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Mahmoud Ezzat nunha ampla entrevista con Ahmed Mansur de Al Jazeera

Mahmoud Ezzat

Dr. Mahmud Ezzat, Secretario xeral dos Irmáns Musulmáns, nunha ampla entrevista con Ahmed Mansour, de Al Jazeera, asegurou que as eleccións para presidente dos Irmáns Musulmáns que os membros da Mesa de Orientación están a realizar no próximo período están abertas a todos os que desexen presentar os seus documentos de candidatura como candidato..

Na súa declaración ao talk show Bila Hedood (Sen Fronteiras) é Al-Jazeera TV, Ezzat explicou que os documentos de nominación xeralmente non deben usarse para os candidatos dos Irmáns Musulmáns, senón que se presenta unha lista completa do Consello Shura de 100 membros da Irmandade para elixir o presidente e a Mesa de Orientación da Irmandade.. Negou que a Guía Xeral da Irmandade para o liderado do Consello Xeral de Shura non lle permita a liberdade de traballar por conta propia na toma da súa decisión final.. Tamén revelou que o Consello ten a facultade de responsabilizar ao presidente por calquera incumprimento e, se é necesario, destituílo en calquera momento..

Subliñou que o movemento está preparado para facer o sacrificio definitivo para practicar o principio da Shura (consulta) dentro das filas de, sinalando que o Consello de Shura elixirá o presidente e unha nova Mesa de Orientación no próximo ano.

Comentou a cobertura dos medios do que realmente aconteceu entre bastidores na Oficina de Orientación, citando que o comité que estaba formado por figuras destacadas como o Dr. Essam el-Erian e varios membros da Mesa de Orientación responsables de imprimir a declaración semanal do presidente opuxéronse ao Sr.. O desexo de Mahdi Akef dunha pequena diferenza de opinións. O primeiro mandato de Akef rematará en xaneiro 13, 2010 con todo o anunciou anteriormente; aínda tomará unha decisión sobre se permanecerá no cargo un segundo mandato como guía xeral do grupo.

Continuou dicindo que Akef, de 81 anos, informou antes aos membros da Mesa de Orientación que tiña intención de dimitir e que non ocupará un segundo mandato.. Os membros da Mesa responderon inmediatamente instándoo a seguir no seu cargo.

Na súa mensaxe semanal, Mahdi Akef referiuse vagamente ás súas intencións de non presentar un segundo mandato e agradeceu aos Irmáns Musulmáns e aos membros da Mesa de Orientación que compartiron con el a responsabilidade coma se quixese que fose o seu discurso de despedida.. O domingo, Outubro 17 os medios aseguraron que o presidente da Confraría anunciara a súa dimisión; con todo, o presidente negou repetidas veces as acusacións dos medios de que acudiu á oficina ao día seguinte e se reuniu cos membros. Posteriormente emitiu un comunicado no que divulgou a verdade. Alegacións dos medios sobre a falta de vontade da Oficina de Orientación para nomear ao Dr. Essam el-Erian son totalmente falsos.

Dr. Mahmoud Ezzat asegurou que o movemento ten o pracer de ofrecer aos membros a oportunidade de compartir as súas opinións, salientar que é unha manifestación de poder que coincide co seu gran tamaño e papel protagonista existentes, indicando que o presidente dos Irmáns Musulmáns está moi satisfeito de facelo.

Subliñou que todas as cuestións volven ao Gabinete de Orientación para a decisión final onde as súas resolucións sexan vinculantes e satisfactorias para todos., independentemente das diferenzas de opinión.

“Non subestimo o que xa pasou ou simplemente diría que non hai crise, ó mesmo tempo, non debemos explotar as cousas do seu contexto, estamos decididos a aplicar o principio de Shura”, engadiu.

Comentouse anteriormente na reunión posterior da Mesa de Orientación que o Consello de Shura do grupo ten o dereito exclusivo de elixir como membro da Mesa de Orientación a calquera membro., explicou. Dr. O propio Essam coincidiu en que non era conveniente nomear un novo membro na Mesa de Orientación da Irmandade xa que as eleccións estaban próximas..

Ezzat afirmou que o episodio foi presentado ao Consello Shura por recomendación da oficina de orientación no medio de frecuentes arrestos e detencións realizadas pola seguridade do Estado.. Esforzámonos moito para involucrar ao Consello de Shura para escoller o próximo presidente e os membros da Oficina de Orientación. Espérase que todo o asunto estea resolto, Deus quere, antes de xaneiro 13.

Nesta reunión o presidente e os membros da Mesa de Orientación de MB decidiron enviar unha carta ao Consello de Shura., salientando que a data destas eleccións non será posterior aos sextos meses. Supoñíase que os trámites se levarían a cabo antes ou durante as eleccións nas que 5 os novos membros foron elixidos o ano pasado. É unha decisión do Consello Shura e non da Mesa de Orientación de MB. En consecuencia, o Consello da Shura do grupo xeral chegou finalmente á súa decisión unánime de celebrar eleccións canto antes.

Destacou que os Irmáns Musulmáns, coa aplicación da Shura está organizada polo seu regulamento interno. Regulamentos que son adoptados e defendidos polas leis do Consello Shura e están suxeitos a cambios. A modificación máis recente en curso cunha das súas cláusulas é a duración do mandato dun membro do Gabinete de Orientación establece que un membro non debe desempeñar máis de dous mandatos consecutivos..

Algúns membros do Gabinete de Orientación foron acusados ​​da súa adhesión a permanecer no cargo durante moitos anos; Dr. Ezzat afirmou que as frecuentes detencións que non excluían a ninguén da Mesa do Executivo incitaron a modificar outro artigo do Regulamento interno que prevé que un membro manteña a súa condición de membro aínda que fose detido.. A ausencia dos honrados traballando polo benestar do seu país e a sublime misión levounos a insistir en que manteñan a súa adhesión.. O enxeñeiro Khayrat Al-Shater permanecerá como segundo vicepresidente do MB e o Dr. Mohammed Ali Bishr un membro da Mesa Executiva de MB. Espérase que Bishr sexa lanzado o próximo mes.

Dr. Mahmoud Ezzat negou completamente os rumores sobre conflitos internos dentro do grupo da oposición no que se refire ao liderado, salientando que os mecanismos, os regulamentos e os termos están abrindo o camiño para seleccionar os líderes do movemento. Tamén sinalou que a situación xeográfica de Exipto e o considerable peso moral dentro do mundo musulmán xustifican a necesidade de que o presidente do MB sexa exipcio..

“A Oficina de Orientación está a explorar a tendencia xeral do Consello de Shura da Irmandade, formado por 100 membros, no que se refire a nomear un candidato axeitado para asumir o cargo de presidente.”, el dixo.

“É moi difícil prever quen será o próximo presidente, notando que 5 minutos antes do nomeamento do Sr. Akef como presidente ninguén o sabía, as papeletas só decidiron quen sería o novo líder”, el dixo.

Dr. Mahmoud Ezzat atribuíu os aparentes informes conflitivos dos medios sobre as súas acusacións sobre comentarios sobre os principais dirixentes da Irmandade ás mesmas inconsistencias dos informes dos medios sobre altos dirixentes que varían dun xornal a outro..

Dr. Mahmoud Ezzat arroxou luz con cifras sobre as redadas de seguridade que levaron á detención dalgúns 2696 membros do grupo en 2007, 3674 en 2008 e 5022 en 2009. Isto provocou a incapacidade do Consello de Shura para celebrar reunións e concorrer ás eleccións.

Tamén subliñou que os Irmáns Musulmáns están moi interesados ​​en manter a seguridade nacional de Exipto e a súa’ interese por lograr unha reforma pacífica da sociedade. “Sabemos ben que as reunións da Oficina de Orientación están vixiadas pola seguridade aínda que só pretendemos practicar a democracia. Centrais, non queremos provocar a hostilidade e animosidade dos demais”.

Tamén subliñou que as diferenzas dentro da organización non están motivadas polo odio ou as diferenzas persoais, xa que os temperamentos decentes fomentados polas sublimes ensinanzas do Islam nos animan a tolerar as diferenzas de opinións.. Engadiu que a historia demostrou que o movemento dos Irmáns Musulmáns atopou circunstancias moito máis difíciles que a crise existente..

Os medios proxectaron unha imaxe negativa dos Irmáns Musulmáns onde se apoiaron nas investigacións do SSI para obter información. É imperativo que os xornalistas obteñan feitos das fontes orixinais se queren ter algún tipo de credibilidade. De feito o poder xudicial invalidou todas as acusacións denunciadas na investigación estatal, el dixo.

Dr. Mahmoud Ezzat mostrouse optimista de que a crise política actual pasará, afirmando que os acontecementos demostrarán que os Irmáns Musulmáns con todas as súas nobres maneiras, obxectividade, e a práctica da democracia brillará con nota.

Publicado o Ikhwanweb

Dissenting Brothers

Founded in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has never experienced a leadership crisis as serious as that which erupted two weeks ago. As is now well-known, the problem originated with the refusal on the part of the MB’s Guidance Bureau (the organisation’s highest executive body) to accept Essam El-Erian as a member to replace Mohamed Hilal following the latter’s death four weeks ago. It was a clear act of defiance against Supreme Guide Mohamed Mahdi Akef who wanted to promote El-Erian and who maintained that the MB’s internal regulations gave him that right. In response to the refusal Akef has threatened to resign and designated most of his powers to his first deputy, Mohamed Habib.
Of course, the crisis goes much deeper than the question of El-Erian’s promotion. This is not the first time the supreme guide has encountered resistance. The problem is rooted in the way the MB handles its internal disputes and in its reading of the Egyptian political scene as it touches upon the organisation’s image and activities. Although in the course of the past two decades the MB has managed to deal clearly and firmly with internal opposition, disciplining and marginalising dissenters, it has signally failed to benefit from any intellectual and ideological diversity among its ranks. As a consequence, it has forfeited an important political asset which it desperately needs in its confrontations with adversaries.
The tensions in the upper echelons of the MB hierarchy are too sharp to be swept under the carpet in the usual way. The supreme guide has set himself against the will of the conservative wing of the leadership over the promotion of El-Erian, whom he believes deserves a chance to serve on the Guidance Bureau. But regardless of what actions he takes, including the threat to resign, there are unmistakable signs that he will be unable to reign in the conservatives. Since becoming head of the movement in January 2004 Akef has worked hard to maintain smooth relations between the different ideological trends within the MB. Almost always, con todo, his efforts have come at the expense of the reformists or pragmatists, whether because of the relative weakness of their influence within the organisation compared to the conservatives or because he feared a rift that would render the organisation vulnerable to the regime’s political and security tactics.
That tensions have reached their current pitch is due to the brewing conflict over the succession to the office Akef now holds. In March Akef announced that he did not intend to nominate himself for a new term, which would begin on 13 January. His decision marked the first time in the group’s history that a supreme guide has voluntarily stepped down at the height of his career. All six of his predecessors died while still in office. Akef’s unprecedented and, apparently, unexpected decision, triggered an initially silent power struggle over who would fill his post. Interestingly, the struggle has not been between conservatives and reformists, but rather between hardliners and pragmatists inside the conservative camp.
The current situation is significant for several reasons. Rarely have internal differences bubbled over into public view. This time, con todo, the main players have been vying ferociously for media attention.
Then there is Akef’s threat, subsequently denied, that he would resign. That Akef should have been driven to such a step reflects the magnitude of the pressures and anger he has faced during his nearly six-year long tenure. Having served as the keel between diverse trends, Akef’s threat must reflect his sense of failure at checking the conservativeshegemony over all the organisation’s bodies and decision-making mechanisms.
That Akef has delegated many of his powers to his first deputy is also unprecedented, as well as being in violation of the group’s internal regulations. Article 6 of the MB’s charter states that the supreme guide can leave his post under three conditionspoor performance of his duties, resignation or death. Since none of these conditions obtains Akef had no right to delegate his responsibilities to his first deputy.
The crisis has thrown into relief a major problem in the MB’s constitutional structure, the lack of an institutionalised arbitrating authority capable of settling disputes between the supreme guide and the Guidance Bureau. It has also demonstrated that many of the group’s internal taboos regarding reverence for, and uncritical obedience to, its leaders have cracked.
The MB leadership will undoubtedly attempt to resolve the crisis as quickly as possible, so that it does not spread through the movement’s rank and file. For this reason, the MB’s General Shura Council will hold elections for the next supreme guide within the next couple of weeks. Even so, it is doubtful that the new leader will enjoy the same level of prestige as his predecessors and will, as a consequence, be hampered in any attempts to maintain equilibrium inside the group. Neither the MB’s Secretary- General Mahmoud Ezzat, or First Deputy to the Supreme Guide Mohamed Habib, the two leading contenders for the post, have the historical legitimacy of Akef, the last of the MB’s founding generation.
But the election of the next supreme guide is not the only problem with which the MB must contend. No less important, or problematic, is the need to elect a new Guidance Bureau. The current bureau was elected in 1995, since which time some members have been added through promotion, as was the case with Mohamed Mursi who became chairman of the political committee in 2004, and others by means of the partial elections in 2008. Comprehensive elections to the bureau should have been held a year ago, following the election of the new MB Shura Council which is responsible for selecting the members of the Guidance Bureau and the supreme guide.
The MB is entering a very delicate phase in its history. Even if MB leaders manage to smooth over the current crisis, its effects will continue to reverberate beneath the surface and, undoubtedly, erupt once again.

Khalil Al-anani

Esam

Founded in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has never experienced a leadership crisis as serious as that which erupted two weeks ago. As is now well-known, the problem originated with the refusal on the part of the MB’s Guidance Bureau (the organisation’s highest executive body) to accept Essam El-Erian as a member to replace Mohamed Hilal following the latter’s death four weeks ago. It was a clear act of defiance against Supreme Guide Mohamed Mahdi Akef who wanted to promote El-Erian and who maintained that the MB’s internal regulations gave him that right. In response to the refusal Akef has threatened to resign and designated most of his powers to his first deputy, Mohamed Habib.

Of course, the crisis goes much deeper than the question of El-Erian’s promotion. This is not the first time the supreme guide has encountered resistance. The problem is rooted in the way the MB handles its internal disputes and in its reading of the Egyptian political scene as it touches upon the organisation’s image and activities. Although in the course of the past two decades the MB has managed to deal clearly and firmly with internal opposition, disciplining and marginalising dissenters, it has signally failed to benefit from any intellectual and ideological diversity among its ranks. As a consequence, it has forfeited an important political asset which it desperately needs in its confrontations with adversaries.

The tensions in the upper echelons of the MB hierarchy are too sharp to be swept under the carpet in the usual way. The supreme guide has set himself against the will of the conservative wing of the leadership over the promotion of El-Erian, whom he believes deserves a chance to serve on the Guidance Bureau. But regardless of what actions he takes, including the threat to resign, there are unmistakable signs that he will be unable to reign in the conservatives. Since becoming head of the movement in January 2004 Akef has worked hard to maintain smooth relations between the different ideological trends within the MB. Almost always, con todo, his efforts have come at the expense of the reformists or pragmatists, whether because of the relative weakness of their influence within the organisation compared to the conservatives or because he feared a rift that would render the organisation vulnerable to the regime’s political and security tactics.

That tensions have reached their current pitch is due to the brewing conflict over the succession to the office Akef now holds. In March Akef announced that he did not intend to nominate himself for a new term, which would begin on 13 January. His decision marked the first time in the group’s history that a supreme guide has voluntarily stepped down at the height of his career. All six of his predecessors died while still in office. Akef’s unprecedented and, apparently, unexpected decision, triggered an initially silent power struggle over who would fill his post. Interestingly, the struggle has not been between conservatives and reformists, but rather between hardliners and pragmatists inside the conservative camp.

The current situation is significant for several reasons. Rarely have internal differences bubbled over into public view. This time, con todo, the main players have been vying ferociously for media attention.

Then there is Akef’s threat, subsequently denied, that he would resign. That Akef should have been driven to such a step reflects the magnitude of the pressures and anger he has faced during his nearly six-year long tenure. Having served as the keel between diverse trends, Akef’s threat must reflect his sense of failure at checking the conservativeshegemony over all the organisation’s bodies and decision-making mechanisms.

That Akef has delegated many of his powers to his first deputy is also unprecedented, as well as being in violation of the group’s internal regulations. Article 6 of the MB’s charter states that the supreme guide can leave his post under three conditionspoor performance of his duties, resignation or death. Since none of these conditions obtains Akef had no right to delegate his responsibilities to his first deputy.

The crisis has thrown into relief a major problem in the MB’s constitutional structure, the lack of an institutionalised arbitrating authority capable of settling disputes between the supreme guide and the Guidance Bureau. It has also demonstrated that many of the group’s internal taboos regarding reverence for, and uncritical obedience to, its leaders have cracked.

The MB leadership will undoubtedly attempt to resolve the crisis as quickly as possible, so that it does not spread through the movement’s rank and file. For this reason, the MB’s General Shura Council will hold elections for the next supreme guide within the next couple of weeks. Even so, it is doubtful that the new leader will enjoy the same level of prestige as his predecessors and will, as a consequence, be hampered in any attempts to maintain equilibrium inside the group. Neither the MB’s Secretary- General Mahmoud Ezzat, or First Deputy to the Supreme Guide Mohamed Habib, the two leading contenders for the post, have the historical legitimacy of Akef, the last of the MB’s founding generation.

But the election of the next supreme guide is not the only problem with which the MB must contend. No less important, or problematic, is the need to elect a new Guidance Bureau. The current bureau was elected in 1995, since which time some members have been added through promotion, as was the case with Mohamed Mursi who became chairman of the political committee in 2004, and others by means of the partial elections in 2008. Comprehensive elections to the bureau should have been held a year ago, following the election of the new MB Shura Council which is responsible for selecting the members of the Guidance Bureau and the supreme guide.

The MB is entering a very delicate phase in its history. Even if MB leaders manage to smooth over the current crisis, its effects will continue to reverberate beneath the surface and, undoubtedly, erupt once again.

Published On Al-ahram Weekly