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EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (НДП) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Иако ће ово вероватно бити продужено, постепени процес, режим треба да предузме прелиминарне кораке да нормализује учешће браће Муслимана у политичком животу. Муслиманска браћа, чије су друштвене активности дуго биле толерисане али је улога у формалној политици строго ограничена, освојио невиђено 20 одсто посланичких места у 2005 избори. Они су то урадили упркос томе што су се такмичили за само трећину расположивих места и упркос значајним препрекама, укључујући полицијску репресију и изборну превару. Овај успех је потврдио њихову позицију као изузетно добро организоване и дубоко укорењене политичке снаге. Истовремено, наглашавала је слабости и легалне опозиције и владајуће странке. Режим би се могао кладити да би скромно повећање парламентарне заступљености браће Муслимана могло бити искоришћено за подстицање страха од исламистичког преузимања власти и тиме послужити као разлог за одуговлачење реформи. Ако је тако, стратегија је у великом ризику од повратних резултата.

Islamic Political Culture, Демократија, and Human Rights

Даниеле. Цена

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, however, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,

can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the

connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,

democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM

SHADI HAMID

АМАНДА КАДЛЕЦ

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, Сједињене Америчке Државе. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Слично томе, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ЕНП) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. САД. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. У међувремену, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (ПЈД), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. Додатно, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

Islamist Parties : participation without power

Malika Zeghal

Over the last two decades, social and political movements grounding their ideologies in references to Islam have sought to become legal political parties in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Some of these Islamist movements have been authorized to take part lawfully in electoral competition. Among the best known is Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won a parliamentary majority in 2002 and has led the government ever since. Morocco’s own Party of Justice and Development (ПЈД) has been legal since the mid- 1990s and commands a significant bloc of seats in Parliament. In Egypt, муслиманска браћа (МБ) has never been authorized to form a political party, but in spite of state repression it has successfully run candidates as nominal independents in both national and local elections.
Since the early 1990s, this trend has gone hand-in-hand with official policies of limited political liberalization. Together, the two trends have occasioned a debate about whether these movements are committed to “democracy.” A vast literature has sprung up to underline the paradoxes as well as the possible risks and benefits of including Islamist parties in the electoral process. The main paradigm found in this body of writing focuses on the consequences that might ensue when Islamists use democratic instruments, and seeks to divine the “true” intentions that Islamists will manifest if they come to power.

Демократија, Terrorism and American Policy in the Arab World

Ф. Грегори Гаусе

The United States has embarked upon what President Bush and Secretary of State Rice has called a “generational challenge” to encourage political reform and democracy in the Arab world. The Bush Administration and other defenders of the democracy campaign contend that the push for Arab democracy is not only about spreading American values, but also about insuring American security. They hypothesize that as democracy grows in the Arab world, anti-American terrorism from the Arab world will decline. Стога, the promotion of democracy inthe Arab world is not only consistent with American security goals in the area, but necessary to achieve those goals.
Two questions present themselves in considering this element of the “Bush Doctrine” in the Arab world: 1) Is there a relationship between terrorism and democracy such that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? Другим речима, is the security rationale for democracy promotion in the Arab world based on a sound premise?; и 2) What kind of governments would likely be generated by democratic elections in Arab countries? Would they be willing to cooperate with the United States on important policy objectives in the Middle East, not only in maintaining democracy but also on
Arab-Israeli, Gulf security and oil issues?
This paper will consider these two questions. It finds that there is little empirical evidence linking democracy with an absence of or reduction in terrorism. It questions whether democracy would reduce the motives and opportunities of groups like al-Qa’ida, which oppose democracy on both religious and practical grounds. It examines recent trends in Arab public opinion and elections, concluding that while Arab publics are very supportive of democracy, democratic elections in Arab states are likely to produce Islamist governments which would be much less likely to cooperate with the United States than their authoritarian predecessors.

Hamas can set an example

Кхадер Кхадер

Perhaps the single most important aspect of Hamasoverwhelming victory in Palestinian Legislative Council elections last month is that it was the first time in the contemporary history of the Middle East that democracy was exercised for real without any direct external or internal interference. The ramifications of such free elections may well reverberate around the region for years to come and might mark a new phase in the geopolitical map of the Middle East.
This, however, was not the first time an Islamic political party showed its popularity at the ballot box. Algeria’s Islamic Front appeared headed to certain victory in elections in the mid-1990s before external intervention on the part of the “демократски” West and its allies in Algiers nipped that experience in the bud. In Algeria, the result of burying democracy has been an extremely bloody conflict that still drags on, much to the embarrassment of western countries, which prefer not to comment. For the ordinary citizen in the Arab world, it was an experience that only added to the sense of oppression and frustration felt in every corner of the region.
Thus Hamaselectoral victory has sparked widespread hope among the Arab masses that they have another chance to find out if an Islamic party can rule better than the current regimes in the Arab world. Хамас, in this sense, carries the hopes of millions of Arabs and Muslims all over the world.
But with such expectations comes a time fraught with danger. Hamas and the way it runs matters in the Palestinian territories can set a very interesting example: if it succeeds; if it proves it can run Palestinian affairs more transparently and to the benefit of more ordinary Palestinians than previously, while at the same time managing tough negotiations with Israel, the experience will encourage other Islamic movements in the Arab world to use it as an example to convince their citizens that Islamic political movements are a viable alternative.
But if Hamas fails in its difficult and challenging task, the setback will strike a devastating blow to all Islamic movements and parties in the region. A Hamas failure could perhaps send the entire region into another period of political wilderness akin to the era after the failure of the pan-Arabists.
Тако, Hamas in power is an interesting and illuminating phenomenon, and one that will be followed closely by all concerned parties. According to a leading Hamas figure in Khan Yunis, др. Younis al-Astal, the International Muslim Brotherhood has already expressed its readiness to assist Hamas with all the needed expertise to make it succeed in its mission. The Brotherhood will of course be the principal benefactor of any Hamas success.
By the same token, however, the West may feel itself forced now to exert all possible efforts to make Hamas fail even if the movement proves successful in meeting the needs of the people. The issue in question here is not how efficient a government is but how loyal a government shows itself to be to the West. This is the measure the West has generally used to assess the Middle East, where billions of US dollars have been spent on keeping Arab regimesmoderate and realistic”, especially in relation to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
There is a curious parallel to the Cold War now in the dynamic that is developing between the West and the Muslim world. During the Cold War, the West was confident that democracy would bring the Eastern Bloc to its knees and forcefully spread the message that individual freedom and the right to vote were human rights par excellence.
Now, however, that same message is likely to backfire on the West. If real elections were held in Egypt and Jordan, it is highly likely that Muslim Brotherhood movements would come to power and cast into doubt the peace treaties between those countries and Israel, in which the West has invested so much effort.
Everyone knows that democracy comes at a cost in the Middle East. Is the world ready to engage in this game? The key is likely to be the success or otherwise of Hamas, which is operating under extremely adverse conditions. Arabs and Muslims across the region, so often let down by political promise from various quarters, may well be disappointed again. But in the meantime their hopes are with a political movement that is posing the first serious challenge in decades to Arab regimes everywhere.

2005 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION ASSESSMENT IN EGYPT

INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE

With President Hosni Mubarak’s surprise announcement to amend the constitution and to hold the first direct, multi-candidate presidential elections in September of this year, it appeared that the Egyptian government had made political reform a priority
and was committed to opening the door to greater political competition. The presidential election initially held symbolic significance and the promise of setting the stage for further reform and greater citizen participation. Међутим, whether this symbolic step toward expanded democratic participation can be characterized as the start of a genuine democratic transition leading to a sustained system of democracy
remains in doubt. The 2005 parliamentary election process suggests otherwise.
The three rounds of parliamentary elections in November and December 2005 appear to have been deeply flawed and will be most remembered for escalating tension over each successive round and outright violence resulting in 12 deaths. Overt intimidation cast a menacing shadow over the second and third phases of elections in particular, and low voter turnout—as with the presidential election—was a notable feature that underscored continued citizen apathy in the political process. Vote buying
was also rampant. Yet despite this, it must be noted that open campaigning for opposition candidates was permitted and that some important procedural changes were made as a result of complaints emerging from the presidential election. Свеукупно, the parliamentary elections seem to indicate that government policies have left the secular opposition extremely weak. Although Egypt does provide for political party engagement—a positive attribute in a region where political parties are not always allowed—the lack of genuine political competition is a pervasive problem that constitutes a major impediment to sustained democratic change.
The most notable features that shaped the electoral environment for parliamentary elections were the fracture and competition between official National Democratic Party-endorsed candidates and those not selected who ran as independents; the inevitable weakness of the secular opposition parties as a result of emergency laws that limited development; and the ability of the Muslim Brotherhood to campaign
freely and demonstrate its strength on the ground despite its status as an illegal
organization.
The new parliament, comprised of a majority of NDP members, the near absence of opposition party members, and a solid minority bloc of independents affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood will present a new challenge for the regime and leave democratic reformers uncertain as to their future.

The Hamas Victory in the Palestinian Elections

Riaz Hassan

The parliamentary election triumph of Hamas surprised almost everybody, including the Hamas leadership, if the press reported correctly. The Bush Administration is blaming its intelligence services for failing to predict Hamas’ victory. Most observers forecast that Fatah would win theelections because of its political dominance in Palestinian affairs. Why, then, did most politicalobservers in the West get it so wrong? This political miscalculation will be the subject of much analysis and commentary in the coming months.A number of specific local issues delivered Hamas its historic electoral victory. Credit must goto the Palestinian people, who turned out to be astute voters. A significant number of Palestinians were simply unable to accept the corruption and cronyism that allegedly flourished under the Palestinian Authority led by Fatah. While most Palestinians remember well and admire the sacrifices made by Fatah leaders in the past, they were simply deterred by their in ability to institute political and economic reforms to better the lives of ordinary people. Hamashad a much better reading of the Palestinian political pulse. It was not difficult for Hamas to doso: Hamas delivers health, educational and social services to large numbers of Palestinians,making daily life bearable.Unlike Fatah, which had several candidates contesting the same constituency, resulting in asplitting of Fatah’s votes, Hamas ran an extremely disciplined political campaign. Hamas alsomade use of its female supporters, sending them door-to-door to canvass voters and to pollingstations to campaign for Hamas’ candidates. These election strategies obviously worked in Hamas’ favor. Hamas has also amassed political capital through its resistance and military campaigns against the Israeli occupation. It was these actions which led to Hamas’ being labelled and treated as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union andseveral other western countries. In a political environment in which ordinary Palestinians feelcompletely powerless, Hamas’ acts of resistance and tough rhetoric gave Palestinians a senseof empowerment that may well be the reason for its electoral victory over its opponents.

Egypt’s Local Elections Farce Causes and Consequences

Мохаммед Херзаллах

Амр Хамзави

Egypt’s local elections of April 8, 2008 were a confirmation of a backwardslide in Egyptian politics. They were plagued by social unrest and politicaldiscord. In the weeks prior to the elections, labor protests escalated,precipitating a harsh crackdown that resulted in at least two fatalities and many injuries.The country’s largest opposition force, муслиманска браћа, decided at the last minute to boycott the elections. Voter turn out did not exceed 5 percent and the ruling National Democratic Party (НДП),facing virtually no competition, landed a sweeping victory—winning roughly95 percent of the seats at stake.These developments bring to light a broader deterioration in Egyptian politics.Three elements of this process stand out and deserve careful attention:

Први, the burgeoning social crisis caused by out of control inflation, acrippled welfare system, and persistent unemployment;

• Second, a return to the old authoritarian practices of the rulingestablishment; и

• Third, worrying signs that call into question the very existence of aviable opposition capable of advancing reform through the political process.

Egypt in Prophecy

Брад Мацдоналд

Муслиманска браћа, though officially banned, is now Egypt’s largest and most influential opposition party. This signals a stunning shift within one of America’s few remaining Middle Eastern allies.December 2005 was a water shedmonth in the history of Egyptian politics. Thanks to elections thatwere closer to being democratic than any in Egypt’s history, the Islamic party of the Muslim Brotherhood (mb)won 88 parliamentary seats (the organization is officially out lawed, but it ran its candidates as independents)—a more than six-fold increase over its previous representation.Considering that Egypt’s parliament is comprised of 454seats, the mb’s capture of 88 seats—fewer than a quarter of the total—may not seem like much to write home about.Despite the gains,the Islamic partywill remain out numbered by the majority rule of autocratic leader Hosni Mubarak’sN a t i o n a lDemocratic Party.Some argue that as long as Mubarak controls parliament—as he hasfor the past 24years—the mb can never play a more significant role in Egyptian politics.But politics can be messy business—especially in the Middle East.Death, incitement, revolution—all can turn a governmenT on its head in a matter of days. The rise of an openly Islamist party in Egypt is no small matter. The political success Of this long-established Islamic group represents a major step toward a fundamental shift in Egyptian politics, made possible by an electorate with a growing affinity for Islamic leadership and law, and mounting disdain for the Mubarak government.Political Shift Banned from government in 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood is an organization of staunch Islamic conservatives with a strong desire to install Islamic law as the foundation of Egyptian government.In the run up to the elections,the Brotherhood’s ominously vague campaign motto was “Islam is the solution.”Thu s , the Brotherhood ’s rising popularity unmistakably signalsthe growingdesire of many foran Islamic governmentin Egypt—which makes itssuccess nothingshort of profound.“Considering thatthe mb won almosthalf of the seatsit is contesting,despite reportedly wide spread

Успех Муслиманске браће на законодавним изборима у Египту 2005

Ноха Антар


У контексту невиђеног отварања политичког система у Египту у 2004/2005, муслиманска браћа (МБ) постигао импресиван успех у 2005 законодавни избори који су показали да мејнстрим ненасилни исламистички покрет, упркос законској забрани самог покрета и његовог политичког деловања, је једина утицајна и организована политичка опозиција испред ветеранске Националдемократске партије (НДП).Разлози изборног успеха Муслиманског братства 2005. године Први низ разлога за успех УО везан је за промене које су се десиле у политичком контексту. Изнад свега, први председнички избори који су одржани у септембру 2005 имао директан утицај на парламентарне изборе у новембру исте године: Отварањем конкурса за место председника, избори су сигнализирали невиђен ћорсокак режима који покушава да закрпи свој легитимитет. Додатно, Појавили су се грађански протестни покрети који су много фундаменталније одбацивали политички систем и позивали на свеобухватне реформе. Најважнији од њих је био динамични протестни покрет под називом Египатски покрет за промене, Кифаиа. Међутим, као други скуп фактора, сам режим се такође може сматрати фактором у растућем утицају МБ: НДП и владини званичници су се у великој мери ослањали на верске аргументе; они су угњетавали секуларне или либералне противнике; они су неговали мрачне верске трендове у Ал-Азхару и међу верским групама; и пустили су УО да преузме бригу о социјалним службама како би уштедели на државном буџету. Такође, режим је дозволио исламистичким активистима да уђу у синдикате, уз задржавање лидерских позиција за НДП. Постоји трећи низ разлога за успех МБ који је повезан са дугорочном стратегијом покрета за изградњу друштвене базе: Стратешки приступ МБ је био да инвестира у социјалне услуге како би се изградила велика база моћи међу становништвом коју су у стању да политички мобилишу. И заиста, не само да су многи кандидати за УО стекли кредибилитет и поштовање кроз свакодневне контакте са људима, покрет улаже у друштвену сферу више од 30 године. У друштву у коме 40 проценат становништва живи испод границе сиромаштва и стопа политичког учешћа је само 25 проценат, пружање услуга у свим виталним секторима – образовању, здравље, и запошљавање – показало се као најбржи и најуспешнији начин да се придобију присталице. Четврто, коришћење верске сфере као места политичке мобилизације била је успешна стратегија УО. Они који су повезани са МБ, чланова и симпатизера, често је сматрао да је гласање за кандидата покрета верска обавеза. Упркос недоумицама, слоган „Ислам је решење“ изазвао је међу многима, УО је наставио да га користи јер је желео да се фокусира на религију као одлучујући фактор за гласање, и зато што је стекао поверење народа као покрет који представља исламски идентитет. На врху овог, покрет је био у стању да искористи невиђену подударност растућих унутрашњих и спољних притисака на режим, отпочињањем отвореног и директног политичког деловања у име покрета. УО је такође схватио важност окупљања са другим опозиционим снагама, и тражио је координацију са овим снагама за стварање већег притиска на режим. С тим у вези је још један важан фактор за успех МБ: свој организациони капацитет.Да ли је УО променио свој дневни ред и приоритете?Док је УО одлучио да мирно учествује у политичком процесу у Египту, остаје нејасно да ли представља истинску демократску снагу или ће искористити демократско отварање да следи ауторитарну агенду. Још увек, учешће у политичком систему већ је трансформисало покрет. Током 2005 у изборној кампањи концепти „демократије“ и „политичког учешћа“ нашли су се у реторици УО и, најважније, у своје политичке стратегије стварања локалних мрежа за подршку јавности. Искуство израде политичког програма за законодавне изборе нагнало је покрет да јавно разјасни своје ставове о концептима као што је партијски плурализам – нешто што је раније одбијано у неким токовима исламске мисли као „ал-тахаззуб“ (партизанство) са аргументом да ислам позива на јединство нације, а не на њену фрагментацију. МБ се може сматрати делом египатских реформских снага, али то је првенствено зато што се слаже са другим политичким реформаторима о алатима за спровођење реформи: владавина права, добро управљање и слободни избори. Досадашње активности УО у парламенту показале су њихову посвећеност служењу својим бирачима и очувању кредибилитета. Они су ефикаснији у решавању јавних потреба, у откривању случајева корупције и у брзој интеракцији са жртвама неправде од осталих посланика. Као што је горе речено, политичке промене у Египту до сада нису значиле значајан помак ка демократији. Први, ово се одразило на организацију УО, стратегија и дневни ред. „Рефлекс обостраног страха“ као резултат односа између илегалних МБ и режима захтевао је од покрета да усвоји стратегију тајности која их спречава да буду транспарентни из безбедносних разлога. Такође, Одржавање двосмислених позиција је одбрамбени механизам који користе и исламистичке и неисламистичке опозиционе снаге у Египту.