RSSが付けられているすべてのエントリー: "ヨーロッパ"

イラクと政治的イスラムの未来

ジェームスPiscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?」, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, 世俗主義, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

ヨーロッパのモスクをめぐる紛争

Stefanoさんの学生

As the reader will immediately see, the present study is the only one in the series not to have a general point of reference. Instead of addressing a broad issue such as places of worship, it focuses right from the outset on a single issue: the question of mosques, which is identified as a separate issue with its own specific characteristics.
This approach faithfully reflects the current state of affairs, as we will demonstrate in the pages below. Although forms of discrimination on the basis of religion are not completely absent – in particular, cases of discrimination towards certain minority religions or religious beliefs, some of which have even come before the European courts – in no country and in no other case has the opening of places of worship taken on such a high profile in the public imagination as the question of mosques and Islamic places of worship. With the passage of time, the question of mosques has led to more and more frequent disputes, debates, conflicts and posturing, even in countries where such conflicts were previously unknown and mosques were already present. This simple fact already puts us on a road that we might define as ‘exceptionalism’ with reference to Islam: a tendency to see Islam and Muslims as an exceptional case rather than a standard one; a case that does not sit comfortably with others relating to religious pluralism, と
which therefore requires special bodies, actions and specifically targeted reactions, unlike those used for other groups and religious minorities, と (as in the present study) specific research. 8 Conflicts over mosques in Europe An example of this exceptionalism is seen in the forms of representation of Islam in various European countries, which vary from case to case but differ, 特に, with respect to the recognized practices of relations between states and religious denominations in general. The most symbolic case is the creation in various countries, such as France, スペイン, Belgium and Italy, of collective bodies of Islamic representation, with forms that often contradict the principles of non‑interference in the internal affairs of religious communities proclaimed and enshrined for other denominations and religious minorities. Forms of exceptionalism from a legal, political and social perspective are, しかし、, present in many other fields, following a pervasive trend which affects countries with the widest range of state structures and which appears to be in a phase of further growth.
This situation, together with the increasingly evident emergence into the public arena of the dynamics of a conflict involving Islam (a kind of conflict in which the construction of mosques is the most frequent and widespread cause of disagreement), led to a desire to analyse recent cases of conflict, including clashes in countries that are regarded as peripheral within the European Union (ME) また
that lie beyond its borders. このために, we have chosen, contrary to the usual practice, to pay closest attention to the least studied and analysed countries, for which scientific literature is least abundant. Setting off on this supposition, we believe that meaningful data for the interpretation of broader dynamics may emerge from an extensive analysis of the frequency and pervasiveness of these conflicts, which are also affecting countries with a long history of immigration and are more generally affecting the relationship between Islam and Europe.For this reason we conducted a set of empirical investigations across seven European countries that are among the least studied and least known in this respect. We selected three Mediterranean countries which in certain respects vary greatly from one another: two countries in similar situations, where there is new immigration from Muslim countries and the memory of ancient historical domination (Spain and Italy); and one in which there is new immigration
from Muslim countries along with a significant historical Islamic presence (the memory of Turkish Ottoman domination) that poses a number of problems (Greece). Also chosen were two countries which have a very significant historical Islamic presence but which also face a number of new problems (Austria and Bosnia‑Herzegovina); the Nordic country with the largest Islamic presence (Sweden); and a central European country which has a long history of immigration and a particular institutional nature (ベルギー). The last of these is also notable for its markedly local management of conflicts, which from a methodological perspective makes it an interesting control group.

イスラム政治文化, 民主主義, 人権

て、Daniel E. 価格

イスラム教の権威を容易にすることを主張してきました, と矛盾する

西洋社会の価値観, 重要な政治的成果に大きく影響します

イスラム諸国では. この結果, 学者, コメンテーター, と政府

当局者はしばしば「イスラム原理主義」を次のように指摘します

自由民主主義に対するイデオロギーの脅威. このビュー, しかし、, 主に基づいています

テキストの分析について, イスラム政治理論, およびアドホック研究

個々の国の, 他の要因を考慮しない. それは私の主張です

イスラム教のテキストと伝統, 他の宗教のものと同じように,

さまざまな政治システムや政策をサポートするために使用できます. 国

具体的で記述的な研究は、私たちが役立つパターンを見つけるのに役立ちません

イスラム教と政治の間のさまざまな関係を説明します

イスラム世界の国々. したがって、, の研究への新しいアプローチ

イスラームと政治のつながりが求められている.
私は提案します, イスラームとの関係の厳密な評価を通じて,

民主主義, と国を超えたレベルでの人権, それが多すぎる

政治力としてのイスラムの力に重点が置かれている. 私が最初に

比較ケーススタディを使用する, 相互作用に関連する要因に焦点を当てています

イスラムグループと政権の間, 経済的影響, 民族の劈開,

と社会の発展, の影響の分散を説明する

8カ国の政治に関するイスラム教.

イスラム野党とEUの婚約の可能性

トビーアーチャー

ハイディHuuhtanen

イスラム世界におけるイスラム主義運動の重要性の高まりに照らして、

世紀の変わり目以来、急進化が世界的な出来事に影響を与えてきた方法, それ

EUにとって、大まかになり得る範囲内の関係者に対する政策を評価することは重要です。

「イスラム世界」と呼ばれる. 従事するかどうか、そしてどのように従事するかを尋ねることは特に重要です

さまざまなイスラム教徒グループと.

これはEU内でも物議を醸しています. 一部の人々は、イスラムの価値観は

イスラム主義政党の背後にあるのは、単に民主主義の西洋の理想と両立せず、

人権, 他の人は、成長のためにエンゲージメントを現実的な必要性と見なしています

イスラム主義政党の国内的重要性と国際への関与の高まり

事務. もう一つの見方は、イスラム世界の民主化が進むだろうということです

ヨーロッパの安全保障. かどうか、そしてどのように

EUが関与すべきであるのは、さまざまなイスラム主義運動を研究することによってのみテストすることができ、

彼らの政治的状況, 国ごと.

民主化は、EUの一般的な外交政策行動の中心的なテーマです, 敷設されたように

記事に出て 11 欧州連合条約. これで考慮される州の多く

レポートは民主的ではありません, または完全に民主的ではない. これらの国のほとんどで, イスラム教徒

政党と運動は、一般的な政権に対する重大な反対を構成します, と

いくつかでは、彼らは最大の野党ブロックを形成します. ヨーロッパの民主主義は長い間しなければならなかった

権威主義的な統治体制に対処する, でも押すのは新しい現象です

最も可能性の高い受益者がいる可能性のある州の民主的改革のために, から

EUの見解, 民主主義とその

関連する値, マイノリティや女性の権利、法の支配など. これらの料金は

しばしばイスラム主義運動に反対する, したがって、ヨーロッパの政策立案者にとって重要なのは

潜在的なパートナーの方針と哲学を正確に把握する.

さまざまな国からの経験は、より自由なイスラム主義者を示唆する傾向があります

パーティーは許可されています, 彼らの行動や考えがより穏健である. 多くの中

イスラム教徒の政党やグループが当初の目的から遠ざかっていた事例

イスラム法に準拠したイスラム国家の樹立, ベーシックを受け入れるようになりました

権力をめぐる選挙競争の民主主義の原則, 他の政治の存在

競合他社, と政治的多元論.

イスラムRADICALISATION

序文
リチャード・ヤングス
マイケル・エマーソン

政治的イスラムに関連する問題は、中東と北アフリカにおけるヨーロッパの外交政策に課題を提示し続けています (中東北アフリカ). EUの政策は、過去10年ほどの間にそのような課題に対処しようとしてきたため、政治的イスラム自体が進化してきました。. 専門家は、政治的イスラムの中で増大する複雑さと多様な傾向を指摘している. 一部のイスラム主義組織は、民主主義の規範へのコミットメントを強化し、平和に完全に従事しています, 主流の国政. 他の人々は暴力的な手段に縛られたままです. そしてさらに他の人々はより静かな形のイスラム教に向かって流れてきました, 政治活動から解放された. MENA地域の政治的イスラム教は、ヨーロッパの政策立案者に統一された傾向を示していません. 分析的な議論は、「急進化」の概念を中心に成長しました. これにより、「脱ラジカル化」を推進する要因に関する研究が生まれました。, 逆に, 「再急進化」. 複雑さの多くは、これら3つの現象すべてが同時に発生しているという広く支持されている見解に由来しています。. 用語自体も争われています. 穏健と過激な二分法では、政治的イスラム内の傾向のニュアンスを完全に捉えることができないことがしばしば指摘されています。. 一部のアナリストはまた、「急進主義」の話がイデオロギー的にロードされていると不平を言っています. 用語のレベルで, 私たちは過激主義に関連する急進化を理解しています, しかし、その宗教的原理主義者と政治的内容の中心性については見解が異なります, 暴力に訴える意欲が暗示されているかどうかについて.

そのような違いは、イスラム主義者自身が持っている見解に反映されています, だけでなく、部外者の認識.

それがポリシーです, 愚かな

ジョンL. エドワーズ

US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. ブッシュ. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. しかし、, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, テロ, and peace in the Middle East.

Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. したがって、, 例えば, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.

In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?


ヨーロッパのイスラム教徒の隣人の間の旅行

JoostはLagendijk

01マリヌスウィアーズマ

「連合を取り巻く友人の輪 […], モロッコからロシアへ」。, 遅くに 2002, 当時の欧州委員会委員長, ロマーノプローディ, の計画された拡大に続いてヨーロッパが直面している主要な課題を説明しました 2004. 加盟プロセスは勢いを増していた, 中央ヨーロッパの旧共産主義国は安定していて、民主主義に変貌していました. EU加盟国は、拡大の範囲を超えた国々の直接の議題ではありませんでした, しかし、. ヨーロッパはどのようにして国境に新たな境界線が形成されるのを防ぐことができるでしょうか? 欧州連合はどのようにして安定性を保証できるでしょうか, その境界に沿った安全と平和? これらの質問は、おそらくEUの南部の隣人に最も関係がありました. 以来 11 9月 2001, 特に, イスラム世界との関係には切迫感が染み込んでいます. 地中海に隣接するイスラムの隣国の政治的発展は、ヨーロッパの安全保障に多大な影響を与える可能性があります. エリアは近くですが, 政治的距離は大きい. 「文明の衝突」についての脅迫的な言葉の中で, EUは、調停と協力という結論をすぐに引き出しました, 対立ではなく, その南の隣人に対処するための最良の戦略を構成しました.

ベルギーのムスリム同胞団

スティーブマーリー,
上級アナリスト


The Global Muslim Brotherhood has been present in Europe since 1960 when SaidRamadan, the grandson of Hassan Al-Banna, founded a mosque in Munich.1 Since that time,Brotherhood organizations have been established in almost all of the EU countries, as well asnon-EU countries such as Russia and Turkey. Despite operating under other names, some ofthe organizations in the larger countries are recognized as part of the global MuslimBrotherhood. 例えば, the Union des Organizations Islamiques de France (UOIF) isgenerally regarded as part of the Muslim Brotherhood in France. The network is alsobecoming known in some of the smaller countries such as the Netherlands, where a recentNEFA Foundation report detailed the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in that country.2Neighboring Belgium has also become an important center for the Muslim Brotherhood inEurope. A 2002 report by the Intelligence Committee of the Belgian Parliament explainedhow the Brotherhood operates in Belgium:“The State Security Service has been following the activities of the InternationalMuslim Brotherhood in Belgium since 1982. The International MuslimBrotherhood has had a clandestine structure for nearly 20 年. The identityof the members is secret; they operate in the greatest discretion. They seek tospread their ideology within the Islamic community of Belgium and they aimin particular at the young people of the second and third generation ofimmigrants. In Belgium as in other European countries, they try to take controlof the religious, social, and sports associations and establish themselves asprivileged interlocutors of the national authorities in order to manage Islamicaffairs. The Muslim Brotherhood assumes that the national authorities will bepressed more and more to select Muslim leaders for such management and,この文脈では, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.

ヨーロッパのムスリム同胞団

のTは、マーシャルBrigi
Shumuliyyat al-islam (Islam as encompassing every aspect of life) is the first of twenty principles laid out by the
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, ハッサンアルバンナ, to teach his followers the proper understanding
of Islam. Even though this principle, usually translated as the “comprehensive way of life,” still remains integral
to the teachings of the members of the Brotherhood, both in Egypt and in Europe, it is strangely enough
neither commented upon in scholarly references nor by the wider public. When the Federation of Islamic
Organizations in Europe (FIOE, representing the Muslim Brotherhood movement at the European level) presented the European Muslim Charter to the international press in January 2008, none pinpointed this “universal dimension” of their understanding of Islam despite the potential tensions or even incompatibilities, both political and
legal, that this concept might have on a discourse on integration and citizenship. What do the Muslim Brothers traditionally say about this concept and how do they justify their call for it? What are its constituents
and the scope of its application? Are there any significant modifications to the concept in attempting to contextualize it within a pluralist Europe?

ヨーロッパのムスリム同胞団の征服

ロレンツォVidino


創業以来 1928, ムスリム同胞団 (Hizb al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) has profoundly influenced the political life of the Middle East. Its motto is telling: “Allah is our objective. 預言者は私たちのリーダーです. The Qur’an is our law. ジハードは我々の方法です. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.

While the Brotherhood’s radical ideas have shaped the beliefs of generations of Islamists, over the past two decades, it has lost some of its power and appeal in the Middle East, crushed by harsh repression from local regimes and snubbed by the younger generations of Islamists who often prefer more radical organizations.

But the Middle East is only one part of the Muslim world. Europe has become an incubator for Islamist thought and political development. 1960年代初頭から, Muslim Brotherhood members and sympathizers have moved to Europe and slowly but steadily established a wide and well-organized network of mosques, charities, and Islamic organizations. Unlike the larger Islamic community, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ultimate goal may not be simplyto help Muslims be the best citizens they can be,” but rather to extend Islamic law throughout Europe and the United States.[2]

Four decades of teaching and cultivation have paid off. The student refugees who migrated from the Middle East forty years ago and their descendants now lead organizations that represent the local Muslim communities in their engagement with Europe’s political elite. Funded by generous contributors from the Persian Gulf, they preside over a centralized network that spans nearly every European country.

These organizations represent themselves as mainstream, even as they continue to embrace the Brotherhood’s radical views and maintain links to terrorists. With moderate rhetoric and well-spoken German, オランダ, and French, they have gained acceptance among European governments and media alike. Politicians across the political spectrum rush to engage them whenever an issue involving Muslims arises or, more parochially, when they seek the vote of the burgeoning Muslim community.

だが, speaking Arabic or Turkish before their fellows Muslims, they drop their facade and embrace radicalism. While their representatives speak about interfaith dialogue and integration on television, their mosques preach hate and warn worshippers about the evils of Western society. While they publicly condemn the murder of commuters in Madrid and school children in Russia, they continue to raise money for Hamas and other terrorist organizations. Europeans, eager to create a dialogue with their increasingly disaffected Muslim minority, overlook this duplicity. The case is particularly visible in Germany, which retains a place of key importance in Europe, not only because of its location at the heart of Europe, but also because it played host to the first major wave of Muslim Brotherhood immigrants and is host to the best-organized Brotherhood presence. The German government’s reaction is also instructive if only to show the dangers of accepting Muslim Brotherhood rhetoric at face value, without looking at the broader scope of its activities.