が付けられているすべてのエントリー: "ヨーロッパ"
イラクと政治的イスラムの未来
ジェームスPiscatori
ヨーロッパのモスクをめぐる紛争
Stefanoさんの学生
イスラム政治文化, 民主主義, 人権
て、Daniel E. 価格
イスラム野党とEUの婚約の可能性
トビーアーチャー
ハイディHuuhtanen
イスラムRADICALISATION
政治的イスラムに関連する問題は、中東と北アフリカにおけるヨーロッパの外交政策に課題を提示し続けています (中東北アフリカ). EUの政策は、過去10年ほどの間にそのような課題に対処しようとしてきたため、政治的イスラム自体が進化してきました。. 専門家は、政治的イスラムの中で増大する複雑さと多様な傾向を指摘している. 一部のイスラム主義組織は、民主主義の規範へのコミットメントを強化し、平和に完全に従事しています, 主流の国政. 他の人々は暴力的な手段に縛られたままです. そしてさらに他の人々はより静かな形のイスラム教に向かって流れてきました, 政治活動から解放された. MENA地域の政治的イスラム教は、ヨーロッパの政策立案者に統一された傾向を示していません. 分析的な議論は、「急進化」の概念を中心に成長しました. これにより、「脱ラジカル化」を推進する要因に関する研究が生まれました。, 逆に, 「再急進化」. 複雑さの多くは、これら3つの現象すべてが同時に発生しているという広く支持されている見解に由来しています。. 用語自体も争われています. 穏健と過激な二分法では、政治的イスラム内の傾向のニュアンスを完全に捉えることができないことがしばしば指摘されています。. 一部のアナリストはまた、「急進主義」の話がイデオロギー的にロードされていると不平を言っています. 用語のレベルで, 私たちは過激主義に関連する急進化を理解しています, しかし、その宗教的原理主義者と政治的内容の中心性については見解が異なります, 暴力に訴える意欲が暗示されているかどうかについて.
そのような違いは、イスラム主義者自身が持っている見解に反映されています, だけでなく、部外者の認識.
それがポリシーです, 愚かな
ジョンL. エドワーズ
US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. ブッシュ. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. しかし、, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.
As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, テロ, and peace in the Middle East.
Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. したがって、, 例えば, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.
In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?
ヨーロッパのイスラム教徒の隣人の間の旅行
JoostはLagendijk
「連合を取り巻く友人の輪 […], モロッコからロシアへ」。, 遅くに 2002, 当時の欧州委員会委員長, ロマーノプローディ, の計画された拡大に続いてヨーロッパが直面している主要な課題を説明しました 2004. 加盟プロセスは勢いを増していた, 中央ヨーロッパの旧共産主義国は安定していて、民主主義に変貌していました. EU加盟国は、拡大の範囲を超えた国々の直接の議題ではありませんでした, しかし、. ヨーロッパはどのようにして国境に新たな境界線が形成されるのを防ぐことができるでしょうか? 欧州連合はどのようにして安定性を保証できるでしょうか, その境界に沿った安全と平和? これらの質問は、おそらくEUの南部の隣人に最も関係がありました. 以来 11 9月 2001, 特に, イスラム世界との関係には切迫感が染み込んでいます. 地中海に隣接するイスラムの隣国の政治的発展は、ヨーロッパの安全保障に多大な影響を与える可能性があります. エリアは近くですが, 政治的距離は大きい. 「文明の衝突」についての脅迫的な言葉の中で, EUは、調停と協力という結論をすぐに引き出しました, 対立ではなく, その南の隣人に対処するための最良の戦略を構成しました.
ベルギーのムスリム同胞団
スティーブマーリー,
上級アナリスト
The Global Muslim Brotherhood has been present in Europe since 1960 when SaidRamadan, the grandson of Hassan Al-Banna, founded a mosque in Munich.1 Since that time,Brotherhood organizations have been established in almost all of the EU countries, as well asnon-EU countries such as Russia and Turkey. Despite operating under other names, some ofthe organizations in the larger countries are recognized as part of the global MuslimBrotherhood. 例えば, the Union des Organizations Islamiques de France (UOIF) isgenerally regarded as part of the Muslim Brotherhood in France. The network is alsobecoming known in some of the smaller countries such as the Netherlands, where a recentNEFA Foundation report detailed the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in that country.2Neighboring Belgium has also become an important center for the Muslim Brotherhood inEurope. A 2002 report by the Intelligence Committee of the Belgian Parliament explainedhow the Brotherhood operates in Belgium:“The State Security Service has been following the activities of the InternationalMuslim Brotherhood in Belgium since 1982. The International MuslimBrotherhood has had a clandestine structure for nearly 20 年. The identityof the members is secret; they operate in the greatest discretion. They seek tospread their ideology within the Islamic community of Belgium and they aimin particular at the young people of the second and third generation ofimmigrants. In Belgium as in other European countries, they try to take controlof the religious, social, and sports associations and establish themselves asprivileged interlocutors of the national authorities in order to manage Islamicaffairs. The Muslim Brotherhood assumes that the national authorities will bepressed more and more to select Muslim leaders for such management and,この文脈では, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.
ヨーロッパのムスリム同胞団
ヨーロッパのムスリム同胞団の征服
ロレンツォVidino
創業以来 1928, ムスリム同胞団 (Hizb al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) has profoundly influenced the political life of the Middle East. Its motto is telling: “Allah is our objective. 預言者は私たちのリーダーです. The Qur’an is our law. ジハードは我々の方法です. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”
While the Brotherhood’s radical ideas have shaped the beliefs of generations of Islamists, over the past two decades, it has lost some of its power and appeal in the Middle East, crushed by harsh repression from local regimes and snubbed by the younger generations of Islamists who often prefer more radical organizations.
But the Middle East is only one part of the Muslim world. Europe has become an incubator for Islamist thought and political development. 1960年代初頭から, Muslim Brotherhood members and sympathizers have moved to Europe and slowly but steadily established a wide and well-organized network of mosques, charities, and Islamic organizations. Unlike the larger Islamic community, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ultimate goal may not be simply “to help Muslims be the best citizens they can be,” but rather to extend Islamic law throughout Europe and the United States.[2]
Four decades of teaching and cultivation have paid off. The student refugees who migrated from the Middle East forty years ago and their descendants now lead organizations that represent the local Muslim communities in their engagement with Europe’s political elite. Funded by generous contributors from the Persian Gulf, they preside over a centralized network that spans nearly every European country.
These organizations represent themselves as mainstream, even as they continue to embrace the Brotherhood’s radical views and maintain links to terrorists. With moderate rhetoric and well-spoken German, オランダ, and French, they have gained acceptance among European governments and media alike. Politicians across the political spectrum rush to engage them whenever an issue involving Muslims arises or, more parochially, when they seek the vote of the burgeoning Muslim community.
だが, speaking Arabic or Turkish before their fellows Muslims, they drop their facade and embrace radicalism. While their representatives speak about interfaith dialogue and integration on television, their mosques preach hate and warn worshippers about the evils of Western society. While they publicly condemn the murder of commuters in Madrid and school children in Russia, they continue to raise money for Hamas and other terrorist organizations. Europeans, eager to create a dialogue with their increasingly disaffected Muslim minority, overlook this duplicity. The case is particularly visible in Germany, which retains a place of key importance in Europe, not only because of its location at the heart of Europe, but also because it played host to the first major wave of Muslim Brotherhood immigrants and is host to the best-organized Brotherhood presence. The German government’s reaction is also instructive if only to show the dangers of accepting Muslim Brotherhood rhetoric at face value, without looking at the broader scope of its activities.