweenFethullah Gülen’s and Islamists’ ideas on several issues that have been relevant for both Islamismand newly-emerged post-Islamism. To identify these relevant issues (secularism, pluralism,demokrasie, rule of law, nationalism, state, Islam, religiosity, the other, borders and dialogue),the paper provides a brief theoretical discussion of Islamism and post-Islamism that will also helpthe reader to understand the fundamental differences between Islamism and the Gülenian thought.

ISLAMIESE MODERNITEITE: FETHULLAH GULEN en KONTEMPORÊRE ISLAM

Ere Mes

The Nurju movement1, being the oldest moderate Islamist movement which is probably peculiar to Modern Turkey, was broken into several groups since Said Nursi, the founder of the movement, passed away in 1960. At the present time, there are more than ten nurcu groups with different agendas and strategies. Despite all their differences, today the Nurju groups seem to acknowledge each other’s identity and try to keep a certain level of solidarity. Theplace of the Fethullah Gulen group within the Nurju movement, egter, seems to be a bit shaky.Fethullah Gulen (b.1938) split himself, at least in appearance, from the overall Nurju movement in 1972 and succeeded in establishing his own group with a strong organizational structure in the 1980’s and the 90’s. Due to the development of its broad school network both in Turkey and abroad2, his group attracted attention. Those schools fascinated not only Islamist businessmen and middle classes but also a large number of secularist intellectuals and politicians. Although it originally emerged out of the overall Nurju movement, some believe that the number of the followers of the Fethullah Gulen group is much larger than that of the total of the rest of the nurju groups. Tog, there seems to be enough reason to think that there was a price to pay for this success: alienation from other Islamist groups as well as from the overall Nurju movement of which the Fethullah Gulen group3 itself is supposed to be a part.

Progressiewe Islamitiese denke, burgerlike samelewing en die Gulen beweging in die nasionale konteks

Greg Barton

Fethullah Gülen (born 1941), or Hodjaeffendi as he is known affectionately by hundreds of thousands of people in his native Turkey and abroad, is one of the most significant Islamic thinkers and activists to have emerged in the twentieth century. His optimistic and forward-looking thought, with its emphasis on self development of both heart and mind through education, of engaging proactively and positively with the modern world and of reaching out in dialogue and a spirit of cooperation between religious communities, social strata and nations can be read as a contemporary reformulation of the teachings of Jalaluddin Rumi, Yunus Emre, and other classic Sufi teachers (Michel, 2005a, 2005b; Saritoprak, 2003; 2005a; 2005b; Unal and Williams, 2005). Meer spesifiek, Gulen can be seen to be carrying on where Said Nursi (1876-1960), another great Anatolian Islamic intellectual, left off: chartinga way for Muslim activists in Turkey and beyond to effectively contribute to the development of modern society that avoids the pitfalls and compromises of party-political activism and replaces the narrowness of Islamist thought with a genuinely inclusive and humanitarian understanding of religion’s role in the modern world (Abu-Rabi, 1995; Markham and Ozdemir, 2005; Vahide, 2005, Yavuz, 2005a).